Why Syrskyi and Sodol came under criticism
Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov analyzed the actions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi and the Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Yurii Sodol against the backdrop of the scandal that arose in social media and shared his thoughts on the effectiveness of the Armed Forces under the leadership of these high-ranking military officers.
Our broadcast is dedicated to an important topic for our army, which is currently resonating with both the Armed Forces and society. This is a scandal that has emerged on the Internet around the person of General Sodol, the commander of the Khortytsia operational and strategic group of troops. This scandal directly affected the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, who appointed Sodol. In fact, this scandal also affected the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, because it was he who appointed Syrskyi and it was Zelenskyy who approved all of Syrskyi's decisions on changes in the top leadership of the Armed Forces.
In short: a post appeared on Facebook by the deputy head of the Defence Committee, a People`s Deputy who had previously been known for a series of critical posts about the former Сommander-in-Сhief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi. She wrote quite loyal things about Syrskyi. But she also wrote that Syrskyi failed and also appointed incompetent generals to senior command positions. Also, this People`s Deputy, a "servant of the people", said that General Sodol, the commander of the largest strategic grouping of the Armed Forces, the Khortytsia OSGT, "is a criminal". This is a quote. The next day, two well-known Ukrainian bloggers, Serhii Sternenko and Ihor Lachenkov, also made critical posts about Sodol. And the most resonant was, of course, the statement of Bohdan Krotevych. He is one of the commanders of the Azov brigade, a participant in the defence of Mariupol, who has been at war since 2014, and these statements are the words of a fairly reputable military man. This is a person who has the right to speak, to give assessments, and these assessments sound weighty.
So, first things first.
We will now talk about the political component, who is responsible for all this and what should be done. I will give an assessment of General Sodol himself, what I know about his involvement in the war and what I know about why criticism of Sodol on the Internet has emerged, why it has a basis and why this criticism has support, why there is no widespread outrage in the army, no one is standing up for him. Next, let's talk about Oleksandr Syrskyi, because this situation affects him directly, his achievements because Sodol's appointment is also one of the results of his work, and a few months in such a difficult war is quite a long time to draw some conclusions about the style of work and what causes such conflicts. This means that certain communication and reputational problems make it possible to launch such information strikes, and it is popular, there is no outrage in the army. Then I offer my suggestions, my vision of what to do in this situation, what the leadership of the Armed Forces and Oleksandr Syrskyi personally should do to resolve such scandals, to strengthen the army's trust and to strengthen his work, his management, and his leadership. Otherwise, this leadership with such indignation and such hate will end very quickly. Because, as you know, in Ukraine, only those who are popular are appointed or kept in office. And only those who are popular are fired. But it is absolutely impossible to be unpopular here. These are the rules set by our current government. Then I will set aside time to answer your questions.
Firstly, with regard to the political and overall framework of the scandal. Why do I keep distance from this? Because this is a political game. The deputy head of the Defence Committee, a deputy, a "servant of the people" who is fully responsible, together with the ruling party and the ruling authorities, for the failure to prepare for the war, for all the appointments, for all the corruption schemes that were initially in place, launched a political campaign against the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and his team. It was very loud, very public. He was dismissed. Syrskyi and his team were appointed. And now she is also starting to hate this team. If you read the posts, there are quite reasonable comments, which, in principle, all the military at the front are also saying. But why are these constant wrong appointments allowed, from her point of view? Who appoints these incompetent generals? Who keeps them in office? And for some reason, the People`s Deputy always forgets to write that these generals have a head - the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyi and the head of the Office, Andrii Yermak. These two people manage the work of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, make all the decisions there, listen to reports, evaluate these reports and determine that this general should be in office, that one should not. In principle, they have complete personnel freedom in any decisions. And the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is actually the main war management body. Not even the General Staff. It is the headquarters. Because it has all the resources, management of all means, mobilization of people, money, equipment. For some reason, we end up with a wave of hate that some problems in the war are caused exclusively by military generals. Let's replace them more often, and it will be better. If a Commander-in-Chief - he is hated and dismissed. A few months later, another Commander-in-Chief is appointed, he is hated and dismissed. Why aren't the reasons corrected? And the person who appoints them and dismisses them, why is he or she not subject to criticism? And it seems that the President's Office and the Servant of the People party are conducting a deliberate campaign to discredit the leadership of the Armed Forces and the Defence Forces in order to constantly shift their responsibility for the failures of preparations for war, for the failures of mobilization, for absolutely absurd political interference in the strategic decisions of the military command. It was Zelenskyy and the "servants of the people" who drove our army to this state. They put us in such a critical, tragic situation with their inaction, their showmanship, their imitation of vigorous activity, their desire to drown any problem in a stream of false statements. This is what causes outrage. In other words, no systemic steps are taken - no proposals, no changes. They produce nothing as legislators who receive a salary and the trust of voters to make laws, decisions, investigative commissions, and criminal cases. The deputy head of the Defense Committee does not say a word about this. She does not demand the initiation of criminal cases, does not file applications with prosecutors, and she has all the powers. She does not demand internal investigations, does not demand that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief explain his personnel decisions in any way. She just throws around slogans: criminal, criminal. Well, who are you yourself? The Servant of the People party? It was you who appointed these people to these positions. Are you not criminals? Look in the mirror before you use such words on the Internet.
STATEMENTS BY STERNENKO, LACHENKOV, KROTEVYCH
Second. The statements of Serhii Sternenko, Ior Lachenkov, and Bohdan Krotevych are a completely different story, when the criticism is actually justified. Of course, the posts don't tell the whole story, but there is a background to the relationship. For a better illustration, let's turn to the personality of General Sodol himself - why posts against him are popular, they are liked, and for some reason, Sodol's subordinates, who commanded the marines and several brigades, do not speak out en masse in his defence. His subordinates in the Donetsk OTG are not in a hurry to defend him, and the Khortytsia OSGT is silent? Perhaps there is a reason? An authoritative combat leader who is important to his subordinates would certainly receive serious support. Perhaps not as much as Zaluzhnyi received, but there would be reputable people, commanders, who would consider it necessary to say: 'Friends, we need this person in his position. So, I want to tell you, and this is very important, very telling, that not a single commander who has been a subordinate since 2022, not a single officer who has been a subordinate of Sodol and performed his tasks in Mariupol, for some reason, has not acted like this in other areas. Now we will talk about why.
WHAT'S WRONG WITH SODOL?
For me, authority and respect are the key ability of a leader. To be a leader is to lead people. And you can lead people only on the basis of your respect and trust. If such trust is not manifested in any way and respect is not manifested in any way, then there are big problems with leadership. What are General Sodol's problems? Let's take an objective look at his combat record.
SODOL'S BATTLEFIELD
At first, he commanded a group of our troops in the south of the front. In particular, his area of responsibility was Mariupol. Sodol was in Mariupol on 24 February. At the beginning of the war, the command of the defense forces that were defending Mariupol had a big conflict. It so happened that for some reason, the senior commander in Mariupol at that time was a captain of the National Guard, Denys Prokopenko. He was the commander of the Azov National Guard regiment. For some reason, on 24 February, Sodol left Mariupol, and somehow the defense organized itself spontaneously. Then there were big problems in the South - a breakthrough near Volnovakha, the encirclement of Mariupol. General Sodol's leadership is not visible there, because at the insistence of the Mariupol defense command, Sodol was temporarily removed from his post and for some time he did not command anything at the front. For various reasons. However, the criticism that came from the defenders of Mariupol was one of the factors. I am not saying that it was a crime. There were coordinated actions, and the deployment of troops before the war and preparations for the war were botched. Therefore, the investigation should find out why and how certain measures were taken. I just want to say that when Bohdan Krotevych speaks, when Sodol is criticized by the Azov regiment, it is a valid criticism. These people have the right to speak out. And General Sodol should respect this criticism and respond to it at least as a man, as an officer. Because these people, who were ordered by him to remain surrounded without being provided with any ammunition, have a right. They have the right to ask questions to anyone. Because in these conditions, they did not only what was possible, but also what was impossible. And the feat of the Mariupol defenders will always be a symbol of resistance for us. And then Sodol commanded a group of marines, new marine brigades were formed and deployed, there were battles near Donetsk, battles in the Zaporizhzhia direction, the battle for the village of Krynky. And Sodol was in command of the 'Donetsk' OTG for a long time. There are quite contradictory assessments. I talked to quite reputable brigade and battalion commanders who praised Sodol's tough actions and orders. But there were and still are a large number of our commanders - I emphasize, not soldiers, but people who are well aware of the situation - who were quite critical of General Sodol's management methods. And they considered them not just harsh. They criticized them for being ineffective.
AUDIO MESSAGE FROM DA VINCI
I have an audio recording that was sent to me by the Hero of Ukraine Dmytro Kotsiubailo. Kotsiubailo's unit was deployed for several days to perform tasks in the Donetsk-Vuhledar area under the command of Sodol, and Dmytro recorded two audio messages for me. I have them on my phone. They have been saved. I cannot release them without permission, but they were very harsh criticisms of General Sodol. Dmytro believed that this man had big problems in managing the troops and that it was unacceptable to let him troop command and control because he was prone to emotional and completely unprepared actions. In particular, Dmytro Kotsiubaolo's unit was deployed into an unprepared mission with a group of National Guard soldiers to carry out an unprepared, unorganized attack in the village of Pavlivka near Vuhledar. Dmytro criticized Sodol for this and personally called Oleksandr Syrskyi, and Oleksandr Syrskyi reviewed Sodol's decision. It was corrected. But Dmytro considered it ineffective, this decision. He gave specific reasons for it. I have two audio recordings to confirm these words. And I think Oleksandr Syrskyi remembers the conversation with Dmytro very well. Why do I mention this fact? Because Dmytro Kotsiubailo was one of the most outstanding individual in this war. He simply felt the war like no one else. His opinion is authoritative for me. There is also considerable criticism from other units, including the Marines, of General Sodol's actions and decisions. In this war, it is not difficult to criticize generals, because the enemy outnumbers us and we are forced to defend ourselves everywhere. I have no reason to say that everything was bad everywhere. I do not take this on myself. I'm talking about specific actions that I know from primary sources, for which I have either testimony or witnesses. But the main reason why Sodol is being criticized now and why the army does not support him is because of the way he is leading now, his method of management and style. Not because of any particular situation, but because he treats the majority this way. And the main criticism comes from his commanders. But especially the brigade commanders, whose decisions are constantly interfered with and determined by the Khortytsia OSGT.
What I am saying now does not mean that only Sodol has such problems. This does not mean that Sodol is the worst general in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. If I evaluate General Sodol's performance and compare it with our other generals, with General Zubanych, with General Moisiuk during the Kherson operation, which he led, with General Bohomolov, I don't see any particular differences. General Sokolov, who was also recently appointed to the post. It turns out that we have a significant number of generals who are guided by the same principle, and now this principle is being cultivated in the Khortytsia OSGT.
First. I would say this. Commanders of the OSGT, strategic groups and some tactical groups sometimes resemble generals - watchmen. They sit at the entrance and their task is to keep someone out or to let someone in. Why this impression and why such negativity in the troops? Because war is a technological organizational process. It is a tactic. These are situations that need to be sensed and reacted to quickly. All of this requires flexibility and speed of decisions, decentralized management, and independence of commanders at the level of brigade-combatants. They must have their own boundaries, their own powers, their own area of responsibility, in which they must make decisions and act according to the situation. What is happening here? At the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian army had a great advantage in terms of speed of decision-making and flexibility compared to the enemy. Our cadre brigades were deployed in small units, groups along the borders, and individual battalions, companies, and platoons. Commanders in these situations acted according to the situation. There was only one situation then: to stand to the death. And the commanders, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and the volunteers who came to them every day, literally did this in those critical days, weeks, and months. But there was one important factor. Our commanders always had freedom of action. Because the speed, the pace of the fighting were such that no commands, no control - all this was simply impossible. While the Russian command was coordinating decisions on where to attack, what decisions to make, how to respond to the actions of the Ukrainians, our battalion commanders, company commanders, everyone who was on the front line always took responsibility and acted independently. In the vast majority of cases. In 2022, the Ukrainian command outperformed the enemy in flexibility and speed. This is an absolute fact, and it is a very important factor that determined the success of our defense. Our commanders took responsibility and acted in every place. What is happening now? Now the war has become bureaucratic and paper-based. It started with Syrskyi. It started at the end of 2022. The war has become bureaucratized. The amount of paperwork is growing. The number of reports increased. The demand for these reports is growing. This is reminiscent of the ATO during the Third World War, such absurd rules that once applied during the inactive period of hostilities. What are some of the generals - watchmen, who are in charge of some of the OSGs and some of the OTGs doing now? In fact, they have turned into people who do not help the brigade commander fight, do not share responsibility with him, do not help him better perform tasks in his lane and add forces, reserves, weapons, and these watchmen are people who called with only one purpose: to demand and call to bust head open, reprimand him, shout at him: 'Yes, in which lane are you standing, where are the points? Why is this observation point lost here? Why? To write an internal investigation, to shift all the responsibility to the commander on the spot, and to just sit there and manage in this way - using a map in the office, with a loud voice, swearing, and making continuous claims. That is, these people are administrators of their map. They administer these stripes that they draw there.
TWO MAIN CRITERIA FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A COMMANDER IN WAR
In our war, the first criterion for a commander's success is how well he can kill the enemy. In modern warfare, there is an ideal reporting tool for this - drone video. Video and photos. The more videos and photos you have, the better the commander. This is the main criterion: how he kills the enemy is the kind of commander he is. The second criterion is how he protects his personnel, who died more: the enemy or ours? Was the exchange worth it? These are the two main criteria. Everything else is secondary.
The issue of reporting, filling in maps, signatures under maps, where the observation point was surrendered, who moved 100 or 200 metres after an artillery attack or a bomb - this is issue No. 25 in general, after all the important ones. And now we have the issue of reporting, paperwork - No. 1. Then there is the distribution of material resources, the distribution of people, all sorts of reports.
"THE ART OF REPORTS"
And the elimination of the enemy is, in general, the art of reporting in our country is flourishing. Sun Tzu wrote a book called The Art of War. All the brigade and battalion commanders say that nowadays the army is focused not on the art of war, but on the art of reporting. Ukrainian generals can simply be given a book edited by a group of comrades on how to make reports so that everything goes well - tense but controlled - and you are not dismissed from office. If you report on the real situation, you can be fired. We had a case of the 47th Brigade commander Riumshyn, a competent officer who honestly reported the situation to the leadership and effectively organized the 47th Brigade's combat operations. He was respected in the brigade when he was in charge. For some reason, Riumshyn was dismissed for telling the truth? Objectively speaking, these problems did not arise under Syrskyi. They existed before. I have been writing about them since 2014. It was the same under Muzhenko. Lies in reports, the art of how to say it so as not to escalate anything and so that the management gets away with it if there is a scandal. So, dear friends, now we have a situation where the functions of some commanders of the OSGT and the OTG are reduced to constantly shouting at someone. There are two criteria. First: what about the line? Where is the line on the map? Why did they leave this sector, whether it was from the observation point or from the platoon post, it doesn't matter what the enemy has there. And second. Why do you have a lot of people listed under the military strength. The military strength is the number of people listed in the reports. Not actual, but what is on paper. So why don't you attack if you still have people? Why aren't you holding if you still have people? And it doesn't matter that there are no infantrymen, for example, but only mortar launchers, drone operators, repairmen, backup folks, rigging persons. This is the principle, unfortunately. What is happening here? The bureaucratization of the army has led to an uncontrollable growth of this paperwork. And instead of killing the enemy, instead of saving the lives of personnel and maximizing enemy losses, minimizing their own losses, commanders are now thinking about papers, reprimands, internal investigations, reporting, and how to report so that later you don't drive your nuts by the commanders of the OSGT, the commanders of the OTG, who may not help you in any way. They don't bring you shells or replenishment, but they will hold hearings at five in the morning every day.
REPORT AT 5 A.M.
By the way, the hearing of commanders in the Armed Forces starts at five in the morning. Can you imagine? Every day. That is, a brigadier is an absolutely unhealthy position in our country because your own superiors - not even the enemy - will not allow you to sleep. You can fight all night, but at five in the morning you have to sit on the chatterbox, listen to something, report at six - it depends - or seven in the morning. Twice a day. The main thing is that the dispatcher, watchmen, knows what's going on. This is an illusion of control. There was no such bureaucratic management in the army in early 2022. And the results were in the army. It turns out that the army did not run away and defended responsibly, fulfilling its duties to the end. Now, unfortunately, this paperwork component is increasing.
Therefore, such actions of the generals - watchmen and the activities of the OTG commander Sodol do not arouse support in the army, because it is simply strange that instead of solving combat tasks together with commanders, commanders turn into such watchmen. This is no way to fight. This is not trust.
But Sodol does this, Syrskyi does this, and other commanders do this for one reason - because they report to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on a daily basis on the situation. And in this Headquarters, as The Economist magazine wrote yesterday, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy constantly shouts at the generals - this is a quote from a British publication that is familiar with the situation in the President's Office - shouts that the generals are reporting inaccurate data. Unfortunately, we have a political leadership, "servants of the people", colleagues of the People`s Deputy from the Defence Committee who shift all responsibility to the military - these are the people: Volodymyr Zelenskyi, his entourage - they are the ones who demand that the army fight by points, coordinates. Because they don't ask how to win the war, how to destroy the enemy, how best to inflict losses on them, what is the strategy, what is the tactics. They ask for maps, where the enemy has withdrawn. And in our country, if you look at all the military arts - you can open any monograph, starting with the Art of War by Sun Tzu, 500 years ago BC - all of it, all this wisdom, starts with the fact that the main task of a military leader is to defeat the enemy's fighting forces. The destruction of the enemy army is the main goal of war. There are tactics to implement this strategy in a particular area. So, when the enemy outnumbers you and advances, and you have fewer forces, sometimes you have to retreat. Sometimes it's to launch a counterattack, sometimes it's to hold back the enemy and сapture other positions. All of this is not there. In the third year of the war, Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy had not yet organized and transferred reliable defensive lines to the army. We do not have the strategic defensive positions that the Russian Federation built at the beginning of the war, the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation in the occupied territories. There is no such line as the one built by the Russians in Ukraine. We have not placed troops in prepared positions. Even in the north of the Kharkiv region, we still have eastern infantry fighting, digging in on our territory, which we have controlled for a year and a half, with shovels in the plantations. As wild as it sounds. Even where we expected an offensive.
So, instead of planning the war, instead of engaging in strategy, instead of delegating tactics, instead of interfering with the powers of brigade commanders, instead of stopping this personnel charade, this paper war with reports and reports, these chatterboxes, held at 5 am by the commanders of the OTG and the OSGT- instead of canceling all this and working with modern management methods that should be based on trust, leadership, clear definition of results, and criteria for evaluating commanders. I have named two main criteria: the elimination of the enemy (video) and the preservation of the lives of your soldiers - at what cost you destroy the enemy. Everything else is secondary. If there are many more enemies, they will suffer losses - yes, we are holding the lines, no one will surrender advantageous positions like that. We don't have people in our army who are fighting to surrender anything. There are some people who are incompetent or cowardly, but they are few and far between. Or a very small number in the army command. Especially at the level of those who make the war: platoon and battalion commanders. If there is no such trust, then you start working by the maps. The country's leadership, which is asking for these stripes, begins to send SBI investigators to conduct official investigations into the loss and to overload all commanders from top to bottom. They are investigating Sodol and him, and any commander of the OTG. The SBI does not send Syrskyi or Sodol to them, they are sent by the Servants of the People from Kyiv. They are very fond of criticizing the army lately in order to throw public negativity at the army and the army leadership. There is a difficult war going on now, and blogging cannot change the army. Posts should be made by those who do not have authority. If it is Lachenkov and Sternenko who are writing, they have no way of influencing the situation. And the ruling government, the Servant of the People party and the Defence Committee are even more so - they have to act in the language of criminal cases or laws, change procedures. What has the Defence Committee done to stop this paperwork in the Armed Forces? Nothing. What has been done to introduce real responsibility for violations of the rights of servicemen, for the heavy losses in units, for the heavy losses of missing persons? Nothing has been done. In other words, instead of the Defence Committee, together with its deputy, making decisions that strengthen the defense capability of the army, this particular People`s Deputy shifts responsibility from herself, from her committee, from her party, from her president, from her Commander-in-Chief, his Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, absolute incompetence, to the generals.
If such posts from People`s Deputies had any impact on the course of the fighting, I would welcome it. But this is just political ping-pong. However, there is criticism that shows that Oleksandr Syrskyi should think about whether the scale of the position of commander of the Khortytsia OSGT corresponds to General Sodol's personal qualities. What is Sternenko's criticism based on? The fact that our army still lacks systematic use of drones. And General Sodol is among those commanders who believe that a drone operator is the same as an assault infantryman, and if there are not enough people in a trench somewhere, then there is no need to plan the enemy's impression in a high-quality manner, but simply send those who are at hand, including drone operators, move forward. This is the style. As I said, we control by map, by lane and by the list of personnel. There are no other criteria. Sodol's criticism of the army is supported by many commanders. And there is a lot of objective criticism.
WHY DON'T THE AUTHORITIES STAND UP FOR SYRSKYI?
Now, as for Oleksandr Syrskyi, who is directly affected by this criticism. I would like to point out that after this wave of criticism, no one in the government stood up for either Syrskyi, who is mentioned in this criticism, or Sodol. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who appointed you, Oleksandr Stanislavovych, is silent. The Minister of Defense Umierov, who is such a wedding minister, is silent. He basically does not interfere in anything and the main thing is that no one disturbs him once again. I want to say, especially for the Armed Forces, for Oleksandr Syrskyi, that you just need to understand the signals, the situation that is happening. This is not a criticism of Sodol. This is a criticism of the situation in the armed forces in general. This criticism says that the army has a great deficit of leadership and a great deficit of trust. Oleksandr Stanislavovych, I don't know of a single example in world history when a person who does not fight for leadership or trust has held the position of Сommander-in-Сhief for a long time. It is a system that stands by some ineffective personnel decisions to the end and does not change a single step. I think that the leadership of the Armed Forces should draw conclusions from this story. They should think about why this is happening. Why do we have generals - watchmen? Why do we have no trust between the commanders? I'm not even talking about the rank and file. And draw the appropriate conclusions from this. Including personnel ones. This is a war. The country needs a leader at the head of the army who will create trust in all levels of management. This is, by the way, a literal quote from James Mattis, the former US Secretary of Defense, a well-known American military officer. Mattis said a very famous phrase, and I repeat it many times, that in modern warfare, knowledge of tactics and administration is not so important. The main thing that Mattis said that modern warfare requires from a military officer is the ability to create harmony in all service units. And whether General Sodol, who always speaks rather contemptuously to his subordinates, can create such harmony, is trying to. Contemptuously is not an exaggeration, unfortunately. The kind of leader who manages by map, by reports, by phone, who directs someone somewhere. No, friends, this is not the type of leadership that is needed in modern warfare. In the army, people fight for each other. It is a family, a team. For a man to go to his death, he goes and risks his life for the sake of his comrades-in-arms. He believes that his comrades and commanders are doing everything to save lives, to fulfill a combat mission, to inflict losses on the enemy. That their risk is not in vain. And this requires trust and respect for commanders and leaders. And what do we have? I would ask Oleksandr Syrskyi to look at how many times the paperwork has increased since he took office. This is distrust, fear, and fear of management and superiors. That's why this paperwork, these pieces of paper, are being produced at all levels to cover themselves. Not to do the job, not to fight, not to kill the enemy. But to cover themselves from another bunch of investigations or SBI investigators. The document flow under Zaluzhnyi was completely inadequate and unnecessary. But even now it continues to grow rapidly. This is Syrskyi's responsibility. This paper war is going on now. And Sodol is just an instrument of this war. A person who meets such conditions, such administration, such management... I know at least 4-5 names of people who, when they were in charge of the OTG, OSGT, were respected and trusted by their subordinates. They tried to solve the problem of planning combat operations together with their subordinate commanders. Why do we need to promote administrators and watchmens to the army leadership? If Oleksandr Syrskyi does not draw conclusions from this situation, it will end badly for the country. Because the unpopular Syrskyi will be replaced by someone popular. Budanov, for example. And the problems will remain. The same demands will be made from the Headquarters, "Give me papers... We need to promote not those who prepare better reports, but those who lead in battle. People follow them, perform tasks not because they are afraid of the pre-trial investigation, but because they are a fighting team. There is no other way. Where there is leadership, there will be successes, and there will always be responsible, adequate tactical decisions. Flexible, fast, and ahead of the enemy. And we have absolute inattention. There is no analysis of what is happening. Now a new order has been issued on the use of UAV units. It was written by a person who simply has nothing to do in the army. He is not in the leadership. These are absolutely incompetent statements that specify the distance - kilometers, meters, hundreds of meters - from which the drone units of the Armed Forces should operate. It's completely absurd. We have no systemic solutions. No flexible solutions. We have none. We have more reporting, but the results are not getting better. Why?
It is not the biggest army or the strongest army that wins. The system that wins is the one that is faster, the one that is ahead. Because it doesn't matter how big and strong you are, if at a particular point in time, you are weak and your opponent is superior. And to be ahead, you need to be more flexible. You need to trust in every link, to build trust, as Mattis said, in all links. Those who do not build trust lose. The bureaucrat stops. The situation is very difficult and requires a lot of analysis.
Answers to questions
Do you think Zelenskyy understands what is really happening at the front, or does Yermak not allow him to have access to such information?
Zelenskyy does not understand what is happening at the front for one reason - he does not ask the right questions. And if the question to Syrskyi is formulated as: where did we withdraw, show me the point? Are we standing there or not? Why didn't they tell me that we withdrew from this point, and you were supposed to be standing there? If the Supreme Commander-in-Chief says such trivial things, if he reads them out and sends SBI investigators to make life a nightmare for commanders instead of understanding the situation, this will always be the result. I have said many times that in order to understand what is happening in the war, we need to apply the US Army standard, the standard procedure TC2520. This is an after-action review. After operations, it is imperative to analyze what happened. It's the right thing to do. In our country, they sometimes write down what happened only on a piece of paper to present to investigators. One day after the war, they will look at the analysis, for example, of the reasons for the loss of Soledar. I read this piece of paper. It had nothing to do with reality. It was signed, by the way, by Oleksandr Syrskyi, who was in command of the Khortytsia OSGT at the time. This paper was made because the SBI investigator will read this paper and will not open a case against the generals. We need trust. This trust needs to be created from the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which are the best decisions we need to implement. What bad ones we should not. When there is such trust and a business approach, then there will be truth. And as long as the army leadership is being asked absurd questions from the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, everyone will lie. All generals, and then demand that their subordinates lie. I was shocked when the Khortytsia OSGT demanded... it was also an absurd idea - to hand over daily maps of the situation with the signatures of commanders, where they were standing, at what positions, with a photo report of that position. What are you thinking about? Why do you demand these pieces of paper, these photo reports? Why is this happening? Because no one analyses it. We're used to the idea that war is self-organized, that people come, organize themselves, build their own intelligence, command and control, and interact with the enemy, and fight the enemy themselves. But there are no more motivated people in the infantry than in 2022. The infantry of 2022 spoilt Ukrainian generals. They thought that war was just a matter of pointing a finger on a map and that the volunteer fighters would do the rest. On self-sacrifice, on heroism. However, there is a big technological war going on. Two systems are at war. The enemy system is adapting to us. They want to defeat us. We have to draw conclusions from this. We are not drawing them. We are all in the same boat. And the problems in the army, the problems in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, are not the problems of Zelenskyy, or Syrskyi, or Sodol alone. These are our common problems. We have to solve them. If a person is not capable of commanding using modern methods, of course, he or she must be replaced. If Oleksandr Syrskyi himself doesn't do this, if he doesn't start appointing commanders who are capable of being leaders and leading, then there will be a situation where someone will replace Oleksandr Syrsky himself. I think that now Oleksandr Stanislavovich understands that just as the Office does not protect Sodol, it will not protect him either. And then he will be blamed for the loss of some city or some territory or some position and will be accused of everything. You have to rely on your subordinates. All the criticism in the army comes from below, from those who follow orders.
What is the likelihood that Syrskyi will be dismissed this summer?
I don't think Oleksandr Syrskyi will be dismissed this summer. Although I do not communicate with him, not even on the phone, I understand from the feedback of those who work with him that he is a smart man. But he is introducing manual methods of management into the management of a million-strong army, which may have worked in the management of a peacetime brigade. The people he appoints, such as Sodol, are also trying to manage a modern multi-factor war, with a million people, with tens of billions of dollars worth of weapons, in a manual mode. Other methods are needed. Who will do this and implement it if not the leadership of the Armed Forces? The Minister of Defence? The Supreme Commander-in-Chief? He will not demand anything from you except for reports. Therefore, I would like Oleksandr Syrskyi to look at the personnel policy he is pursuing and just think: either he will appoint people who strengthen his authority, who are respected and able to create harmony in the service ranks, who help the army fight and are responsible for the result, or he will continue to keep watchmen in the positions of OSGTs and OTGs and take all the negative effects of problems during the fighting on himself. On himself. Not on Sodol.
Thank you for the broadcast. I emphasise once again that this is our common task, our common pain. Because in this war, the situation on the frontline is not a problem for Zelenskyy, Syrskyi or Sodol alone. This is our common problem, our common task and our common victory, which we can only achieve together. Therefore, with the belief that our democratic and free country is capable of systemic change better than totalitarian Russia, I am ending this broadcast. Thank you to all the sponsors who support us, 2,308 sponsors support Butusov+. Thank you for this opportunity to talk to you, to communicate, to hear your questions. Glory to Ukraine!
