Target №1: How state frames arms manufacturers
In recent days, Russians have carried out two of the most massive attacks on Ukraine since the start of the full-scale invasion.
On 29 December, Russians launched more than 120 missiles of various types and more than 20 drones at infrastructure and residential areas of Ukrainian cities. On 2 January, Ukrainian air defence forces destroyed 72 enemy air targets, including 10 X-47M2 Kinzhal aerial ballistic missiles.
The attack on 29 December killed 29 Kyiv residents. There were also casualties on 2 January.
But if we know about casualties, at least civilian casualties, we know about them. While the government speaks out loud about hits to maternity hospitals, high-rise buildings, shopping centres, and if we can guess about the damage to critical infrastructure by the lack of electricity, water and heat in our homes, we never know the details about the damage to military targets.
This text will also not be about what was hit, but about how well we protect information about military infrastructure.
Let's be honest, the Russians didn't need Google - they came to Ukraine using maps of World War II roads. The author saw this firsthand when she was under occupation for a month.
The Russians have all the information about our military enterprises that operated during the Soviet era. The same goes for critical infrastructure.
We remember how in March 2022, a missile and bomb attack destroyed the production facilities of the "Luch" Design Bureau in Kyiv.
A month later, on 15 April, "Ukroboronprom" confirmed reports that the Russians had struck at the workshops of the "Zhulian Machine-Building Plant "Vizar", located in the Kyiv region. This plant produced components for the R-360 cruise missiles of the Neptune anti-ship complex.
On 30 July, Russia shelled the territory of the Malyshev plant, which specialises in the production and modernisation of heavy and light armoured vehicles. This was not the first attack.
On 19 August 2022, the Russians struck at Motor Sich's workshops, despite the fact that the plant's owner continued to supply them with components during the war and was detained by the SSU for this.
Of course, the plants had to change their location, although some of them were hit immediately after launching.
First of all, the human factor and specific traitors cannot be ruled out.
In recent months, the author has heard of arrival at one airfield at the very hangar where the fuel was supposed to be stored. It was only by some miracle that it was removed two hours earlier.
Another critical infrastructure company was visited by a spy disguised as a cleaner from a cleaning company.
In the summer of this year, the facilities of a private drone manufacturer were destroyed, which were supposed to fly 40 km.
And while on 2 January our air defence forces worked like gods, on 29 January we did not manage to save everyone and not everything. Unfortunately.
Despite the enemy's attacks and raids by the State Audit Service, the production capacity of the defence industry has tripled this year, and in some areas - tenfold.
This was announced by Minister for Strategic Industries Oleksandr Kamyshin at a briefing on 27 December.
According to the ministry, Ukraine's defence industry currently comprises 500 companies employing 300,000 people.
"Despite the hostilities, our country's economy is developing. And the defence industry is making a significant contribution: out of 4.9% of Ukraine's GDP growth, 1.5% was contributed by the defence industry in 2023," the ministry said in a statement.
"Production at state-owned enterprises in monetary terms increased by 92% (compared to 2022) and amounted to more than UAH 79 billion," said German Smetanin, CEO of Ukrainian Defence Industry JSC.
This is more than 637 thousand units of manufactured and repaired products, which is 1,117% year-on-year.
It is worth noting that some of the companies carried out the relocation and reconstruction without government assistance. Rather, they were assisted by a "workshop", which was chased by the SASU and shouted that they illegally had a 3% profit (because it was forgotten to be included in Resolution 335).
As a result of the SASU audit, 44 proceedings were initiated. But this is not the main thing. It is the fact that for some reason the SASU demanded documents on the actual location of warehouses, production facilities and contractual co-executors from some defence manufacturers.
But this is not the worst thing - it is quite easy to find data on many companies in Ukraine. You don't even need to go into open registers to do this. In some cases, Google provides much more information.
Now the Ministry of Defence is asking the Cabinet of Ministers to change the resolution so that data on contractors is not made public during public procurement. This is logical for reasons of army security.
However, in protecting rear procurement, the Cabinet of Ministers and the SSU should have taken even more care in defence.
Instead, the main surprise is that there is a website where you can see all the contractors and contracts of state-owned military enterprises. As it turned out, many people did not know that such trash was possible in the 10th year of the war.
It turns out that stacking ammunition in a Christmas tree and taking a picture against a white background for a postcard is a safety hazard. But open information about the manufacturer is fine.
It's like equipping a soldier and putting a paper white target on him instead of a bulletproof vest.
In order to resolve this situation, it is enough to simply restrict access to information about such manufacturers.
But it seems that someone is waiting for irreversible consequences.
Because in fact, Russian missiles are very accurate.
Tetiana Nikolaienko, Censor. NET
