First results of work of new Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi
The stream is dedicated to the activities of the new leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
The immediate reason for this is an interview, the first big interview, a big report, in fact, and a strategic vision formulated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi. He gave an interview to Ukrinform. Let's go through it thesis by thesis and compare it with the facts that are known, for example, to me, about the situation at the front and what we can talk about. In order to compare, to understand how the vision of the leadership of the Armed Forces corresponds to what is on the zero line, what soldiers see, what volunteers see, what journalists see, in order to possibly adjust some vision or continue the discussion, or clarify the discussion, or, for example, say: these are absolutely robust assessment, we should support them and welcome what they are. In order for us to have such a common vision, I think it is necessary to do this, especially since I am very pleased that the leadership of the Armed Forces watches some of the broadcasts we make and gives feedback. It's very nice. We really appreciate it.
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First. "We are not only defending ourselves, but we are also advancing in different directions every day. Recently, the number of positions we have regained exceeds the number of positions we have lost. The enemy has not managed to advance significantly on strategic directions, its territorial gains, if any, are of tactical importance."
So, friends, this is how the interview begins. With this quote, with this assessment of the strategic and operational situation, so of course we have to pay attention to this because these first words basically set the tone, the vision for everything else that follows.
It is difficult for me to say personally on what grounds this statement was made. I cannot say that Oleksandr Syrsky is not interested in the situation, but according to all sources, according to the maps shown by Censor.NET, which are constantly updated online by the Deep State project team, they are quite accurate, and according to all sources, the enemy is advancing and has captured significant territory. The Russians have captured several hundred square kilometres after our offensive. They completely captured the city of Avdiivka and the town of Marinka. A number of villages were captured. Right on the day when Oleksandr Syrskyi's interview was published in Ukrinform, the Russians launched a large, powerful attack near Avdiivka in the Tonenke area, and unfortunately, they also managed to capture about one field, completely captured it, and moved forward. With heavy losses. Our soldiers inflicted huge losses on the Russians in people and equipment. Nevertheless, this meaty assault led to the fact that they seized another part of our land. I cannot say that I am against a positive attitude in the war. But it seems to me that politicians should speak positively, public figures can speak positively, and they can give positive assessments of the situation. Perhaps they see it that way, even if it is not entirely true. But when the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces speaks, unfortunately, I have to admit that this assessment of the... I want us to look at this quote again.
So, I would like to say that "the number of positions we have recaptured exceeds the number of positions we have lost" is not true. The phrase "the enemy has not managed to make significant progress on strategic directions" is unfortunately also not true. Because the enemy is advancing. We cannot recapture this territory. It's not because the soldiers don't want to, or the generals don't want to. The Russians objectively have an advantage in manpower. They send more replenishment to the front. And they have a significant advantage in munitions. Therefore, unfortunately, it is impossible. Everyone knows this. The entire army knows this. Our Western partners know this because they also monitor the situation. All Western media write about it. It is even written on our own online maps, on all of them. Deep State, all other projects, all interns, all researchers show this. Why say this? For whom? Perhaps the audience of this interview is people who are far from the war. And where are they? It is very difficult to find people in Ukraine who are far from the war. I don't know why Oleksandr Syrskyi made this statement, but I have a very unpleasant impression of this interview. I would like to see objective reality, not propaganda, from the commander-in-chief. I think that none of us, I personally do not want to humiliate the new leadership of the Armed Forces in any way. But we don't expect stories that everything is fine when it's not. We expect the truth, i.e. an objective assessment of the situation, recognition of problems and difficulties, and what to do. Perhaps it doesn't even need to be said, but it needs to be done. But if something that does not exist is publicly announced, what does it lead to? And then other leaders in the army face the same risk: to say that everything is fine, that we are not withdrawing, that we will hold on to everything, that we have order everywhere. But it's not true. Why do you say that? We realize that the enemy has an advantage. Why do we need to put these rose-coloured glasses on the people of a country at war? To be honest, I think this is a deep mistake by Oleksandr Syrskyi. I hope that he will take a critical look at this interview and that his subsequent public appearances will be appropriate to the situation, without these... unnecessary things. I don't think that anyone will reproach Syrskyi now, or say that it is because of him. There are no grounds for this. Why should we say something that doesn't exist?
Then, the following quote. "We have learned to fight not with the amount of ammunition, but with the proficiency of using the weapons we have. In addition, we make the most of our advantage in unmanned aerial vehicles. Although the enemy is trying to overtake us in this effective type of weapon."
Yes, well, this is a bit of an out-of-order quote. It's out of order. It's not like that. The following is in the interview. That's not what's in the interview. What's next? "It should be recognized that the current situation in certain areas is tense. The Russian occupiers continue to increase their efforts and have a numerical advantage in personnel. They traditionally do not take into account losses and continue to use the tactics of massive assaults. In certain areas, the Ukrainian Defense Forces repel several dozen attacks every day."
Well, this is absolutely true. The enemy has the tactical initiative. To be honest, we know it ourselves. He keeps on making meaty assaults in certain narrow areas. On the entire front, the Russians have no forces, because Ukrainian soldiers are inflicting such heavy losses on the Russians that even the great Russia cannot mobilize enough soldiers, they do not have enough, and there are huge losses during meat assaults. And everything is being thrown into the battle as equipment: old MTLBs, 70 APCs, 50 APCs are already being thrown into the battle, golf carts, buggies, soldiers are just walking. The Russians are throwing everything into the battle. Why? Our soldiers are really inflicting heavy losses on them. But. There is no place to hide the truth. The enemy has the advantage and they control the tactical initiative, they dictate: they are the ones who attack, dozens of attacks in different directions. Here I can agree with Syrskyi's assessment. This paragraph is accurate. It is true.
"The experience of the past months and weeks shows that the enemy has significantly increased its aviation activity, using GABs - guided aerial bombs that destroy our positions. In addition, the enemy is conducting heavy artillery and mortar fire. A few days ago, the enemy's advantage in terms of ammunition fired was about 6:1."
Well, I can fully agree. In principle, I think it is most likely 6 times, objectively speaking, I think there will be an advantage in ammunition. That is why the enemy is advancing. I can only agree with this assessment.
Next. "But we have learned to fight not with the amount of ammunition, but with the proficiency of using the weapons we have. In addition, we make the most of our advantage in unmanned aerial vehicles. Although the enemy is trying to overtake us in this effective type of weapon."
This paragraph, to be honest, again struck me as very unpleasant. Unfortunately, the situation is not as it is stated here. First, are we trying to maximize our advantage in unmanned aerial vehicles? We are not trying to maximize it. The army has formed a large number of attack drone units. But the majority - what is the majority? All these units are understaffed. Some of them are very understaffed. There is no recruitment of professional staff. The tactics of these units are completely unmanaged and not organized in any way. The interaction of the use of attack drones simply does not stand up to any criticism. Both the distribution of control channels, takeoff sites, and electronic warfare equipment, which constantly jams their own drones en masse. During the planning of operations, drone strikes are not systematically used or planned. Now the Unmanned Systems Forces have been created. Beautiful, loud, all said and done. This process is happening there, at a large level. But at the tactical level, at the level of attack drone companies in brigades, it is not visible at all. The supply of drones, the supply of antennas, and the supply of ammunition are just terrible. I want to tell you that the supply of drones does not correspond to a million drones, to all these promises made by Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy. They are not at the front. It's not true that there are no drones in the number promised from that million. Most of the drones used at the front, in most brigades, 95%, in some units - maybe I can't speak for all of them, maybe there are a few where not 95%, but let's say 70-80% of the drones are volunteer drones. These are drones that were not bought by the state. The question arises: where? The question is very simple. This is a topic for a separate program. Unfortunately, there are still no systematic actions to develop drones or use them in the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the tactical level. And I am very curious, who is this... how did this conclusion come about that we are maximizing our advantage in unmanned aerial vehicles? Who said that? How did the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine come to this conclusion? I can say that this is a false vision. First of all.
Second. Where did the idea that we have an advantage in unmanned aircraft come from? I want to say that it is not at all. First of all. In terms of the number of drones on the battlefield - Mavic, tactical reconnaissance, fpv kamikaze drones, Mavic with a drop - my friends, the Russians are not inferior in any way. In some parts of the frontline, they outnumber drones, and significantly so. They use them more at the tactical level. I'm talking about the tactical level now. There is no advantage in numbers of quadcopters on the battlefield. We have an advantage in the quality of use. This is true. This is the advantage of the personnel. Those people who voluntarily gathered in these companies of attack drones, create some teams there, look for sponsors and provide all this at their own expense. They are looking for vehicles, equipment, people, and drones. They make their own ammunition. Yes, by the way. The state does not supply ammunition. You have to look for it yourself. Most of the drone units have to produce their own ammunition, have to look for detonation initiators to use these destructors, to activate them. To be honest, I don't know about the maximum - it's an exaggeration. And the fact that we have an advantage is also an exaggeration. For some types of drones, such as long-range homing drones like the enemy's Lancet, long-range reconnaissance drones like the Supercam, kamikaze drones like the Shahed, the Russians have a numerical advantage and a significant one, and they are constantly trying to improve their use. Again, we have seen a video of a Russian drone detecting a Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery from a distance of more than 50 kilometers, and thanks to this, the Russians managed to destroy two of our launchers with missiles. 50 kilometers is a long range. This does not mean that we have... In some areas, the Russians have an advantage, not us. Therefore, these words say that, unfortunately, the leadership of the Armed Forces has not yet made the necessary attention and objective assessment of what drones are in the Armed Forces, how they are used, and what their advantages are. Therefore, I hope that Oleksandr Syrskyi, as a person with critical thinking and analytical thinking, will pay attention and create an objective picture of what is happening with drones. Because we will not outnumber the Russians. We are destroying them, causing losses due to quality. We need to improve management and organization, first of all. And planning, of course, both for procurement and for conducting the operations with drones. Are drones our main tool of warfare now? What do our generals think about? Do they send some attack aircraft into the trenches or do they first carefully plan the use of drones in a particular area? Unfortunately, in most cases, they think about how to send people somewhere, not how to organize the work of drones in certain areas and ensure an advantage there. This is the reality. Therefore, I hope that these words are such an advance and that Oleksandr Syrskyi will soon deal with the issue of drones and improve this component of the Armed Forces exactly as it is stated here so that we can maximize the benefits of unmanned aircraft.
Next. The following quote is from Oleksandr Syrskyi.
"The enemy continues offensive actions on a wide front, trying to reach the borders of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions at any cost, to push us on the left bank of the Dnipro River in the Zaporizhzhia region. In certain areas of the frontline, we managed to level the situation with artillery, and this immediately affected the overall situation. Our artillerymen are using high-precision ammunition to hit enemy concentrations even tens of kilometers from the front line. Not only does the enemy suffer significant losses in manpower and equipment, including artillery systems, every day, but it can never feel safe anywhere, including the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. This is an important psychological factor. They will have no peace on our land."
Here I can only agree. I want to say that a very important phrase in this block is that the Russians' goal is to reach the borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The borders of the Luhansk region - they are actually on them. But to reach the borders of the Donetsk region. The borders of the Donetsk region are really the main strategic goal of the Russians. They want to push us through by force and seize the entire Donbas. This is true. I was also a little surprised by the phrase "to push us on the left bank of the Dnipro River in Zaporizhzhia region". That's the same phrase... To push us... They are trying to knock us out of all those bridgeheads, all those salients that were created in the Russian defense during the summer offensive of '23. In principle, I can agree with these assessments. There are no questions here.
Here is a quote from Syrskyi.
"It is clear that these are statistics, but it is important to know that in February-March this year alone (as of March 26) the enemy lost more than 570 tanks, about 1,430 armored combat vehicles, almost 1,680 artillery systems and 64 air defense systems. At the same time, the Ukrainian Defense Forces are keeping the main heights and defense areas under control. Our goal is to prevent the loss of our territory, to exhaust the enemy as much as possible, to inflict the greatest possible losses on him, and to form and prepare reserves for offensive operations. It is also very important that we managed to reduce enemy activity in the air, of course, thanks to the skill of our air defense units. Over the course of 10 days in February, they shot down 13 enemy aircraft, including two strategically important A50 surveillance and control aircraft."
Yes, let's look at this quote again. It is important. There is a lot of different important detailed information there. First of all. On losses. We can agree that loss is not necessarily destruction, it can be damage. I think the order of the numbers is as follows. Artillery systems, I think, including mortars and everything, because to be honest, the number of artillery systems surprised me a little bit. There are more of them than armored vehicles. I don't know how accurate this is, it's verified information, maybe there's some kind of mistake. There is more artillery than TMPs and APCs, which are constantly burned in attacks. In general, I think the order is as follows. If we assume that all this is destroyed and damaged, I think it is realistic in 2 months. Because the Russians constantly use a large number of armored vehicles for attacks almost every day. As for artillery and air defense systems, I don't know how many were destroyed or damaged. In terms of air defense, most likely, for sure. As for artillery systems, I think it's not 1680, but rather 168. Maybe there is an extra zero. "At the same time, the Ukrainian Defense Forces keep the main heights and defense areas under control." Again, we have lost Avdiivka. And this is exactly the dominant height over the area. So to say that we are in control... Well, okay. We are in control, we are still in control of that part of Donbas and that part of the front where we are. The enemy is not advancing quickly. Okay. "Our goal is to prevent the loss of our territory." This is clear, I agree.
"Prepare reserves for offensive actions". I want to draw attention to this. I like this phrase. That the army will have reserves. Unfortunately, our reserves are not combat-ready, and we have a big problem with this because we need to constantly replenish people at the front, and because of this, our reserves are constantly depleted. The reserves must be combat-ready. Let's hope that Syrskyi will manage to get it right. He and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should decide on this.
Next "It is also very significant that the enemy's activity in the air has also been reduced." Dear friends, I cannot agree with you completely. For some time in February, indeed, for some time, when the Russians are shot down, when our air defense works effectively, yes, they step-back. The number of bombings decreases. But of course, Russia is also fighting our anti-aircraft missile systems, our radars. Therefore, unfortunately, the use of air bombs, guided air bombs, unfortunately, has not decreased. It is massive. Unfortunately, the enemy has a great advantage here. And this is now the main means of promoting fire support for the Russians. Until we can fully cover the troops on the battlefield, cover our strategic facilities. This is the reality. This is not because there is someone good or bad. It's just that these systems are not even enough. And we must, of course, draw conclusions from the fact that we should not repeat such painful defeats when the enemy managed to hit Patriot batteries.
"Everything is fine with the proficiency of our personnel." Okay. It is possible... it is possible, let's say, to refrain from commenting. Indeed, we have a lot of qualified professional people in our army, no joke, who are doing well. And some who are not doing well. But in general, I must say that the Ukrainian army is significantly improving its skills and the use of many types of weapons, and the combat experience of gun crew operators and commanders is growing.
Everything is fine with the proficiency of our personnel. We hope to receive more air defense systems and, most importantly, missiles for them from our partners, especially given that the enemy has switched to the tactics of massive air strikes against Ukrainian troops, civilian infrastructure, and peaceful cities of Ukraine. We are obliged to protect them." Well, indeed, here we can say that we can only agree that we need, of course, more air defense systems. Unfortunately, only our Western allies can give us this at the moment. And we need to make the most of it. With proficiency.
The following quote from Syrskyi. "We are changing our tactics at sea. The attacks of unmanned drones on enemy ships are so effective that it allow us to talk about changes in the strategy of combat operations at sea in general. We are purposefully destroying the Russian Black Sea Fleet. And we will continue to do so. The recent destruction of several ships in Sevastopol is just another confirmation of this."
I can agree here. Unmanned drone attacks are effective. The Russian strategy has really changed. The Russian Black Sea Fleet just hid in its bases. It's like in World War II when they were hiding from the air force. And now they are hiding from crewless boats. This is the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. As we recall during the Crimean War of 1853-1856, in the nineteenth century, the Russian Black Sea Fleet self-sank in Sevastopol. In the Second World War, it was destroyed by the air force and hidden in bases. And now, during, let's say, the Third World War, unmanned boats, guided drones developed by Ukrainians, enthusiasts and volunteers during the fighting, now the Russian fleet is again defending itself in bases and destroying it there. This is really nice to note, and the Russian fleet, its activity, its operational area has been significantly narrowed. This does not mean, however, that it is possible to eliminate it with unmanned carriers alone. The enemy is trying to avoid strikes by unmanned maritime drones. This war at sea is far from over. But really, I think the whole world is shocked that you can... a country that has no navy just defeated, sank almost half of the combat-ready warships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which had been sailing there for so many years and frightening the entire Black Sea region, how they will attack everyone from the sea here.
Next, the following quote. There is a question here.
"Your appointment follows the high-profile and, frankly, not entirely understandable resignation of General Valerii Zaluzhnyi. What are the reasons for these changes, as well as the reformatting of virtually the entire military leadership? How were such perturbations perceived by the troops?"
Answer. "The military has one duty - we do not discuss orders, we execute them. So if the President of the country had reasons for such a replacement, especially during the active phase of the war, then these reasons are good. Valerii Fedorovich and I worked side by side in the most difficult times since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, and even before. We worked as a team. I wish him success in his new and very responsible position. I can say that all our knowledge and experience...".
Next is the next block. Well, what can I say? Of course, there are no explanations or answers here - Syrskyi cannot give a direct answer to the question. Of course, the change of Zaluzhnyi is political in nature. I want to say that those statements, you know, there is nothing about this in the interview. And let's remember that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said before he dismissed Zaluzhnyi, in fact, after he dismissed Zaluzhnyi, he outlined the following eight orders to Syrskyi that Syrskyi must fulfill. The first order was to create a strategic action plan for 2024. In the shortest possible time, it was said. Here in the interview, there is not a single word about this plan. No one talks about it. Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself has already forgotten about this plan. He has never said that he had a plan, that Syrskyi had prepared a plan, - everyone has forgotten about it. When Zaluzhnyi was being dismissed, it was like ... he even said at a press conference: we need a plan, a plan for the 24th year, a task for Syrskyi, a plan. And here, bam, there is no plan in the interview. There are no comments from the president or anyone else about the plan. Where is the plan?" This once again suggests that the change, the dismissal of Zaluzhnyi was a political story. Syrskyi, of course, cannot comment on this. To be fair, Zelenskyy had actually artificially created two armies, Syrsky's and Zaluzhnyi's, and created a competition in the Armed Forces between two top-level commanders, which was absurd in general - now at least there is one responsible. Now we can no longer say that it is the latter. No. There is Syrskyi alone, and he is responsible. There's no one to nod at anymore, we can only say that the top leadership is not providing something. But in principle, this is Syrskyi's issue. As we can see, there is no plan. And others were there, by the way... this is not the topic of this broadcast. We will talk about Zelenskyy's strategy later. Is this a topic for a separate program? His tasks for Syrskyi and what was accomplished.
Next quote.
"I can say that all our knowledge and experience gained during a full-scale war in battles with superior enemy forces will be used to improve the effectiveness of our actions and maximize the damage to enemy strike groups. On this basis, we are working out algorithms for the work of military command and control bodies at all levels. We are talking about detailed, careful planning of the actions of units, formations and units, of course, taking into account the needs of the front. In fact, not only the success of each military operation but also people's lives depend on the precise work of this vertical, which includes planning and support of combat operations, on the timely supply of the latest weapons and ammunition from our Western partners. Commanders at all levels should remember this, and we constantly remind our allies in the West of this."
Yes, friends, this is a very important piece. I think it will also cause a great resonance in the army. I want to say that it's hard for me to say... now we are talking about strategic decisions. Friends, what is the experience of war? Experience in war is personal and individual. Each person, each leader has his own. Each person, each leader has his own vision. The experience that changes the course of the war is the experience that should be reflected in planning documents in order, as it is said here, to work out the algorithms of the military command and control bodies. I completely agree with this phrase of Syrskyi's. Absolutely. This is the key. The advantage is created by management and organization. This increases the effectiveness of our actions and reduces the effectiveness of the enemy's actions, provided that they have technical and numerical superiority. So I want to say one thing: what is this experience expressed in? If there is experience, it is not in the head of one person, or two, or three. Experience means changes in the charter, changes in algorithms, changes in operational procedures, changes in the order of use of troops. All this must be recorded somewhere. Experience is an after-action review that allows us to constantly improve the process of military management and teach - not just soldiers. Generals should be taught. So we only like to teach soldiers. When will the generals learn? What? Generals don't have to study, do they? On what? On methodological materials. Does or did the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Commander-in-Chief of the Khortytsia OSGT, Oleksandr Syrskyi, conduct such analyzes? I saw it, for example, in Soledar. The analysis of Soledar was that only the brigade commanders had problems during the operation, and the brigade commanders did not prepare their soldiers and subordinates well. And that is why the problems occurred. Not a single word about responsibility for the untimely deployment of troops, unrealistic tasking, and the lack of rear lines of defense was addressed to the generals. This is a very strange experience. For some reason, experience is only for executives, and for some reason, managers believe that experience somehow comes to them by itself. Experience should be structured in the form of regulatory administrative documents in the form of planning documents that determine the procedure for the use, preparation and organization of combat operations. These are obvious things in fact. I want to say that we can say a lot of nice things about learning from experience, but I want to tell you that until the after-action review, the US Army's operational procedure, TS2520, is implemented in Ukraine, in our army, we should not say that we are learning from experience. We are not studying the experience. We say that we study the experience, and our analytical documents, like the one on Soledar, these post-operational documents, have one goal: to show that no one is involved, responsible, or liable. And to shift their responsibility to some generic executor, from whom no one will ask anything. That is not an improvement. So, unfortunately, friends, I cannot agree with these theses in full.
There is also a very powerful thing here: "we are working out algorithms for the work of military command and control bodies at all levels. We are talking about detailed, careful planning of the actions of associations, formations and units, of course, taking into account the needs of the front line." Friends, unfortunately, I want to say that this is a very subjective thing. To put it mildly, from what I see at the front. When top-level commanders ask to be given paper maps once a week to look at the situation and sign on the map who controls what, this is not careful planning. This is bureaucracy, pecking to death subordinates with unnecessary work that no one needs, and a lack of understanding that the tactics of warfare involve responsibility not for the observation points drawn somewhere, but for holding the line of responsibility. Every commander knows this. But for some reason, people forget this when they are appointed to higher positions and start doing this... then calling and shouting. What is the procedure for setting tasks? Have we begun to plan tasks carefully, for example, step by step, to define steps, routes, schedules that would be realistic? Or do we still have the practice of receiving a call: tomorrow at six in the morning, be there, march, find interaction with the first, second, third, do everything, go out at night... here I am, I'll turn it on for you, here's a map, dabbing with finger. Do we have this? This is a question for the military, who knows. Unfortunately, to put it mildly, it is practiced. And to put it mildly, it is widely practiced. Planning in words by dabbing a finger on a map. A paper map. Planning - go, figure it out, find interaction. So, to be honest, I don't understand what kind of planning is involved. I want to say that we have had problems with planning before. And under Oleksandr Syrskyi's predecessor, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, unfortunately, there was such an order. Or rather, a disorder that did not really correspond to the realities of the war on planning. It was on many levels. And this is no secret. But now, again, I would like to say that no one, in my opinion, demands from Syrskyi that he say: I have restored order, everything is fine. We all understand that he has been in office since the beginning of February. Why say something that is, to put it mildly, prematurely optimistic in general? What is the point? In my opinion, we need to identify the problem and say what we need to do in this or that area. And there are a lot of places in the interview where, you know... everything is fine, everything is great, everything is in order, everything is tense, but controlled. I want to tell you, I would forbid the command at the front to use the phrase "tense and controlled" to describe the fighting. I would allow generals to use the phrase "tense and controlled" only in their personal lives. It does not correspond at all to what is happening in a full-scale war. Tense and controlled do not exist in war. Either the enemy is advancing and we need to show the objective situation, what the enemy's tactical advantage is, what our advantage is, what forces we have. Unfortunately, he hides behind many of these optimistic reassuring phrases. Unfortunately, we have to tell the truth. And this is the biggest problem at the front.
The following is a quote from Syrskyi. "Our headquarters must know all the needs of the front, without exception, and be aware of the situation in each section of it. The qualifications of officers belonging to the military command and control bodies are of paramount importance in this regard. I can confirm that the composition of the General Staff and other military command and control bodies will be renewed thanks to combat officers with extensive practical experience in combat operations, which they gained on the battlefields of this war."
"Our headquarters must know all the needs of the frontline, without exception, and be aware of the situation in each of its areas." To be honest, I'm surprised. Didn't our headquarters know this before? Didn't they know the needs? Or is this some kind of secret information? I don't really understand. I want to tell you that we have so much reporting, so many forms and documentation for all occasions in the army that they seem to know more than they need to. More than they need to. Commissions, inspections, paperwork - it's just terrible in the army. It needs to be reduced. All headquarters do not need to know everything. Staff need to know what concerns their levels. And we have a big problem that our OSGR headquarters are operational and strategic, manually managing platoons and companies all the time. This does not mean that they know what is going on. It means that they are replacing and disorganizing the existing command and control system. They try to know much more than is necessary for the effective use of troops and create problems for individual units. This is a really big problem. And here I want to say: "The composition of military command and control bodies will be renewed thanks to combat officers with extensive practical experience of combat operations, which they gained on the battlefields of this war." This is exactly the same as the experience that Syrskyi mentioned earlier. Everyone's experience of war is different, and in Ukraine, we do not have a single methodology for assessing what constitutes effective combat operations. How can they be assessed? What are the criteria? Are there many dead - is the commander successful or not? Or is the one who has destroyed the enemy the most effective commander, isn`t he? I want to say that due to this subjectivity, there are also wrong decisions, which, by the way, Oleksandr Syrskyi himself made in his practice. Let's recall how Ruslan Shevchuk, the commander of the 93rd Brigade, was dismissed. For fighting in Bakhmut. The brigade performed all its tasks perfectly, the enemy's losses were simply many times higher than ours, the brigade held the front with incredible skill, with great sacrifice. For some reason, the brigadier was dismissed. Why was he dismissed? That was Syrskyi's decision, and I don't think anyone in the army would say that it was a justified decision. It was a wrong decision. Experience, right? So who is being promoted to the highest levels of command then?
I want to say the second thing. Here is the situation now. The brigadier of the 47th Brigade, Riumshin, was dismissed. Why was he dismissed? What was wrong with him? All the allies and personnel were absolutely positive and supportive of the brigadier's activities, and there were a huge number of videos of the enemy being destroyed. Why then is a person dismissed and transferred to another position? What kind of experience is this? Whose experience is this? This is also a decision that is not justified by anything. Why do this? Why say that he will have combat experience? What kind of combat experience? Whose experience? Now General Sodol has been appointed commander of the Khortytsia OSGT instead of Syrskyi. So what has changed? To be honest, when you see how Khortytsia is fighting now, it seems that nothing has changed there, no war experience at all... What has changed? Just as they were trying to shift platoons back and forth, to reshuffle companies, so it is happening now. Unwillingness to recognize the situation, reshuffling of personnel. What has changed, can you say? No. Why do this? Who does it reassure? It seems that we are engaged in some peaceful peacetime maneuvers. Why do this? No one is now demanding that the new leadership of the Armed Forces admit that everything is bad, that we have done everything. We understand everything, you are only in office. Why exaggerate and say things that do not correspond to the situation? I believe that Oleksandr Syrskyi is a new leader in the army and he should behave like a leader in the army, and not report to someone who is not clear, to whom? Who needs this information? The army reads this first of all, subordinate soldiers. They need information that shows that the leadership understands the situation objectively, clearly understands the problems, the enemy's advantages, and our shortcomings. And by identifying these shortcomings and problems, we understand, we know where we can become stronger, we will move forward. This will be the truth and it will motivate us. And who do you need to reassure? I don't know, after the loss of Avdiivka, Marinka, and the enemy's advance, who do we want to reassure? I don't understand the goal. The goal of this interview is a bit unclear.
Here is a quote. "What changes will take place on the battlefield after your appointment?" - The situation on the battlefield depends not only on the Commander-in-Chief, as you understand. Modern warfare requires decisiveness and initiative on the ground, exactly where the fighting takes place. The success of combat operations depends on the officer, sergeant, and soldier in the trenches and at the strongholds - they are the ones who carry this huge combat load on their shoulders. We can define the strategy and coordinate actions, respond promptly to changes in the situation and to the needs of the frontline. At the same time, the philosophy of using troops - at least this is my position - should be based on the main formula. The most valuable thing our Armed Forces have is people. Our task is to save their lives and at the same time inflict maximum losses on the enemy. Implementation of this principle requires a balance between performing combat missions and restoring military units. Our people are heroes, but their strength is not unlimited, and they need to recover and rest. That is why we have already launched the process of rotating military units on the front line, which allows us to fully restore the combat capability of not only equipment but also to ensure rest and recovery of our servicemen."
Yes. I will continue this quote here later. It is important to note here. Indeed, it is worth noting in this case that Oleksandr Syrskyi told the truth. His words are completely true. He started the rotation process. Several of our brigades that have been living for years on the front line, on the front line, are now finally being replaced. Rotations are partially underway. This is a very positive signal that should be welcomed and celebrated. As for the people... I agree. The main thing is that you know, our concern for people is reflected directly in our planning, organization and provision. This is the main thing. Then people are taken care of. Not only morally, but practically. I would like to see this very much. Changes in this direction. But I want to note that there is truth in Syrskyi's words, and we should welcome it regarding the rotation of military units at the front.
I'll continue with the quote. "We need people to ensure this process (the rotation process, I mean). That is why I would like every man of military age in Ukraine to realize that it depends on his will and actions for Ukraine to survive. For you to understand, this process is not limited to the activities of the TCR (territorial centre for recruitment). This is a whole range of issues that includes training people, providing them with proper equipment and support. Such efforts also include social protection measures for military personnel and their families. We need to take care of how a serviceman's life develops after discharge or demobilization. The Armed Forces alone cannot fulfill all these tasks. We see that the state does not stand aside and creates mechanisms to address all these issues. Ukrainians go to defend their country, including those returning from abroad. We have a lot of volunteer fighters, and this is not an exaggeration. I am not saying that there are no problems, but I emphasize that we are doing everything to solve them."
Well, one cannot disagree with this last phrase. As for the rest. "The state is not standing aside, it is creating a mechanism to address mobilization issues. It is being created, but it has been created for many years and still hasn't been created. For some reason, the state is in no hurry. But Syrskyi is optimistic. He is also optimistic about volunteer fighters. It is true that volunteer fighters. are still joining the army. Unfortunately, this is not the number to replenish all combat units. Therefore, this will not happen without properly organized mobilization. But mobilization needs to be fair. Mobilization must be fair, because it cannot really, I agree with Syrskyi, be limited to the TCR, but we understand that in this interview Syrskyi cannot demand anything from President Zelenskyy and the government, who are responsible by law for organizing mobilization, because otherwise he will have the same problems as his predecessor Zaluzhnyi.
Next. Next question, quote. "They used to say that in order to maintain combat capability and ensure the rotation of units and subunits of the Armed Forces at the front, it is necessary to mobilize another 500 thousand people. How realistic is this number now?"
Answer. "After reviewing our internal resources and clarifying the combat composition of the Armed Forces, this figure has been significantly reduced. We expect that we will have enough people capable of defending our homeland." Well, to be honest, I'm a little surprised. What do you mean significantly reduced? In fact, we need a large number of people to be mobilized. There must be a logic to mobilization. To what extent do these people come? There are no grounds to reduce 500 thousand. What are the calculations? Look, there is a manipulation here. Nowhere was it said that Zaluzhnyi demanded to draft 500 thousand people at once in one month. This was the figure of people's needs for the year. If in 2023, Zelenskyy, who is responsible for mobilization, announced the draft of 500 thousand people, then a fair mechanism could have been created, which categories of people are subject to it, which are not - if all this had been determined, then there would have been some kind of mobilization plan: who in the first place, who in the second, in what month. It would be logical. Of course, this does not happen simultaneously. But the fact that Ukraine will have to draft 500,000 people during the war is a fact. An absolute fact. This does not mean that it will have to be done immediately. But over time, this figure will be mobilized. Why? Because the current army needs rotation. If we have a million people in the Defense Forces, then they need to be given some time, someone to dismiss, someone to replace, and rotate. Of course, we need much more people there. This is obvious. That's why this is a diplomatic answer because Syrskyi remembers that Zelenskyy attacked Zaluzhnyi and doesn't want to..
I'll continue with the quote. "We have to keep in mind that people are not robots. They are physically and psychologically exhausted. Suffice it to say that the 110th Brigade has been involved in the Avdiivka direction since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. They need to recover and rest, it is an objective necessity. And there are many such units."
Yes, it is true. We can only welcome such an assessment of the 110th Brigade and other units that are now being withdrawn.
Let's continue the quote. "We are currently reviewing the number of certain units that are not involved in combat operations based on an audit of their activities. This allowed us to release thousands of servicemen and send them to combat units."
Here we need to talk about it. It is true that some servicemen, for example, from the air force, from rear units, from security units, are indeed being redeployed to replenish the frontline combat units. But what is the number of these people? Can they replace the absence of mobilization? Are there hundreds of thousands of them? No. Are there tens of thousands? No. There are not so many of them. They will cover some current losses for a certain period. A short period. And they will not replenish these losses and the shortage of troops. So, yes. It is very good that this is being done, the audit, perhaps it is justified. The Commander-in-Chief is in charge here. Now I can't say who is being dismissed, whether it's the right people or the wrong people. But I want to say that this is absolutely a temporary improvisation. This is not systematic work. Nothing will happen without a new mobilization order, which President Zelenskyy must approve.
Here is where Syrskyi says, and here is a quote, that we should refrain from extremes. "All the armies of the world have personnel who do not take part in combat operations but provide support for combat units. This is no less important part of the work. The war we have to wage against the Russian invaders is a war of attrition, a war of logistics. So the importance of the efficiency of rear units cannot be underestimated. We are talking about the system of supplying troops with food and ammunition, repair units, medical facilities and much more. These people contribute to the effectiveness of combat operations."
I fully support this. It is fair. And God forbid that this really does not lead to the search for how to mobilize, that all units that are not on the first or second line are thrown into the trenches. The army needs support.
Here is a quote. "I would like to emphasize that citizens who join the army after mobilization are not immediately sent to the front. With very special exceptions, when a person already has combat experience, the vast majority of people arrive at training military units and centers. As of February this year, the number of people undergoing such training amounted to 84% of those mobilized. Only after training can they be sent to man up military units to reinforce their combat capability."
This can only be welcomed. I would like to say that, unfortunately, the quality of training of soldiers and sergeants in training centers remains insufficient. But it is very important that there is a procedure in place, that no one is sent to the zero lines. I can only welcome this and agree with it, I support the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, I just want to say that we need to revise the system of combat training, because each brigade, in addition to the two months provided by the state, receives very poor training in the training center. It does not meet the requirements of war. Therefore, the need of the hour is for separate training units that could conduct additional training for at least 2 months after the arrival of any new recruits in the brigade itself. 2 months - this should be a clearly defined time in which a soldier should receive comprehensive training. Again, this requires systemic solutions.
The following quote. "When Ukrainian troops were withdrawing from Avdiivka, Russian propaganda was shouting about almost thousands of captured Ukrainians. What really happened there?" We withdrew our forces from Avdiivka because the enemy had a significant advantage. Unfortunately, during these battles, 25 Ukrainian soldiers were taken prisoner by Russia. This is war. Russian propagandists are trying to use various videos with prisoners to discredit the Defense Forces."
It is true. Syrskyi told the truth. I also did not see on the video more than 25, 30 people at most who were captured during the entire final phase. Not only during the withdrawal from Avdiivka but during the fighting over the last two weeks. That's really true. In general, despite the less difficult conditions, they tried to make the withdrawal in an organized manner. The main thing is that our soldiers inflicted such huge losses on the Russians during the storming of Avdiivka in terms of equipment and people. Basically, the enemy did not sit on our shoulders and try to overtake us there. They did not manage to surround our units, except for one of our companies, which was surrounded at the Zenit stronghold. All the other troops were withdrawing, some of them fighting. But in principle, the enemy did not pursue us closely. This made it possible to avoid a large number of casualties during the withdrawal. And in general, during all these maneuvering battles in recent days, there were no more than 25 prisoners of war.
He said. "I would like to say to the captured soldiers, if they hear me, and to their families: we have not forgotten anyone and are doing everything to free these soldiers from captivity. The leadership of our country is involved in this. It is worth remembering that the offensive on Avdiivka resulted in significant losses for the enemy, which is unlikely to be reported on Russian TV. In the period from October 10, 23 to February 17, 24, that is, from the beginning of the assault on Avdiivka to the withdrawal of our troops, the Russian invaders lost 47186 personnel, 364 tanks, 748 armored combat vehicles, 248 artillery systems, and 5 aircraft. Ukrainian defense forces captured 95 Russian occupants in this area."
I think that these figures are really absolutely close to reality. I think that these are the total losses, both in killed and wounded, that the Russians have suffered. But the number of killed is really there - Russian sources say that during this period they lost 16 thousand in killed. By the way, I want to say that this figure is in contrast to this one: 16 thousand and just 48 total. I think this is exactly the same as what was published by Russian sources and what we see here, the summary given by Syrskyi. I think the figures for tanks and BMs are also absolutely realistic. Because if you include damaged equipment, it is 100% true. I want to say that in October alone, the Russians lost, according to our aerial reconnaissance, what is on the video, about 200 units of armored vehicles. Therefore, these figures are objective in principle. As for prisoners, too. Here we can only agree.
Next. Next. Well, it's about Kharkiv. Preparations, okay. Preparations are underway.
Quote. Question. "I can't help but ask where the lines of fortification to which our troops were supposed to withdraw from Avdiivka have gone?"
Answer. "Let me start with the main thing. We managed to stop the enemy near Avdiivka, using the positions we had organized during the battle. The main line of fortifications has been equipped and is located much further, in the depths of our defense. We are currently preparing powerful defense lines in almost all threatened areas. For the leadership of the state, the Armed Forces, local administrations, etc., the construction of fortifications is now a priority. Prepared fortifications save the lives of our soldiers."
Here is the answer, friends, right away. For some reason, the construction of fortifications was not an obvious priority for the leadership and local administrations before. Because it is only now a priority. As you know, in 2022-23, I'm not talking about before the invasion, no systematic fortification work or construction of echeloned defense lines, unfortunately, took place. A few strongholds were dug around Bakhmut, but there was no dense position, no echeloning, no front of fortification lines - all of this was absent. Unfortunately, the situation is the same in other parts of the frontline.
Now about Avdiivka, friends. The enemy was stopped near Avdiivka, let's say in an open field. The 47th Mechanized Brigade, the 3rd Assault Brigade, the 225th Separate Assault Battalion, and some units of the 110th and 53rd Brigades stopped the enemy in a clear field. They stopped it. The 61st Brigade tried to help. For a short time, unfortunately. But they stopped it like that. In an open field. In the trenches that the soldiers themselves dug with shovels during this organized withdrawal in quotation marks. So, unfortunately, I can't agree with this. This is a construction... The defense was not prepared. Unfortunately. Why say this when you can even watch a video of Berdychiv, where there are battles. Are there any prepared positions there? What a soldier dug or hid in the basement is just that. That's all.
"The main line of fortifications is equipped and located much further in depth." Further, in the area of Hrodivka, on the border of the heights, we built the strongholds that existed in 2015. The ones that were dug up back then. This is the defense line. It has started to strengthen over the last couple of weeks. This is good, we can welcome it. But, of course. We had to keep the enemy in the open field, because there were no powerful fortifications in the depths that could hold back the enemy. We had to win time, and we are still winning time. Our soldiers managed, our commanders managed to organize a very sophisticated use of troops in the Avdiivka direction in such conditions in theopen terrain. Despite the fact that the enemy has a city, a factory, and dominant heights, they are still beating the enemy there with heavy losses. It should be noted that Syrskyi told the truth about the fact that the equipment of fortifications is being strengthened. Indeed, in March, the government finally allocated significant funds to equip the fortifications. And finally, they started digging. This is just the beginning. But it is happening. It is happening. It is happening. I can only welcome it. I am grateful to the government for starting this process. Because it was painful to watch the army fight for 2 years, just burying themselves in the holes in the plantations with shovels. Finally, the equipment is digging, finally the infantry will not enter an open field, but into some position. So it is true. Indeed, such work is underway in Donbass. This should be welcomed. Let's wait for the results. These should be blocked positions with concrete fortifications, of course, blocked from drones, protected from drone surveillance, then it will be the survival of people. If it is just a trench, it will not be effective everywhere.
Yes... the assistance from our Western allies is very significant. Friends, I think we all understand that it is insufficient because we have less ammunition, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces said, and we lack air defense. So here I can only agree with General Syrskyi.
Next, let's talk about the capabilities of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex. Quote. "We are not sitting idly by, but are building up the capabilities of the domestic defense industry. Ukraine is among the absolute leaders in terms of the number of innovations and in-house developments of weapons, military equipment, and most importantly, in their practical use on the battlefield. In this context, it is worth mentioning the rearmament of artillery units with the domestic 155-mm Bohdana gun, with its simultaneous refitting with an automatic fire guidance system. Soon, we can expect that Ukraine will produce certain models of Western howitzers and domestic rifled mortars. This also applies to the development of modern missile weapons and counter-battery systems. Society is already quite well aware of the production of drones. So all these measures can provide an operational advantage over the enemy at the front in the near future."
I want to say that there are indeed questions, many of them, and we can agree on the equipment in general. I would say that our main problem now is not even what to shoot with, but the means of destruction. I agree that Bohdana needs an automated fire control system, because without it, of course, its effectiveness will not be comparable to Western equipment. We can, in principle, equip and buy such units. Production of Bohdana is now increasing. The government is actually producing them now, and they have set a serious plan for the year, so the artillery can be rearmed fairly quickly. But we need shells. So far, we are buying shells. Or at least mortars. The news about rifled mortars is good. Indeed, mortars are in short supply in the modern world. It is better to produce them as accurately as possible. So I can only welcome it. The French rifled mortars are performing very well at the front, they are very accurate weapons.
Next. And the last phrase, the last quote. "What is the most important thing for the Syrskyi Commander-in-Chief today?" - The main thing is to save people.
I agree, there's no arguing with that.
"Another priority is the unity of society, the absence of political discord. We must remember the tragic pages of our history. I am confident: Russia will never be able to defeat us on the battlefield as long as Ukrainians remain united and strong. If we waste energy and strength on empty political disputes with each other, this is not even a path to defeat, but to death. I want every Ukrainian to understand this: Russia denies all of us the right to life. That is why defeat and death are identical. Now it's time again for the country to turn into a strong, united fist. The main task of Ukraine is to maintain unity, this is the main component of our victory."
The main factor, I would say. Well, there are some problems with the blame shifting but these are nuances. I want to say, friends, that I fully agree that we need unity. Indeed, Russia is waging a war to destroy us. This will affect everyone. But I want to say one thing: the victory in the war will begin when we start talking at least about strategic things that concern people's lives, the issue of people's lives. Okay, everyone has their own decisions about what weapons systems to build, where to spend money, who will spend this money on which companies and how. We understand that the government is thinking about ratings, that's all. Let them do that. But what concerns people's lives must be true. If there are problems in management, if generals do not learn from experience and do not draw the right conclusions, if there was no tactics for using drones and interaction between different types of drones and electronic warfare systems, and there is none now, we need to talk about it. Because this is people's lives. If there is no proper use of troops, ammunition, if people rush into battle tonight, without any planning, they are put somewhere, the war is fought by separate platoons and companies, and instead of planning, generals in the OSGT and in the OTG scare brigades, combatants, company SBI and investigations, instead of clearly discussing the battle. If this continues, it is not true. This is not caring about people. I would very much like to see these sincere words of Oleksandr Syrskyi, at the end of which he said that he would simply rethink this interview, listen to criticism - and he listens to criticism - and the next time he does an interview, after a certain period of time, I think many of you would love to watch the interview, if I, for example, had to talk to Syrskyi, I would love to ask these questions. I hope that the President's Office will allow General Syrskyi to speak more frankly for the sake of unity, as he says, and to strengthen the morale in society. To speak to the heart of the problems. By the way, the interview with Ukrinform was very good. I liked it. But there are simply many more questions. And they relate to some things where, perhaps, the general himself has not yet had time to form a comprehensive picture. But there are problems.
Victory begins, first of all, with the recognition of mistakes, your shortcomings, your strengths, your friends, comrades, who is effective and who is ineffective. War is a technology. Truth in war allows this technology to be built. No one expects Syrskyi to become a new Napoleon and solve everything right away. It will not happen. War is about technology and logistics. Let's start with the truth. Let's start building on the basis of the truth some of the right things that are stated in the charters and are not done in practice. Let's implement NATO standards in the management of combat operations not in words, not by replacing ranks, but in practice, applying American charters, standard operating procedures. Let's do it. No one is demanding this today or tomorrow. But we need to move forward and improve management and organization at the highest level. Generals need to be taught better and more than soldiers. And not to hope that they have some experience. Only those commanders who are on the battlefield and directly ensure that soldiers and officers perform combat missions have war experience. Therefore, combat experience is quickly geometrically accumulated at the bottom, in platoons, companies, battalions, and is learned very slowly where the war is far away. Where the war is only on maps and streaming screens. This is an objective reality. It's not that generals and colonels are bad. It's just that there is a distance in war. The further the distance from zero line, the slower the experience is absorbed. This is normal. To understand war, you need to be at zero line, to see how it is done there. Then you learn quickly. And if the distance is long, then learning is slow, because there are many intermediate links. So, dear friends, I hope that this first interview with Oleksandr Syrskyi, which had many critical points, will nevertheless become a starting point, a basis for rethinking this situation by the Commander-in-Chief himself. We do not need manual control. We don't need a messiah in uniform to solve everything. We need professional leaders in the war, whom the army respects because they speak the same language with the soldiers and officers who produce results. The language of truth, the language of recognizing honest deeds. Honest professional merit and recognition of unprofessional incompetent decisions. Without substituting all this writing and paperwork for real war. Which, unfortunately, is intensifying in our country. By the way, I will talk about this paperwork in the next program about how Ukraine, unfortunately, has critical problems after the changes in the army. First of all, I will talk about the problems with the development of the Unmanned Systems Forces and the use of drones in the Defense Forces and about the paper army, which is growing at an unprecedented pace, bureaucracy is growing, and paperwork is growing. And instead of tactics and the use of troops, bureaucracy is replacing real problems. We will talk about this.
We live in a free country. Our Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces gives interviews. These interviews can be criticized. We can draw conclusions from them, they are important for us, for society, for the army. So, friends, this is a great advantage. Russian generals don't have to do this. They do it like that, on command with a stick, under the escort of a guard. We are a democratic country. That is why I respect Oleksandr Syrskyi's desire to give interviews. I hope that this tradition will be continued, that he will regularly publicly give his vision of the war at such a basic level, without secrets and mysteries. Both the army and society need this. I hope that this is the beginning of regular conversations and that this transparency will lead to changes in rhetoric, and then to changes in practice. So I want to believe that we are on the right track. We are stronger because we are more flexible, we are a democratic country. So today, more than ever, I am confident in our victory. Thank you for the broadcast, for being here with us for so long. Glory to Ukraine!
