COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN WASHINGTON POST: ARTICLE ANALYSIS
On a topic that has caused a great public response both in our society and among Western diplomats and military officers. The Washington Post, one of the most influential political publications in the United States, published a large article analyzing the problems and failures of the Ukrainian offensive, or counteroffensive, as we call it, in the South in 2023. In Ukraine, a war of incremental gains as counteroffensive stalls.
HOW THE WASHINGTON POST JOURNALISTS SAW THE OFFENSIVE
There was a big article devoted to the analysis, as the Washington Post journalists in Washington heard it and noticed it. Obviously, they were helped by some advisors, perhaps by people who are informed in Ukraine, in the United States, because there are indeed many true details. But of course, there are also many exaggerations. There are a lot of mistakes. Many things Americans simply did not understand or did not see.
How the Washington Post article begins:
"On the fourth day of the summer counteroffensive, Zaluzhnyi had to completely abandon the previous plan," this is a quote from the article. So, I quote. The Ukrainian Armed Forces command expected to reach the Sea of Azov within two to three months of the start of the counteroffensive on June 23. But the scale of the mining and the density of artillery fire was such that Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi had to completely abandon the previous plan.
This report is based on interviews with more than 30 Ukrainian and American officials, as well as more than two dozen officers and soldiers on the front lines. Some of them spoke on anonymity.
According to the newspaper, it was planned that the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade was to launch a counteroffensive on June 7, reaching the village of Robotyne on the first day, to further liberate Melitopol and cut off Russian supply routes.
We see that the Ukrainian Armed Forces command expected to withdraw within 2-3 months of the start of the counteroffensive. The first thing I would like to say. As for the operation plan, the operation began, though not on June 7, but on June 8. But the plan was for June 7, indeed. On June 8, the 47th Mechanized Brigade was supposed to attack the Russian defence and take the village of Robotyne. This is true. Indeed, the goal was obviously to reach Azov. 2-3 months - well, such detailed plans, I know that it was very fast indeed, up to 2 months, maybe they expected. There is also a reference here... This is reliable information used here. On the first day, we were supposed to take the village of Robotyne. The further goal of the operation was - we'll look at the map now, we'll talk about this separately. But I want to say that there are interviews with 30 Ukrainian and American officials and another two dozen soldiers and officers. I would like to say what was glaring at me here. I saw that the scale of the mining and the density of the artillery fire were such that Valerii Zaluzhnyi had to completely abandon the previous plan. I want to say that I was immediately surprised by this in the Washington Post. After such a large-scale... such an analysis. This is not a completely correct reflection of what is actually happening in the war.
In fact, the main problem in the offensive was not the density of artillery fire at all. It is worth noting that the artillery fire during the offensive from our side was at least as dense as the enemy's artillery fire, and on some days we even had an advantage in the number of shells we could drop on the Russian defense. Mines were also a very unpleasant and dangerous factor for us. But of course, a minefield alone cannot stop an offensive either. So, what were the main factors? We will come to this later. But I'm going to... let's criticize the critics. In this case, the Washington Post. To have a comprehensive understanding. The main problem of the offensive was drones. A large number of Russian drones completely controlled the situation in our tactical zone. The enemy had an advantage in drones in this area of the front. This is the first thing. That is, the enemy built a front of drones and, with the help of long-range reconnaissance drones, controlled our combat formations to a depth of 30 km and monitored the approaches. Unfortunately, in these conditions, it was extremely difficult to avoid enemy observation. The enemy had very accurate targeting. He had a high level of situational awareness at each of his strongholds. This allowed him to act adequately to the situation and, of course, make fewer mistakes, build up forces faster, direct and adjust fire. Drones are the reason number one. It is the reason number two. I would point out the lay of the land.
MAP OF THE OFFENSE. "IN 5 MONTHS WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE HAD TO DO IN ONE DAY"
Let's look at the map now. The map shows the village of Robotyne and the Ukrainian offensive. We made the map earlier, we have already shown it on the air. But we just need to show it.
To give you an idea, this is all that we managed to do from June 8 to October 5. That is almost 5 months of fighting. 9 kilometers. We can see that the village of Robotyne, the target of the first day of the operation, is here... Our troops have reached Novoprokopivka, which is 9 km away. Robotyne is about 7 kilometers away. The outskirts are already 7 kilometers from our positions - this is Robotyne. Indeed, Robotyne, these 7 kilometers, had to be passed on the first day. On June 8, this was the task of the day. Unfortunately, we failed to fulfill this task. Why?
First of all, I noticed the drones. Second, look at the map itself. The strike was made on a very narrow front. The enemy has been holding the flanks of our breakthrough and is still holding them, and is conducting very powerful flanking fire. We see that the width of this ledge is very small, a few kilometres. And it is being shelled from the flanks with all types of weapons. The presence of drones allowed the enemy to organize fire from the dominant heights very effectively. From the entire perimeter of this foothold that we have broken through during all these months of offensive. That is, the enemy did not have to keep firepower at the dominant heights all the time. Using the data from drones, at the right time, they could deploy, first of all, Kornet anti-tank missile systems, which are also equipped with thermal imaging sights, missiles with a range of 6 to 1 km, which can fire from dominant heights. The terrain in this area is very open. The number of landings is very limited.
The enemy has very good capabilities not only in observation but also in shooting. There are long ranges. The enemy can strike very effectively from the heights near Robotyne, which they controlled. It was this fire control, combined with drones, that prevented our troops from breaking through quickly. Quickly clear minefields. To get through the artillery fire quickly. In fact, the enemy managed to effectively pin down our attacking units with the help of their infantry and anti-tank missile systems. And the enemy inflicted damage. The drones were adjusting. I would say that the main means of destruction, what we see in the video, if perhaps the people with whom the Washington Post spoke, perhaps, did not watch all the video from that area. All these experts, dozens of them. But if you look at the video, the main means of defeating the enemy is precision weapons. These are guided missiles. These are drones. These are guided artillery shells. These are guided aerial bombs, which were used both from ground platforms and from air platforms. A large number of helicopters, ground launchers. Importantly, the enemy's artillery did not have an advantage in this section of the front. It should be noted that the Ukrainians, having their drones, also conducted a fairly strong counter-battery fight. I cannot say that they managed to suppress the enemy's artillery, no. The enemy was firing very densely, constantly. But this fire, this constant fire, the Russian artillery suffered significant losses in the area, there were strikes and damage. But the main thing was the large number of drones that completely controlled the battlefield and a large number of high-precision weapons of various types, especially with the help of mobile ground platforms of the Kornet ATGM, especially with the help of helicopters - all this made it almost impossible to make any maneuvers in this minefield. If you look at the elevation map, Robotyne is located at a high altitude. The enemy left a 7 km space in front of it. This is an open hillside that goes from us to the enemy. There are dominant heights above Robotyne, and these dominant heights, these 7 kilometres, were fired upon by the enemy. So it should be noted that the Russian command prepared for an offensive in this direction, and it is very important to note that they were able to adapt high-quality defense to the terrain. Let's look at the general map of the situation so that we can see not only this direction. So that we can see not only Robotyne itself but also where our troops were going.
THE FIRST TARGET OF THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE IS TOKMAK
Here we see this ledge and the first target, the first closest such important settlement from Robotyne and Novoprokopivka, we see that the closest distance is Tokmak. If Ukrainian troops had reached Tokmak, we could have said that the Russian defense line, the Surovikin line, had been completely broken through, that our troops had entered the operational space, and that we had liberated the very important Tokmak communication hub. Unfortunately, the distance from this wedge, the foothold that we broke through the Russian defense, a very narrow wedge, as we can see, to Tokmak is 16 kilometers. That is, there were 25, 9 have been passed, and 16 are left. Thus, we must understand that before we planned to reach Melitopol, Tokmak was actually the first target of the operation. Unfortunately, we were unable to reach Tokmak, and the Russian defense was not completely broken through. In fact, the capture of Robotyne and Novoprokopivka meant a breakthrough in the first line of Russian defense. Indeed, their first line, which was based on the dominant heights near Robotyne, was broken through. But this breakthrough is very relative.
Let's take a close-up look at the map. So Robotyne, friends, look, this is a very small foothold. We have penetrated the Russian defence and reached the heights. But on a very, very narrow front. In fact, this foothold is now, if you look at it, threatening our troops, I want to say, no less than the Russian front. Rather, our troops in this area are perhaps even more threatened than the Russian front, because it is a very narrow wedge on a very narrow front. It is possible to hold this foothold when the enemy is shooting at it from the flanks only through the strong, heavy defense and high-quality defensive structures that must be created here. Otherwise, the enemy has very convenient conditions for a counterattack and for cutting off this foothold completely.
I'm talking about this because we have a lot of positive feedback about the offensive, that we are pressing, the Russians are not holding out, they are withdrawing. I want to say that the general logic of the Washington Post article, the logic that we still failed to pass, the logic in general, I must say, is correct. We have achieved such wedges, we have driven such a deep foothold into the Russian defense, but we cannot expand it. Russia has no less forces in this direction, and this should cause... this article is an analysis not only of what has happened but also of what will happen.
WHAT DID THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE BRING?
On the fourth day of the operation, General Zaluzhnyi saw burned-out Western military equipment: American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, German Leopard tanks, and demining vehicles left on the battlefield. The number of dead and wounded undermined morale.
According to a senior Ukrainian military officer, then Zaluzhnyi ordered his troops to suspend the attack. Instead of trying to break through the Russian defences with a massive armoured attack backed by artillery, as advised by the United States, Zaluzhnyi decided that the Ukrainian military would advance on foot, in small groups of 10. This saved lives and resources, but such an offensive takes much longer.
"Months of planning with the United States were thrown away on that fourth day, and the already belated counteroffensive, designed to reach the Sea of Azov within two to three months, was almost at a standstill," the article says.
These are very important words. I want to tell you that if this is true - and I have no reason not to trust the American contacts of the Washington Post, I think they really did communicate with the American military... I want to say that if the American military really analyzed and planned the offensive in this way, it is obvious that the Ukrainian military is also responsible. I want to say that this is a very big mistake. A very big underestimation of the enemy and the lack of analysis of previous actions during the offensive. For example, we can recall near the village of Vyshneve on May 14, this is also this direction, Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia region, on May 14, 22, an unsuccessful attack by the first tank brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which failed, unfortunately, with significant losses in equipment for exactly the same reasons. In other words, anti-tank defence deployed, anti-tank missile systems in the landings, significant density, receiving targeting from drones. The Russians posted videos of the enemy shooting at our tanks with missile systems. Unfortunately, it was true. Russian anti-tank defence was not completely suppressed. It may not be possible to do so with so many ATGMs, but it is necessary, of course - we will talk later about what can be done in this situation. This experience was not analyzed, as we see in the preparation of the operation, there are no references to previous experience in this area. In addition, there are no references to the organization of defence and combat operations at the Kherson foothold, where the Russians have built a very heavy defence. I would like to say that the September attacks near the village of Pravdyno near Kherson were also, unfortunately, very unsuccessful for us, with significant losses, which failed for the same reasons. That is a dispersed controlled defence with a significant number of drones, with adjustments to the actions of artillery and missile systems by drones. And a significant number of drones that notice in advance the approach of our attacking columns and the enemy prepares, strikes, the spontaneity disappears and the result is very difficult. That is, it is impossible to overcome the minefields covered by drones and missile systems in the east at speed with masses of troops... and this was obvious on May 22 from our own experience. And the same conclusions could have been drawn from the Russian experience in February-March '22.
It is also important to note that we had not 1, not 2, not 3 such operations. That's why we see that this second block, let's look at it again, the second part of the Washington Post article, says that a massive attack with armored vehicles supported by artillery, as advised by the United States, instead of breaking through the Russian defense. There's a very important phrase here... I'm quoting it because it's about planning. So, I want to tell you that if it really was the case that the United States advised to break through the defense, if the United States advised to break through the defense with a massive attack of armored vehicles and artillery, I can say that the American military advisers who suggested this do not understand what is happening on the battlefield in Ukraine and obviously do not watch the Internet, do not watch YouTube, Internet sites. In the conditions of intensive use of drones in combination with precision weapons, if this is further reinforced by steadfast infantry, large numbers, availability of reserves, availability of high-quality defensive structures dug by equipment, if this is covered by artillery and mortars, and in the case of the Russians, it is also covered by air strikes with massive guided bombs and helicopters with precision weapons, it is impossible. It is impossible to pass. High-precision weapons in massive use with drone correction make it impossible for masses of armored vehicles to act. These are losses and that's it. Artillery, I think it's been obvious to everyone since World War I, cannot destroy the entire defense, cannot fulfill all the tasks of breaking through the enemy's defense, cannot hit all the targets. Every single machine gunner in every trench, every machine gun point that can pin down infantry, every grenade launcher, every ATGM, every small machine gun somewhere in the bushes. Artillery alone cannot do it all. And armored vehicles take a long time to reach their positions because there are minefields, they are hit, they are clearly visible, and it is easy to adjust fire. These are obvious things, it would seem. But for some reason, the Washington Post attributed this to the Americans. Unfortunately, I think this is a joint creation of our generals as well. This shows that unfortunately, we do not have an analysis of previous actions, the same after-action review that is in NATO standards, which we do not apply, and as we see, American advisers are also bad at analyzing what is happening on the battlefield if they did - they obviously did, we trust the Washington Post in this case. If they made such completely wrong conclusions. I would like to say, friends, that before the start of the operation, some Ukrainian military, aerial reconnaissance men who knew well what an elevation map is, who used Kropyva (Nettle), a very basic tablet, and who had experience in combat, warned many Ukrainian commanders that the attack on Robotyne was a very unfortunate choice of area of operations.
MISTAKES OF THE COUNTEROFFENSIVE
Unfortunately, the Washington Post article says nothing about this. But I want to say that the enemy's defense there is well tied to the heights and that the enemy will use a large number of Kornet ATGMs at these heights, that the density of minefields there is several kilometers and this will not allow you to fly over these minefields quickly, that the enemy has an advantage in drones in this area. Certain commanders who were responsible for the offensive in this area were warned about all this. Unfortunately, these messages were repeated, these warnings were not taken into account, sadly. And so they did, indeed, in the early days they tried to plan such an offensive with quick actions.
WHO WAS IN COMMAND OF THE OFFENSIVE?
On our side, General Zubanych, a well-known commander from Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, planned these actions and commanded the offensive. Sadly famous, in fact. He commanded this offensive. And when planning this offensive, I can tell you right now, no one planned to use drones and counteract the enemy's drones. It was not serious planning. Drones were not concentrated on our side. There was no systematic counteraction to Russian drones. Therefore, this great underestimation of the importance of drones in modern warfare, the attempt to break through the defense with the number of new armored vehicles and the number of artillery shells, naturally failed. It did not have the desired effect.
General Vasyl Zubanych
WHAT WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THE ARTICLE?
This is not mentioned in the article. And I have to say this because it is very painful to watch this obstacle race, which is almost continuous. When we plan offensive actions, we must proceed from the fact that we have a great deal of our own experience in combat operations. Why the Ukrainian military command does not use it in full, why it is not discussed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's staff, why it is not analyzed in some analytical materials by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or our advisers is absolutely unclear to me. I consider this to be the biggest strategic mistake. We have the best experience of modern warfare and we do not draw any conclusions. I want to say something about this article. It says "breakthrough by large masses of armored vehicles". In reality, we do not have large masses of armored vehicles that would give us an advantage over the enemy. Ukraine has received Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, really high-quality combat vehicles, and Leopard tanks, I mean, I want to tell you that Leopard-2A6 tanks are in this area. They were supplied to us from Germany. We had 18 of them. 18! There were a few dozen more old Soviet tanks and we had Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. Again, according to official reports that we have, there were somewhere a little over 100 Bradleys. I would not say that this is a large number of armored vehicles in this area, that these are large masses, that it is possible to break through with this - I would not say. We had no advantage in armored vehicles. If you look at the offensive, we'll see later. Now we'll analyze the Washington Post, and then I'll give my integral vision of this offensive. Let's look at this second fragment again, there is one more point that is worth commenting on. What does it say? "On the fourth day, General Zaluzhnyi saw burned-out Western military equipment: American Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, German Leopard tanks, and demining vehicles left on the battlefield. The number of dead and wounded undermined morale."
I want to say that this assessment is very inaccurate.
WHAT UNDERMINED MORALE?
In fact, it was not the number of dead and destroyed equipment that undermined morale at all. If you count in absolute numbers, on the fourth day of the offensive, the losses in equipment were very significant, I would say, large. But it was not the majority of equipment. Most of the military equipment remained combat-ready and suitable for combat missions. Most Ukrainian soldiers, despite the fact that they were depressed by the losses, nevertheless went forward and performed their tasks. In fact, what undermined morale, in my opinion, from day one, was exactly what this article is talking about in this fragment - poor planning. People saw that the conditions of use, the procedure for the use of troops, the orders for the use of troops at the tactical level - at the tactical level, I want to emphasize - did not correspond to the situation and were ineffective.
If you look at the map strategically, what was drawn in the headquarters, those arrows on the map, in Zubanych's headquarters, was very logical and very reasonable. At the strategic level, what was written there in detail - orders, maps - was basically logical, common sense, and it should have worked. But why didn't it work? Why was morale undermined? In fact, these strategic arrows on the map are completely irrelevant, they are disconnected from tactics. Our strategic planning is completely disconnected from tactical planning. And unfortunately, careful planning of battle tactics, passage through minefields, interaction of forces and means, troop density, availability of reserves - all this was not enough.
Why, for example, did we have so much equipment being blown up and yet it didn't work in the early days? It was because the passage through the minefields was from two to four kilometers. And to break through this under the fire of enemy ATGMs, aircraft, and artillery, it was necessary to use not only a few demining vehicles. We needed a much larger number. We lacked the density, the number of reserves that would be fixed in the positions we managed to reach, and the reserves that would then move forward through these positions. There was not enough equipment to replace the equipment that had been knocked out and move forward. In other words, the calculation of forces and means did not correspond to the operation plan that was drawn up. The strategy was logical. What strategy? We have seen the map. Directly to Tokmak - forward, forward. The shortest route. The route is conveniently plowed, yes. The shortest route. But the Russian generals were looking at the same maps. They thought the same way, and on that shortest route to Robotyne, they tied their fortified positions to the heights, several lines, mined, organized firing positions, deployed equipment - equipment that the Ukrainian army does not do - dug defensive structures, very deep, a large number of field fortifications and strongholds for infantry to better secure them, and raised a large number of drones. And they acted with constant massive air support. Yes, in such conditions, the enemy certainly had an advantage even on certain days, even during the offensive, which we could not simply destroy. The number of enemy drones flying over our combat formations was such that we could not shoot them all down. And of course, the enemy saw everything. How to move forward in such conditions? You need to have reserves. And if there are no reserves and the task is set for the 47th Brigade alone to go somewhere far away on such a difficult section of the front, the result was, unfortunately, predictable. I want to tell you that we have soldiers who warned us in advance that this would happen, that this would be the result, that it would be a very difficult battle to gnaw through, to push the enemy, but there would be no speed. I would like to say something more about the 47th Brigade, which is mentioned here immediately.
ABOUT THE 47TH BRIGADE
The 47th Mechanized Brigade, yes, it received the best Western military equipment: Bradley armored personnel carriers, Leopard-2A6 tanks, but it was a completely new combat unit that had no combat cohesion. A large number of its personnel were volunteers who had not fought or had very little combat experience. In addition, it should be noted that strategic offensive operations are generally rare in Ukraine. We have never conducted a strategic operation against a stationary echeloned defense of an enemy that is not inferior in any way. Not that we have an advantage. They have an advantage in some types of weapons. And they have no less people than we do. Therefore, of course, when we talk about undermining the morale of soldiers, it is always a matter of planning and management, not that the soldier is depressed, frightened of something, afraid or maybe not having dinner. This is not the main reason. The main reason is that the tasks that are set should meet the terms of the mission. So that it can be done, and not just heroically go forward in the calculation - and what if they all get scared and run away on their own. What if... What if... The Russian never worked in war. The calculation that the enemy will be frightened if the entire calculation of the operation is based on this, such an operation is doomed to defeat. It will never be successful. Yes, in general, this is the situation according to the Washington Post.
Soldiers of the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade
"Months of planning with the United States"....
I don't know what they were planning. I mean, what is being said here is a change of tactics, that the Ukrainians will advance on foot in small groups of 10 people. This seems like such a radical deviation from the plan. In fact, I don't think it's a deviation from the plan at all, because after the armored vehicles failed to be used, what do you do? Should we say: that's it, the operation is stopped, because we failed? Unfortunately, there is inertia in our operations. Our command tried to impose a battle of attrition on the enemy. We had advantages in this battle - we had a significant number of artillery shells, a significant number of drones, a significant number of high-precision weapons in the form of, first of all, the HIMARS missile systems, which were used very densely on many targets in this area. Among other things, there were attacks on infantry strongholds, so the HIMARS worked very effectively. They worked well against individual units of military equipment. But if the infantry hadn't been there, the equipment would not have been able to get through in principle. And in fact, if we were planning an offensive, it was basically impossible to advance without infantry. Planning an offensive in such a heavy defense with the help of infantry is, in fact, a reasonable and logical task. Let's see how it was done. Small groups of infantry are the basis of offensive operations in modern warfare. This was the case in the First World War. In the First World War, for example, the Germans developed such a technique... then the British, the allies, developed an infiltration technique. That is infiltration of infantry through combat formations in order to bypass defensive strongholds, thus destabilizing them and breaking through the front. Infantry infiltration is necessary. No one works in modern warfare without it. Let's look at the modern war, for example, in Karabakh in 2020. How did Azerbaijan break through the Armenian defense in Karabakh? Through massive attacks with armored vehicles? No. The Armenians repelled all massive armored attacks with significant losses for the Azerbaijanis. But the infantry, the simultaneous actions of the infantry in cooperation with artillery and armored vehicles, simply broke the defense. The constant independent autonomous actions of small groups of infantry allowed the defense to collapse very quickly. So I don't know who, to be honest, what level of advice the Washington Post was giving, it's a little bit strange, to be honest, what level of people, maybe they are aware of the strategy, but I want to tell you that those who were giving advice, they just don't understand tactics well. I'm surprised at even this superficial level of what is written in the newspaper. Of course, there was no other option to attack but with small groups of infantry with - necessarily with - not independently, but in cooperation with armored vehicles, with small groups of armored vehicles - of course, there was no other option from the very beginning. From the very beginning, nothing else could have worked there. Therefore, what is presented here in the Washington Post article as some remarkable details of this operation, history, some turning point... it is not a turning point. The armor will end one way or another. Look at the video of the Russian offensive on Vuhledar on February 23. The same thing will happen. Massive attacks will only knock out more armor and that's it. Therefore, the change of tactics from strikes with these... tanks with infantry fighting vehicles would have ended not on the fourth day, but on the fifteenth, and that's it. And there would have been only losses, no advance at all. So here again, this article is quite superficial and from what I see, these preliminary fragments, unfortunately, do not fully correspond to the situation and do not allow us to draw objective conclusions about what actually happened.
The next one. Instead of making a 14-kilometer breakthrough on the first day, the Ukrainian Armed Forces advanced 19 kilometers over 6 months. All in all, Ukraine liberated about 200 square miles (almost 518 square kilometers) of territory at the cost of thousands of dead and wounded and billions of dollars in Western military aid in 2023 alone.
"Almost six months after the start of the counteroffensive, the campaign has become a war of gradual victories," the newspaper states.
According to the Washington Post, 70% of the 47th Brigade, which led the counteroffensive, entered the battle with no combat experience.
After that, Ukraine's failures on the battlefield led to disagreements with the United States over further actions.
This is already important.
The commander of the U.S. Forces in Europe could not contact Zaluzhnyi for several weeks at the beginning of the campaign. Each side accused the other of mistakes and miscalculations. The U.S. military believes that Ukraine underperformed in basic military tactics, particularly in the use of ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. Ukrainian officials have said that the Americans do not seem to understand how combat drones and other technologies have transformed the battlefield.
PLANNING MISCALCULATIONS
There were important things that, unfortunately, neither the Americans nor the Ukrainians took into account in their planning. First, about the liberation. On the first day, 14 kilometers is a bit more, if you count the gray zone. It was 14 kilometers. In fact, we had to go through and take Robotyne on the first day. It's about... up to 8 at most. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have advanced by 19 in 6 months, Ukraine has liberated about... yeah, yeah, okay. The war of gradual victories is an optimistic title. In fact, it is a war of attrition, where there is a positional war, very viscous, on every kilometer of the front.
Next. 70% of the military entered the battle without combat experience. This is true. But I want to say that this is not critical, in fact. The brigade had time to prepare. It had a certain number of experienced soldiers. The fact that they lacked experience is a matter of its application. Yes, maybe I think we should raise the issue and consider the experience of the 47th Brigade. I think we should also talk about this in a separate program. Look, the brigade could have gained this experience. For this purpose, it did not have to be immediately thrown into the offensive in the direction of the main attack. This is true. It was necessary to give them a chance to get along a little bit in a combat situation. It is much more important that the soldiers of the 47th Brigade were for the most part motivated volunteer fighters who were good at training, who were motivated and who could gain experience in the shortest possible time. Many of them did. The issue of using a brigade is again a matter of planning. If the soldiers are inexperienced, this must also be taken into account in the planning of combat operations.
Next, there were disagreements with the United States about how to proceed. Each side accused the other of mistakes and miscalculations. Let's see, here is an important phrase. The U.S. military believes that Ukraine has underperformed in basic military tactics. This is unequivocal. You can see it on the video. We've been talking about this as well. But there is an interesting emphasis here - on using ground reconnaissance to understand the density of minefields. This is not true, because our troops had a good idea of the density of the minefields. Various Ukrainian brigades were used in the area, territorial defense brigades in particular, who had actually been in the area for many months and had full knowledge of the information. The information about the density of minefields was reported. The tactics were not worked out, and the use of troops was not planned per these ambitious tasks that were set. The next sentence. Ukrainian officials said that the Americans do not seem to understand how combat drones and other technologies have transformed the battlefield.
So look, these last two phrases are very important here, what the Americans said about the Ukrainians and the Ukrainians said about the Americans. In this case, the leaders on both sides miscalculated and are now trying to shift the responsibility to each other. Drones have changed the battlefield in a key way, and this was clear even before the offensive began. There was no need to launch an offensive for this and it was obvious. But it was not taken into account. There was a very large underestimation of the enemy. And there was no planning for the use of their drones. I am very interested in when our analysis will be conducted. At least a closed, secret one. At the level of the General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's staff, who are responsible for all this. When? Didn't anyone know that drones had changed and shaped the battlefield? Yes, they did. Didn't you know that the Russians have even more drones in that area than we do? Yes, we did. Didn't you know that we did not concentrate additional drone forces there? Tanks, artillery and shells were concentrated, HIMARS were concentrated, but no additional drones were concentrated. This area was not reinforced with drone units, and we have central subordination units that can reinforce certain areas, and a separate drone command group was not created that could use them at the tactical level in a massive way, to the full depth of the enemy's combat formations. This was not done. Were strike drones used? Night and day drones. They were not used. There was no planning for this. Again, in terms of the personal initiative of the unit commanders. Yes. So whose fault is that? Who is responsible for that?
As for the density of minefields. All this was clear. All this data was available, even the soldiers knew the density of minefields there. Everything was obvious. So now what I see here in the article is an attempt by military leaders on both sides to absolve themselves of responsibility and shift it to some new factors that allegedly did not exist. The enemy did not use anything unexpected in this area of Robotyne. There were no accidents and no unexpectedness. They knew everything. We knew the density of the defense. On our operational maps, this Russian defense is marked in great detail. All this is known. We also know the density of minefields. We knew what forces were concentrated. Yes, there were miscalculations in tactics. But tactics depend on what? It depends on resources. If you have a certain amount of resources, then you can apply one tactic. If you don't have the resources for this tactic, then don't use it - it won't work. What are the attacks with masses of armored vehicles? 100 Bradleys, 18 Leopards, which were received right before... in general, it was very shortly before the offensive. Was there any preparation at all? Were the resources ready? Yes. So here, unfortunately, there are very... intrigues in this article from different sides thrown in.
The then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, and other senior American officers involved in planning the offensive urged the Ukrainians to concentrate their forces in one key point in the Zaporizhzhia region, while the Ukrainian General Staff planned to attack in three directions and contain Russian forces.
Mark Milley
A soldier of the 47th Brigade with the call sign Joker said that the Americans did not take into account the presence of a huge number of drones, fortifications, minefields, and the like, and did not even want to integrate the use of drones into their training programs.
"We had to improve our tactics during the battle itself. We couldn't use it the way we were taught," Joker said.
In addition, the Washington Post writes that when Ukrainian President Zelenskyy was asked during a meeting with the NATO secretary general in late September why Ukraine continues to deploy so many forces to the east and not to the south, where the main attack is developing, Zelenskyy replied that if the Russians lose the east, they will lose the war.
Yeah, well, let's look at this again. I will comment on the first block now. Look, the position of Mark Milley, the Americans. The Americans convinced the Ukrainians to concentrate their forces at one point in the Zaporizhzhia region, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to attack in three directions.
We have seen the map with you. Here is the direction to Tokmak, the key communication hub, the closest to us. The direction to Tokmak, see? This is a narrow corridor. If we concentrate all our forces as planned by the Americans and General Mark Milley, what will happen? The enemy will hold this large front and will concentrate all its forces on striking this front from the flanks. The Ukrainian General Staff has drawn up three lines of attack. The first was from Velyka Novosilka. The enemy was near the town. Our troops drove the enemy back from the town. Next. This is the Vasylivka area, the direction to Vasylivka from Polohy. It is along the Dnipro River that the attack on Enerhodar is so direct. From Velyka Novosilka, you can see it on the map to Mariupol. From Polohy to Enerhodar. And from Orikhiv to Tokmak. What do we see? We managed to push the enemy back from Velyka Novosilka. However, we failed to penetrate the defense. We have practically knocked back the enemy in the direction of Enerhodar. We have succeeded in the direction of Robotyne, but it is a very vulnerable ledge that the enemy controls with fire from the flanks. It is very vulnerable for us. More than for the enemy. If you throw all the forces into one point, this narrow Robotyne corridor - well, maybe it will be a little wider, maybe it will be a little deeper, but it will still be shelled from the flanks with all the fire. I think that, in this case, the American command miscalculated, and indeed, what is written in the Washington Post, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had a much more logical and adequate strategic vision than Mark Milley and American advisers suggested. Why the discrepancy? I have already said that we have few forces. I think that the Americans decided that we could break through in one direction because they did not give us as many infantry fighting vehicles as they gave Morocco. Morocco was given 500 infantry fighting vehicles, we were given 100. Well... if we had 500 infantry fighting vehicles, maybe Mark Milley would have said: okay, attack in three directions. We have less of them. That is, the armored vehicles and shells that supported the offensive, the number of HIMARS missiles, were not enough, from the American point of view, to create the necessary density for a simultaneous offensive in three directions. The General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces realized this. Therefore, to disperse Russian troops, the concept of advancing in three directions was adopted to prevent the concentration and counteraction of all enemy forces in one place. This is a more adequate strategy. Why? Because we were attacking in very difficult conditions. We were attacking in conditions where the enemy was not inferior to us in any kind of weaponry. We had a certain amount of artillery shells. But not many times. And the enemy could also throw up shells, transfer them from other directions, and reinforce their troops. We had high-precision weapons, such as the HIMARS. The enemy had various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, aircraft missiles, air bombs, and helicopter missiles. They had a lot of weapons. In terms of high-precision weapons, the enemy was not inferior to us, but rather even slightly superior. We did not have any advantage in terms of defense equipment, as the Russians used armored vehicles for support. There was a lot of it in the area, and we had no advantage either. Personnel. The Russians were constantly moving reserves there, and they have reserves now thanks to mobilization. This is the main problem. The enemy's strength. The enemy's strength and the availability of reserves and our lack of numerical superiority over the enemy. That's why we have to use our infantry forces in addition to these small groups of 10 people in these positions - otherwise, we could not advance there. They can adjust their fire. And you have to hide from this fire. The smaller the group, the fewer people, the less equipment, the worse the enemy sees it. The later he reacts to it. Therefore, there are certain positions in this article, but they are not based on logic and facts. Unfortunately, this has to be said. Many things are not said here, and the article seems very politicized.
ASSESSMENT OF THE ACTIONS OF AMERICAN ADVISORS
To show why the leaders on the Ukrainian and American sides basically underestimated something here and why no one is responsible for it. Especially because the Americans are good, they say everything well, but they also bear no responsibility. I think that General Mark Milley should give some explanations for the actions of the American advisors after this article.
Then let's read what else is said there. The same block, let's go back.
A soldier of the 47th Brigade said that the Americans did not take into account the presence of a huge number of drones, fortifications, minefields, and the like, and did not even want to integrate the use of drones into the ready-made training programs.
"We had to improve our tactics during the battle itself," Joker said.
Here, unfortunately, I do not support Joker's criticism of our American colleagues. I do not support it completely. In this case, unfortunately, I'm sorry, but who is responsible for developing tactics? For the use of drones? The Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian military command. Not the Americans. Well, the Americans don't offer a drone training program in Germany. They do not have such small drones as Mavic, for example. So they can't give it, they don't use Chinese drones and volunteers don't arm them with drones. The state buys them from them. The state has not bought them, so there are no drones. And who is responsible for this? For the fact that the Americans did not teach tactics? It's on the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian command, when using the brigade, should have prepared it for a drone war, for the massive use of their drones and the enemy's drones. It is not the Americans who are responsible for this. Absolutely not. If the Americans didn't do something, then the 47th Brigade was commanded by the corps in which it was located and the operational-strategic group in which it was located - by specific Ukrainian commanders, and they were what?
General Mark Milley, the then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior officers involved in the planning of the offensive urged the Ukrainians to concentrate their forces in one key area... we saw it. Yes, it says at the end that President Zelenskyy was asked during a meeting with the NATO secretary general in late September why Ukraine continued to deploy so many forces to the East and not to the South, where the main offensive was developing, and Zelenskyy replied that if the Russians lost the East, they would lose the war.
THE OFFENSIVE IN THE SOUTH - A POLITICAL SOLUTION
Frankly speaking, this is a fragment of the article that is not commented on in any way. From my point of view, what I see now, and this Washington Post article, shows that both in Ukraine, in the leadership, and the United States, the offensive in the South was rather a political decision, in my opinion, on both sides. That is, to demonstrate that we can attack. That we can beat the Russians, that we can concentrate our superior forces somewhere, at least in some points. But in fact, there were heavy battles on this entire front in '23. Not only there, but in Zaporizhzhia. On the entire front. The enemy was advancing. Because the main goal of the enemy is not even to capture any territory. It is to undermine the combat capability of the Ukrainian army, and now the fight at the front is not for a landing. It's about eliminating the enemy personnel in this position. To undermine the combat capability of the company, battalion, or brigade, to force them to withdraw from the front. Then knock out the next one. That is, to undermine the enemy's combat potential. And the Russians act in the same way. They are trying to influence our reserves, our troops. And the positional war is going on along the entire front. And the offensive in Zaporizhzhia was a positional one. The same as the war along the entire front. It was no different. They attack everywhere in the same way. Just in smaller areas, with smaller forces. Small groups of infantry with small groups of armored vehicles. And in fact, the problem is that we were preparing for victories and breakthroughs, or at least announced victories and breakthroughs when the nature of the war and the strategy of the war is completely different. This is a positional war of attrition. And this is what it became in November 2022. More than a year ago. And unfortunately, this nature of the war was not understood by the Ukrainian top leadership, especially at the strategic level, which is the responsibility of Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy, the Supreme Command headquarters, which includes intelligence and all the heads of the defense forces. And as a result of this inadequate planning, we now see articles in the Washington Post where some generals point at other generals, telling them who did not take into account what was new... But in fact, there was nothing new during this offensive. All this was clear. Many military men had foreseen all this. For some reason, it was not taken into account. And why is it important for me to talk about this? Because we still do not have adequate conclusions. Not only from the offensive.
We have no conclusions from the loss of Soledar and Bakhmut, absolutely stupid losses. We had all the strength to hold these cities. Again, these were mistakes in planning and commanding the troops. At the highest level. The same failures are here. And now we don't have enough reserves to knock the enemy out of Avdiivka, for example, to knock the enemy out of Bakhmut, to knock the enemy out of Kupiansk and out of Lyman. Because we are planning by political methods, without taking into account the available forces and means, without analyzing the previous tactics that are needed in a modern war. Without planning modern procurement. This offensive was not driven by drones but by the number of shells. A large number of shells were fired - and what are the results of all this? A battle of attrition. The goal of war is not to walk a few kilometers now, the goal of war is to destroy the enemy's combat potential, to destroy his brigade, a certain number of soldiers and officers, and military equipment.
CONCLUSIONS
This is the real goal. Whoever wins this infantry war, this heavy, positional grind, whoever inflicts heavy losses on the enemy faster, wins this key. Therefore, unfortunately, we see that at the strategic level, in terms of planning, in terms of analysis of actions, in terms of the enemy's actions, this article in the Washington Post shows that neither the American advisers, generals, nor their Ukrainian counterparts, unfortunately, took into account many factors and were in a hurry to separate strategy from tactics. Unfortunately, this has now led to disappointment, and now the military elites of the two sides are trying to somehow fight each other. I think this is not constructive. If General Mark Milley wants to define his position on the war, he should not talk to Washington Post journalists, but write a report for official use, secretly, where it was clearly stated what was planned, what was taken into account, what was not taken into account, why he thinks so. And why, for example, he planned an offensive along one line, not three. All this must be recorded. Similarly, I hope that the Supreme Command should consider what happened in the south. Unfortunately, according to my information, the Supreme Command Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces have not conducted such an analysis of events at the strategic level. And this is essential so that you and I do not analyze Washington Post articles, but that our senior leaders speak, give a brief summary: such and such responsible for planning have been suspended, such and such have made conclusions, such and such, who, for example, despite failures in planning, achieved the goals, are noted, but there must be conclusions. And we don't have them. Those who planned and led this offensive remain in charge. They are still in charge of other critical areas of work. Similarly, those who took over Soledar and Bakhmut are also doing well in their critical areas of work. There are no changes. We don't analyze anything. We don't have any conclusions. Why? I'm just being bitterly ironic.
Unfortunately, this article shows that at the strategic level, there is no analysis of what is happening in Ukraine, the nature of the modern strategy of positional warfare, either in America or, unfortunately, in Ukraine. And this is the biggest problem that I worry about.
Thank you very much, friends, for this air. Thank you for being here, for listening, for hearing. For me, this broadcast is an opportunity to once again show everyone at the highest level, first of all, the Ukrainian command, Ukrainian politicians, because it is the President of Ukraine, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is responsible for the first appointment of personnel in all defense forces. Secondly, at the strategic level, the preparation of an analysis of what worked and what didn't, and planning for the next steps. Because war is not about the military, for example, being the starting point in a war. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief plans the use of resources, how many people the state mobilizes, how many resources the state mobilizes, how much money the state allocates for the production of ammunition and munitions, how much it actually makes these technological programs and supplies to the front. The political leadership of the country, which is responsible for defense, must give all this to the military in the first place. When they gave it to the military, they said, we give it for defense. For the offensive, you have to decide the first, second, third thing... after that, the military begins to plan its actions, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi cannot plan his actions alone if he does not know the schedule for supplying reserves to the front if he does not know what strategic reserves will be prepared in a year, two years... what will be the volume of ammunition supplies. Now we see that all these quarrels, when the servants of the people and Zelenskyy himself are trying to shift responsibility solely to the military, to Zaluzhnyi. The Americans are also pointing fingers at Zaluzhnyi, at the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Zaluzhnyi also point out that the President's Office has effectively destroyed the vertical command in the army, that there is no order, that the Americans do not provide all the ammunition that they give to Morocco, so to speak, and do not give at least as much to Ukraine. Now, I am very sorry, we are stuck in these quarrels and showdowns, instead of analyzing intellectually, first of all, to stay ahead of the enemy. We need to analyze what we have succeeded and what we have failed, what the next challenges are, and how to plan further actions. This is not there at all. And as a result, this article, this offensive in Zaporizhzhia region, all these quarrels, this article in the Washington Post. It's just an echo of the fact that strategic planning in war, unfortunately, is absent in our country. As a phenomenon. There are political ambitions. There are some political desires and instructions. Unfortunately, there is no result.
Why did this offensive happen at all and why did we walk those 9 kilometers? To Novoprokopivka. Why did we hold this front in the first place? Only for one main reason. Because Ukrainian soldiers are capable of attacking an enemy that outnumbers them... and significantly. And because a lot of Ukrainian brave men, unfortunately, gave their lives and lost their health during these difficult battles. But we certainly believe in those people who are at the front, in those who are defending Ukraine. And we believe much more strongly after those fierce battles. We believe that those people who do not see us now, who are in the trenches, in the cold. They are doing their best to fight off Russian drones and artillery. That is why today, more than ever, I am confident that with such heroes we will be able to find the right path and win our Victory.
Thank you, friends, for the stream. And glory to Ukraine!
