Army’s problems: administration, counteroffensive, will Syrskyi replace Zaluzhnyi?
This stream is entirely dedicated to the problems of the army. First of all, I would like to congratulate all military personnel, those who served in the army, especially those who are serving now, on the Day of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. I would like to express my gratitude to the Ukrainian soldiers who gave their lives and lost their health during this great war for independence. (Stream was held on December 6)
This is a special day for us. In fact, the Armed Forces Day is like Independence Day for Ukraine. Where our army stands, Ukraine stands. There are no words to describe what the Armed Forces do to protect Ukraine, to describe all the sacrifice and heroism that is simply massive. And it is the army that is the core of defense and the core of our state. I think that we all feel this especially acutely now, every minute of every day. That's why I decided to dedicate this stream today to the problems in the army that immediately require systemic solutions.
The need for systemic changes is now being discussed by everyone in power, including people's deputies, politicians, and society. Most of all, the military speaks about the need for changes in the army. The same people who are holding the frontline, who are destroying the enemy every day, and those holy people, infantrymen, real heroes, who are holding that thin blue line of our frontline in small holes they dig for themselves, protecting us from the Russian invasion. In the cold, in very difficult conditions, under surveillance and constant attacks by Russian drones, under constant shelling by artillery, tanks, and all types of weapons. The price of every day when we have no changes is a certain number of lives. A significant number of lives. Therefore, changes are necessary. Changes are overdue.
ARMY REFORM. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT?
I will briefly describe the problems that, in my opinion, need to be addressed in the state now to immediately save as many Ukrainian lives as possible, to change the situation at the front in our favor as soon as possible.
Then the questions will be answered.
When we talk about problems, we need to understand that the problems of the Armed Forces have a very clear and understandable structure. That is, all of this can be corrected in a very short time, provided that the country's leadership has the political will to change something - this is really a question to which we do not yet know the answer, whether there is such a desire or not. So far, there are words, there is criticism of the army by the ruling Servant of the People party and the army leadership. But we don't see any systemic changes yet. What are systemic changes? Where does the reform begin?
In times of war, the highest decision-making body is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff. It includes all state leaders responsible for defense in their sectors, including the entire leadership of the Armed Forces. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and several other high-ranking officials. This is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office that should make decisions. It is not interviews or Facebook posts that change the structure of the army. It all depends entirely on the decisions of the Supreme Command Staff. Planning begins there.
Second, we are talking about reforms. We have the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Defense. There is a specialized committee on defense, security and intelligence. Changes that need to be formalized in legislation are planned there.
And the third is the representative body of power from the voters. The third is the government of Ukraine. The government includes the Ministry of Defense. The Minister of Defense, at the moment, Mr. Umierov, is the person who is responsible for the formation of defense policy, who is responsible for the state of affairs in the army. So we see that there is a Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He appoints everyone from the bottom up to the power structures in the defense forces. And the government, the Minister of Defense, who is politically responsible for the army as a person politically authorized by the ruling party. And the Verkhovna Rada committee, which receives feedback from voters, from military personnel and forms legislative acts, accumulates all the information.
ABOUT THE RATINGS OF ZALUZNYI AND ZELENSKYY
What do we see now? There are a lot of words that the counteroffensive failed, or the counteroffensive succeeded, Zaluzhnyi should be dismissed, as the servants of the people demand, or Zaluzhnyi should not be dismissed, and there are many other categorical opinions in the parliament and society. There are many words. And, unfortunately, our war is turning into an absolutely political competition. I am very disappointed, very sad that even in the Ukrainian media, the problem of Zaluzhnyi's dismissal is always commented on by sociological ratings, that Zaluzhnyi's rating is higher than Zelenskyy's. And unfortunately, the authorities itself, President Zelenskyy accused Zaluzhnyi of some professional mistakes, perhaps, of organizing hostilities. The president does not touch on any of this. However, the president said that he believes that Zaluzhnyi is engaged in political activity. And this is a violation of the chain of command, President Zelenskyy said in an interview with the British newspaper The Sun. That is, the government itself politicizes to the maximum. I want to say that Zaluzhnyi himself has not yet given any political comments. But he has already been openly accused of politicization by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself, his boss. So we see that we have a very difficult situation. We have a lot of uncertainty. We have war management, which is a serious technological process, and it is being politicized. And unfortunately, we have these political slogans: who is for whom? Are you for Zaluzhnyi or Zelenskyy? Or for Syrskyi? This is how we replace the solution of specific problems with all this. So now I want to formulate a list of the main problems, the basic logic of considering problems in the army, which I would like to hear from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, from the Defense Committee, from the Minister of Defense, which, unfortunately, we do not hear.
Perhaps public opinion - I think that only public opinion can influence the position of the country's leadership. I consider it necessary to formulate this as I see it.
WHO IS MANAGING THE WAR AND HOW?
So the first question that needs to be resolved is the main one. We need to define the procedure for managing the war - who is in charge and how, who is responsible for what. So we do not have a collective farm in our management, which we have now. That is, war management, command, and the appointment of specific positions.
Secondly, the command of the defence forces, the Armed Forces in particular, and the branches of the armed forces, how it should be organized.
The third. Administration of the army. First of all, the Ministry of Defense, Minister Umierov, is responsible for the administration of the Armed Forces. He will soon have 100 days in office.
We will see. We'll also talk about it, and we'll evaluate the activities now. In this administration, the Ministry of Defense is responsible for two key things: the budget, i.e. material resources, and human resources, i.e. people. And how are they mobilized and used? This logic is also the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense forms policy. Before a soldier goes into battle, his process must be administered, managed, how he got there, how he got to this part of the front. All these are policies, documents, regulations.
Next, the fourth. Organization of the troops. How exactly is the army organized? What is the number of military units? Do we need these military units? What is the number of military positions? What is the organizational staffing structure? Who do we need more of? Perhaps attack aircraft, as the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine constantly demands, or perhaps drone operators, which is a position, for example, in the army, and perhaps we need more of them and need staff positions that we have not yet defined.
Fifth. Providing and financing people. That is, the main thing we have is that people move all these guns. This is the main thing. And ensuring the financing of people, the use of people is the main task for which the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, his subordinates, his citizens, his voters - according to the law, this is his responsibility first and foremost, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Minister of Defense.
We have three key people in charge in the highest positions. The highest of them, of course, is Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, was appointed by his decree, and Defense Minister Umierov, was appointed at the request of President Zelenskyy.
Next. Preparation. Mobilization is an integral part, mobilization of administration, planning of mobilization measures - the Ministry of Defense is the first one. But the training of troops, the use of people, the use of people is the main task of the General Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The last element of this system is weapons. So we will now briefly go through everything: management, command, administration, organization, supply, finance, training, armament.
MANAGING THE WAR "LIKE A COLLECTIVE FARM" AND THE DESTROYED VERTICAL COMMAND
Unfortunately, our war management is organized like a collective farm. Unfortunately, there are no clearly defined areas of responsibility. And the main problem of our army is that by the decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, the army has actually destroyed the vertical command. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office has actually divided the active army into two large groups. One group is commanded by the commander of the Land Forces, Syrskyi.
The other unit is commanded directly by the team of Zaluzhnyi, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, to whom Syrskyi is supposed to be subordinate. But in reality, our ground command communicates directly with the President's Office. The President comes directly to Syrskyi, talks to him, communicates with him... he communicates directly with him and he directly resolves his issues with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. President Zelenskyy has also established such direct communication with other military leaders through the head of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Zaluzhnyi. We already know the case when the president appointed the commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Khorenko, without Zaluzhnyi's approval, and Zaluzhnyi's subordinate was appointed to him without Zaluzhnyi's approval,as well as the president dismissed General Khorenko during his interview on live TV without asking the Commander-in-Chief himself.
And then he also appointed a new commander of the Special Operations Forces without asking the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Zaluzhnyi. We have the same appointment in our logistics forces. We have the same appointments, direct communication with the Air Force. That is, the subordination in the army has been virtually destroyed. That is a paradox. In an interview with The Sun, the president says that Zaluzhnyi violates the chain of command, but in fact, what is the chain of command when Zelenskyy himself violates it with his decisions and actions. This has to stop. The system cannot work like this. This is not right. One person should be responsible for the state of war management in the army. This is not a Ukrainian invention, it works all over the world.
A HINT TO ZELENSKYY
There was no such thing as Field Marshal Montgomery, for example, fighting in World War II, and having half the front under his command and half under another general's command, because he could also get Churchill on the phone. This is absurd. There should be one commander-in-chief in the theater of operations. It's a shame. We have a front line, active combat operations are about 800 kilometers. On these 800 kilometers, we have two actual commander-in-chiefs: one for half of the front and the other for half. And each of them is in charge of the army on his own. This is just absurd. In the twenty-first century, how can we approach war management in this way? It is not possible. This has to stop. If President Zelenskyy, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, does not like the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, then I want to suggest to the president that perhaps he has not yet had time to re-read the powers under the Constitution, the law on defense, and national security. It is clearly stated there: the president has to make decisions. If he believes that someone cannot fulfill his duties, the president must raise the issue, and it must be considered by the Security and Defense Council, or the Supreme Command Staff, or the Defense Committee, or the Ministry of Defense. An assessment of the official's actions must be made, a decree issued, and the head of the company must be replaced by appointment. This is an acceptable responsible approach of a manager. But not interviews or Facebook posts. Today, the country's leadership has actually destroyed the chain of command in the army. It is gone, there is competition, conflicts, scandals, and internal squabbles. This is reflected in dozens of details. There is a constant fight for ammunition, who gets the replenishment and where. One operational-strategic group competes with another. There an internal squabbles. This is absurd. You realize that the price of this collective farm-like disorder and chaos at the management level is people's lives. This is not acceptable. Therefore, we need to establish clear responsibility in the management of the war. We need the president to consider the situation and still entrust the management of the war to one person in the army. One commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. One person. Not two, not three, not four. Not to each unit of the army separately. But one person is responsible for the result, for planning actions, the use of troops, and all other aspects of providing ammunition, equipment, and training. And now, what have we achieved?
Try to understand something in the Ministry of Defense. I'll give you some tragicomic examples. For example, these amendments to Order 260, which are known to all military financiers, or the purchase of weapons. You can't find it that way. Every department of the Ministry of Defense - one department nods at the General Staff, the General Staff nods at the Ministry of Defense. The Defense Minister says it's the predecessors. The predecessors say that everything is fine, and the military says that we are not provided with supplies. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief says: I'm not responsible for this, it's them. It's a complete mess. What is the result? We have people who do not know who gets how much money, this order is uncertain and there is complete chaos in these financial calculations. This is happening right now, and the government does not know what to do. There is no planning of solutions. They just create a situation and then start thinking: what to do with it? All this is the result of the fragmentation of governance. We need to create one department in the army.
SYRSKYI VS ZALUZHNYI
Now the main issue that is being discussed. President Zelenskyy is clearly showing that for him, General Syrskyi is an alternative to Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the Commander-in-Chief. Let's ask this question: if Zelenskyy does fulfill his intentions and appoints Syrskyi instead of Zaluzhnyi, this is a striking photo. It was not long ago, during these events, that the president criticized Zaluzhnyi in The Sun, and after that, he demonstratively came and met with General Syrskyi without Zaluzhnyi. That's him. On the right, as usual, Yermak is in the picture.
It is unclear why a person with unspecified powers is looking at military maps and plans. But in the center is General Syrskyi, wearing a helmet. He is the commander of the Land Forces. And the president believes that he is looking at the situation at the front, looking and emphasizing that Syrskyi is close to him. Thank you for this photo. Everything is clear.
I talk to the military who are in one operational-strategic group, where Syrskyi is, and in the other, where, relatively speaking, Zaluzhnyi's people manage. You know, to say that the operational-strategic group with the letter Kh is doing much better than its neighbors, that it has better organization and management, I'm sorry, it's not true. Will such a replacement bring about qualitative changes in the Armed Forces? No, it won't. I'm speaking without judgment of our generals, but I'm frankly absolutely convinced that replacing Zaluzhnyi with General Syrskyi will not lead to any qualitative changes in the management of the troops. In any case, I do not see any qualitative changes, no advantage in the operational-strategic group headed by General Syrskyi over the operational-strategic group headed by a general appointed by Zaluzhnyi, let's say. There are no changes there. We can analyze some individual situations. But I'm sorry, look at the situation in Bakhmut and Soledar, which is a disaster. Have we drawn any conclusions from this? Did we build defensive lines or somehow determine the tasks for the troops concerning the situation? Are there any qualitative differences in the application? I don't see any. I say that this is even a very controversial opinion, where there is better management. This is a debatable issue, not for the air. It needs to be supported by specific examples. We are not talking about this now. But I want to tell you that I don't understand why we need to change it. Then it's just a political change. It's just that one less loyal figure is being replaced by a more loyal one. I thought that during a war, if the president raises the issue, and the defense committee says that he doesn't like the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, the reasons for this should not be political. First, second, and third: here's the responsibility, here's the failure, here's the failure. We exchange it for someone else who will take responsibility for it, who will do this, do that, do that, do that. This is a professional approach to war. Unless, of course, President Zelenskyy is interested in the result, not the process. Well, that's the way it is. So, friends, this is about managing the war. Our problem is that we have no vertical and no figure to whom the president would entrust the entire management of the army. And the fragmentation of management is not about the army, it's some kind of... I don't know. Maybe there are a few accountants in the Kvartal (Quarter). The 95th Kvartal (Quarter) has this management practice: several producers, several directors, several accountants. Each of them puts on their own shows. Each of them holds their own talk shows on the same stage at the same time. But in the army, at the front, it doesn't work like that. We need to change this somehow.
ABOUT AWARDING FRIENDS
Second. Command. The conflict is there. The conflict, and in this conflict the command, is, of course, the problem of what kind of figure should be there to build trust. There must be trust between all service levels. This is the main thing. There must be leadership. Can anyone in this politicized situation be an alternative to Valerii Zaluzhnyi? I want to tell you my view. I will not assess the commander's performance, in fact, there are not only many positive things in the activities of the Armed Forces, but there are also many things that are criticized that are not solved in the army. People do not stay in their positions forever. There can be changes. The President has the right to make changes in the army. But these changes must be justified. What is the alternative? What leaders in the army are now being recruited with war experience and a reputable history? I now see that as a result of this confrontation between army clans that the President's Office has created and that exists, as a result of this confrontation of promotion, any vertical development, the emergence of new commanders at the highest level is virtually impossible. Nowadays, only acquaintances are appointed to positions. The commanders are very controversial. For example, the commander of the 56th Brigade, an old friend of General Syrskyi's, for some reason was awarded the Hero of Ukraine and the rank of brigadier general. Why? I want to tell you that this Hero of Ukraine Silchenko has very controversial management results. They are very controversial. And there is a lot of criticism of his management methods. And it is well-founded, confirmed by video and testimonies of soldiers. So... why this appointment? General Bohomolov is the same, to be honest. I don't quite understand how Soledar is managed there. I'm not interfering in this, of course, and I won't comment on it in detail. But, you know, among many brigade commanders in this area, this general has this surname - Dilnychnyi (District Militia Officer). Because twice a day he holds absolutely incomprehensible telephone meetings, to put it mildly, which are completely far from the needs of military command and control, operational control of troops, and look like some kind of planning meeting in some incomprehensible institution. When everyone listens to a general who is broadcasting something to himself, he listens to everyone. Meanwhile, there is a war going on, and people's time is simply being taken away from them. I'm not talking about planning. For balance, I want to point out that no matter what they say that we are singling something out, the same problems exist in the operational-strategic group and the one that reports to General Tarnavskyi.
He is a person close to Valerii Zaluzhnyi. I mean, who analyzed why, for example, our corps commander, General Zubanych, plans combat operations in this way? How effective was his work on the southern direction when he planned and directed the use of troops? To what extent were his personnel decisions and management decisions justified by the situation? How effectively did he defend Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk, for which he took responsibility? There are a lot of questions about this, mildly speaking. Unfortunately, no one is looking at this. There is no responsibility. Why is there no responsibility? Because of the fight between alignment of forces. When there is a struggle between the alignment of forces, it is no longer measured by who is responsible, who is competent, but by who are you? Who are you for? For Zaluzhnyi or for Syrskyi? That's it. Do you have constant direct communication with the President's Office? Do they call you? Unfortunately, this is the level of management. This is a completely unprofessional approach. The army has to stop with this.
ABOUT DEFENSE MINISTER UMIEROV
Next. administration. Defense Minister Umierov. A new team has come in. I wrote right away that the disadvantage of this team is that, in principle, most of these people, like Minister Umierov himself, have no idea what the army is and its problems. And this is the main problem. Well, okay, it's the president's decision, his responsibility to appoint people from nowhere to responsible positions. Okay. Now let's look at the first results of the work.
I want to say that on the positive side, it should be noted that unlike Reznikov, who simply appointed his supervisors who did what they wanted - contracts, wrote off money, bought unnecessary expensive things, and paid no attention to any statements or appeals - the organization of communication here is still qualitatively different. Umierov is trying not to hide. He is trying to react and respond. These are basically the only things that are really nice to see. This is at least public policy, and not just some person who thinks that if Yermak fits in for me, then I can basically not comment on anything with anyone and not answer anything. That's why there are certain shifts compared to Reznikov. These shifts, in such a short time, if we are talking about real results, unfortunately, are not yet systemic. There are encouraging signs, I would say. Why are there encouraging signs? Because in fact, in our system, the Minister of Defense is not the only figure who has been handed over the responsibility for managing the war. Umierov, in addition to learning how to manage the economy that he has been given, has to fight for authority with the Cabinet of Ministers, the Presidential Office, and a bunch of other ministries and agencies that also have their own piece of authority from the ministries and actually perform functions that are also close to the Ministry of Defense. This is a complicated process. The result of this complex process is that, again, we lack a strategy. The main problem of war management, command and administration is what unites them? All these are consequences of the lack of a war strategy.
WAR PLAN FOR 2024
What kind of war should it be? What kind of war are we preparing our army for, preparing reserves, mobilizing people, buying weapons, asking our allies for weapons: are we fighting in a war, how? Are we constantly attacking or are we building a reliable defense? This is a big and still unsolved problem for us. We do not have a war strategy. The result is that some servants of the people, a few of them, accuse the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, of not having a war plan for the next 2024. This is, I would say, a kind of self-flagellation. I apologize for the war strategy - and the war strategy is based, first of all, on the administration of available resources, calculating how many people you plan to mobilize, how much ammunition to produce, how many weapons to arm. What is the financial support? What kind of training? I'm sorry, all these things are complex and not Zaluzhnyi's responsibility. Zaluzhnyi should be responsible for the operation, the use of troops, and the organization of these troops. But he cannot know how many people the state is mobilizing for him. Because the state adopts laws and regulations for this purpose, and has an enforcement apparatus - the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Border Guard Service, and other structures. There are a lot of enforcement structures. The army itself cannot calculate all this. Someone has to say to the army: we give you the first, second, and third things, and now calculate how you are going to win the war with this. There is no such plan. Where is it? That's why we have this problem.
BUILDING DEFENSIVE LINES
The problem of organization, by the way, also applies to building defensive borders. I mean, it's not for nothing that we've been doing this since the end of the, I don't know, which end? Since the end of 2021, many people have been writing on the Internet all the time: why doesn't Ukraine build defensive borders, unlike Russia?
That is, Russia outnumbers us and is building defensive lines, while we are not. They are well built, with equipment, with concrete floors. The problem is obvious: there is no organization. There is no strategy that defines this organization. On December 1, President Zelenskyy said that we need to build defense lines. December 1 was a few days ago. For the first time during the war, this issue was raised at the highest level. For the first time. Before that, everyone said: it's not us. The Minister of Defense said: not me. The President: not me. The President's office: not us. The military: not us, we don't have the resources, tractors, concrete, specialists. That's it. Now the president has decided. So now we have to start building defense structures in the winter. What can it be like? What quality should it be? In winter...But they talk about it. This is the result of the lack of strategy, the lack of organization that comes from that. In terms of organization, what is important in the army? We are now facing a major crisis. A crisis when we don't have enough assaultmen, but there is a large surplus of military units. Thousands of them. We need a huge apparatus to administer a huge number of military units. First of all, we lack not only people. We do not have enough commanders, not soldiers. We lack commanders. A competent commander spends people more efficiently, destroys the enemy and reduces losses. So instead of changing the command, our main request is to send us people. Give us more mobiks (Newly mobilized soldiers-ed.), more assaultmen. All the assaultmen... this is not the way to fight. And this organization is really a matter not only for the Ministry of Defense but also for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valerii Zaluzhnyi. He is responsible for this.
REDUCTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS
We now have an over-organization, a huge administrative apparatus, a huge number of military units. It is simply difficult to manage even this process. It is very complicated. Competent accountants, financiers, clerks are needed everywhere, and a large number of people are needed in the rear, supply, and communications. It's just a lot of support staff. All this needs to be reviewed and reduced immediately. The administrative part of the army needs to be reduced. We need to provide people with competent commanders. The best soldiers for the best commanders, the best soldiers for the best weapons. We have to build an army at the level of qualitative superiority. And we have nothing about it doctrinally. We have some kind of structure that was chaotically formed without any plan during the war, when dozens of brigades are deployed one after another. And now there is a big problem: how to replenish them? And we have a huge pile of brigades and battalions that are incomplete or have no reserves, no replenishment. Some brigades and battalions have not had any replenishment for a year. People are leaving, but there is no replenishment. Why? Because they created such a large number that it is impossible to administer. This is a big problem. And this is the problem of organizing the army, reducing the number of its organizational structures, simplifying the management system, reducing the number of intermediate management units - this is a very big problem. If we looked at it this way, we would have a different logic for organizing our troops in general. Look how important the organization is. The frontline of active operations is 800 kilometers. We need to provide a certain set of weapons, reconnaissance equipment, drones, guns, tanks to conduct active combat operations on a relatively small active combat part of the front. The main efforts should be concentrated there. Yes, we need some reserves. First of all, these 800 kilometers. And the army needs to be adapted for these 800 kilometers. There must be responsibility. There must be a constant planned supply, replenishment of people with ammunition and equipment. And it should be given to the best-trained units, the best commanders. So that the quality of use is constantly improving. The one who hits the targets better is the one who gets the reward.
I wanted to talk about after-action review, about operational analysis. So, we have problems with the organization, because the right organization determines the right use of human and material resources. And the only way is to reduce the number of military units. Reduce the paperwork, which is simply growing in incredible quantities. Thus, it will be a qualitative change.
ABOUT PAYMENTS
Next. Security and finance. This is a very acute issue. Now we are in a total fire drill. I have written a post-appeal from military financiers who say that now, after the conscientious implementation of new orders and the work of the audit service of the Ministry of Defense, all financial and administrative units in the army are simply paralyzed. Because now, at every level, including in battalions in the combat zone, it is necessary to fill in the forms to determine who exactly fulfilled a combat order and should receive 100 thousand and who should not. This is just absurd. That is, now, in order to receive a higher amount of financial support, a soldier has to run around and make sure that he has properly certified reports that he performed such and such tasks for such and such number of days in such and such position and this is really a worthy decision of the first... such and such additional payments. It's an absurd situation. Just imagine. Now in our artillery, the crew of a cannon or self-propelled artillery unit receives additional payments as for the first line of combat operations - 100 thousand. And the command and observation post that provides data for firing and is closer to the enemy than this cannon, which actually controls the fire, does not receive such additional payments. This is a different, lower category of payment. And all this in one battery, can you imagine? What do the personnel think? We do about the same work as a team, in a well-coordinated manner, but one of us gets more and the other less. Isn't that absurd? Absurd. It is the same now in all combat units. The unit is in the first line. There is a battalion headquarters. There are infantry who are fighting. There are command and control officers. They may be there, it depends on what happens - some of them sit in the basement, while others lead people to positions and manage the battle, take responsibility for the implementation of the command's decisions. Battle management depends on the command staff. And here it starts again. Now we have to prove that so-and-so in such-and-such a battalion should directly receive 100 thousand, and so-and-so should prove that they are entitled to 100 thousand, and all this is required because there is a very complicated list that needs to be provided. Why is this happening? Because we have a bureaucratic system in place, which the audit service of the Ministry of Defense has now begun to carefully check. Without thinking about the consequences. In the army, increasing bureaucratic work and paperwork never leads to fighting corruption, but rather increases corruption. But it definitely creates one thing - problems for the staff, for those people who are far away from this document flow and do not have time. Unfortunately, it is easier for them to be manipulated. Yesterday, after this post, I spoke with representatives of the Ministry of Defense and was assured that soon, Minister Umierov will supposedly address this issue and simplify the reporting that is followed by accruals. And everything will be simplified. My opinion is this. The state really does not have the resources to pay all those increased obligations that were accepted out of fright, without preparation. There is no money in the budget, it's true. The army is big, it takes a lot of money. We need planning. But why do you have to twist people's arms like this? Take responsibility, say so: We can't raise 100 thousand, but we can raise 80 thousand, and it will be done. People will understand. But there is no need to twist arms. It is very difficult to regulate this reporting within one battalion.
In educational units, for example, the number of training hours must be recorded in a separate record book. Why is this necessary? These registers will still be corrupt. Why do this? This is a difficulty for conscientious people. It's not for those who want to cheat. What is my point? Supply is connected to organization, connected to the army's development strategy. If we want to have proper funding, and this is the responsibility of Defense Minister Umierov, first and foremost, we need to not increase audits in each battalion. Instead, we need to create separate... I don't know, to conduct such an audit, we need to hire these auditors for a whole battalion or two for the entire army. And we need to simplify the procedures. The minister should - I apologize for this advice - draw some conclusions from this. What happened in the army, not to increase paperwork, but to reduce it. The less paperwork, the better it is to check and administer. That's what needs to be done. Unfortunately, in our country, everything is getting absurd. And now, when we have created a problem and all military financiers are tearing their hair out because they have queues of claims from people who have been paid, who have not been paid, why are you refusing to pay them. Instead of first thinking and creating a system, they just intensified the audit. I hope that soon, what the representatives of the Ministry of Defense told me will be fulfilled in the coming days. Otherwise, I will have to say and write that for 100 days this is already Minister Umierov's problem. It's not Reznikov's predecessor, it's Umierov who is responsible for this, for the fact that these queues are happening now. The minister should take it, consider the situation, make a decision, simplify reporting, determine how much is clearly spent on whom and make it easier to check. If it's a battalion on the front line, it should be simplified reporting. There is a risk there. Make a separate payment for "soldiers on the front line". This is a very understandable payment. I sincerely believe that anyone, but an infantryman sitting in a hole, hiding from a drone and fighting in close combat, should be paid the maximum. There is a 100 thousand extra payment, 20 thousand - 120 thousand is even the minimum that an infantryman on the front line should receive. Give the rest of them less. But don't play these games. Define a category: so-and-so is in the infantry on the first line - that's it, let's go. And if he is the battalion headquarters, make it a little less. But stop these games. I understand that the Ministry of Defense wants to cut budget expenditures. So do it not with such Jesuit inadequate methods, but do it in a civilized way.
TRAINING OF MOBILIZED PERSONS
Next. Preparation. Training of troops and combat use. These are interconnected processes, and in this process, of course, all of this also requires the high-quality use of people. We have big problems with this. With the use of people. Unfortunately, the situation is not getting better, not getting organized. Poorly trained people are still sent to the front. The second year of the war is coming to an end. Poorly trained people and the impression that it is like February 2022. There is no need for this now, we need to plan mobilization and we need to plan training. These are components of interaction. It is beneficial. It is financially beneficial. Why do we send unprepared people into the meat somewhere, when we can prepare people in six months? They will gain confidence in themselves, in their weapons, in the team, in their comrades, and then they can be sent out. Here again, there is the issue of the inefficiency of our training system, which we have had since the Soviet era, these unnecessary infantry training centers. Training units should be concentrated in brigades directly.
ARMING THE TROOPS
And lastly, weapons are the main component. All this is also part of the strategy of organizing troops. Weapons must be supplied and purchased for the needs of a specific number of military units. We cannot meet all the needs. But at least we can provide 800 kilometers of the frontline, and we need to work on this. To do this, of course, we need to change the organizational and staffing structure of the army. The army needs to use drones in a quality manner.
We still do not have the required number of drone operators in most of the ground forces, airborne assault and other subunits. The army is still fighting, preparing and supplying itself on a kind of residual, I don't know, principle. For some reason, we don't have the required number of drone operators in the infantry, and we always have these positions as freelance positions. And since they are freelance, the army and the state are not responsible for their provision. And we hear such bright reports: the state has now taken all the personal income tax from local authorities, now drones will be used, we are buying drones. At the moment, most of the drones have been bought by volunteers and are still being bought. Nothing has changed. The vast majority. It has even become worse. Unit commanders criticize the government's decision to take personal income tax away from local authorities because local authorities used to give military units up to 50% of personal income tax. And with this money, brigades could buy something for themselves. And battalions. And now what? Where is this money? The state gave nothing to the military units. So they took away personal income tax, the law was adopted. And in November, that's it. But we need to fight. Unfortunately, neither the President's Office nor the Verkhovna Rada, which adopts such laws, is interested in the fact that there is a transition period and the troops need to fight for a few months. We need drones, which the Ministry of Defense has not yet adopted. And for which the General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces have not created the necessary number of operators. But we need to fight. And the army is fighting with drones. And to do all this, the military has to chip in or, as a rule, ask for volunteers and sponsors: please help.
IS THERE AN ADVANTAGE OF RUSSIAN DRONES?
It's the second year of the war. When you arrive at the front, the brigade commander looks at what he has on his tablet, how many Russian drones are flying over the positions. Then he looks at ours. What is the difference? Ours are mostly volunteer drones, which the brigade commander needs to talk to someone every day for a couple of hours, to ask for them and to look for them. Whereas the Russians receive them from the state centrally. This is an item of arms supply that Russia, unfortunately, is increasing. And the enemy has more and more drones every day. And on most of the frontline, the enemy's advantage in drones is already several times greater. And it is growing. And we are still waiting for something to be adopted. To be honest, I have a constant desire to teach our Ministry of Defense, from the heads of finance, lawyers, managers, the Presidential Office, this deputy for defense policy and his very strange staff, Yermak himself, who likes to go to the front in his uniform, people's deputies who say something there - I really want them to go somewhere for one day at least once a year, to be sent in turns, to sit in a hole on the front line with an infantryman who holds the position for one day. The soldier digs the hole himself with a shovel - he has nothing else. He has his own facilities there, he sits there, pulls up a net, watches the drones bombard him, the enemy flying, the artillery, and thinks he won't get hit. I'm sure that in one day, the leadership of the Defense Ministry, the Presidential Office, people's deputies-one day, I'm not talking about constantly, one day of such a real ground zero excursion-change their minds about military policy. They would have made decisions so quickly. Because if they knew that they would be put back in this hole, commenting on Facebook, writing an address in the evening, they have their own lives. They make their own decisions there, and you guys can figure it out for yourselves, fight your own war. I want to tell you that our government is so disconnected from the army that this is really the main problem of the Armed Forces, unfortunately. This is the complete inadequacy of the country's top political leadership to the problems that exist in the army. And the desire to view everything that is happening as a PR exercise. Not as a technological problem. This is unfortunate.
Now let's have time to answer a few questions. Pavlo Sebastianovych: Why doesn't the General Staff order pickup trucks and other vehicles from the Defense Ministry? Why doesn't the Minister of Defense tell the Prime Minister that it is necessary to redirect procurement from peaceful to military purposes? Did the Ministry of Health really request a budget of 17 trillion hryvnias, as Pidlasa says? Were there any restrictions imposed by the Ministry of Finance on the Ministry of Defense's requests as to who and where should create an arms production center, gather entrepreneurs and economists there? Friends, there is a big question here. Why doesn't the General Staff order pickup trucks and other vehicles? It is obvious. Because we don't really have any planning for our needs. No one makes it. Needs planning depends on the budget. The General Staff needs the Ministry of Defense to determine the policy of what to buy, where to buy it. What resources are allocated. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief has to ask for it. If the General Staff does not include transportation in its needs, then we have the Defense Committee, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with his full-time position, the National Security and Defense Council, the Minister of Defense with the entire apparatus, who is responsible for the army just like the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. And they have to correct him. But they don't do it. And most of it is also bought by volunteers. Yes, almost all of it is bought by volunteers. Why? I want to tell you, there are two problems. Yes, there is a nuance that the state has little money. But the state needs to buy at least a small share of drones, at least 10%, 20. A small share of transportation. At least 10%. Why? Because the state creates infrastructure in this way. It creates standards. If you buy certain machines, service centers are set up to support them, and machines of such brands and types can be brought in profitably by private volunteers and private companies. A logic of application is being created. Cheaper operation, cheaper purchase. It is easier to work with. It's more maintainable. But none of this is being done. Why? Ukraine has no strategy, no defense planning. No one is engaged in this. Everyone is engaged in PR. In the Sun newspaper, the president criticizes Zaluzhnyi for PR and preparing for the election. Where is the criticism about the pickups? No one is interested in that. No one has bought pickup trucks over the years, and no one is buying them now. I'm not talking about symbolic batches of a couple dozen vehicles. There are no such things.
Why won't the Defense Minister tell the Prime Minister? Oh, let's say it this way. Why is the Minister of Defense not a subjective figure? Because he has just been appointed. He does not know what he is doing, he is learning his job and does not yet know his powers, how to build relationships in the government. So, of course, how can he do anything? He is learning.
Valerii Petrukhno: I would like, dear Yurii, to have you describe the initial period of the war when Tavria was occupied in a matter of hours, and to share the responsibility of the political and military leadership. Valerii, of course, this is... it is Tavria, that is, the South of Ukraine was surrendered and occupied by the enemy in about 5 days. Within 5 days, the enemy captured Enerhodar, Tokmak, Melitopol, Berdiansk and approached Mariupol from Berdiansk, i.e. from the west. On the sixth day of the war, the enemy captured Kherson and then went as far as Mykolaiv and Voznesensk. And almost reached Kryvyi Rih. Well, what can I say? This is just a unique failure. Of course, the main responsibility here lies with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who did not deploy the territorial defense troops, did not deploy the operational reserve, did not declare martial law in the border areas, and did not announce the construction of defensive structures and the preparation and immediate destruction of all bridges as soon as hostilities begin. None of this was done. That's why the enemy rolled at speed and took over the territory in 5 days, where heavy fighting is going on and thousands of Ukrainian soldiers are dying. This is the problem and Zelenskyy is primarily responsible for it. I am confident that both Volodymyr Zelenskyy and those people who contributed to such treacherous actions of surrendering the South of Ukraine will definitely be brought to justice. These are Andrii Yermak, Ruslan Demchenko, the head of the Intelligence Committee and other officials. Ivan Bakanov, the FSS agents whom Zelenskyy and Bakanov appointed to senior positions, including Oleh Kulinich, an FSS agent, who was appointed to the head of the Crimean SSU, will have to answer for all of this. And the military leadership, you are absolutely right to ask the question, of course, the responsibility of the military should be considered. They had to demand it. They should have acted decisively, even realizing the treacherous actions of their senior leaders. It still had to be done. But this can be established at a trial. It has to be done. And do not separate the responsibility of the military from politicians. These are interconnected things. This is one process. It is not just one or two generals who are responsible. This is the responsibility of the one who gave them orders and appointed them to their positions. And this is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
Roman Inko. The issue of demobilization - what options are being considered? And no options consider the issue of demobilization. None at all. We have a completely irresponsible system now. Here, if you want to resign from the army, transfer, you have only one option - you have to resign completely. Otherwise, you won't be given any normal vacations, rest, or anything else. You have to resign, go on sick leave, as they say, for health reasons, family reasons, and it is a mass phenomenon when people register fictitious relationships to get demobilized. But what can you do? How else to get out of this? It's absurd. The current system of using troops is so exhausting that it is a one-time thing, so that a person enters, gets exhausted, and then leaves the army. You stay there as long as you have the strength. This is a wrong system. It needs to be changed, of course. The entire system of mobilization, training, and use of troops needs to be changed. So that people are fresh at their positions, not just indifferent to their lives. We have all the conditions for this. We should not write people off, but train them intensively and efficiently for six months, and losses will be less. And then rotations will become more frequent. And now they can be made more frequent if the troops are used correctly and the defense line is built. None of this is being done. We do not save people. That is why mobilization was an individual initiative, and demobilization is an individual initiative. Unfortunately.
Marko Bachmaha. Please assess the effectiveness of Zaluzhnyi's tactics of attacking small infantry groups in fortified positions with minimal artillery and drone support. Oh... A big question. I understand that they are from the Washington Post. I will read out some more questions on this topic.
Anna Romanova asked me, "I'm interested in your analysis of the Washington Post article. Indeed, let's take a look at this article. This article talks about the miscalculations and disagreements in the planning of a counteroffensive operation between the United States and Ukraine. Yes, what can I say? The command of this operation... In fact, this is the topic of a separate broadcast. We will devote a separate program to the counteroffensive - what worked and what didn't. I will say this briefly. I believe that all the problems we have with this so-called counteroffensive are the problems of strategic planning. Or rather, the absence of it. To attack somewhere, you need to be sure of the strength of your defense and the availability of reserves. Because in order to attack, war is, of course, about logistics. It is not a tactic. In the question, you see how, and in this article, it says, there was one tactic, the tactic was changed, we went in small groups. Friends, in fact, in war, tactics do not solve anything if there is no planning and logistics. War is about planning resources, first and foremost. A soldier, his tactics, his heroism, can win a battle. He can win two battles. But you cannot win a war and a battle with heroism and tactics. Tactics are very important. But if you don't have reserves to constantly bring fresh forces into the battle, if you don't have defensive positions and while you are counter-attacking somewhere, the enemy is capturing Bakhmut, Soledar, advancing near Kupiansk, advancing in other places, near Avdiivka, deeply surrounding you, what kind of counter-offensive can there be? This means that we don't have the strength to hold. We throw what we have at the attack. And we leave everything there weak. Modern warfare - and this was demonstrated by the Russian offensive on Vuhledar in the winter of 2023, in January and February - is a war of drones. Drones make tactical surprise impossible now. Large columns of armored vehicles cannot just drive by. Drones can see them. A large number of high-precision weapons inflict damage. And so, if we want to attack with such columns of tanks, then there must be Agato. Did we have many of them? Did we have an advantage over the enemy? It was clear that we did not... it was clear even before the offensive began. Russia had mobilized and the total number of Russian troops was not only not inferior to Ukrainian troops, but in many areas the enemy outnumbered them. In terms of military equipment, high-precision weapons, and the number of drones, the enemy was not inferior to the Ukrainians. That is, we had no advantage. How can we compensate for the rate of losses? That is, why do we need superiority in forces when attacking? Let me put it this way, literally. Because one wave has to break through the defense, relatively speaking. The second wave has to gain a foothold in the positions that have been taken from the enemy and repel counterattacks by his reserves. The third wave should move on. the fourth wave should gain a foothold. And so on. The enemy has built an echeloned defense. Deeply echeloned. He concentrated no less forces on the direction of our attacks than we did. He had air superiority. He had an advantage in the number of drones. He controlled our tactical zone and combat formations. Please tell me, what kind of realistic planning can be done in such conditions? To be honest, from the very beginning of these events, I want to tell you that there was criticism at the level of our brigades of such breakthrough plans. There was criticism. But it was not heard. There is a war strategy, and the war strategy is not measured by tactics. Not by the fact that you need tank columns or small groups of infantry. The strategy of war is decided by analyzing the situation, the ratio of forces and means. This is what needs to be calculated. If you calculate it realistically and do not lie to yourself, then you will have an effective offensive. Then the tactics will start working in our favor and create an advantage for us. During the counteroffensive, Ukrainian soldiers demonstrated their superiority and ability to break through such a heavy defense. Only a high-quality organization can break through a heavy defense. Not heroism. Because when you have a drone flying above you, the main means of reconnaissance, which sees everything, with a thermal imager, and can spot any hero from several kilometers away and aim high-precision weapons at him, then, unfortunately, the tactics of a small group, a single person, a column - nothing will work. Heroism will not work. The enemy will be able to destroy any number of attacking forces in this open area on the dominant heights. So, of course, there is a question in general - what about the political leadership? How did it approve this offensive strategy, did it not realize that we had no reserves, that we had no advantage over the enemy? What were they counting on? It seems that it was planned as a political demonstration. Who is responsible for this then? This is a modern war. Due to the high density, high number of drones, it is a positional war. In order to turn a positional war into a maneuver war, we need to either improve the number and tactics of using our drones. Either make more drones so that they can break through the front, or produce means effective for fighting and neutralizing enemy drones. And it is best to do both. It is impossible to break through the modern front without fighting drones, without having superiority in your drones. The number of infantry, tanks, and artillery does not ensure a breakthrough in modern warfare. The number of drones can. But for this, we need to add management tactics and quality of organization. Did anyone plan to use drones during the counteroffensive? No. Here is the question. And the people who were responsible for the development did not pay attention to the drones. To be honest, this Washington Post article really strikes me as the Americans having their own vision. To be honest, I didn't notice what the Americans were planning at all. The operation was in the details. It was actually so... very much a desk-based idea, mildly speaking. Our counteroffensive went this way because no one here is studying our own experience. At the strategic level. I have seen a lot of different, you know, we have reviews... now the high command, the General Staff is conducting reviews of tactical actions. They analyze tactical actions at the company-battalion level. They take some videos and watch them. The maximum is up to the brigade level. But yes, very rarely. I want to tell you that we don't really have a generalization of the war experience. Our counteroffensive took place in the same conditions and was just as difficult as it had been during the war. I want to tell you that on May 14, 2022, near the village of Vyshneve in the same Zaporizhzhia region, I also saw the results of our unsuccessful, unfortunately, offensive operation. at that time, there were units and tankers of the First Tank Brigade and other units. Unfortunately, the same factors worked, which did not allow us to push through and completely break the front in June of 2023. Who analyzed this? Nobody. The same mistakes were repeated, as they were, for example, during the September 2022 attacks in the Kherson region, when they also tried to send the 28th Brigade and the 60th Brigade of the Reserve Corps to attack the Kherson staging point... the problems of tactics are the same.
All of this is not taken into account and is not taken into account primarily in terms of resource planning. Our operations are always conducted with the expectation of heroism - that heroism, dedication, tactical literacy and volunteer drones that unit commanders will create for themselves somewhere, somewhere they will find that it will help somehow. We are constantly looking for our own heroes who are heroically ready to go against the enemy's well-organized defense and break through it with their bodies. This is not how modern warfare works. It was clear when the Russians were trying to break through us, and it is just as clear here. There is no war going on now, no modern war at this stage in the year 2023. It's not about capturing something. It is about destroying the combat potential of the enemy's troops, about inflicting unacceptable losses in people and military equipment. This is what war is about. That's why when you concentrate large masses of military equipment and people somewhere, the enemy gathers a bunch of drones - we do it, and they do it - and it is immediately noticed, and a large concentration of forces and means begins to cause large losses. And the main goal now, if we are talking about tactics, is to dictate a high rate of losses to the enemy. Where there is a high rate of casualties, you can't sustain, the operation will be very short. If you attack in dense combat formations along one route on favorable lines for the enemy, the attacker will have a high rate of losses, even more than those on the defensive. This must be calculated. And if there are not enough people and equipment, if the drone operation is not planned at all, as happened, unfortunately, in Zaporizhzhia, and there is nothing about it in this Washington Post article, what can I say? I want to say that, unfortunately, all these Western experts and political articles are written rather superficially. We will consider the deeper problems of organizing a counteroffensive in a separate broadcast. Of course, not everything, but only those nuances that can be discussed in order to influence the country's leadership so that they finally begin to study our own combat experience and draw conclusions from it, which has not been done so far.
Halyna Ivanivna Klymovych. The need to introduce military justice to restore order in the army and protect the rights of servicemen. Well, what can I say? I have already spoken about this many times. I have written about it. There is no order in the army. There is no order because the Presidential Office, Andrii Yermak, his deputy for law enforcement, Oleh Tatarov, believe that the army should not have its own military justice. They believe that if the military police, military investigation and military prosecutor's office are subordinated to the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces, they will not only be able to... the problem is not that they will be able to, but there will be at least some structure. Responsible for order in the army, which will at least investigate crimes. Unlike the current civilian structures. Which will somehow ensure order in military units. From the point of view of Yermak and Tatarov, there is only one problem: the military vertical of law and order, military justice, will be a threat to whom? For Tatarov himself and the Presidential Office. Because if a military investigator, unlike the State Bureau of Investigation, gets a case on the surrender of the South, a conscientious investigator will suddenly ask the Supreme Commander-in-Chief what orders he gave. He will make a very careful request. Or he will summon the former head of the intelligence committee, Ruslan Demchenko, for questioning and ask: What did you report to the country's leadership about the Russian attack? What if he detains Demchenko? That's why they are afraid of these uncontrollable actions, and Zelenskyy will not give Zaluzhnyi military justice. Zelensky, Yermak, Tatarov are afraid of the army. The fact that they do not give the army military justice is a vivid example. To illustrate, I want to tell you that this is not my subjective opinion. The Servant of the People party registered a draft law on military justice in the Verkhovna Rada in February 2022. A year and a half has passed and... and nothing. There is no military justice. There is no military police, which they wanted to create in their decisions. That's it.
Andrii Kfatman. The question of the lack of punishment for senior officers and generals who led to huge losses. The media may not have covered these cases much. But among the military, these cases are well known. This topic is very demotivating. I'm talking about the barracks in Mykolaiv, Yavoriv, and the brigades that have been zeroed out several times. This issue is related to the analysis of combat experience. What I want to say now is that punishment for intense combat is a complicated thing. It requires investigation, and this cannot always be done in hot pursuit. It is difficult to look at what happened there right away. But I want to say what I have told you many times on the air. We do not have an after-action review in the entire vertical of the army, the basic NATO standard, which has been in place for 10 years. I have written about this dozens of times. The U.S. Army has a standard called TS2520, which for some reason no one wants to apply in our country when we are transitioning to NATO standards. Why? This is not a criminal case. It's not even an internal investigation. This is an analysis of previous actions. That is, a combat operation took place. For example, the unsuccessful attack on Vyshneve on May 14, 2022. And there, for example, it was necessary to say the reason why it was not possible to break through the defense and why there were such significant losses in tanks - more than 10 combat vehicles were lost. Unfortunately. In that battle, there was no advance in one day. That's it. And then it would have turned out that the enemy had tied the defense to the dominant heights. He deployed anti-tank missile systems at the heights, raised drones, highlighted the advance of tank columns, organized an artillery strike, and organized fire from an antitank-guided missile launcher (ATGM). Artillery alone cannot destroy all ATGMs. It's a small target. You can't even see them all. There were problems in intelligence, in command, in the organization of combat, in the speed of reaching the frontlines. If only there had been such an analysis on video back in May of 2022. Unfortunately, the enemy posted a large number of videos from their drones. And if we raise our drones. If we raised the commanders of the units that participated in this operation and were very critical of it. If there was such a report now, I am sure that if there was an order not to repeat all these mistakes, to study and not to repeat them, then a year later, in 2023, General Zubanych would not have repeated the same mistakes during this march to Robotyne, which is basically an article in the Washington Post. Because there would have been some responsibility, some logic. If people would draw conclusions from this. But we have nothing. We have a combat order. What is there to study? In fact, we have already done everything, we know everything. We broke through the enemy's echeloned defense, (inaudible) for several months in the Kherson region in 2022. There were already battles in May of 2022 in Zaporizhzhia. There were battles in different parts of the front. We tried to break through to Kreminna and Svatove. We have a lot of experience. All of this needs to be studied, watched and planned for the offensive. Do we have any conclusions about the results of the offensive? No, we don't. Does anyone analyze it? No. We have a department in the General Staff that analyzes it. But what does it analyze? Written reports. We just made it a kind of... show, really. We simply obliged commanders and appointed responsible officers to collect information about combat experience. When there is time, this officer has to go to all the performers, the participants of the operation, ask what was the number, if you remember what you said and what was good... and then the person starts to remember something. And of course, they don't want to talk about mistakes so as not to spoil relations with anyone. We have created a separate reporting vertical for the people who handle this reporting. That's how we did it. In fact, after-action review in modern warfare should not be a bureaucratic process. We need to collect the enemy's video and our own and analyze the video. And make objective reports based on the video. And then submit your losses and the enemy's losses to these reports. But not the losses that are written in the reports, but those that are confirmed by video reports. Then a completely different picture of the war will be in the minds of the command at all levels. And people will be able to learn from it. If you want to make a breakthrough in this area, here are some videos to see how it used to be. And that's it. And conclusions are drawn. Do we have this? No, we don't. Why don't we learn from our mistakes? Again, the lack of strategy, the lack of political will and the lack of desire to make strategic changes. Instead, our leadership endlessly blames our allies for not sending us more tanks, more missiles, more money. Someone complains that they did not add people here. Sorry, with this kind of management planning, the irresponsible will always lack neither shells, nor missiles, nor people. Because we are at war against one of the largest countries in the world. It wants to destroy us. And every day it tries to do so on this entire frontline. We have to act accordingly. We have to be smarter and faster in our decisions. We can't get ahead of them in terms of money, number of shells, missiles and drones. We can only do it through one thing: better use of people, more intelligent management methods, and faster changes. Do we have this? This is the main problem. So, dear friends, here is a brief summary of the main problems of the Armed Forces.
I realized that this broadcast should be followed by a more detailed report on the counteroffensive, the lessons learned. And we will follow up on all other issues. I want to say that our main achievement, our main achievement in our army now is people. Unique people. Despite all the difficulties, with volunteer help, they are fighting this war on their own and despite the enemy's great advantage, the advantage in drones, shells, and people, unfortunately, the enemy also outnumbers us in many organizational and managerial decisions.
During our broadcast, which I do in the studio, you can see me, there are a large number of people who, for us to meet here, are now sitting without any communication, without warmth, in cold holes that they dug at their positions, under fire, risking their lives every second. They are the ones who created our state, our freedom and the opportunity for us to communicate with you. And a large number, a large number of these heroes are in the ranks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Therefore, first of all, on this day of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, I thank our heroes, our soldiers, for the broadcast. Thanks to them, I have the opportunity to speak, and you have the opportunity to listen. So today, with faith in our Victory, more than ever, I want to say goodbye to you. I thank you. Glory to Ukraine.
