Situation in Avdiivka is critical: what to do?
According to Deepstate, Russian infantry in the south of Avdiivka approached the "9th Quarter" neighbourhood in one area. This is a complex of nine-storey residential buildings that is key to controlling the city.
Heavy fighting is currently taking place on the southern outskirts of Avdiivka, with attacks and counterattacks from both sides.
I will say my personal opinion.
In order to hold Avdiivka, the enemy must not be allowed to enter the residential areas up to high-rise buildings. The battle for Avdiivka will not be like the battle for Bakhmut. If the enemy captures the 9th quarter, it will become tactically unprofitable to hold the entire city.
If the enemy captures the buildings, they will put antennas on them to control drones and Kornet ATGMs, and the drones will be able to see and hit targets along all roads in the city. The same thing happened during the enemy's capture of Bakhmut - the enemy's seizure of the dominant height where the MES unit was based led to the establishment of fire and visual control over the main highways of the city.
And Russian aviation will receive data for new strikes with guided bombs. Since the beginning of 2024, more than 400 bombs and missiles have been dropped on Avdiivka.
Our drone operators now have a tactical advantage. And it must not be lost, because in modern warfare, the loss of tactical advantages in the use of drones can no longer be compensated for by heroism or the number of people.
The enemy is now suffering heavy losses and is being hit on the approaches to the city. Russian losses are much higher than Ukrainian ones, but the enemy can only be stopped if he cannot advance and his losses continue to grow.
What would you like to see to stop the enemy? I would like to see all the units that can be sent to reinforce Avdiivka transferred to a single command and intelligence centre - the 110th Brigade. Then the new people will have an objective and unified understanding of the tactical situation and a unified and reasonable plan of action.
It is important to categorically prohibit poorly planned and poorly organised counterattacks that simply lead to an exchange of manpower with an enemy that has more reserves. First, we need to strengthen our defences and deter the enemy with fire and daily casualties. This is the only way to stop Russian offensives.
The enemy cannot be stopped by shouting, we need high-quality reconnaissance and destruction, command and control, timely rotation of positions, and engineering work. And then there is an opportunity to inflict losses on the strike group that the Russians will not be able to sustain for a long time.
And counterattacks need to be fast and well-organised only if they are prepared in advance in certain areas, supported by armoured vehicles and drones.
And we need to stop playing with optimistic reports. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office should define the situation in Donbas as one that requires immediate systemic solutions.
First of all, we need to start digging a defence line reliably and efficiently to cover Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad and Kurakhove on the far frontier. We need to start building, not just imitating with words but not with actions. So that the current army can rely on the rear lines in case of further advance of the enemy. To create new positions where we can impose a high rate of casualties and a ratio of losses that is unfavourable to the enemy.
Secondly, we need a mobilisation plan and a plan for the training and use of the mobilised people to stop the inefficient waste of untrained but priceless and irreplaceable human lives. That is, to give people time to prepare and train, which is at least 3-5 months, to improve the quality, combat capability and survivability of the replenishment.
The third task is to improve the tactics and control of our main means of reconnaissance and destruction - drones. Drones must be used in a comprehensive, massive way to save the lives of our people and kill more enemies. This requires better coordination and the creation of a special drone tactical group for coordinated and massive actions.
Fourthly, we need to start analysing previous actions, not only at the company-battalion level, but primarily at the level of the OSGT, OTG, and brigade. Because many of the mistakes of Sievierodonetsk, Soledar, and Bakhmut are being repeated now, but running on a rake is unacceptable after two years of a great war.
Yuriy Butusov, Censor. NET
