Mobilization and war-2024 – Butusov
About mobilization in 2024, which determines Ukraine’s strategy in the war and its prospects. It is the mobilization that determines the combat capability and defense capability of Ukraine and the entire situation at the front, the future of those who are now on guard in the cold trenches, on duty at the front lines.
People on the front lines, our infantry, are waiting for decisions that will allow them to increase rotations and give them vacations. They will allow us to replace tired people with new units. All this depends on mobilization. Any offensive, defense, or war is primarily about logistics. And logistics is the supply of people, the supply of munitions and supplies. It is the number of people that determines whether Ukraine can conduct any offensive, whether Ukraine can conduct any defense, whether these actions will be successful and effective. All this is calculated in advance. All these resources must be transferred by the state, transferred to the military. Of course, this issue is very, very painful. The wave of volunteers that entered the service in 2022, of course, cannot continuously perform difficult tasks on the front line. People have to replace the tired, the wounded, the dead. There must be a constant flow of new people to the army and defense forces. This requires high-quality defense planning. That is why there are such heated debates about mobilization at the end of the year.
PRESIDENT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR MOBILIZATION BY LAW
These disputes were highlighted by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, at his press conference. Zelenskyy said that the military was demanding the mobilization of an additional 500,000 people into the army. The president said that this would require an additional UAH 500 billion, that it was unclear where to get these people and where to get the money for this mobilization. He thus shifted the responsibility to the military. He said that the General Staff should submit some proposals again. So far, we have not heard of any proposals because it is already the New Year. That is, the government simply has not prepared a war strategy or mobilization strategy for 2024. What they were doing for two years and what the office of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is doing now is a rhetorical question. I have repeatedly written that the office of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has become a PR structure so that in the evening the president can say you know, we met, discussed something, everything will be fine. It turns out that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has been meeting weekly for two years, sometimes twice, and has not yet developed a mobilization strategy. I would like to say that according to the law on mobilization of Ukraine, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, the only person responsible for mobilization is the president, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This is a direct provision of the Constitution, a direct provision of the second section of the law on mobilization in Ukraine.
Unfortunately, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has failed to fulfill his duties and has now clumsily rolled over on the military. Then the following events took place.
CHANGES TO THE LAW ON MOBILIZATION
On December 25, very quietly, without any discussion, the Cabinet of Ministers proposed a draft law on mobilization. This draft law provides for a reduction in the conscription age from 27 to 25 years, an improvement of the military registration procedure for employees who are liable for military service and reservists, i.e., everyone must be registered and controlled. The third is to allow servicemen released from captivity to rest and rehabilitate, and to provide additional leave with pay for up to 90 days. Conscript military service is being eliminated completely. This means that all servicemen will be retired from active service. Those servicemen who have been on military service for the past 2 years will not be subject to call-up for military service during mobilization within 2 years from the date of discharge from military service. Well, that's the following- there is no talk of dismissal yet.
ABOUT THE LIMITEDLY FIT
Next. Exclusion from the list of conclusions of military medical commissions on limited fitness for military service. This is a very important point. There is a category in the army now. We all understand that these are now legal grounds. A person who has serious health problems can get the status of limited fitness, which does not allow them to be used in certain types of combat operations. For example, on the front line, in the infantry, on the ground. Obviously, a significant number of people take advantage of this. A large number of people in the army absolutely deserve this status, because not everyone can afford to sit in a trench in the cold, in the mud, because people have real health restrictions. But on the other hand, it must be said that this term of limited fitness is also used by a significant number of people who do not want to perform tasks but are healthy. Now this very important norm is being removed altogether. A person is either fit or unfit. If you are fit, then it is at the discretion of the commander what tasks you will be involved in.
TRAINING OF THE MOBILIZATION RESERVE
Next. Introduction of basic general military training for citizens of Ukraine, for all, for up to 3 months, for all citizens aged 18 to 25 years at educational institutions. That is, for the first time, the formation of a mobilization training reserve is determined. This is something we have never had before on such a scale. Let me remind you that conscription in Ukraine has so many restrictions and so many people have legal grounds for not doing conscription that only a very small percentage of people actually serve every year. Next. Introduction of optional basic military service up to the age of 25 for those who have not completed general basic military training - a person wants to sign up for a contract right away, for example, after receiving a passport. Restrictions on the rights of Ukrainian citizens who evade military registration and military service. That is, a certain set of restrictions on rights, and a coercive mechanism is introduced here. That is, if you do not participate in all these activities that the state determines, then automatic restrictions on your rights will arise.
ABOUT THE ELECTRONIC DATABASE
Next. Involvement of administrative service centers, employment centers and recruitment centers in military recruitment activities. That is, those government agencies that interact with citizens, have access to databases and are necessarily used by citizens for public services are involved in mobilization. Thus, their database becomes a database for the work of recruitment centers, i.e., simply military commissariats. It is also proposed that conscripts, persons liable for military service and reservists can send draft notices to the territorial military recruitment center via e-mail. That is, it is simplified, and military commissariats no longer need to run after recruits, but simply everyone who contacts the state, who is included in the database, has their own conscript account created and a draft notice is sent to the registered phone number, which the person must fulfill. And the draft law must stipulate liability for failure to appear at the military commissariat.
LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR AT THE MILITARY COMMISSARIAT
In other words, if a person fails to report to the military commissariat, law enforcement agencies have legal grounds to search for the person, bring the person in forcibly and hold the person liable for that. Therefore, the draft law is very tough, very tough. It raises a lot of questions. It is not clearly drafted. But it is obvious that there is a war going on, and now it is impossible to continue the war without coercive measures, without high-quality mobilization. People are not iron, they need to be strengthened. They need to be constantly replenished. Therefore, of course, if we are talking about a draft law, do we need a draft law on mobilization, on strengthening measures with coercive measures, with everything? Friends, surely yes.
ABOUT ROTATIONS
I was recently at the front, in one area near Bakhmut. I can tell you about a significant shortage of infantrymen. The frontline is held together by people of stamina who, despite their physical limitations, still go to the front line and serve at the front line.These are not outcasts, like in the Russian army, who are simply bought for money and need to be paid at any cost. These are conscious people. People who can find a job in civilian life, who are well aware of the risks. But I want to tell you... I talked to an infantryman, he is one of the real heroes, a very famous hero in his brigade. He took part in the assault, a man who had been at the front line for a whole year. He was in the infantry. In the area of Bakhmut. For a year. Just imagine. He was on vacation for 10 days in a year. All this time he was performing tasks on the front line. For 4 months this year, he did not receive any rotation from the front line, as did his entire company. Once every two weeks he went to the neighboring town to wash up. In the evening. And in the morning he was back at his positions. He slept after 3-4 days at the front line, he slept about a kilometer away from these positions in a dugout. That's the way of war. I asked him: what is your dream? And he is a motivated guy. He is very motivated, educated, and understands and deeply feels the war. He says: "My dream is to get my leg severely wounded. He says I will never leave my positions and my comrades-in-arms, I think it is rude to leave the front because of some physical limitations or illness. I will never do that. Even if I am sick, I will still be at the front line. But, I say, a serious injury would allow me to honestly be in the rear and get some sleep and rest. Because it is very difficult to live in this mode, despite the fact that he is a young man. And a person needs rest. 10 days in a year of war in the infantry is absolutely unacceptable. This leads to the fact that a person loses fear. He simply stops being afraid of the threat. It is not a matter of endurance. A person simply stops being afraid. They become a target for the enemy. It can no longer perform combat missions with high quality. Therefore, it is necessary to increase rotations. Rotations are impossible without a reserve of personnel. Therefore, increased mobilization is absolutely necessary. And we must now discuss not whether the draft law is needed. We need to discuss how to implement this mobilization effectively and competently. How many people need to be mobilized. What these people should do. How to ensure that this mobilization is supported by society? How to make sure that the state finally starts using people wisely? What the state is not doing now.
HOW MOBILIZATION SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED
How do we stop using people as disposable material? Unfortunately, this is happening in many places. So this is the main topic of today's broadcast. And now I'm going to share my thoughts on how to make mobilization effective. How to give at least a logic to this mobilization and what the state should do so that this mobilization leads to the strengthening of Ukraine, and not just to the fact that... now there will be such a showy campaign and that's it.
What is the biggest threat? Unfortunately, we have a lot of imitations. There are a lot of cargo cults. We have a lot of people in power who feel like actors, who read some texts from the screen that some speechwriter writes to them and do not think about the words and the consequences of these words. What is the threat of this draft law on mobilization?
First. The government does not want to take responsibility for mobilization. The servants of the people want the General Staff to be in charge of mobilization exclusively. That is, all the negativity, all the criticism was directed not at politicians, but at the military. That's why the president, who, by law, should have said: mobilization should be like this, like that, and talk about it every day in his evening videos. The president did not do this. And some incomprehensible text-it was difficult to understand Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the press conference, but he simply did not even articulate what he was proposing. He is the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, is the chairman of Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Instead, they organized Zaluzhnyi's press conference. Zaluzhnyi, in fact, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, said about the same thing, only more logically and clearly, that he is not politically responsible for this draft law. That people are needed, a certain number. But it is the state's responsibility to calculate the number because the state has a financial resource and calculates it. The state controls demographic indicators, how many people there are, who can be mobilized from which sector of the economy, for example. And the state has to do it. That is, Zelenskyy did not say anything substantive about how to do this. Zaluzhnyi did not say how to do the mobilization in essence. And then the Cabinet of Ministers, with absolutely no announcements, no press conferences at all, the Prime Minister did not come out, said nothing, proposed a draft law and submitted it to the Verkhovna Rada. The Cabinet of Ministers does not explain any of the provisions of this law in any way. The Verkhovna Rada says: we are seeing it for the first time, and does not explain any of the provisions of this law. And all the politicians who were voted in by the voters, who are paid by the voters, by the taxpayers, to deal with mobilization issues, pretend that they have nothing to do with it and do not know how to deal with it. We will figure it out ourselves, friends.
I will now briefly summarize my opinion, and then I will answer your questions. I would like to thank the sponsors of the Butusov-plus channel, 1459 sponsors at the moment, almost 1,500. Some people made maximum donations of up to UAH 12 thousand per month. Now we have a significant number of people. They donate 3 thousand UAH per month. Some people donate 50 or 100 UAH a month. I want to tell you that this is a very big support for the channel. This is an opportunity for us to work properly, to broadcast regularly. As you can see, now I try to do it as often as possible, both reports and videos. All this is thanks to your support. So I thank everyone who helps, who becomes a sponsor and who continues to support the channel. First of all, we will answer all the questions of those people. Those who are with us all the time.
So, dear friends, on mobilization. It is impossible to make mobilization popular. But mobilization must be made effective. First of all, it must be understood. It must be realized. It can be implemented if it is first understood by society. And here we need communication. The president, the prime minister, they should not hide their heads in the sand like ostriches. They should initiate the discussion. Because it is important. First of all, mobilization means convincing people who are not yet in the army that they need to be in the army. Not just those who are going to join. We need to convince the heads of enterprises, businesses, and services where these people work that they need to let their employees go. Instead of businesses going to another country and taking everyone with their families across the border, buying certificates, as is still being done thanks to the total corruption of our state apparatus. That is, we must be clear in this mobilization. Unfortunately, this is not the case. This was the first thing.
TO MOBILIZE 500 THOUSAND
Second. Mobilization cannot be done without coercion. But we have to show the purpose - why, how. The volunteers held the first wave. Then we mobilized people, and they withstood the most difficult two years, destroying the enemy. Now, to find human resources, we need to take people from the real sector of the economy. We need to take a large number of people who pay taxes, who do important things that are needed, but they need to be sent to the front. What does this coercion mean? That the human resource is not infinite. There are no unlimited numbers of people. In my opinion, 500 thousand, what the General Staff is talking about, is basically the maximum we can do at one time. We can call up 500 thousand people once. Moreover, not all at once, but within a year, I think, or maybe even a year and a half. Because this is a complex organizational process. It cannot happen the way it happened in February of 2022, when there were just lines of people demanding weapons. This will not happen. There will be no such mobilization. The state does not need to prepare for February 2022. You have to be prepared by the age of 24. Different rules. Different logic. And now you need to understand not just that the state wants to take away a certain number of people. We need to understand why the state wants to take this number of people. What should the army be like? What should the army do with this number of people? Should it create a number of new brigades? Is it to be made up of new people without commanders? Or to replenish the existing brigades with commanders? Does the state want to attack and we need a lot of stormtroopers with machine guns and shovels, or do we really need to conduct a positional war? Modern positional warfare. In order to outnumber the enemy, so that our goal is to destroy the enemy as much as possible and minimize our own losses as much as possible. That is, are we in favor of territory or are we in favor of destroying the enemy army? What are our priorities? What is our organizational staffing structure? What military specialties are the mobilized people involved in? On which front, what exactly should they do? Now that the full-scale war has been going on for two years, the main problem is not to fill the army with a lot of people in uniform and then look for someone to become an assaultman and sit on the frontline. Today, the main problem of the army is that our army does not yet know how to adapt its model of organization to the modern requirements of war. First of all, what President Zelenskyy should demand from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Zaluzhnyi, is an organizational and staff structure, a combat model, which requires a certain organization, a certain number of people to be mobilized, a certain number of positions to be closed. This could have been written down a long time ago, with the number of people needed for each position. A certain training system. Because unprepared people are no longer needed in war. They are not needed at all. Certain weapons that these people should receive. Certain tasks that people have to perform. New tactics. New principles of using troops that allow us to really protect people and allow them to perform tasks for a long time, and not be disposable. For a couple of months. That's the question.
Next, the provision of these people. How it can be done. Now we see that we have no defense planning. Finance Minister Marchenko, when he heard about the mobilization, made a statement that he expected the General Staff to tell him where to find sources of funding for the mobilization. This is probably only in Ukraine where you can hear such an anecdote: the Minister of Finance of the government responsible for mobilization, the government that proposes the draft law on mobilization - think about it - the Prime Minister signs the draft law on mobilization, and the Minister of Finance of this Prime Minister says: you know, I don't know where to get the money, let the military look for it. So maybe we can somehow reduce the government and the president's office and send them to the front, reorganize them. And will the General Staff decide everything? Mobilization - the General Staff. Where to find money - the General Staff. How to mobilize the economy - the General Staff. There is complete anarchy in the government, in the authorities. Everyone is afraid of mobilization. They are afraid that it will have a bad impact on someone's rating. And no one wants to make an intellectual effort to explain to people how it should be done. It's a paradox.
In my opinion, the first thing the president should do is what the government should do. I have already said it. I will repeat it. Communication.
Second. The General Staff should not hold press conferences but provide a clear organizational structure of the army for a specific type of combat. Now it is obvious - for positional warfare, which should involve holding our positions and creating the preconditions for an offensive. Stopping the Russian offensive. Creating preconditions for our offensive. That is positional defense. They must clearly present the number of positions, the number of stormtroopers, the number of infantrymen, relatively speaking, the number of scouts, the number of aerial reconnaissance men, drone operators. These are now the main means of destruction and reconnaissance. That is, drones are now a new kind of troops, which I am sure will be formalized soon. And all of this requires a number of artillerymen, tankers, maintainers - all of this needs to be assigned. This is what we need to demand from the General Staff. The General Staff must show a model of war. Instead of going to press conferences and convincing someone that mobilization is necessary, so that, God forbid, people do not think negatively about the government. This is such a kindergarten. You guys are in the president's office. You've been in a large-scale war for two years, you've been in power for five years, can't you start taking your responsibilities seriously? Stop hiding. Mobilization will not be done by anyone other than the president and the government. There are no such structures. If you can't do it yourself, then transfer power to someone else. Say: we are not able to do it, let someone else do it. This is not the way to do it now. This is a real clown show. Mobilization is a serious issue. We are starting a year, and we don't know how many people will be mobilized and how. We cannot plan anything. Therefore, mobilization is necessary. But in a modern war, people need to be mobilized not just for war. We need to mobilize for victory. And how can this be done? This requires all available human resources, and they must be clearly structured. And we need to structure not only those who go to the army. Ukraine needs to mobilize all citizens who can fight, who can help the war, who can create weapons and supplies for the army. This is what is needed. Mobilization must be general. But it should be general not only to the front, to the front line. It should also be a general mobilization to the factory, to the economy. Even to pay taxes. This also requires mobilization. To work and fulfill the task of supplying the front. We need mobilization. Full mobilization. But here, mobilization is perceived only in one way. Mobilization means that you are given a rifle, a shovel and sent to the front line. Unfortunately, we have the Ministry of Defense, Minister Umierov...
WHERE HAS MINISTER UMIEROV DISAPPEARED TO?
By the way, I want to tell you that Minister Umierov has disappeared from the discussion about mobilization. I forgot to say, it's very funny. You know, we have a defense minister, Rustem Umierov. It turns out that we actually have him. But he is not involved in the discussion about mobilization. It's strange, really. The law stipulates that he is responsible for defense policy. But he is not there. Zelenskyy is speaking. The Cabinet of Ministers. Zaluzhnyi even came to the press conference. But Defense Minister Umierov did not attend the press conference. And he does not comment. He does not give his proposals for mobilization. That's why we have a lot of such evaders of responsibility, I would say. First, there are evaders in the government. And then those in power are afraid of why these evaders appear on the streets and evade the responsibility to defend the country. Well, because that's the way the responsibility is connected. Someone is evading their responsibilities. And unfortunately, this is happening from the top down. So what do we need, in my opinion? This is a discussion, so please, I would be happy to hear criticism. I believe that all citizens we have in the country should be registered. Those who are physically and psychologically capable of participating in any actions to defend the homeland. There are a lot of such actions. For example. Yesterday I was at a drone production facility. I was at the production of attack drones. I walked into the enterprise and what did I see? 95% of the employees who work there are boys and girls in their 20s. What do they do? Girls, for example? They solder microcircuit chips, solder contact points. The guys also assemble these drones very well. Very high quality, professional, students. That is, they find time, allocate time, and not only assemble them, but even get paid for their work. And they do their work well. These are young people. By law, they are not subject to mobilization. But they assemble drones with high quality. And then drone operators can use these drones to inflict real damage on the enemy. They still have a few years to go before they are mobilized, even under the new law, but they are already working. And they are working for the defense. And they are doing the things necessary for defense. Similarly, there are many other areas, for example, in the field of supply, in production, even in sewing uniforms, where even elderly people can participate and help the army. People can repair cars. This is very important.
To repair equipment and cars. This does not require mobilizing people, putting on uniforms and going to the front line. The state must realize that it must take control of all forms of possible participation of people. Now, for example, they are doing something very stupid. They are completely disbanding the volunteer formations of territorial communities. They want to send a few tens of thousands more people to become stormtroopers in the army. This is actually a partially understandable, correct logic. There are some people in the voluntary formation of a territorial community (VFTC) who, in fact, can fight, but who are there because they don't need to be there. There is a certain logic. But in reality, the VFTC is a great mechanism that allows the state to save what? Money. In other words, VFTCs are on-site volunteer formations consisting of representatives of territorial communities, people who work and live locally and can perform important tasks that need to be done there. For example, we have VFTCs performing tasks, many VFTCs, in air defense. They destroy enemy drones, they are on duty, they fight against... protecting various facilities. And this is beneficial for the state. People live near their homes, live at their own expense, receive a minimum salary from the state, and at the same time perform tasks. That is, they are a reserve. At the same time, a significant part of the people in these VFTCs will not be drafted anyway, because they are active duty officers, for example, with armor. They still cannot be mobilized. I want to tell you that we have a VFTC that hunts for shaheds. It includes several Supreme Court judges. In fact, people fulfill their tasks in good faith and go on duty. Is it necessary to do this? Of course it is necessary. Why mobilize everyone and turn people from taxpayers into salary recipients, which, as we hear from the Minister of Finance, we already lack. Therefore, we need a general register of people. We need to define tasks in the rear, on the border. We need to define the tasks for the assignment - aerial reconnaissance, construction, maintainers. You have to do all this, to see. And then you have to think about whether all these people should be drafted into the army on a salary. Or maybe we should stop sending service station repairmen to the infantry and mobilize them all, for example, to some VFTCs and make them obliged to repair a certain amount of equipment for certain military units in their workshops. It would be more profitable for the state. People will stay in their jobs. They earn their own money and at the same time use their industrial base and their competencies to repair equipment for the state - isn't that more profitable? Isn't it beneficial to offer all students, for example, young people who want to do this, who have the opportunity, who have physical and intellectual abilities, to be offered a job in military production? With part-time employment, so that they still have time to study? Isn't it reasonable? I saw girls in their 20s sitting at a drone factory, soldering contact points. The quality is high. They learned quickly. Why do you need the military to assemble these drones at the front? People can do it in the rear. A large number of them.
What am I talking about, friends? Our problem is not that we cannot mobilize anyone. The main problem of our state is that we do not understand how to use the available human resources. And everyone is looking for stormtroopers in modern warfare, where the main means of destruction are drones, control systems, power supply systems, optoelectronic reconnaissance systems, combat vehicles. And all this mass of equipment requires professional technical personnel in the first place. If we have builders, for example, we need to constantly equip construction facilities. We have a 2,000-kilometer border with the Russian Federation. We have to build everywhere, constantly build new shelters, false positions, reserve positions, main positions. We have to strengthen our positions. Repair the destroyed ones. To build new ones. This is a continuous process. We need several lines of fortifications along the entire border line at the front. And what is happening here? We do not have military construction companies and organizations or private companies that would be involved in equipping positions on a systematic basis. For example, we have two state-owned enterprises in our gas transportation system. They have their own construction companies. They employ 1,500 workers. Instead of pipelines, they can be involved in partial - I'm not talking about full-time - employment. Mobilize them as part of their own companies. Not in the army with a machine gun. But to have them constantly digging fortifications. And this will save a much larger number of lives of soldiers who are already serving. Those who have already been mobilized. This is saving resources for the long term. This is what we need. We do not have this. They are looking for anyone to join the infantry. What is the use of infantry? Do they dig in these equipped positions? No. Unfortunately, the enemy's positions are much better equipped. They mobilize state and private companies, pay money and dig stationary fortifications. Why don't we do this? Because we don't have mobilization. We have a law - what is our law on mobilization? This is a law that says how we can, with minimal effort, force a certain number of people who apply to administrative service centers, who are officially employed, who can be registered in the database, how we can force a certain number of these people into the army. Well, it's not a problem. It is possible. Of course it is possible. It will mean even fewer taxpayers, even worse for business. There is a war going on, something has to be sacrificed. People will go to the army. But what will be the result? They will come once, and then what? People quickly exhausted, lose their health, lose their lives, and unfortunately, they give their lives for the country. That's why we can't fight the way we used to fight.
ALTERNATIVE AND AIM OF MOBILIZATION
We have to change the system of not just mobilization. We need to change the system of training, organization of troops, use of troops, and tactics. Then mobilization will be effective. Because the purpose of mobilization is not to force people into the army, but to win the war and use the available human resources efficiently. This is the purpose of mobilization. In our country, mobilization is a law to catch someone else and send them to the front line with a week or two of training. Very dubious quality training, by the way.
We need a systematic approach. Not to mobilization. To conducting the war. This is what the state leadership does not understand. Instead of working out systemic approaches to the changes that should be made before the war, we are looking for opportunities to catch someone on the street, force them to come in or issue a draft notices so that they cannot get away with it. We'll last another year. It's good if you can last a year like that. And what will happen next? The war will continue even more... There must be a logic for why you are taking people out of the economy. You can and should do it strictly. But why? This answer is why? What will be the future of war? What should be the modern structure of the army? The state and the authorities do not understand and do not have all this. But it should develop it. And it can be done quickly enough. We still have a large army. There are thousands of military units. They are everywhere. Of course, there are not enough people anywhere. Because everywhere you need a bunch of competent commanders, sergeants, and funding. Well, we don't have that. We need to reduce the management apparatus. The military-administrative apparatus, so that there are resources for combat units. We need to think about this. We need to work on it. We have an active front line of 800 kilometers. 800! We are not fighting the Russian Federation from Bakhmut to Vladivostok. We are fighting on the frontline of 800 kilometers. And we need to think about how long we are going to the front for 800 kilometers - this is business logic, there should be business administration, management is needed in war. For these 800 kilometers, a certain number of defense lines and strongholds need to be opened during the year. This is all quickly calculated. A certain number of drones must be stationed. There must be a certain number of surveillance camera operators. Artillerymen, tankers, scouts, supply vehicles, evacuation vehicles. Everything can be calculated long ago. And we have a war like a collective farm. A huge number of brigades have been created, which are trained during combat operations and, due to the lack of personnel, simply do not have time to even learn. Because of this, the quality of management is low. That's why we lose people quickly. This is the problem. It's not a problem of catching these losses, but a problem of reducing these losses through quality solutions. This is the problem to solve. And of course, if we are talking about mobilization. This is a very important issue. This is a question for Zaluzhnyi, the Minister of Defense - the quality of command personnel. We need to look at what kind of commanders, commanders of the operational strategic groups and the operational-tactical groups, are the ones who are suffering such heavy losses and why? Are these heavy losses justified? Is it not the result of poor planning, lack of effective intelligence, defeat of the enemy, or incorrect use of drones, insufficient attention to the use of drones, lack of engineering support for the equipment of positions. This may have something to do with it. We need to promote team personnel.
Finance Minister Marchenko says there is no money. President Zelenskyy says there is no money. And the money is really big. How do you manage it? Who are the main people on whom your financial situation and life depend? We always say a lot of words about people - people, we need to pay attention to people. Let's look at money. How is the situation in the army managed in general? The army is actually a corporation, too. Business logic works there, just like in any process in life. Why is it so important to replace and assess the competence of commanders? It is because the commander is the person on whom these financial resources depend in the first place. Along with lives. A life is a unit commander's equity. Let's see how a unit commander manages it. In many cases.
THE COST OF PROVIDING FOR ONE SOLDIER
For example, let's look at how much the war costs financially and how much a life at war costs. To train a soldier, to mobilize a soldier to serve, you need to spend several hundred thousand hryvnias on his maintenance. Several hundred thousand for his provision. A few tens of thousands to arm him. And then, if this person is used incorrectly and dies due to poor training, incorrect tactics, poor management, and shortcomings in weapons. The state assumes a liability of UAH 15 million for the deceased. A company of 100 people, let's say it's 10 people, is 150 million, 100 people, a company, is 15 billion hryvnias. If these people die. A battalion - the cost of living in a battalion is about 10 billion, the maintenance of a battalion per month, even if we count 100 thousand people, is about 10 million in salary fund alone. And with supplies, weapons, it will be about 20 million. Imagine that some many such corporations and businesses can cause billions, tens of billions in damage to themselves. And who do we put in charge of such structures? A structure that can suffer losses of 10 billion, which has a cash turnover of only 60 million UAH in salaries. UAH 60-70 million in one battalion is just wage fund and welfare funds. It's a huge amount of money. And who is in charge? Who do we trust with these funds? Do we entrust people's lives to the Commissariat? Could these people even make a business career, are they leaders? Are they even capable of governance?
That's why we need to pay attention to recruitment. We have serious problems with this. Unfortunately, the problem of commanders' responsibility is a burning issue. Unfortunately, we think about the responsibility of soldiers and the responsibility of recruits. And these are actually all interrelated things. Responsibility should be at all levels. From the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to the soldier. Then it works as a system. And no one evades. And if there is evasion from above, then there will always be evasion from below.
IS TIME PLAYING IN RUSSIA'S FAVOUR?
What do we have on the issues? Stollen 1983: Obviously, the mobilization potential of the Russian Federation is ten times greater. Even if we recruit 500,000 in a year, which I doubt given the current resistance to mobilization, don't you think that time is globally playing in Russia's favor?
Friends, this is a very good question. I would like to tell you that time always plays in favor of the one who is more effective and more combat-ready. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had an absolute advantage in everything, and yet in 10 years it lost the war and was forced to leave Afghanistan. Therefore, for us, the possibility of resistance should be measured not in terms of the number of people, but in terms of quality and superiority in the organization of combat operations. This is the main thing. Russia cannot mobilize an infinite number of people. It can only mobilize a certain number. Putin mobilized 300 thousand. Why? Because he simply could not do more. They could have mobilized a million, but they just don't have more. There are no supplies, no communications, no weapons. There is no management, no command staff. They simply cannot do more. That is why Russia really needs to understand that modern warfare is not a war of quantity against quantity alone. First of all, it is a war of quality. Losses can be smaller. Much less than the enemy. But this requires the systemic solutions I mentioned. We have 800 kilometers of the frontline. We do not need to be stronger than the Russian Federation everywhere. We are not fighting near Moscow. We need to be strong on the 800-kilometer front. Are we able to fight the Russian Federation on the 800-kilometer front? We are capable. How much time? Quite a long time. But only if we do not lose people, and do not "waste" people. If we exchange 1 to 1 with the Russians, then yes, the mobilization potential will work. And if we realize our intellectual potential, the motivation of our people, to outperform the enemy in the quality of management, not in the quality of lies, to outperform the enemy in the quality of defensive structures, in the quality of drone control and the number of drones, in the use of our artillery and missiles, in the use of our infantry, in the training of fighters, to reduce losses at all levels, especially non-combat losses, if we outperform the enemy in the mobilization of our people for war, then in fact this potential will not work. Russia is not going to get all together and come here. It is impossible. It is physically impossible. We need to understand that this is a holding warfare. In this positional warfare, you need to be more effective than the enemy and inflict losses on the enemy, at least 3-4 times greater than ours. In modern warfare, drones can be used to plan enemy losses and to plan to reduce our own losses. That is, ensuring high-quality control of drones will allow the enemy to inflict damage that will simply destroy the combat capability of Russian troops. And this advantage in numbers will not work. That's all.
Next question.
Hennadii. Thank you for your support, Hennadii, it's a pleasure. Thank you for supporting the channel. What is your opinion on the age threshold for mobilization in 60-year-olds?
I believe that mobilization can be possible in principle if a person is in his or her place and is up to 70 years old, even more, if this person is needed. But where exactly? I'll tell you frankly, I've met infantrymen at the age of 60, 59, 58, 60 at the front. It is very difficult. You don't need to be an infantryman at that age. And it is impossible to put people in charge at that age. The stress on the front line is very high. I was at one of the frontline areas. There, I had to walk 4 kilometers in the mud to the frontline, then spend 3 days on duty, and then return. Unfortunately, there was one man, 60 years old. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack. A good motivated man. A good man. He wanted to fight, an honest patriot. You just have health, your body, you can't deceive it. But there are many specialties. Not front line, not the trenches, where people are needed. Mobilization does not necessarily mean 60 thousand people and a military ticket to the infantry, to the assault forces. A person in his 60s or even 70s can be a high-quality engineer, planner, administrator, and thus do incredibly important work, having competencies that 20- to 30-year-olds do not have. And in this way, younger people can be freed up. To free them to fulfill the tasks. So of course, but mobilization for what? Again, it doesn't have to be to the army. It can be mobilization to the VFTC, mobilization to government agencies. Therefore, I believe that in principle, the 60-year mobilization threshold is possible for the army. I want to tell you that I know one of our outstanding artillerymen who has long since passed the age threshold in the army. But he is still serving. And he is serving very effectively. Because this person with his knowledge, competence, is a unique specialist in the army. Nobody else can do his administrative and managerial work except him. Therefore, once again, this is the question, Hennadii, it concerns what we see, it is not in the question, because you look, you read the discussion about mobilization, there are no questions, but mobilization where. Mobilization to where is the key question. We have to give each person, according to their competence, their age, the tasks that they can perform. If it is a very young person, 20 years old, 25 years old, should they serve? Absolutely. But they should receive very high-quality training. A young man at the front is very important and necessary. Any young person. But this young man needs to be trained in war, so that he can live a long time, so that he can fight well, so that he is not afraid, so that he does not get psychological combat stress when he goes to the combat zone. Therefore, we need young people who will have extensive training. And do you need people aged, for example, 60? What kind of training? They need minimal training. They need to be used according to their skills, abilities, and capabilities. In fact, there is a lot of such work in the army. And not in the army, but there is also a lot of work for defense. In my opinion, the presence of a person if he is not mobilized to the army but is mobilized to industry makes it possible to save the state budget. I want to tell you, the example of the service station masters is just a horror. Why should people be mobilized into the army? A person has his own workshop and equipment. He earns his own money. Why are you mobilizing him into the army? Mobilize him to work for the army. Assign him to a brigade, let him sit there, in the rear anyway, and they will just drive a lot of cars there. And that's it. He will work with them. Because this is a big problem. Why mobilize people for this? A certain number of repairmen on the front line are needed for the equipment, but most repairs should still be done in the rear, where there is equipment.
MOBILIZATION OF THOSE WHO ARE ABROAD
Next, teleskOp: how to attract people from abroad, can people go through military training and serve?
Friends, I don't know how to attract people from abroad. I'll be honest with you. This question again depends on the grounds on which a person is abroad, what are the possibilities of being summoned, how these people are motivated to come and what kind of service they will perform. This is the main thing. If the question is not how our politicians ask, but how can we send people back from abroad, or mobilize them while they are still there, bring them here and go forward. I think this will be a failed approach. But if it is a systematic approach, people who are citizens of Ukraine, who are registered in all state databases, will be contacted, the draft notices will be forwarded, people will understand their place - why, where they will do what, what training they will receive, how they will be used, I am sure that a significant number of people will receive such draft notices even abroad, and will use the account of the reservist that all citizens of Ukraine have to receive. It will work. Maybe not 100%, maybe a percentage.
Thank you, next question. Beluck: Please comment on Zaluzhnyi's press conference.
I want to say, friends, that Zaluzhnyi's press conference is... for some reason, the President's Office decided that the issue of mobilization is so unpopular, so bad, it will bring down the rating so much that it should be commented on by someone who has a higher rating than President Zelenskyy himself, i.e., the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Zaluzhnyi. Why should it be Zaluzhnyi? Frankly speaking, the question is completely barking up the wrong tree. We need to ask Zaluzhnyi, as I have already said. It is to the wrong quarter. That is, Zaluzhnyi should receive a specific resource from the state and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should ask him how he will not lose these people, how he will best prepare them for the tasks and how he will best use them to inflict losses on the enemy, at least 4-5 times greater. This is what to ask Zaluzhnyi. All of this was not present at the press conference. That's why these were diplomatic conversations. On the positive side, Valerii Zaluzhnyi communicates with journalists correctly, unlike President Zelenskyy. He treats people with respect, and is not rude to anyone. And in general, his thoughts sound coherent. Because our president cannot speak without a piece of paper. Zelenskyy, if no one wrote him a text, is just a completely unrelated phrase that has no logic. So it was nice to hear this in contrast. But, frankly, Zaluzhnyi did not say anything serious about mobilization, if you look at it. It's a political courtesy. Well, okay, nice. Nothing systemic was said there and, to be honest, could not have been said. How can the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine be responsible for an issue for which he is not legally responsible? He can't. Can he talk about operations? He can't. So, yes... It's good that it happened, it's good that Zaluzhnyi did not hide like Zelenskyy and Shmyhal, for example, and Umierov. And he came out. Well, okay. We saw that he was not afraid. He fulfills the task set by the president. Let's hope that the president will also someday fulfill the tasks assigned to him by the Constitution, for which he receives money from taxpayers.
ABOUT DEMOBILIZATION
Yes, the following. Maxym Mochyk. 36 months is too long for mobilization. What is your opinion?
Oh, friends. I think so. There will be no demobilization. Frankly speaking, it is even impossible. Demobilization during an all-out war means that people who have gained combat experience will simply be lost by the army, and then others will gain this experience with much blood. I don't think Ukraine needs demobilization. We need a high-quality use of people. People need to be protected. To do this, people need to be given significant vacations. If you have served for 1 year, you get 1 month of vacation, 2 years - 2 months, 3 years - 3 months. That's about it. Maybe even more. You need to give normal rotations so that people don't just physically "burn out". In our country, the issue of demobilization is a matter of physical survival. Because a person can be just exhausted. Constantly being at the front line in many units, lack of rotation, lack of reserves for replacement - this leads to the fact that demobilization is the only opportunity for people to sleep, rest, recover because otherwise, they will not get such an opportunity. I think we just need to look at the experience of how it was done in the First and Second World Wars in many armies of developed countries - the United States, Britain, Germany, for example. The organization of the army itself. This was already in the world. In order for people to stay and physically and psychologically fulfill their tasks, they were given a significant number of rotations, vacations, transferred from combat units to training units for a certain period of time, so that a person could live in the rear, in the city, train new recruits, share their combat experience, finish work at 6:00 p.m. and go home to their families. This is how it should be done. Because a person cannot work in war forever. They need to be used in periods. Then you have to give them periods of recovery. Then it will be normal. And we have 36 months for demobilization. Friends, I want to tell you that 36 months is like a well-known parable, it's never 3 years for demobilization. But this is just about nothing at all. These are empty words. I want to tell you that the government, which says such populist things about demobilization, will not fulfill these obligations. It is impossible to physically demobilize people. Experienced personnel are needed in the army. But they are not needed indefinitely at the front line. These are people who should have normal rest, normal conditions of service. Their experience and competencies should be used in the rear for training in instructor work, in staff work, including management work. And people have to go to the front for a certain period of time. And in Ukraine, when I arrived at the front, we had brigades that had been on the front line for two years without rotation. And there are categories of people who are constantly going to the front line. This is impossible. It is impossible. It should not be like this. Therefore, for people, the issue of demobilization is a matter of their own salvation, of physical survival, because otherwise, the body will not be able to withstand it. This is what we have to fight against. With this problem.
I think there will be a lot of questions, a lot of criticism, and comments. We will start discussing this crucial topic in the new year. I would like to thank everyone who has been with Butusov Plus, supported it throughout the year, and helped us. Let me remind you that 1459 sponsors support the channel's work. It is a great honor for me and for our team. Thank you, my friends. And thanks to the Ukrainian soldiers, thanks to those infantrymen who really need mobilization the most, who do not hear us now because they are sitting somewhere in holes, hiding from shelling, from drones. They are sitting at the front line, in the cold, in the mud. They endure all this because they are confident that somewhere in the rear, civil society and the government will find the best opportunities to mobilize professionally, to reorganize the army for victory, to reduce losses, to improve the conditions of combat operations and to ensure that we move to victory as quickly as possible. I am confident that we have sufficient intelligence and motivation. We have enough intelligence and motivation to do it all. We will keep pushing. If the government does not understand something, civil society will help. So, dear friends, thank you for this difficult year of war, for your support, and I will see you in the new year of 2024. Today, more than ever, I am confident in Ukraine's victory. Thank you very much. Glory to Ukraine.
