AVDIIVKA: DEFENSE AND WITHDRAWAL OF AFU
Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov analyzed the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ withdrawal from Avdiivka on 17 February 2024 in a live broadcast.
Greetings! I am in Donbas now. All these days I have been near Avdiivka. I was watching what was happening there with my own eyes. I saw everything that happened there through streams, through communication with soldiers and commanders. So today I can talk about the events that have taken place.
The purpose of the broadcast is simply to show the situation and how our troops acted. Strategic conclusions about the future will be made in the next broadcasts. My goal now is to report the facts of how we lost Avdiivka.
HOW THE SITUATION IN AVDIIVKA HAS CHANGED SINCE OCTOBER 2023
I've been writing about the situation in Avdiivka for many months, literally dozens of articles.
On October 10, 2023, the Russian army launched a massive offensive on the city of Avdiivka. The main blow was struck in the north. The enemy also conducted numerous attacks directly on the city and south of the city.
How did the situation develop? In short: the enemy managed to break through our first line of defense and in heavy fighting broke through to the village of Stepove. It is north of Avdiivka. The enemy entered Stepove and came close to the Avdiivka Coke Plant. The Ukrainian command moved its strategic reserve, the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which is equipped with modern Western-made armored vehicles, to this northern direction. And the 47th Brigade was reinforced with additional units and managed to stop the enemy's advance in the area of Stepove. The situation at that time did not seem hopeless for the city. I kept repeating this on the air. The enemy's breakthrough area was about 3 km wide. We had reliable control of the breakthrough flanks and heights. It was very convenient for our drone operators and our fire controllers to work from these heights. We were in a factory building at the coke plant itself. That's why it was very difficult for the enemy to destroy such a large building area. It allowed us to maneuver and inflict damage. All the Russian infantry in the north was crawling across the open terrain, and they were hit. The enemy's losses in the battles for Avdiivka exceeded ours many times over. Because the enemy acted in the most tactically disadvantageous way possible, and we had a complete tactical advantage. The situation in December, especially in January, deteriorated significantly due to several factors.
First. The number of reserves that the enemy was deploying to Avdiivka far exceeded the number of reserves that we were deploying. Thus, the Ukrainian command did not ignore the threat. The 47th Mechanized Brigade and units of other units were redeployed to the area. The units of the 116th Mechanized Brigade and border guards who operated in this area performed well. The brigades and battalions of territorial defense were active. Separate rifle battalions were operating. That is, the reserves were being redeployed. But the enemy was moving much more of them. We see how Putin announced today that his brigades were being honored. At least 12 Russian military formations, brigades, regiments that attacked the city were honored. In fact, these are the ones that came in this last wave of the attack, and the Russians actually concentrated much more forces. In total, from October to February, the enemy used at least 20 brigade-regiment-level formations to attack the city. That is, the enemy could use rotations, he could change his troops. He could, which is very important, use fresh forces. Our 110th Mechanized Brigade, which was the backbone of the city's defense, held the frontline with 5 battalions 32 kilometers away from the direction of the enemy's main attack at the time of the Russian assault in October. I think all the military understands how large the front is, how difficult it is to hold it with such forces. However, due to the high quality of command, the organization of intelligence, and the quality of artillery, the 110th Brigade repelled Russian attacks and inflicted much greater losses on the enemy than it had suffered. But it was still a trade-off. The course was unfavorable for the enemy, but we also suffered losses.
The enemy set the task to capture Avdiivka in November. These plans failed. Then they conducted attacks in December to capture the city by January 1. They also failed. But these continuous attacks and constant reinforcements exhausted us. And in January, the enemy launched an aircraft attack on Avdiivka. In January alone, only what we have registered in terms of launches, more than 600 air bombs were launched at the city in the area of the 110th Brigade's defense. Such massive attacks, together with the Russians' superiority in artillery, had a severe impact on our defense. In January-December, we did not have as much ammunition as before, and the enemy began to quietly press on to our positions. He was not defeated. From the north, they were able to get closer and closer. A critical moment in the defense of the city... The enemy also pushed through the defense of the 53rd Brigade and penetrated the city very deeply from the south. In other words, they had actually occupied the Tsarska Okhota area, even beyond the 9th quarter, and the 110th Brigade could no longer maneuver its forces.
The enemy attacked it from all flanks. There had been a critical moment before, everyone was talking about it, and the military command was fully aware of it - at that time, the 110th Brigade needed to be reinforced to stabilize Avdiivka. Not only to replenish the losses but to build a reliable line of defense in the areas where the enemy was putting pressure. A defense line like the one in the south, after the enemy broke through the defense, passed through the 53rd Brigade's combat formations, pushed through with heavy losses, and after they reached the plant and began attacking the cottage area near Coke Plant in the north, a second line of defense had to be built there. The enemy was close. We had to strengthen our troops and build a second line of defense. The military spoke about these things, the commanders of the 110th Brigade spoke about them, they reported constantly. However, the 110th Brigade did not have the strength to build a second line of defense and reinforce with some fresh units at that time.
I wrote a post on January 19 that the situation in Avdiivka was critical because the enemy had captured the first houses and cottages on the northern outskirts of Avdiivka. They were actually 2.5 kilometers from the entrance to Avdiivka. The entrance to Avdiivka was on a single road. There were no other off-road routes. The enemy started attacking. They were suffering heavy losses again. They came to our positions, knocked them out, and shot them. But the enemy concentrated reserves and the Russian command chose the following tactic: they bring in fresh brigades, and then they send them company by company, battalion by battalion, not immediately throwing everyone into the attack, but they are active for about a few weeks. That is, they throw a company, a battalion, no more, to keep our defense in constant tension. And the Russians demand that they attack at any cost. In fact, they are continuously conducting extensive reconnaissance by combat. Of course, with heavy losses. But this constant pressure leads to the fact that after a while our defenders, who are much smaller in number, are exhausted. That is, people are under constant attack. They don't sleep, they can't rest - there are no rotations. What was to be done at that time? This is not my personal opinion. This is the opinion of the military who were in Avdiivka. Indeed, we were in favorable positions. In these positions, we could simply kill these Russian reserves endlessly. Avdiivka is a very favorable defense line. From a tactical point of view, there was no reason to withdraw from there. The 57th Mechanized Brigade created a reliable front north of the city and the enemy stopped advancing. The enemy was stopped. He was suffering losses in the area of Stepove and could not advance any further. There was a crisis south of the city, but it could be closed. The enemy could not act there with significant forces, because the direction of the breakthrough was also narrow and our troops tried to fight there as well. The key factor why the enemy was advancing was the lack of ammunition, the lack of reserves, and the lack of engineering equipment for the second line of defense.
We are very fond of shifting responsibility to the troops. But the 110th Brigade, which is constantly in combat, with all its men involved, with all its forces on rotation at zero point, which is stretched into one defense line for 32 km, cannot do this - because there are no men to dig a second line of defense. They just don't have people. I'm not talking about the equipment. That is why it was necessary to bring in reserves in time to gain a foothold and replace those battalions that were under the greatest fire. One of the battalions of the 110th Brigade, after several months of assaults, had about 50 infantrymen left - in a battalion with a 6 km area of responsibility. Imagine that. So, of course, heroism, tactical advantages, and good management all work. But the enemy has a great advantage in means of destruction and has fresh reserves, numbers, and they continue to attack.
What was expected in these circumstances? That sufficient forces would be brought to the breakthrough area in the north in time. Sufficient forces would come to the south, the enemy would be stopped and somehow we would get ammunition and we would knock out again, we would just break all these wedges that the enemy had built up from the south and north. Avdiivka's position remained favorable. In war, as in life, everything has to be done on time. We know that the 3rd Assault Brigade was sent to save the situation in Avdiivka. I saw the guys arrive and deploy. I was in Avdiivka in early February, so I saw the situation in the city, I drove around the entire city. Why was it so hard for the 3rd assault brigade?
THE ROLE OF THE THIRD ASSAULT BRIGADE
I will now share my observations based on my communication with officers and soldiers. First. The third assault unit arrived very late. It did not arrive, as some say now, to organize the withdrawal. It was actually very easy to withdraw from Avdiivka. It did not require additional forces. Additional forces were needed to hold Avdiivka and defeat the enemy. In order to defeat the enemy, it was necessary to reinforce the 110th Brigade in two directions in time. I would like to remind you that on January 19, the enemy took hold of the cottages near the coke plant. These houses became the storage areas for Russian assault groups. And gradually he advanced, advanced, advanced. Because it was not destroyed there on the approach. There was no fire damage on the Russian communication routes, on this narrow line they had entered. Because our artillery did not have enough ammunition. And then they sent in the third assault. The 3rd assault arrived quickly enough... On January 19, the enemy entered the cottages, and the 3rd assault arrived on February 3, in fact. That is, 3 weeks have passed. The brigade could not be immediately put into action either. Because the OTG (operational-tactical group) command was waiting for the brigade to concentrate and enter the battlefield. That is, they did not give an order to enter at the OTG. So the brigade had to wait until February 6. Deployment, so that they could be included in the order and could go there, get acquainted with the situation.
And the enemy did not lose a single day. He was sending reserves to the breakthrough area, where the enemy had already gained a foothold in the dachas and had already passed our combat formations. In addition to the enemy troops that had already been deployed, two brigades arrived there - the 74th and 35th motorized rifle brigades - to complete the breakthrough and move to the road, to the entrance to Avdiivka. Our combined arms units that were stationed there - the 31st Mechanized Brigade, individual units - could no longer withstand such pressure. At the time the 3rd assault brigade was put into action, the enemy was 900 meters from the entrance to Avdiivka. And this is the only way to supply the troops. The situation was critical. In fact, the road was being fired upon by all types of heavy infantry weapons, artillery, mortars, and controlled by drones. The deployment of the 3rd Assault Brigade had already taken place in a critical situation. It was as complicated as possible. Even the very entrance to Avdiivka was complicated. In such conditions, it was impossible to expect them to deploy quickly. The problem was that the 3rd Assault Brigade was not actually sent to strengthen the defense. It was thrown into a counterattack with the enemy, who had concentrated its forces in the direction of the main attack. And in this direction, the Russians initially had an advantage in the number of people and military equipment on the third assault brigade. They threw all their reserves there. In fact, the guys were deployed along this railroad, having already engaged in contact battles from the first day. In contact battles, the 3rd Assault Brigade, 95%, had an absolute advantage and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. But since this is a counterattack, the enemy conducts reconnaissance by combat every day, clarifies positions, strikes, and those houses are demolished - by artillery, aviation, mortars. And it is almost impossible to hold the area of one-story buildings, these garden houses and village huts. Because to take cover from massive fire, you need defense lines. And there were none. That's why the 3rd Assault Brigade was actually held together by the heroism of the soldiers as long as the human body could withstand the cold under round-the-clock fire, the brigade was deployed at the front for almost 7 km.
There was simply no time to study the situation because the enemy did not give it. It was too late. As a result, the enemy suffered much greater losses in these battles. And when our troops received the order to withdraw, the enemy did not pursue them because the Russians were knocked out... Indeed, the enemy did not count losses. Instead of saving infantry in principle by training them, the Russians simply limit, dose how many they can lose per day. They have set themselves a limit of 2-3 companies per day. They set themselves this limit and threw in a reserve. And at such a rate they continued to move forward.
If the third Assault Brigade had had more time to get involved, to be gradually reinforced, for company commanders to withdraw, for the battalion commanders to go out in advance, to familiarize themselves with the situation, to deploy aerial reconnaissance, all the drones, and artillery, the results would have been much better. The enemy would have suffered much heavier losses, and our soldiers would have suffered less. But there was no such time. Therefore, the enemy, under constant pressure, managed to advance to the road after about a week of fighting, and when the enemy reached the road, the only entrance to Avdiivka, everything became clear. When the enemy controls the only main entrance, what kind of defense of the city can there be? No other road to Avdiivka was built. And when the soil was blown away, of course, only tracked vehicles could pass through. That's why we decided to withdraw. It was, of course, justified by tactical issues. The withdrawal was carried out. Unfortunately, we suffered losses. But most of our troops withdrew. Losses in equipment, given this withdrawal, were minimal. There was organization, there was planning, there was attention.
THE LOSS OF AVDIIVKA: CONCLUSIONS
This story of Avdiivka, just like the story of Bakhmut, Soledar, Sievierodonetsk, Lysychansk, is a story where you say: unfortunately, we didn't make it in time. There was a little bit missing. Unfortunately, there was not enough.
110 MECHANIZED BRIGADE - PROFESSIONALS
We have lost a very important Ukrainian city. I want to thank the soldiers, the heroes, first of all, the soldiers of the 110th Mechanized Brigade, which held this city for two years. The brigade was created in the first days of the war. It had no time to prepare or organize before it received a combat order. On March 20, the brigade was deployed to Avdiivka from scratch, and trained and organized itself there, during the fighting. For 2 years, these people held the city. Most of those who are still in service are from the brigade, and no one has gone further than Avdiivka for any rotations. People bathed, slept, and rested there, practically at their positions under fire, in the area of impact of all enemy firepower. How was it done? It's just... it's incredible heroism. This is an incredible quality of personnel. The high level of command. Honor and glory to the soldiers of the 110th Mechanized Brigade.
We should also thank all those who held the flanks of Avdiivka - the 47th Mechanized Brigade, the second battalion of the Presidential Brigade, the 53rd Brigade, the 59th Brigade, which holds the flank a little further south. Special forces of our National Guard, border guards. Many of our units have distinguished themselves there. All these people deserve the highest respect. And the 110th Brigade, which has been fighting for 2 years without rotation or replacement. People lived at the front because of the long length of the front. Most of the people. I constantly communicate with soldiers and commanders. There are infantrymen who, for example, were on vacation for 10 days in 2 years - that is, they traveled outside Avdiivka, for zero days. But the guys were proud, happy, they had baths, showers, rest, and kitchens - everything was at their positions. They lived there. The battalion commanders lived there. Such endurance is just something incredible. Our enemy, the Russian troops, cannot use this kind of approach. There is no such dedication.
Unfortunately, the enemy realized that the quality of their infantry was much lower. They cannot recruit heroes into the army, they do not have the motivation. With every month of the war, the enemy is trying to increase its advantage in organization, management and means of destruction. That is, in equipment. In organization. In planning their actions. And this is a very big challenge for us. Because it is impossible to extinguish all the problems solely by heroism in war. The withdrawal from Avdiivka was also a forced measure. If there had been planning, if there had been timely actions, if the country's leadership had paid attention to this issue, we could have held Avdiivka further. The situation became critical not when the 3rd Assault Brigade was deployed, but much earlier. The heroes of the 3rd Assault Brigade actually tried to do ... they were abandoned to perform a heroic deed. That is a counter battle with the superior forces of two fresh enemy brigades, reinforced by additional units on a large front. There was no question of any echeloned defense either. The 3rd Assault Brigade had to build all its combat formations in one echelon. I want to speak from the tactical conclusions. The time when it was possible to fight in one echelon is long gone. Building combat formations in 1 echelon, as we did, and extending the units leads to the fact that the infantry is very quickly exhausted. The enemy knows this. He simply accumulates enough forces to suffer losses - 1, 2, 3 weeks, and then still push through the position. This is how they build their tactics. Russia is increasing the production of ammunition, destruction means, and unfortunately, in December and January, they are making progress due to the fact that they outnumber the number of shells, bombs, and missiles. And they are not inferior in the number of drones. And the enemy's fpv drones are constantly attacking en masse. And this is a big problem for us, significant losses. And reconnaissance drones are constantly adjusting their fire. So we have to draw conclusions from this. The third conclusion, which we have been talking about for two years, is also true. Well, okay, we have no ammunition production. This is a separate topic, why it is so slow to build up. We don't have as many people as the Russians have in their reserves. But we have problems with usage. But why are we not building a defense line? This is just absurd. The enemy is advancing in all directions, and they have state construction organizations that are digging rear defense lines for the Russians during the offensive so that the troops can gain a foothold and concentrate close to the front in protected positions. And we don't have such large-scale construction anywhere near us. On October 10, Russia launched an assault on Avdiivka. It was not the first assault, but the third, in fact. They started the first assault in July 2022. The 110th Brigade has been repelling all these attacks for so long.
Unfortunately, conclusions are not drawn at the highest level, and all the problems of combat use that occurred in Sievierodonetsk in April-May 2022, that occurred in Soledar in December 2022-January 2023, all the problems that occurred in Bakhmut from May 2022 to May 2023 - all this is repeated in our organization, management for some reason. And you can just copy and paste these mistakes. The same reasons. But when in 2022 you realize that the war has begun, not all managers understand, not all have learned, not all are able to respond flexibly, not all have built an administrative and management apparatus... Why can't we be intellectually ahead of the enemy in management and organization? But when this is repeated after 2 years of war, the question arises: when will we start learning from our own mistakes? When will the army put into practice the after-action review, the standard NATO procedure for analyzing the aftermath of a war. Not a criminal case, but just an honest conversation between professionals about what we did well, what we succeeded in, and what we failed in. When will it come? How much time, how much more ground do we have to lose? Most people at the front do not understand this. They don't understand how you can report a false situation. Let's see, there are constant reports - the situation in Avdiivka is tightly controlled. And then - bam! We are withdrawing. How so? If it is tightly controlled, how can there be a withdrawal? Who will be responsible for these false reports now? If the situation is under control, then there is no need to surrender the cities. And it is impossible. And if it is critical, then it should be treated as a critical situation. There's no need to make any announcements in the media. But we shouldn't talk about control, we should take measures. And timely ones.
Right now, the 3rd Assault Brigade is an example: they were introduced in a hurry, without deployment, and thrown into a counterattack near Bakhmut in January 2023. One-on-one, at the wrong time, too late. Where there are no more troops. Without timely deployment, without what was possible. A counterattack. Go for a heroic deed. And exactly a year passes, and in January 2024, the third assault unit is similarly thrown into a counterattack with an enemy that has already learned a little something. Why are we repeating ourselves? Why do we not conclude? It's a shame to even repeat these rhetorical questions, which are obvious to the military at the front. The army is constantly talking about this. I do not understand why the military command cannot conclude from this. And I want to tell you that since October if you look at the number of times the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has announced the General Headquarters for Avdiivka, it has been more than 20 times. Even Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself came to the command post of the 110th Brigade with Yermak to personally familiarize himself with the situation. He promised help, reserves, facilities. He promised everything, everything was fine. І?... Why did he come then? Why does the Supreme Commander-in-Chief come then? To take photos and videos of him being there? Well, excuse me, this is not a travel club - look where I took a selfie, at the entrance to Avdiivka. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief is responsible. If you arrive, you need to assess the situation and take action quickly. Not just be an observer and hunt for selfies. This is just absurd. This is the job of a blogger. We expect decisions from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. If someone doesn't understand something, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office is responsible for analyzing the situation. And where is the analysis of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff on the reasons for the loss of Sievierodonetsk, Lysychansk, Soledar, Bakhmut? Will there be an analysis of the loss of Marinka - a rhetorical question here - or will there be an analysis after the loss of Avdiivka? An analysis that would correspond to reality. And not just an analysis to say that all the leaders are good, but something was missing. Because, of course, you can explain everything by the enemy's great advantage. There is a great advantage. But we can also use the available forces much more effectively. This is the position of most soldiers and commanders at the front who fought in Avdiivka. The enemy has a technical and numerical advantage, and we cannot understand that we need to be intellectually ahead of them, as it was in 2022. The miracle of 2022 was not due to the superiority of Ukrainians in terms of the number of tanks, shells, airplanes, or the number of people. It was the quality of intelligence. The quality of the will, the motivation of Ukrainian soldiers, the people of Ukraine, the best Ukrainians who went to destroy and stop the Russian machine. And we need to use our advantage.
ZENITH POSITION
Now the situation at our Zenit position. Because the order to withdraw was not given in time, our Zenit stronghold was surrounded. A tragic story happened. Several of our fighters were ordered to leave during the breakthrough. The soldiers who were at the stronghold were already breaking through, and they could not be withdrawn in normal combat order. The combat vehicles that tried to break through the 110th Brigade were hit. They could not fulfill the task. They simply did not get there. So the Zenit garrison had to break through on their own. Unfortunately, during this breakthrough, four of our wounded soldiers were left at the stronghold. Yes, four. I wrote 6. According to the updated data of the 110th Brigade, 4 wounded soldiers were left at the stronghold. They were left under orders. But our fighter Mykola Savosik was not wounded, he was absolutely intact, alive, he saw his comrades who were still wounded and decided to stay with them. He could have gone out, broken through. But he chose to stay with his wounded comrades. We saw a Russian video showing how 5 Ukrainian soldiers were shot at the Zenit checkpoint. Three of the wounded have already been identified. That is, the Russians captured our fighters and shot them on the spot. They pulled the bodies and threw them into the water. They committed another war crime. Now the soldiers of the 110th, the commander, are dealing with this story. The story is tragic. All the soldiers who died there were heroes, volunteer fighters. They were wounded while going for a breakthrough. They paved the way for others. They were Ukrainian heroes. These are Heorhii Pavlov, Andrii Dubnytskyi, Ivan Zhytnyk, and Oleksandr Zinchuk. The bodies of three of them were identified by their relatives and friends. These are Pavlov, Dubnytskyi, Zhytnyk. These people were wounded when they were going to the breakthrough at the beginning. They were the first to go, in the first group that was supposed to pave the way for the others. Mykola Savosik stayed with the wounded. These are real heroes who deserve the highest awards of Ukraine. I hope that the military will clarify the degree of responsibility of all people and draw the necessary conclusions from this terrible tragedy.
I want to note that Zenit was held until the last moment when it was completely surrounded. It was held because there was an order. The order was not even from the command of the 110th Brigade, but from the higher command of the operational and tactical group, which was confident that there would be some reserves that would break through the corridor. None of this was planned in such a way that the corridor could be broken through. The Zenit garrison did not receive the order not to withdraw in time. And this is the main reason for this tragedy. Not only this one. We have this kind of delay in war. We must also draw conclusions from this.
I hope that someday these conclusions will be drawn after the loss of another very important city of Avdiivka.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
Questions about partner assistance
I don't think we can act without the help of the United States and our partners. I think we need to step up our diplomatic efforts, but it is equally important to look at what we are doing to strengthen our munitions production. We also have these capabilities. Where are our drones? I want to tell you that the promised one million drones for 2024 have not yet been funded. I don't want to say it's been a month and a half since the New Year, 2 months since President Zelenskyy said there would be a million drones in 2024. So far, there is no funding for this. I am confident that the West and NATO will not abandon us and will continue to supply weapons. But we cannot solve all the issues with Western weapons and rely on the West alone. We need our own production.
Question.
I did not hear it. Zaluzhnyi did not say at the press conference that we should withdraw from Avdiivka. Absolutely not. The withdrawal from Avdiivka was not prepared. It was not prepared. Neither Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi, nor Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi, nor Defense Minister Reznikov, nor Defense Minister Umierov, nor Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy built any rear defensive lines behind Avdiivka. They are not there now. So I don't see who was preparing what. The withdrawal was not planned. Maybe people think that the 110th Brigade has been holding for 2 years, so now they will continue to hold, continue to live there in the city - this was far from realizing the situation.
Questions about the reasons for withdrawal from Avdiivka
The first factor. This is, of course, the enemy's advantage in destruction means. We had a real shell famine in December and January near Avdiivka. Next. This is the lack of trained, high-quality troop replenishment in the direction of the enemy's main attack. Lack of additional reserve brigades that could be deployed in time. Unfortunately, the 3rd Assault Brigade could have done much more if it had been deployed in time and had time to prepare. And the third factor is indeed the lack of engineering work. I think it is simply unfair to transfer the brigade to the 10th. People who have been holding 32 kilometers of the front for 2 years do not have additional infantry units or engineering units to dig something in the rear. It was necessary to reinforce it with equipment and engineering units. This is the responsibility of the military command and the responsibility of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff, which was supposed to check. The President, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, visited Avdiivka twice. Why didn't he familiarize himself with the progress of the work, where is the second line of defense? What was stopping him? All social networks are writing about it. All the military are talking about it. The military told the President this to his face in Avdiivka, but there was no reaction. All this finger-pointing: it's not me, it's not me, it's the military. And the military says: they didn't give us tractors, they didn't give us people, they didn't give us materials. And this is how each unit, each leader, pokes at each other. This is how we "build" - or don't build - defense lines.
Why are they not building?
I will probably make a separate broadcast. We will talk about this in the near future, so if anyone has any questions or suggestions, by the way, I have been sent some suggestions, Volodymyr Makohon, thank you, so we will talk about this separately.
Question.
Because we are critically late in assessing the situation at the strategic level, at the level of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Even in February, even at the end of January, at a meeting of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the situation in Avdiivka was reported as tense but under control, we are holding out. The defense had collapsed in two areas. Meanwhile, in Kyiv, people are sitting around, calming themselves down, encouraging themselves, creating high-quality videos, addresses, and speeches in the evening. Everything is fine. There is no crisis. And then someone has to fix it all. We have absolutely no such responsibility for people's lives in the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Once again, no conclusions have been drawn that the soldiers somewhere there could not stand it. We have a problem in Avdiivka, and I want to tell you, it's not a problem that people ran away somewhere. They ended up on the defense lines. This is completely different. To prevent them from running out, the command had to take comprehensive measures. The country's leadership had to take comprehensive measures in a timely manner, which was not the case. Like everyone else here in Avdiivka, I'm just annoyed that this is a rake run. How long can the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Office run on a rake? Do you have wooden foreheads? But don't train here. Not in a war.
Questions about strategic lines of defense
Strategic defense lines are still not being built. There is complete inattention to this. Strategic lines need materials, planning, and engineering staff. To do this, we need to mobilize construction workers from construction companies for engineering work. Does the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff deal with this? No. These are materials. The military command cannot objectively organize engineering work. First of all. There are no managerial and administrative competencies. There are no materials, and no necessary resources. There is no equipment. And our engineering troops and the State Military Transport Service are very weak. They do not have the capacity to engage in engineering work of this level and scale. That's why they don't build. Everything is shifted to the troops. And in the end, most positions are dug by a soldier with a shovel in the ground. There are initiative brigades who ask for engineering equipment from volunteers, digging for themselves. But this is not systematic. This is not a line, as the Russians dig - large construction companies, in a short time.
The situation at the front is very difficult. And the government has to make intelligent decisions about planning its actions. First and foremost, they should look within themselves for what to fix in order to be ahead of the enemy in their decisions. Avdiivka shows that there is no competition in the heroism and motivation of Ukrainian soldiers. The Russians can do nothing. But we have a problem with the means of destruction, with organization, management, engineering work, and with the production of ammunition and the supply of ammunition. These are the real problems we need to solve. Of course, we need mobilization. And not the kind of mobilization that results in the mobilized soldier being at zero point in two weeks. We need mobilization that takes 4-6 months to fully train a mobilized person so that he or she is gradually involved in combat operations so that he or she understands what he or she is doing, has a military profession, and thus survives, lives, destroys the enemy, and is effective in combat. And exchanging manpower for manpower is not our way. We will not catch as many homeless people as in Russia. We do not need to compete in the exchange of people. We need to compete in the exchange of ideas. To seek intellectual superiority in management and organization.
In the near future, we will make several more detailed broadcasts about Avdiivka. There will be interviews. We will cover it in great detail. Avdiivka was a very important defense line. This is a heavy defeat. Now we need to build new frontiers. This is Selydove, this is Pokrovsk. I understand that no one in Ukraine likes critical news. Everyone likes to listen in a tense and controlled way, but I want to say that we need to dig defensive lines not only around Selydove, not only around Pokrovsk, but also on the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region. We need to prepare, plan for the worst-case scenarios. Because now, at a distance from the front, civilian construction organizations can do all this. State organizations. And this should be done in time, not later, and not by looking for heroism and saying: well, you can't drive a tractor to the first line. So let's start driving tractors to the third line or the fourth. Let's start learning to think strategically. The troops must rely on fortified areas. Not sit in houses. Russians are gradually demolishing houses with missiles and bombs. The troops should be dispersed. They must have high-quality dugouts disguised in the ground, where they can live for a long time, where people do not get sick, have all the living conditions. This is what is called valuing people. Not just pay lip service to it. And Avdiivka is actually a very important lesson for us. We had an advantage in tactics, in management, in organization, in heroism, in motivating people. An incomparable advantage. But we were unable to defend these positions because the enemy had an advantage in numbers, an advantage in the number of weapons, partially had an advantage in some types of drones, and had an advantage in the fact that they acted purposefully. They took the narrowest of positions, pressed on, regardless of losses, and pushed through. Although we could have simply destroyed all the reserves that the Russian army had accumulated for 2024.
There, not only several brigades of the 21st, 15th, and 30th motorized rifle brigades were completely eliminated. Several other Russian brigades have been knocked out. 74 with the 35th are now defeated. We could have knocked out more. They rushed to Avdiivka endlessly. Because the situation there is such that they have outflanked us from the north and from the south so much that they either have to retreat or continue to bash their heads against our defense. Even though they suffered heavy losses, they made it through. Honor and glory to all the defenders of Avdiivka. It was truly a skillful and heroic resistance. It was of a high quality, different from what we have seen in defense before. Our soldiers did the best they could in this situation. There were problems at the operational level in management and organization. At the highest strategic level, there were problems in management and organization. There were problems in planning and supplying the troops. If we don't want to end up with Selydove, Kurakhove, Pokrovsk, and then Pavlohrad, we need to start drawing conclusions.
I am addressing the leaders of the state. If you are not able to think and draw conclusions on your own, you should at least ask the military, the brigade commanders who are carrying everything on their shoulders. Brigade commanders and battalion commanders are the link that is actually holding the frontline today. Everything depends on their managerial and organizational skills. They need to be strengthened. Not in words, but in deeds. And we need to learn from their war experience. To analyze, draw conclusions and then apply them on a large scale. And we will talk a lot about Avdiivka now, so that the authorities can no longer hide behind it, as they did in Bakhmut and Soledar - there is heroism there, all the deeds. We have a critical situation at the front. We need quick changes. And the soldiers at the front are demanding that the government, I'm passing on to you the position of those who fought to the end and were the last to leave in Avdiivka, demand that they be allowed to destroy the enemy better and more efficiently. I was amazed, I talked to many soldiers today in the 110th Brigade, I talked to the 3rd Assault Brigade. People do not even ask for rotation. They are asking for a short rest. They need to get themselves in order. But they want to fight in the right organization, with the right management, so as not to repeat mistakes. Our soldiers who hold the front are our main asset. This is what makes Ukraine and still keeps it free, independent and strong. I saw Ukrainian heroes today, many of them. I talked to them, saw their eyes, will and mood. Today, more than ever, I am confident in our victory. Thank you for being with me. Glory to Ukraine!
