Two years of great war
The stream is dedicated to the second anniversary of the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The tenth year of the war, the tenth year of Russian aggression, which began on February 20, 2014.
Let us recall those events two years ago. What we see today from a distance. What we are still experiencing. The war is fierce, but on this day I will always remember the great feat of the Ukrainian people, which most of us took part in. We all saw, we all were inspired. And by what we felt from each other, the spark, the energy, the confidence in victory, the belief that we would do everything for the sake of honor, that we would not surrender Ukraine. It was an extraordinary uplift and exhilaration. It will always be with us. I would like to say, looking back, that to emphasize that feat, that incredible miracle... in my opinion, it is simply a Ukrainian miracle of the 22nd year. And for two years now, there has been a lot of data that is open in both Russia and Ukraine, detailed about the balance of power, about what happened.
We need to know the truth, the history, to draw conclusions. The war continues. In order to honour the memory and majesty of Ukrainian heroes who have already given their lives, lost their health and to honor those who continue to hold the frontline. At this moment, tens of thousands of our soldiers are not watching our broadcast because they are in the cold trenches, on combat duty, fighting the enemy. They are at their combat posts. Our thoughts are with them. And we also recognize and thank them for their feat.
What strikes me personally about those events. First. The balance of power. We all know what state Ukraine was in. There were advertisements on the screen, on television, even on some billboards saying "Join the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF)". But in fact, the territorial defense was not deployed. I can speak for myself. In January, I attended a meeting of the Kyiv Territorial Defense (TD). Up to 300 people came to the meeting. They came from all over Kyiv. Some of the people who came to the meeting were not given assault rifles. They trained with wooden models. Unfortunately, some of the fighters who attended the training were not enlisted in the TD, in the TD reserve. I handed in all the documents, but the commanders said: you know it's a policy, I'm sorry. Let's let you get a quick permit for a weapon. Even though I handed in all the certificates. This is how we live. As we remember, our government constantly lied to the people that there would be no war, that we had a truce. Literally in the last days before the invasion, the actions that we have all been demanding since November 21 began. Statements began. But, unfortunately, we did not have time to prepare for war. The President issued a decree to call up the operational reserve of the Armed Forces only on February 22 in the evening. He had one day to implement it. Of course, no one had time to fulfill this decree.
The Verkhovna Rada adopted a decree declaring a state of emergency on the evening of February 23. Of course, it was also not implemented at all. That is, I want to remind you that our military, the military command, Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhny, could mine, build engineering barriers, blow up bridges, prepare to blow up a bridge only under martial law, either on their understanding or on the order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief did not issue any orders to prepare for defense. Martial law was declared at five in the morning on February 24. That is when Russian columns had already captured the border bridges or were moving towards them. Not a single bridge in either the North or the South of Ukraine was blown up on the morning of February 24, except for one bridge span. Unfortunately, it was not on Chonhar. It was nearby. Also on the Crimean direction. Which was blown up at the cost of his life by the hero of Ukraine, sailor Skakun. We will tell you about this feat soon, you will see a video on the Butusov+ channel in memory of this real hero, who was the only one who tried to do everything possible in the conditions of complete lack of preparation for the blowing up of bridges, key hydraulic structures.
So, there was no preparation. The territorial defense troops - we were told that they were being drafted. They were not deployed. We remember how on February 24, assault rifles were simply handed out to anyone from trucks, and most of them received them even without recording their passport data. This was the case in Kyiv and Kharkiv, where they simply did not hand out weapons to people. Not that they were organized or coordinated. They just handed out them from buses. Well, let's put it this way. We remember all this. Preparations were at zero. But what else made the situation worse? Russia had a great advantage in its forces. Russian troops were trained, maneuvered, deployed and practiced for an attack on Ukraine back in April of 21. We remember a large deployment along the borders, the Russian army pulled up. Then they scaled back and left, allegedly to their permanent deployment sites, but left their equipment near the borders. That is, the Russians worked out their contract army once. And then in November, all the Russian ground forces arrived back near the border and started training again. During this time, the Russian command was able to fully supply 140 battalions of its contract army, professional soldiers who were recruited to the maximum extent possible. They even included some conscripts to ensure a full capability package. The Russians have deployed 240 battalions of tactical groups. This was the majority of their ground forces. These were all their elite troops, airborne, marines. These were their selected tank motorized infantry units. And they were almost 100% complete. That is, they were fully equipped. All Russian equipment, most of the equipment, was new and combat-ready. All Russian military equipment is also an important factor - in terms of its characteristics, most of the Russian equipment, especially tanks, was superior to Ukrainian military equipment. As Russia concentrated up to a thousand tanks of a new design, new generations, which were equipped with modern thermal imaging sights, guided by large numbers of projectiles. These were tanks of the last years of production. The enemy concentrated them. There was also a large number of new types of artillery of new years of production. And Russia had an advantage, that is, 140 battalions of tactical groups were reinforced by about 100 battalions of mobilized troops. In February, while Ukraine was not mobilizing, Russia conducted a total mobilization in the occupied territories of the "DPR" and "LPR" in the occupied territories of Donbas. In the first wave, the Russians mobilized 110 thousands of people.
During March and April, they mobilized another 30 thousand. 110 thousand are confirmed in the first wave - this is Russian data. And our intelligence data says that there were 140. I think this is close to reality. 110 thousand is the minimum number that Russian sources say. That is, 185 thousand is the contract army. And 110 thousand are mobilized. That is the total number of Russian troops... and plus the contract units of the first and second Aramean corps of the DPR and LPR. At that time it was 9 brigades. They also had an operational strength of at least 30 thousand soldiers. That is, in the first wave, the enemy concentrated at least - at least - about 240 thousand soldiers of ground forces alone. In addition, Russia had an absolute advantage in the air. Russian aviation, which numbered almost a thousand combat aircraft.
According to Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the entire Ukrainian aviation was up to 40 aircraft. It is worth noting that aviation cannot be compared to infantry or tanks in the field or in an ambush. Aviation is a whole complex that depends on the availability of a large number of different types of air- and ground-launched weapons, which depends on a large number of radars aimed at controlling reconnaissance radars, observing air targets, and guiding its aircraft. Of course, Russia had an absolute advantage here. Before that, Russia had concentrated several hundred combat helicopters against Ukraine. Ukraine, I emphasize, according to Valerii Zaluzhny, according to his article, had up to 40 aircraft. This is not even comparable. All the Ukrainian aircraft were old, dating back to the late 80s, while Russia had several hundred modern aircraft of the latest types of a new generation. It was a completely incomparable advantage. Similarly, the Russian troops had an absolute advantage in air defense. All Russian troops were accompanied by a large number of missile and anti-aircraft systems to make it impossible to observe them in the air and prevent our aviation and drones from operating. This is also a factor of absolute superiority. And this is also not taken into account in the numbers, by the way. The number of personnel in aviation, the number of personnel, for example, in the Russian missile forces. That is, the Russian missile brigades concentrated around Ukraine were able to launch cruise missiles at Ukraine without any obstacles. And they also had an absolute advantage in this. That is, the fact that we had only one single 19th Missile Brigade and a small stockpile of missiles did not allow us to even compare with the Russian missile potential. Next. The Russian Navy. It was also an important fleet. At first, their navy was not included in the number of participants in the special military operation. But the fleet was a factor that forced Ukraine to keep two regular brigades in the Odesa area- the 28th and 35th. And the Russian Navy threatened to land. This was one of the components of the Russian invasion plan - an assault on Odesa directly. So there was still a Russian fleet. So, if you look at the balance of power, let's look now at what Ukraine had.
Ukraine at that time did not deploy the troops of the TD. Again, this is a big question for the country's leadership, because in April of '21, when Putin first concentrated troops, the deployment of the TD was carried out. And now the government promised to deploy the TDF in March of '22. Well, it happened, just a little bit earlier. And without the government, but on the enthusiasm of people, unfortunately, who had nowhere to go and had to defend their lives. And so. Since we had not deployed our defense, we actually had... our army, which could act on February 24, consisted of only 22 brigades. It was about 80 active battalion tactical groups. We have 80, and the enemy has at least 240. Yes, it is close. That is, in terms of the number of units, the enemy had a 3-fold advantage in combat units, battalion tactical groups. This is if we compare the total number. But in reality, the advantage was even greater.
First of all. The Russian troops, as we said, were already organized and deployed. They had equipment. They did not need to spend time reorganizing. They were already mobilized and deployed on the border. They were trained. Second. They were concentrated in strike groups. For example, on February 21, Defense Minister Reznikov made an absolutely shameful false statement that Russia had not concentrated its strike groups near the border with Ukraine. This is not true. In fact, there were strike groups then. I made a statement at the time criticizing Reznikov's words. What really happened? Half of our army was concentrated in Donbas. About 50% of our forces. All the main forces were concentrated in Donbas. However, approximately 50% of our ground forces were withdrawn from Donbas to training grounds in places of permanent deployment. Ukraine, let me remind you once again, at that time had 22 combat brigades, about 80 battalion tactical groups and nothing else. However, the manning of these battalion tactical groups averaged about 50%. That is, once again. The Russians had about 240 battalion tactical groups, 140 personnel with equipment, who had a complete set, and the troops of the first and second army corps in Donbas were also mobilized, which is also about 100, perhaps 100 to 130 battalion tactical groups. And they had at least 240, and possibly even up to 270, i.e. a large number, an advantage of at least 3 times in terms of the number of strike formations, operational units on the map. And they were 100% manned. And we had 50%. In addition. In terms of equipment. We didn't have the same percentage of serviceable equipment as the Russians, not even close. That is, we did not have a complete set of equipment anywhere. We had no new self-propelled guns. In fact, we had no new guns at all. There were no self-propelled guns, no towed guns in such numbers. That is, the enemy had an absolute advantage. The advantage was complete in the air. Superiority on the ground. Superiority in missile weapons. Superiority at sea, which allowed them to threaten our flanks. And here is another advantage. The advantage is in the number of weapons. Russia also had a stockpile of ammunition to go with its new guns. I want to tell you that at the beginning of the war in our brigades, even in Donbas, the supply of ammunition in each brigade was about 1.5-2 munition packages. There were brigades with only one munition package. That is, ammunition was limited.
It was also difficult for us to defend ourselves from the air. According to Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine had 18 long-range anti-aircraft missile systems, S-300 type, I believe - he did not specify the type - at the beginning of the invasion, but this was very little and it was simply impossible to cover anything with so many anti-aircraft missile systems. I think that everyone understands and remembers how Russian aircraft, for example, flew over Kharkiv in the first week of the war almost without any restrictions all the time. At low altitude. Absolutely without any obstacles. And over other cities as well. So, if you look at the ratio of forces and factors (I promise, I will really do it in writing so that this correlation will be more informative and I will analyze all the factors, there were enough of them), Russia had a huge advantage over Ukraine. The only thing that Russian leaders did not understand was the Ukrainian people and Ukrainian society. In my streams and in articles and interviews that I posted, I said that Russia would not have a blitzkrieg, in an interview with Radio Liberty on January 30, which I gave, I said, I said many times, that there would be no Putin blitzkriegs because Ukraine had an advantage in the infantry. It was as infantry. And when we analyzed the deployment of Russian forces and the maps of the Russian invasion, it was clear that Russia was not creating large strike groups that could capture Kyiv in one blow. So they were concentrating their forces, they were threatening Kyiv, they were threatening the south of Ukraine. However, these strike groups did not have sufficient numbers to capture a city of 5 million people. I counted on the maps, it was about 30 battalion tactical groups that the enemy could have concentrated in the Kyiv direction. But. What was the threat? In fact, I did not think that Kyiv could be captured with such a ratio of forces, because Kyiv has a large mobilization resource and it was clear that the quality of our infantry was an order of magnitude higher than even those trained Russian troops. The motivation of our people is higher, and the level of intelligence is certainly higher than that of Putin's contract soldiers.
But. There was a great risk, and what could have really hindered us was that Russian troops could have tried to disrupt our mobilization, cutting off our communication routes. The Russian plan of invasion was to encircle Kyiv, cut off Kyiv from the routes of communication from the West. And also to cut off Kharkiv. Encircle Kyiv and encircle Kharkiv from the West and East. This attack from the West was especially dangerous because it was impossible to bring in ammunition and weapons and reinforcements from the western regions of Ukraine from our allies. So, of course, it was a great danger, a great threat to us. Because the enemy could have slowed us down - slowed down our communication routes, blocked them. And even the temporary blocking of the Kirovohrad highway, as we know, from Vinnytsia region, or the Zhytomyr highway, or other routes through Bila Tserkva to Kyiv, that is, the blocking of these routes would have practically blocked resistance in the central regions of Ukraine. It would have blocked our economy, communications, and everything else. It was also a great risk... so I thought that the enemy would demonstrate in these areas, and the main attack would be made along the Dnipro, on the left bank, to cut Ukraine into two parts and capture it completely, capture all the crossings and encircle and block our army in Donbas. The Russians' operational plan provided for this. But they wanted to attack everywhere at once, in eight directions. They decided to actually block the possibility of Ukraine's mobilization so that the Ukrainian army would simply not have time to respond to the crisis in all directions and would be forced to either surrender, lose control, or be unable to resist.
That is, it was a blitzkrieg. It was similar to Operation Danube, which the Soviet Union conducted to take over Czechoslovakia. It was similar to Operation Gelb, when Hitler tried to capture neutral Holland and Belgium in one fell swoop in World War II. That is, it was a quick combined operation to capture in one blow, to repeat what Hitler did, what the Soviet Union did - to make organized resistance impossible in one blow. To cut off communications. Do not allow people, the state, and the economy to be mobilized. The main thing was to disrupt mobilizations. In fact, the Russians had all the conditions to do this. I told you about the balance of power. As of February 24, at least, the total ratio of forces that were actually in formation was 1 to 3, and in the areas of the enemy's main attacks, for example, Crimea, we had 3 battalions covering Chonhar according to the schedule. And on Chonhar itself, there was 1 battalion, the 137th Air Assault Battalion, manned by 50%, without heavy weapons. Further, near Kherson, in Oleshky, there were 2 battalions of the 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade on the left bank, 1 battalion of the 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade was being relocated to the Melitopol area, and 2 battalions were at the training ground, not deployed. The battalion near Melitopol also did not have time to deploy, arriving too late. The artillery of the 59th Brigade and the anti-tank battery were in the process of being relocated and not deployed. Well, the serviceability of tanks in the tank battalion was also low, unfortunately. The Russians had an entire army corps advancing in this direction, and there were at least 15 battalion tactical groups, fully equipped, deployed, with equipment, ready to attack. On our side, there was nothing on Chonhar. Not a single position was dug. No minefields, as far as we could see. Only sailor Skakun tried to blow up one of the bridges. There are 5 of them. And there are several dams. And there are also passages between the dams. All this is a large number of small bridges. None of them were blown up. This is still a mystery that no one in the current government can tell us. That is, the ratio of forces in the Crimean direction was at least - at least! - 1 to 15.
This is true if we do not compare combat potential. But our fighters could not put up this resistance in principle, because they were not deployed for combat. That's how you calculate, right? They were not in deployed positions. They had not dug in, set up minefields, or deployed equipment to their positions. That is, the balance of power was absolutely not in our favor. On the directions of the main attacks, the enemy had a 1 to 15, 1 to 20 advantage. And they attacked, acted with a great advantage in strength. That's why, you know, I'm looking at many Russian observers now... this is how the enemy entered Chonhar. They entered through Chonhar and through Henichesk, and they entered Ukraine through the Arabat Spit. I would like to say, friends, that unfortunately, the Russian command accomplished its task of seizing the corridor from Crimea to Donbas in one week. In one week, they completely encircled Mariupol. They completely captured the large cities of Berdiansk, Melitopol, the entire corridor, the large city of Tokmak, Enerhodar, with the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, which provided a quarter of Ukraine's nuclear power. Kherson, the enemy crossed the bridge on the first day of the war. The dam at Novokakhovka on the first day of the war. The tasks were completed to create a corridor. And the enemy moved in the direction of Odesa and began to advance. And in the direction of Zaporizhzhia.
That is, they were trying to encircle our troops on the Left Bank. That is, the situation was simply threatening because of this balance of forces. When they say that comparing the number of people in the ranks is not everything. If you compare the difference in combat potential, it is simply incommensurable. Now Russian analysts and experts are trying to justify the failure of Russian aggression by saying that there was no superiority in manpower. But there really wasn't on February 24. Ukraine began to level the playing field, and this Ukrainian infantry appeared and leveled the combat potential of the parties with its heroism, not numbers. Not by the number of ammunition, not by the number of weapons, but by heroism, motivation, and real sacrifice. This is what the Ukrainian infantry did to level the playing field. But this Ukrainian infantry did not start appearing immediately. On February 24, they just started handing out weapons. Weapons were not given to everyone at once. In most cities of Ukraine, weapons were not issued for several more weeks. Those lines at the military recruitment offices - people were looking for someone to give them an assault rifle. Just an assault rifle. Grenade launchers were not delivered.
On the night of February 25, I came to Dnipro and asked the leadership of the Dnipro Defense Headquarters, and all the security forces, all the military, the East Command was part of it, representatives, I asked about the main thing, the main communication hub is the Dnipro. And the seizure of 4 bridges across the Dnipro, even on the left bank, could be a disaster for our entire logistics. Or the seizure of bridges near Zaporizhzhia. It would have been a disaster for the entire flank and the supply of our troops. That's why I came and heard that there were no anti-tank weapons there at all. There were none in the city. All the troops that were there had already left for the front. And that was it. There were no reserves. That is, the enemy, in addition to actually having an advantage, they also had the advantage of actually attacking units, they had aviation, they could block the movement of any of our troops, strike at communications, which they tried to do. And we could not take cover. Therefore, the difference in the combat capabilities of Russia and Ukraine on February 24 was not even 3-4 times, but if we measure the combat potential, it was 10-15 times. That's at least what I'm saying. This situation did not begin to level out immediately.
But. What factor did Putin calculate? You and I know this very well. It is the fact that we, Ukrainians, are passionate people, people who are hardened and have independent thinking. And these lines at military registration and enlistment offices, these crowds of people, patriots who were looking for weapons, any weapons, by all means, to join the ranks. These were the people who were going to storm, to attack, and on the way they learned how the machine gun works, how to take off the safety catch, how to shoot. Just while going into battle. People who sacrificed themselves with one thought in mind - to kill at least one occupier, to sell their lives for a high price. These people completely destroyed and changed all of Russia's good plans.
So, you know, I think it's really a miracle. In terms of the balance of power, in terms of the fact that we had a failed deployment. Oh, I forgot to mention the deployment. Unfortunately, none of our brigades that were supposed to cover Kyiv, Kharkiv - not a single brigade managed to fully deploy near the border. Because we also had an order not to provoke. And in fact, the troops entered the battle from the east. They were not in their positions. Not a single brigade. Not a single one, I emphasize.
The biggest miracle happened near Kharkiv, when, of course, the 92nd Brigade went to the border, part of the units that fought deterrent battles to prevent the enemy from entering Kharkiv. It had only 4 battalions with 50% of the equipment. Kharkiv was saved not only by the 92nd and the National Guard, which was in Kharkiv, the 5th and 3rd brigades. But Kharkiv was saved by the fact that the famous 93rd Mechanized Brigade was deployed on the flanks of Kharkiv, both to the west and to the east. The 93rd Brigade, 3rd Battalion Tactical Group held positions west of Kharkiv. To the east of Kharkiv, battalion tactical groups of the 93rd Brigade also fought. Their total front was more than 150 kilometers if you measure where they were deployed. All these units engaged in the battle from the east. We failed to reach the objective in time. Even these forces, which were many times, many times inferior to the enemy, did not have such means of destruction, they did not have time to deploy. So, of course, no one expected this. It is hard to imagine such a level of lack of readiness for war. I understand why the Russian command had such a brazen plan. They looked at all this, at everything I have listed, and thought that an attack on Ukraine would be a walk. Because people are in command here who do not understand what is happening at all. They did not deploy forces, did not respond to intelligence, to warnings from Western allies. They just...I want to say that this is a real miracle, what happened. A real miracle. But this miracle was created by Ukrainian soldiers. You know, when I talk to the military, they... the most vulnerable moments for me are when people tell me... the commander of the 59th Brigade, who was then a company commander in one of the battalions, told me how they were already breaking through, they did not have time to deploy the defense, they were already breaking through to Kherson on this Antonivskyi bridge under enemy fire, went beyond the bridge. And they were just gathering people. There is no organization, no order. They are trying to create some kind of combat order to fulfill the tasks of covering Kherson. And this officer said, you know, the most important moment of the war for me, which I remembered during these 2 years, he is still fighting, is when several dozen men approached us in Kherson. They were all in ordinary clothes from home. They had just come out of the house. They said: guys, give us machine guns. We will go to defend the city. He says: we had weapons, there were no people, we were short-staffed. We had weapons. A significant number of people had not yet escaped from the encirclement on the left bank. We gave them assault rifles and a few grenade launchers. And these people gathered and just like that... like on Maidan, there was such a barrier and just ran there in a crowd to that bridge, and they fought with the enemy, who was also trying to capture the city. He says that nothing in the war made me feel as strongly as the sight of people coming out of their homes on the first day of the war. They asked for weapons and went into battle. For many of these people, this battle was the last one in their lives. Just imagine. It's really hard to even imagine. People who were told that there would be a truce, peace. No need to worry, no need to evacuate. Who were not organized by anyone. They were just friends, comrades. Maybe some of them served in the military, some of them trusted each other. They were not ready for war. But when they saw the Russian attack, they all left their homes and did everything possible and impossible to defend their hometown. Indeed, the entire history of the war is made up of such episodes.
These stories are in the memory of everyone who was there and saw this real national impulse, how people did everything to destroy the occupiers. In a few days, a huge number of people completely changed the balance of power. It became obvious that our cadre army, despite the fact that we do not have aviation... We do have aviation, but it cannot cover the troops like Russian aviation, which operates absolutely everywhere, with impunity. Our guys, who do not have so much ammunition, do not have such advanced equipment, are still fighting. They beat the enemy. I want to say that it is hard to even say how happy I was when I saw on March 1 how the 3rd Battalion Tactical Group under the command of Oleksandr Sak of the 93rd Brigade defeated the Russian battalion tactical groups of the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade west of Kharkiv. This was the most important direction, because the west of Kharkiv, we all understand, is almost encircled. To cut off Kharkiv from the western communications would mean that the city would not have stood. Our troops simply defeated the enemy. It was just an incredible sight. I saw a gray zone a few kilometers ahead at the battlefield, and we didn't have the people to control it.
I personally drove through the gray zone with two volunteer friends. I counted more than 30 pieces of Russian equipment there. It was abandoned. Some of it is absolutely serviceable. It was abandoned, hit, destroyed. It was just amazing. I realized that the Russians had lost at least most of the equipment of a battalion tactical group, that they had seriously lost their combat capability. And that all this was done with minimal effort by our guys. It was near the town of Dergachi, west of Kharkiv. This glorious battle took place there. I saw Russian equipment. Our fighters captured 6 Akatsia self-propelled guns in that battle, and one self-propelled artillery system was destroyed by Javelin. I showed a video of it being destroyed. We captured 6 Russian newest T80BMV tanks, a Russian Solntsepek multiple rocket launcher system and a large number of other military and automotive vehicles. Commander Sak, call sign Staff, received volunteers, operational reserve, and immediately placed them in position. Every day, only Russian trophy KAMAZ trucks were brought to the positions to equip the companies, and people were shown that a battalion tactical group was fighting here, which had actually doubled in size due to Russian equipment. It was such an incredible motivation to see and feel it. It was clear that Russian plans were failing, they were unrealizable.
I also remember seeing a battle going on in Derhachi, heavy equipment and trophies. It was clear that Russia had sent in large forces, and our people were fighting. In the village of Derhachi itself, Russian-speaking people are speaking Russian, and they are building barricades in their village with some stones, garbage, and sacks. It was just incredible to see. It was impossible to watch without tears. And everyone who came out of the house came up and asked in Russian, but asked: guys, how can we help you? What can we bring you? How can we treat you? It was just normal... I will never forget it. And this breakthrough completely changed the balance of power. No one expected it. I think no one in the world expected it at all. First of all, the Russian command did not expect it. Because I want to say that this is a miracle of the 22nd year. I think that we have to leave as many memories as possible about this incredible heroic time, so that all these organizational and managerial efforts, all these feats of the soldiers, all this will never be forgotten. Because I think the Ukrainian nation has been hardened for many years in fierce battles and trials. But this was a feat of global proportions. I think that in the twenty-first century, no nation on such a scale, no state has ever fought for its freedom like this. This is unique.
So, friends, I want to thank everyone. I want to thank and just recognize all those who went into battle in the first days of the war, on the first day of the war and gave their lives right then. When nothing was certain. When no one knew what would happen next. When there was a great risk. But people did everything.
One of the captives who returned from Chonhar wrote to me about the first battles. He was a laborer. Unfortunately, I did not have time to write down his contact information. But I will find him. I ask this person to respond. He said that there was a shot in Chonhar. One of our fighters, who was at a stronghold near Chonhar, also managed to make a shot from a grenade launcher and hit a Russian tank. Or an armored vehicle. It's hard to say now because he was a civilian. Unfortunately, this worker, he was working nearby... because at Chonhar, as we know, this border crossing, a coffee shop was being built there, landscaping, a gas station. So the workers there were not working with fortifications. But this soldier, a Ukrainian soldier, died heroically. I don't know who he was. I also dream of finding out, maybe there are some witnesses or something that will allow us to find out who the fallen hero was. I can imagine it. The first day of the war. He sees an armada of hundreds of armored vehicles moving across the bridge, absolutely calmly, without a shot being fired. No one is shooting at them. And this one hero enters into battle with this armada. This battle was the last battle of his life.
Stories like this are what make up the Ukrainian miracle that happened two years ago. It should be noted that in about two weeks all Russian attacks were repelled. Around March 13-14, there was a radical change in the course of the fighting. Russian strike groups in central Ukraine on the right bank got stuck in the agglomeration, urban development. And they suffered huge losses in battles with poorly armed but well-motivated Ukrainian infantrymen. All of them were infantrymen. These were all our special forces, TDs, and volunteers, of whom there were a lot because you couldn't sign up for anything. And of course, the army, the military, the National Guard, the police. Whoever didn't go into battle and fulfill their duty at that time. This is the story.
Answers to questions
There was no fighting in Vasylkiv itself...
It was a very important base for our aviation, which was used even during the fighting when the enemy was close. It was an important logistics point. Indeed, there were fierce battles near Vasylkiv, not far from this town. Vasylkiv played a very important role. The people, the volunteers who were there, they all played a very important role in the defense of the country.
The sabotage-reconnaissance group (SRG) was just a horror. There were a lot of rumors about the SRG in Kyiv. Everyone was scared. The authorities themselves were frightened. We remember how Hanna Maliar, the Deputy Minister of Defense, even the Army Command officially reported that an SRG was coming to Kyiv. Unfortunately, immediately after that, there were several incidents, several dozen people, our military and civilians, unfortunately, were killed, shot, because there was no organization of checkpoints. There is no order of control. Weapons were handed out to people, and the command was simply not psychologically prepared for this. And very often there were cases, unfortunately, of shooting at their own. There was a well-known case in Obolon where several soldiers of the 72nd Brigade were shot on their own, unfortunately, after Maliar's statement. Unfortunately, soldiers of the 58th Brigade were killed in Kyiv. And a unit of the 101st Security Brigade shot 2 columns of our own military near its location on Berestiivskyi Avenue... these are also just shameful incidents. Shameful incidents, because, you know, when the government was lying about preparing for the war, in fact, nothing was done to prepare. If these people, these checkpoints had been prepared in advance - and there was unlimited time. If people had been properly placed there, prepared for this, there would have been no mess, no chaos, no panic.
The authorities told about it for their own interests. President Zelenskyy still says that there were five attempts on his life. Arestovych said that there were SRGs on Bankova Street, there were fights. Friends, none of this happened. Perhaps not Arestovych, I don't remember who among the speakers on Bankova Street said that the SRGs were going to eliminate Zelenskyy. This is complete nonsense. Not a single case of an SRG attack in the center of Kyiv has been recorded. There were no documents or facts to confirm that Russian saboteurs were operating in Kyiv. Unfortunately, there is evidence that the columns fired on their own. The Solomyanskyi district administration also has bullet marks. Unfortunately, this is also our fire. This is shelling. So, all these things, the enemy did not come to the borders of Kyiv even once. They did not enter Kyiv. This was because our fighters, our army, the 72nd Brigade, primarily the mechanized brigade under the command of Oleksandr Vdovychenko, deployed around Kyiv. They were reinforced by a large number of volunteers, TDF units, volunteer units. Then they were reinforced by reserve units, paratroopers, the 14th Brigade was coming up, the 10th Brigade. The reserves were reinforced. The enemy was repelled, defeated near Kyiv. But unfortunately, we still hear these stories about the SRG. Yesterday, in an interview with Fox news, the President said that there were five attempts on his life. This is the panic that is in the minds of the authorities. You know, not a single one of these SRGs has been found. And with this panic, they intimidated not only themselves. They were sitting in a bunker under guard. And they intimidated people, and people reacted in this way, unfortunately. There was a similar tragedy in Vasylkiv.
What are the real chances that Putin will take advantage of our weaknesses - lack of weapons, failed mobilization, lack of financial support? Will he attack again from all sides, as he did in 2022?
The particular danger of the 22nd year of the attack was the suddenness of the actual attack. That is, when we all knew everything but did not react in any way. The authorities did not react in any way. People gathered themselves, prepared for war on their own. Now the situation is different. We are ready for war. We will not be able to ignore the concentration of troops on all sides. And now Putin has big problems with manning the army that is advancing in Donbas. Therefore, it is impossible in the near future. I want to tell you that I always analyze the data of the killed, the documents that are being prepared during the war, those we take prisoners, and collect on the battlefield. I am constantly going to collect documents, to look at the dead - which units, how long they served in the army, what kind of service they did. You can see the documents, I have a video on my channel showing how the 53rd Brigade, it was on February 17, was being cleared by an infantry company of a commander with the call sign Zam (deputy - ed. note). He is conducting a mopping-up operation. The company commander kills several Russian occupants himself. They take their documents. And there's a Russian who was drafted on January 27, signed a contract, and on January 13 he was already near Avdiivka. That is, he was eliminated actually two weeks after he joined the Russian army. Therefore, they also do not have enough human resources. They are collecting them. Russia has a large human mobilization potential. They are increasing it at the expense of migrants, by increasing financial payments, by improving the supply of troops. But the enemy is not in the mood to concentrate large reserves right now. They used all their reserves to break through our defense and capture Avdiivka. So in the near future, if there is any concentration, we will see it in advance. We saw it in '22 as well. It's just that there were no actions at all then.
Regarding the failure of mobilization. Well, let's hope that the government will do something about it. Of course, this is not the way to go. It's just a completely uncontrollable situation. The situation at the front is very difficult. Mobilization is definitely needed. Absolutely. It must be reasonable, first of all, for the state, so as not to undermine or destroy the economy. That is why we need mobilization not in the form of looking for healthy men who can be caught on the street. We need mobilization that will start with registering people in general. We need mobilization both to the front and to industry. Because the army needs more than just people with machine guns. The army's task is not to force a number of people into a barracks or a trench. The army needs weapons, the destruction of the enemy. The purpose of the army, the effectiveness, is to destroy the enemy. The army needs ammunition, drones, transportation, equipment, communications, electricity. A lot of stuff. A significant amount of this work can be done by people with health problems, serious limitations, or disabilities. Women can do it. Youth can do it. Even young men. There is no need to look everywhere for healthy men to fill all the positions. There must be a war plan. There should be mobilization to industry, there should be mobilization to the army. Then the workload will be reduced. What is the army looking for in Ukraine? The army is only looking for stormtroopers. Those who will sit in a trench. I was near Avdiivka just 2 days ago in the direction of the enemy's attack. They are moving further from Avdiivka to the west. There are just no words. The gap - here in Kyiv, they say one thing. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief says one thing. But what is happening at the front is different.
Outside Avdiivka, there are no line of fortifications has been built so far. I saw our soldiers in these dug holes being attacked by Russian drones and mortars. It is very painful to watch. Because no conclusions are drawn. If the government is unable to find builders to equip at least the most basic rear lines of defense, if they cannot find engineers to maintain modern equipment, drones, communication sensors, if they cannot find workers, engineers, technologists who will produce ammunition, then there will never be enough attack aircraft. We could mobilize all the people there. The war is not fought by attack aircraft alone. The war must be waged in an organized manner, with technologies and means of destruction. People cannot be one goal, one resource of war. And our government expects a miracle to happen every day. Not only on February 24, 22. And that there will be hundreds of thousands of heroes who are ready to go to the tanks with machine guns and hold the line to the last. It does not happen. People are a finite resource. And more than that. People need to be protected. Because an experienced warrior gains experience and understanding. He can kill more. Or train more, prepare those who can learn to kill. Therefore, the occupiers must be destroyed with intelligence, first of all, with strategic decisions and organization. All of this has not been present at the front, and it is not there. I hope that public opinion will force us to act. And not just to hold some shows and press conferences to talk about some non-existent successes. There are big problems at the front. And these visits of Zelenskyy for photos, which he takes and immediately runs away after 20 minutes of photo shoots, are not a solution. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief should not be the most popular person at a single marathon, but he should be an effective leader in the war. A leader. Unfortunately, Zelenskyy has not become such a leader. This is the main problem and challenge for us. Therefore, as we see, it is not a problem to change generals. It's easy. What is changing? Do you think something has changed at the front and in the fighting? Have any of the soldiers or officers noticed it? What has changed? Not yet. There are changes at the highest level. But when will the changes happen at the lower level? How long do we have to wait? How long do we have to wait for construction organizations to start building defense lines? How long until our concrete plants and construction companies start supplying ready-made building structures to the front? When will we start producing drones according to the order of 24 years? Where is the million? Almost 2 months have passed, and most of the contracts for the production of that million drones have not yet been signed. And the main supplier of drones to the frontline at the moment, dear friends, is still volunteers and citizens. The economy, without which our drone pilots will not be able to kill and destroy the enemy with technology. I filmed a report recently, and spent just one day with the FPV drones crew. Before my eyes, a 19-year-old boy who was part of the crew destroyed two Russian occupiers in a day and hit 6 guns. 6! One of them was hit by volunteer drones, friends, of course. Not with state drones. That's how it's fought. People have all the equipment which they bought themselves, or the unit bought a little bit and the volunteers bought it. So they fought with absolutely volunteer equipment on a volunteer vehicle. And they gave results. This is what the rear and the economy are needed for.
Well, unfortunately, there are big problems. I do not yet see how to reach the consciousness of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff, except by creating public opinion. Unfortunately, the loss of Avdiivka after the loss of Sievierodonetsk, Lysychansk, Bakhmut, Soledar does not bring the leadership to its senses. Now a commission has been set up in the General Staff to establish the reasons why we lost Avdiivka. I will also make a detailed broadcast about this in the near future, why we lost Avdiivka. Let's simplify the task for the General Staff because I have read the report on the reasons for the loss of Soledar - I will touch on it so that you understand the level of our analytics. Unfortunately, it is not high. I don't think it will be completely secret. It's more like self-deception. It is impossible to analyze your actions at this level. I hope that if Oleksandr Syrskyi wants to make the right changes in the army, one of the innovations that needs to be changed is to introduce an after-action review, the NATO standard operating procedure for after-action analysis. That is, when an operation takes place and each of its leaders writes a short report, a brief report on why certain events took place, the reasons. And they are not beaten over the head for this report, that he is a rascal, criticizing his superiors, and no criminal case is opened by the SBI. Instead, there is a professional discussion, clarification of the reasons, objective conclusions are drawn, and the army begins to learn. Unfortunately, we still have this Soviet mess, where you can't criticize your superiors, you can't question them. All decisions are the only right ones. Everyone should be happy. And who is to blame? Always the soldier. Because it is the soldier who, excuse me, did not hold his position. Or he does not want to go to his death under fire. The soldier is to blame. Unfortunately, this is how we came to the conclusion in Soledar, and, frankly, it's the same as it will be in Avdiivka. Therefore, in order to avoid this ingrained Soviet mentality and bureaucracy, we must draw conclusions.
Today is the second anniversary of the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the 10th anniversary of the beginning of the aggression against Ukraine. The war has been going on for 10 years. This sense of unity that you feel in the air, that you feel in your souls and eyes - it will always be with us. And it will lead us to victory. I am sincerely grateful to those who took the first blow in those terrible days. I will never forget the feat of those who went to their deaths and who gave their lives, not knowing that we would have victories, that we would be able to stop the Russian offensive. And many thanks to those who are now in the trenches and cannot watch us. Because they are fighting, they are beating the enemy.
Yurii Butusov
