SBI case against 125th Brigade and General Halushkin: what happened in Kharkiv region?
Events in the Kharkiv region that led to the Russian advance. Criminal proceedings
The State Bureau of Investigation reported that criminal proceedings had been opened. This criminal case involves the commander, now a former commander, of the "Kharkiv" operational and tactical group, which was General Halushkin. Then the command of the 125th Lviv territorial defence brigade, the command of the 415th separate rifle battalion, the 23rd mechanised brigade and the 172nd battalion of the 120th Vinnytsia territorial defence brigade. A significant number of officials are listed, with virtually the entire command structure notified. Of the senior command staff, one official is the commander of the OTU directly.
So, friends, I have gathered some information about those events in Kharkiv and on the borders of the Kharkiv region, and I consider it necessary to analyse this situation today, to conduct what is called an action review, according to the American standard. This is not done by our Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and if we do not start drawing conclusions from the problems we have in the defence organisation at least in the third year of the war, we will not be able to change. And in war, as you know, the winner is not the one with the most forces, nor the one with the largest size. The winner is the one who is faster, the one who is ahead of the enemy at a particular point, at a particular time. Therefore, in order to stop running on a rake, we need to understand what happened. And it is very important for us that these investigations, which are now being conducted by the SBI and the SSU, are not just a simple investigation, as is usually the case with us. This is an investigation that should establish who is guilty and who is innocent. The innocent are those who give orders and organise such situations. And the guilty, the responsible ones are always some executors at the level of a soldier or a commander of a military unit. Therefore, I would not want this to be another show, bureaucratic reporting, nothing more. We still need to draw conclusions about what happened. Objectively. So first, I will tell you the facts that I know about what happened, and then I will assess them. And then we will draw conclusions about what we need to do in the future, because the same situation can now happen again in Sumy region, and it can happen again in Chernihiv region. And the same situation continues in the Kharkiv region, not all of the border is covered by fighting. And basically, the reasons are the same, we have the same problems in other parts of the frontline.
Let's start talking about the events in the Kharkiv region that preceded it, first of all, with the organisation of management, since the main thing in war is management. Good governance allows you to use even negative factors to your advantage and offset the enemy's advantages. So, what happened to our management? To be fair, the SBI is indeed considering the commander of separate territorial community as a person of interest in the case. But let's look at when General Halushkin was appointed to this position and who appointed him, whether he was fit for this position.
Let's start with a person from the command of the OTU "Kharkiv". So, from the beginning of 24 year, there were reports that the Russians were preparing an offensive in the northern part of the Kharkiv region. After the Russian presidential elections and the battles fought by the Russian Freedom Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps in the Belgorod People's Republic, we know that the Russian command began to concentrate a large military group. Starting from March 24, the situation on the border became much more tense. And the Russian command began to build up its forces. It became obvious that the Russians were preparing an offensive. Therefore, in April 24, the Ukrainian command, namely the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the then-appointed commander of the operational and strategic group of troops, General Sodol, whose area of responsibility includes Kharkiv and who is in charge of the OTU Kharkiv, decided to change the command. At that time, the OTU commander was General Hrytskov. He is a well-known general who commanded the 1st Tank Brigade back in 14 year. He is known for some of his habits, which, according to those who spoke to him, made it very difficult to manage because he sometimes abused, I would say, alcohol. That's why he was replaced, I won't say anything about how he managed, I don't have any information about that at the moment, we will evaluate the information based on what happened at the end of April. Hrytskov was dismissed. He was appointed by Valerii Zaluzhnyi. It's also not very clear why Hrytskov was there, because he has no experience in managing modern combat, he did not command any unit in 22 year that had its own specific area of responsibility. Nevertheless, our army has its own friendly relations in the top command that allow even people who do not really have experience of modern warfare to make a career.
Many people here in Kharkiv, including me, perceived Hrytskov's replacement as evidence that Alexander Syrskyi and Yuriy Sodol want to change the command, to appoint somebody with more capable and modern experience who will bring some new quality to this area. Quality in management. So what happened? In April, on the eve of the Russian offensive, Oleksandr Syrskyi and Yuriy Sodol appointed General Yuliy Halushkin to this position. The decision, if you look at Wikipedia about his service and what he did, and the media reports about Halushkin's appointment, what do we know? We know that in January 2022, Halushkin was appointed commander of the Territorial Defence Forces of Ukraine. However, in May 2022, he was removed from this position and appointed deputy head of the Military Law Enforcement Service. In other words, during the full-scale war, General Halushkin was actually in a senior administrative position, but had nothing to do with combat management in a modern full-scale war, did not lead any group of troops, and had no experience of modern combat operations. He comes from a paratrooper family, all paratroopers know him, and, most likely, Sodol, as a paratrooper, favourably supported his candidacy. Although, you must admit, it is a strange decision. Everyone knows that there will be an offensive in the area, and a person who has no experience of modern warfare is appointed. There is a very limited time for him to get up to speed and build a modern defence with very limited forces in a very short time.
This is the first thing, that is, Halushkin was appointed to manage. Now the second, in terms of preparation. What has been done? We talked a lot about preparations and the offensive. The president and the head of the civil-military administration, Syniehubov, came to visit, and there are many reports from the prepared positions. These positions, the three lines of defence that the civil-military administration was building, do exist. We will talk about their quality separately, but a large amount of work has actually been done. A large number of positions, three lines of defence, have indeed been built. There is only one problem with the planning. We don't know who the person is, but it is also very important to establish this. That is, some person planned the construction of these defence lines, which involved large amounts of state budget funds and large resources of the regional authorities. These defence lines and their construction were completely inconsistent with the tactical situation and conditions of warfare that actually exist in the Northern Kharkiv region. It is unknown who planned this and it needs to be found out. What happened? In fact, the control of the border strip ensures control not only over the border villages. They were actually there, the border villages, most of them were in the so-called rural zone, in the war zone. And the control of this border strip is ensured by a ridge of heights, which is located at a distance of 3 to 6 km from the state border of Ukraine. And it is these heights, the dominant heights, that are of key importance both for controlling the border on our side and for the enemy's further advance towards Kharkiv and Vovchansk, and further, say, into the depths of the Kharkiv region. Therefore, all the military who entered the area, every commander, anyone who looks at a map from the heights, understands that this ridge of heights is a key defence position and that they need to dig in. Again, these heights were not under the border itself, they could be buried and should have been buried with equipment, but unfortunately, our defence line, both under the border and on the line of these dominant heights, was given to our troops for construction exclusively by our own forces. And as a result, these dominant heights were not included in the first line of defence that was built by the civil-military administration. The situation is very strange, because now, for example, there are battles in the area of the dominant height 208, which is about 7 kilometres from the state border and actually controls the village of Lyptsi.
The village of Lyptsi is located in a lowland relative to this dominant height. And this dominant height, yes, there are field fortifications on it, but it is a rather local point, a local fortified separate stronghold, it is not included in the defence line, it is not covered from the flanks, there are no communication routes, no equipped entrances. Therefore, our troops failed to hold this height during the offensive. However, we cannot allow the enemy to advance from this height, and now we are fighting for the area around this height. And if the enemy gets a foothold there, on this line, they will be able to enter the village of Lyptsi. And the enemy cannot be allowed to enter the village of Lyptsi, because it is a large village, it is practically a large massif, a green massif, forests, a dam, a reservoir, a large number of houses. That is, if the enemy enters Lyptsi, it will be their defence node, a node for the accumulation of significant forces, and they will be able not only to further develop the offensive on Kharkiv, but they can also bring field artillery to Lyptsi and fire on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv. What I am telling you now is not some kind of know-how or special sacred knowledge. Any sergeant who has war experience and can read a map will tell you the same thing. It is not clear why the dominant ridge of heights was not included in the defence line. Kharkiv needed defence right there, along this ridge of heights. And then, because it is now during the fighting, everything that the Military Administration built there and what the president inspected is not being used. Because if we retreat to the strategic defence lines that the Military-Civilian Administration built with this money and during this time, we will lose tactical advantages on the border. The enemy will definitely gain a foothold there and it will be impossible to drive them out. We will simply give away favourable tactical positions. It is unclear who planned this.
And now to continue. The troops are on the border. In 2023, starting in August, the strip from Lyptsi to the village of Starytsia, Velyka Polosa, Ternova, Starytsia, all this large strip, all this was transferred to the command of the 125th Lviv Territorial Defence Brigade. The defence line is 45 kilometres long. The brigade had been constantly in combat since the middle of '22. And the brigade was withdrawn. It had never fought as a unit. It was constantly fighting in separate units, separate battalions. And the 125th Brigade was withdrawn to the north of Kharkiv region in a very strange way. They withdrew only the brigade's command and two battalions, and a company of attack drones. That's all. The 125th Defence Brigade has no regular artillery at all. All battalion firepower, mortars, automatic grenade launchers were purchased, not issued to the army by the Armed Forces, but purchased on a completely freelance basis on their own initiative by the Lviv City Council and the Come Back Alive Foundation. That is, to put it mildly, a small amount of firepower. They had no guns of their own, no tanks of their own. There were only a few armoured vehicles. Well, such a brigade is given a front of 45 kilometres. This is only 45 in a straight line, and 55 along the state border. The brigade goes out in two battalions. Its other two battalions are left in other parts of the frontline, separately. And the other two battalions are transferred to the brigade from other brigades. It's a strange situation, isn't it? A brigade command is created, but instead of its battalions, the command of OSGT Khortytsia, at that time it was Oleksandr Syrskyi, then Yurii Sodol, for some reason, instead of deploying all the battalions, it scatters two battalions across the front, disorganising, in fact, complex command, as we all understand. They are sending very weak units, also in a very difficult condition, also after the fighting. The 415th Infantry Battalion of the 23rd Mechanised Brigade, which was just in one of the most important areas, and the 172nd Battalion of the 120th Vinnytsia Brigade of the TRO. This is a hodgepodge that is unclear why.
That is, since August 23rd, the 125th Brigade has not been able to be withdrawn, no one has been interested in it and no one has paid attention to it, so that it could be assembled with all forces on one front. This way, we could increase both controllability and cohesion. Again, this is a decision of the military command. What forces were used to reinforce the 125th Brigade? What kind of forces did it have? The 125th Brigade had infantry manning in battalions to defend a 45km frontline. It was realistic. From 40 to 50%. That is, the battalions occupied a front of 11-12 km. Can you imagine? A battalion with not 250 infantry, but a maximum of 150 people occupies a front of 12 kilometres. So you can imagine what the combat order of our positions was. It was a chain of strongholds near the border in one echelon, because the 125th Brigade had no tactical reserves with so many forces there. The combat capability of the brigade, which had been manned for a long time according to the final manning levels, and these two separate battalions according to the residual principle, the combat capability of the personnel was also not very high. The brigade was stretched out in a thin chain of strongholds, of course, there were large gaps between positions, and a very low number of people per position. I'm not talking about their age, combat qualities, experience. Their firepower was also very limited.
In April '24, according to the information I received from the 125th Brigade, they received reinforcement equipment to make them have something. Three self-propelled artillery systems and two tanks. These were forces to cover the state border. This thin chain in a single line, this thin blue line, they were all there, there were no tactical reserves, no one to send to help, no one to reinforce, no rotation to give people better rest. And such a limited amount of firepower, so blatant.
What about the fortifications? Here I want to thank, I have to thank, although the military-civilian administration of the Kharkiv region did not include the Lyptsi, Ternova and the ridge of heights in front of them to cover these settlements, not in the strip in the first line of defence that they built, a large line of defence, a powerful one. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning the city authorities of Kharkiv region, the city authorities. The soldiers of the 125th Brigade are especially grateful to the communities and self-governments of large villages such as Lyptsi and Ternova. They provided equipment. And there is a lot of talk here, you know, we are having conversations now that we cannot bury ourselves under the border, that we cannot use equipment there, because the enemy is everywhere, flying everywhere, destroying everything. Friends, everyone who has been there, the soldiers of the 125th Brigade and the locals, say this is a lie. It was possible to bury our equipment in this ridge of heights, on the borders, even 4-5 kilometres away. It took a long time to prepare, and there were many days when the enemy's drones could not see anything because of the bad weather. And the area has very dense vegetation, a large number of hiding places where equipment can move quickly, hide if it moves in small numbers. And it is very difficult for the enemy to find it. And during these works, there is no evidence that the equipment provided by the territorial communities to work near the border has ever been used to do anything. All those tractors, several tractors that they could provide, they all worked. Unfortunately, this is not enough. Not only tractors were needed there, but also planning, organisation of work, and, of course, building materials in the form of preferably concrete structures or ready-made concrete dugouts, which, by the way, are still standing. These reinforced concrete structures, they exist, they were installed on the line, on these three defence lines that the Allied Central Command was building around Kharkiv. But near the border, all this had to be done by the troops themselves.
So, unfortunately, the quality of these works was not always high, I must say. When there are not enough people even for combat service, then, of course, when this brigade is not one of the most combat-ready formations, which has always been used wherever it is sent, as an attached force, we understand what this means. That, of course, they were used there as attached forces by individual battalions, and as a result of their use, people had to restore their combat capability. To do this, the command staff had to be strengthened at different levels and replenished with more motivated people after heavy losses. Because the 125th Brigade was in Bakhmut and Terny, and fought bravely in many parts of the frontline. And all these people are motivated, of course. There were losses, in five Heroes of Ukraine brigade, and there are people who have been recognised for, but of course, they are not ironclad. So, there were problems with fortifications.
Next. The mining. The mining was like this. I won't tell you all the numbers now, but I can tell you one thing. Why is the Russian infantry wandering around the landings like that? At the front, the 125th Brigade was issued as many as 1700 mines for mining, covering 55 kilometres of the state border and 45 kilometres along the front line. 1700 anti-personnel mines. There were much larger numbers of anti-tank mines, but according to the data available to the officers of the 125th Brigade, their positions were covered on such a large front by only 1700 anti-personnel mines. That's why the Russian infantry can easily roam around these dense plantations day and night. There is little mining, and the density of mines is low. And the enemy was able to manoeuvre freely with infantry forces. Starting in March-April, Russian troops sharply increased the number of attacks. A large number of Russian drones were constantly flying over the defence area. The enemy identified locations, conducted additional reconnaissance, and repeatedly launched regular air strikes. Bomb strikes. At this point, it turned out that the 125th Brigade could find a large number of targets on the territory of the Russian Federation, but in the vast majority of cases, almost all cases of observation of Russian units on the territory of the Russian Federation, unfortunately, no fire was opened on them. This was explained by the command as a ban on the use of Western weapons by their partners. Therefore, the deployment of enemy troops and their approach to the offensive lines was virtually unhindered until the last moment. Imagine the conditions.
Now, what did our command do when the attack was close? Since 28 April, we've been moving on to the next stage, after preparations. What happened? On 28 April, the 125th Brigade received a message about a possible attack. Everyone started working at maximum capacity, in full combat readiness. On 4 May, two Ukrainian generals visited the positions of the 125th Brigade. The commander of the Khortytsia OSGT, Sodol, and the commander of the Kharkiv OTU, Halushkin. They were checking the combat readiness of the 125th Brigade's defence line. Sodol and Halushkin saw and heard everything I'm telling you, they were told about it in writing every day at meetings, but on 4 May they saw it in person. They were told again at the command posts themselves. What did the Ukrainian command do?
On 5 May, the Ukrainian command began to deploy our units in the area behind the positions of the 125th Brigade, that is, in the gap between the first line of defence on the border of the field fortifications dug by the 125th Brigade and those that came before it. There, beyond this line, units of the 42nd Mechanised Brigade began to deploy from the rear to reinforce the 125th Brigade, to cover it. The 42nd Brigade had also just come out of the fierce fighting near Bakhmut. It was being withdrawn for recuperation. The people were tired, there was also a large shortage of people, there were also big problems with combat capability, and the concentration was also carried out, of course, could not be carried out instantly. It all took time.
So, the 42nd Brigade was behind and began to deploy. But the enemy did not give us the opportunity to prepare everything and strengthen ourselves. That is, for months, imagine how many months they talked about the Russian offensive, preparations, and until now, a huge border was held by very weak 4 battalions of one of the brigades, which, due to the conditions of use, is not the most combat-ready, the strongest. They are just, they are just infantry, infantry with the means they have in their hands. And the tasks they were given, well, judge for yourself.
What happened next? They started reinforcing with the 42nd Brigade, but the lines where the 42nd Brigade was deployed would have been quite difficult to hold. The 42nd Brigade in the second echelon also received the same 45-kilometre strip. That is, one company of the 42nd Brigade managed to bring in 125th Brigade to reinforce it, while the rest of the forces were gradually concentrating and deploying behind. That is, the density of combat formations did not increase. Several strongholds in the 125th Brigade's area were transferred to a unit of the State Border Guard Service. But, of course, this did not allow the brigade, unfortunately, to build any kind of combat density, to create any tactical reserves. None of this was possible. The amount of equipment of the 42nd Brigade was also too small to cover such a large front. What happened next? On 9 May, it was finally clear that the Ukrainian command had received information about exactly what was going to happen within a few days. The visit of Sodol and Halushkin was connected to that, and the deployment of the 42nd Brigade was connected to the fact that, in principle, obviously, the concentration of Russian troops was recognised as a threat, and they began to prepare for battle.
A very important event took place on 9 May, on the eve of the Russian offensive. In several areas from Vovchansk to Ternova, three special units of the Defence Ministry's Main Development Directorate moved into position to reinforce the 125th Brigade and battalions. This was a very important decision, and it played a very important role in the subsequent events. All combatants say so. That is, the arrival of the DIU units allowed us to dramatically improve our combat capability. Several important strongholds were entered by 2-3 DIUMO soldiers to reinforce our infantry. The officers entered the command posts to improve situational awareness and strengthened the defence with their firepower. This was an important decision, and all the soldiers of the 125th Brigade, 172nd Battalion, they are all sincerely grateful to their DIUMO brothers, and they all say that it was just invaluable help that allowed them to hold a large number of positions. Without it, the frontline could have collapsed. This is important. So we are very grateful to these DIUMO soldiers.
And on 10 May, at 3 a.m., Russian troops launched an attack. Their concentration, of course, in this attack, was not unexpected at all. Commanders began to react, troops began to arrive, and reserves began to be used. The areas of advance of Russian troops that our intelligence had identified were struck by drones, and the Russians in the west suffered some losses. But unfortunately, in two large areas where the enemy struck, and this is the Vovchansk area, let's look at the map again, this is the Vovchansk area, and this area, this Starytsia-Ternova-Lyptsi area, the enemy managed to advance in these areas.
After 15 days of continuous fighting, the advance of Russian troops in Vovchansk itself was up to 6.5 kilometres, in the area of Starytsia up to 7 kilometres, and in the area of Lyptsi up to 9 kilometres. The enemy managed to capture a significant number of our forward positions, in fact, the enemy managed to break through to the front of the 125th TRO Brigade. When we think about breaking through the front, we probably think that it is some kind of powerful line of fortifications, but in fact it is a small thin chain of individual strongholds that were not in fire or visual contact, and did not even see each other. Separate groups of fighters, covered by separate means. That is why a criminal case has been opened.
What happened? After the offensive began, communication with many positions was lost. These electronic warfare devices managed to shut down the Starlink communication system along the border for one day. Along the border with Russia, they were ineffective and out of order. They suppressed most of the Motorola radios, our main tactical radio communications. And in these conditions, the Russian infantry attacked. The enemy struck a significant number of high-precision weapons at pre-determined positions. With bombs and shells. After that, the enemy began to gradually and systematically attack our individual positions, where there was no more than a squad at each position. With forces up to a platoon at a time. The enemy tried to improve coordination and interaction between their fire and infantry attacks as much as possible. The enemy conducts all attacks accompanied by a large number of drones. Drones with drops and FPV drones. This led to the fact that, unfortunately, the units of the 125th Brigade, as well as the 415th and 172nd battalions attached to it, were forced to abandon a significant number of positions. And on the same day, the commander of the OTU, Kharkiv Halushkin, was dismissed from his post for losing control, for the enemy's advance and losing positions. So, imagine, we had been preparing, preparing, talking so much, and when the war started, it turned out that the commander who had been appointed was not fit for his position. Only on the day of the attack. And Oleksandr Syrskyi immediately removed him. And instead of Halushkin, one of the most respected and competent Ukrainian generals, Mykhailo Drapatyi, was appointed. The deputy chief of the general staff was appointed to such an important area and actually entered the battle in this position on the second day after the offensive. A number of units of the 125th Brigade, which had lost contact with the 195th Brigade and attached forces, which had lost contact with their neighbours, which had no radio communication with the command, also lost control and were forced to withdraw in a disorganised manner. After a day of fighting. But it was not a panic, and wherever there were either adequate commanders in positions or situational awareness, our fighters also tried to fight. That is, the enemy was not walking around. The Russians approached Lyptsi, a distance of 9 kilometres, in the evening of 12 May. So it was not a simple walk there. They actually spent two days there, and on the third day, the 10th, they left, and on 12 May in the evening, a Russian reconnaissance group passed height 208 and came directly to the village of Lyptsi. But there they met our reserves, which had already deployed during this time. This was the situation in this area, directly in Kharkiv. The units of the 42nd Mechanised Brigade were forced to engage in combat on the very first day, in fact, all along the entire strip. And on the very first day of the offensive, the Ukrainian command, the chief commander, Oleksandr Osyrskyi, took a number of very vigorous measures. He replaced Halushkin with Drapatyi and began to move reserves to the area where the enemy had made the greatest progress. The most critical situation here, on the Kharkiv direction, was threatening. It was really in the direction of Lyptsi. However, the 13th Brigade of the National Guard, the Khartiya Brigade, which includes many Kharkiv residents, was moved there, and the breakthrough was stopped.
Yes, and then. Unfortunately, the situation in the direction of Vovchansk was absolutely difficult. There was no walking around there either. The border area near Vovchansk was controlled, it was transferred to the area of the "Pomsta" border service brigade. The border guards were also stretched along the border with very small forces. And also on 12 May, in the evening, the enemy came to the outskirts of Vovchansk, advanced 5 kilometres, entrenched themselves at the meat processing plant, in the outer houses of the town, and created conditions for entering the town. On the morning of 13 May, almost without a fight, on the morning of 13 May, Russian troops began an offensive directly on Vovchansk. Several assault groups entered the city at once.
I want to say that the situation in Vovchansk was completely different. There was nothing behind the border guards at all. Beyond the river that divides Vovchansk, the main part is on the other side, beyond the river, units of the 57th motorised infantry brigade were deployed and withdrawn for reconstruction, also with very low equipment. But they were not supposed to enter the city. It is unclear who was supposed to defend the city. I can personally say that what I saw was that the city of Vovchansk was not prepared for street fighting and defence in the face of the Russian offensive. In the city itself, on the outskirts, there are no defence lines, no positions, not even any high-quality field fortifications. And the enemy was entering the city absolutely calmly. I want to tell you that at night, on the evening of 12 May, there were no troops in Vovchansk at all. At all. The units of the 57th Brigade entered Vovchansk in the morning, at night, from 12 to 13 May. But there was a situation when there was no one in the city for several hours, and the enemy could simply march in. On the night of 12-13 May and in the morning, in the central part of Vovchansk, our units had already begun to be drawn in. One company of the Charter Brigade was also there, and units of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade arrived on alert. Our forces entered the city, and finally our troops appeared in Vovchansk itself. These troops, despite all the warnings, everything that was obvious, were not deployed in advance. This is simply shocking. The city is not prepared for defence, but rather for surrender. Who is responsible for this? It is completely unclear. But it is really worth looking into this.
There is still fighting in Vovchansk. Our troops are still holding the same positions that were occupied at night. So, dear friends, the situation is... I want to tell you what conclusions we can draw from this. Why did the enemy advance?
Despite the fact that the actual defence planning was very strange. I would now like to address the investigators of the State Bureau of Investigation of the Security Service of Ukraine, who are now investigating this case. And who have now announced in the media the list of those who are suspects. I would like to address the Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which withdrew the 125th Brigade. And now the soldiers there are making claims to the Command, some of them are being transferred to different units. The situation looks as if the 125th Brigade failed in defence. As if it was the 415th Battalion and the 172nd that failed the defence. And everything was fine. They had to... They were just scared from the point of view of the investigation. And Halushkin himself made some wrong decisions. I looked carefully at the list of suspects that was announced by the SBI. Friends, what can I say? This is disrespect for our soldiers. This is dishonest work. This is showmanship in its most shameful form. How can you claim in the media and assign blame to the soldiers of the 125th Brigade and other units if the list of those you were supposed to interview and determine responsibility does not include those who were in charge. And who appointed Halushkin, who has no experience of modern warfare, to command units in modern warfare? Who did this? Why is he not on the list? At least get an explanation first before you start to suspect anyone. By the way, the criminal case was initiated on 11 May, the day after the offensive began. But where are the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the commander of OSGT Khortytsia, Yurii Sodol, on the list of those who are to be questioned? Where is the person in charge of building and organising the defence from the civil-military administration? This should be explained to you by the head of the Military-Civilian Administration, Syniehubov, whose superior told him that the defence line should be drawn in Lyptsi itself, the first line of defence in the lowlands. And that the equipment, it turns out, to cover the view of the heights could not be transferred to the troops, although the territorial communities of Lyptsi and Ternova did so. It was working fine. Why? Who said that? Why not here? Who was responsible for the defence of Vovchansk? It cannot be that there is no official who was responsible for Vovchansk itself. Who was responsible for the preparation and construction of defences there? This is also the Kharkiv region. Who was responsible for the troop cover? None of this is in the case. Only convenient people are involved. General Halushkin, who was actually hired from some administrative position, was fired again a month later. Everything is in its own way, everywhere there are friends, like in our army, everywhere there are such horizontal connections, everywhere there are good people, they served for many years, they have made friends. Nothing bad will happen. I am sure that with such a staging as the text written by the SBI, with such a press release, with such a press release, no one will get any truth, no one will draw any conclusions. Because when the commander of the 125th Brigade, General Horbenko, makes public what I have told you, and I think they can make more public, there will certainly be questions to the top leadership. What is it? What is its role? What will they do? As it was in the report, the reasons for the loss of Soledar. The reasons for losing Soledar are, after all, also a criminal case. Why did we lose Soledar so quickly? The reason was that the brigade commanders did not prepare their personnel well. And the personnel did not fulfil the task. In short, the soldiers who left their positions are always the last ones to die. There were a lot of criminal cases opened against the soldiers. Soldiers also called me, I talked to many who retreated from their positions, from empty fields near Soledar, who were told to bury themselves at minus 15. And no one is responsible for this either.
I also wanted to say, where in OSGT Khortytsia is the person who assesses the combat training of the troops? And why is this person not in charge? Why was a brigade with low combat capability, for objective reasons, with low manning, why was it put there, given a task that actually does not correspond to its forces at all? Isn't it clear? Why is there no replenishment of weapons and people? Who is responsible for this? Why weren't people supplied? Who was lying? For example, during the fighting, the brigade was sent 125 men. Some TCRs told us to immediately replenish the brigade. They sent more than 100 people. It turned out that all these people were not really fit for service. Out of these 100 people, only three were enrolled in the brigade. Imagine that. That is, someone reported that the 125th Brigade was being replenished, all the papers were sent, the reports were sent. This is a fake, a lie. Only three of those recruits are fit.
I'm not saying this, friends, to absolve the people who left their positions, the brigade commanders, of responsibility. Everyone has to be responsible. But I want to say that before the SBI investigator is given the order to go ahead and do it, the army leadership and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office should at least understand the reasons for what happened for themselves. Why are you judging people? There is no troop density, no supply, no mining. Wasn't there at least 10,000 anti-personnel mines in the country to fill those landings more densely before the enemy went on the offensive? They would not have roamed those landings day or night. They would have been blown up and the advance would have stopped. Couldn't we have increased the supply of razor wire, other engineering barriers, nets, everything that works against infantry? Well, dear friends, not only the 125th Brigade is responsible for all this. There is more than one commander responsible in the OTU, more than one commander in the OSGT, in the command of the ground forces, in the command of the territorial defence forces. Everywhere there are responsible people who sit in headquarters, get paid, serve, get seniority and travel with inspections, commissions, write reports and reports on high combat capability, on the organisation of defence. How is this possible? The commander of the OSGT arrives, checks the combat capability, does not see all these shortcomings that are obvious, that we are talking about now, and he is not even present, he is not even mentioned, and he should be asked for an explanation. General Sodol is in command and he is responsible for this area, just like General Halushkin. Those who appointed Halushkin to this position should also share this responsibility. Then there will be conclusions, not appointments of those not involved. So let's not disgrace the army. And the question posed by the SBI is simply an insult to the soldiers of the 125th Brigade, who have been at the front for a long time. The SBI employees themselves are far from the war, they have no involvement in the defence of the country and should respect those in trenches and those who are fighting. This will be fair. Not to fulfil any political orders.
Of course, the best place to draw a line under everything in our country is the soldiers. So, dear friends, I want to say that what happened in the Kharkiv region, in the north, is absolutely not the fault of some soldiers who have poor morale, or who were afraid. These are solely problems in the organisation of defence, the construction of low-strength combat formations, which were obvious to everyone in advance. And the fault lies in the fact that we know the enemy will attack in advance - it's not an accident at all. Why wasn't interaction with artillery organised? Why wasn't the necessary number of shelters built to accommodate the firepower along the border so that the Lancets wouldn't destroy our guns? Why wasn't aerial reconnaissance organised in the normal number of deployed aerial reconnaissance units? Why were all the landings not mined with anti-personnel mines? Are they being mined now? Do you think there are no mines? Yes. The units of the 47th Engineer Brigade, a whole battalion was stationed in that area, could have mined everything a long time ago, along with the 125th. But they did not mine then and they are still mining now. Now they have removed the mines. Isn't this absurd? What kind of training is this? It's not the soldiers who are responsible for this, right? These are just basic organisational measures. And in general, I must say that it's not just the military that we need to ask. Because if we had Oleksandr Syrsky testify in this case, and this is necessary, the SBI should do so and ask him the same questions I have just asked you, if it is an objective, honest investigation. We need to ask: where is our mobilisation? Did the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, raise this issue at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief? Why are there not enough people to replenish even the one brigade that is being deployed in the direction of the Russian offensive, which everyone has been talking about for three months? Look how absurd this is. The President comes to our strategic defence line, which is being built by the Military and Civilian Administration, and makes news stories, but this defence line is 7-8 km away from the war zone. And the troops are not occupying it, because it is not profitable for us to fight on it now, we need to fight on the border. At the same time, the president does not check the readiness of the actual line where combat operations are to be conducted, which is tied to the terrain, and does not check the manning of the troops. And why? For whom, it turns out, for whom? I would like the investigators to tell us, to give us all an answer. And for whom are these defences being built if there were no troops to occupy them? Defensive structures are dug so that the forces necessary and sufficient to destroy the enemy can be deployed in the direction of the enemy's offensive. And they were supposed to arrive there. They did not arrive, because they did not even replenish the brigade that was in the first line and received such tasks. That was it. And there were no troops in the second line. Who is responsible for mobilisation? This question is very interesting. The fact that people are not given to replenish. Who is responsible for this? It's not Syrskyi, Halushkin, Sodol or the commanders of the 125th Brigade. And certainly not the soldiers who came under heavy fire, who have been under fire for a long time, who are not covered by air, who are subject to massive damage, who are attacked by Russian infantry. And from myself, as a soldier, there is no communication, not all people have the necessary level of training, combat experience, organisation to fight independently without communication, without fire support. This is a high level of training, especially for junior commanders. And in order to have this level of training, we need to ask those who are responsible for it, these commanders. And we have generals, colonels, and relevant departments. For some reason, I do not see all this. That is why I have a big request to the SBI, not to disgrace the SBI and not to create a conflict, not to discredit the army, not to discredit our troops without any reason. We need to add a second press release to that text and write that before accusing the 125th Brigade, we interviewed the leaders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff about the problems of why they did not replenish troops in the direction of the enemy's attack. We asked them why they appointed a person with no experience of managing a junction or a brigade during a full-scale war, at least a brigade, as the commander of the Kharkiv junction. Why are there no normal structures on the first line of defence, for which they now want to condemn the 125th Brigade? Why are there no mines? Why was there no fire support? Why were the reserves not brought up in time? Who is responsible for all this? These are organisational measures. And now I see in this criminal case the wording that the whole problem is that some soldiers escaped somewhere. Let's put them all on trial and say that they are to blame. And let's disband the brigade, cover it in shame and do it so that all the other officials whose decisions led to this situation get away with it and bear absolutely no responsibility. Is this fair? I'm asking, I'm appealing, I'm wondering who will bring justice to this situation. I hope that this event and the statement of the SBI accusing the military will be properly assessed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Office. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the comment of Oleksandr Syrskyi, and the OSGT Command in Khortytsia will be assessed. Without this, I'm sorry, it's just discrediting the army and it's absolutely useless for us. It means that such mistakes will continue. No one is going to fix anything. They will just appoint the most extreme ones and that's it. And they will mess with people's heads and nerves. And there are complaints.
But everyone's claims need to be measured at their own level. Everyone has it. Everyone should get their fair share. If the command of the 125th Brigade is involved, if it was not competent enough. Excuse me, who checked the readiness of these people? Didn't someone appoint them? Did someone control them? Was everyone happy with everything? If Sodol and Halushkin themselves were at the command post of the 4th Brigade a week before the attack?
In conclusion, I want to say that, as always, everything is based on heroism. On the fact that some people from that 125th TRO brigade were sitting there under fire for a long time. They endured all this in such difficult conditions. And they did not run away before the offensive. They went to their positions. And during the offensive, some units tried to do something. And we should thank everyone who did everything possible to seal this breakthrough. The border guards who also took the first blow near Vovchansk. I am especially grateful to the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine units who entered the battle on the spot and saved us from very dangerous situations near Starytsia, Ternova and Vovchansk. To the units of other brigades. The 92nd Assault Brigade, which again showed its superiority over Russian infantry. The 13th Charter Brigade. The 42nd Mechanised Brigade, which also entered the battle in very difficult conditions. On the move, instead of recovering. Friends, I would also like to mention all the heroes there in Vovchansk, the soldiers of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade simply showed their character. And, in fact, the 57th Motorised Infantry Brigade, the people who were there. The 82nd Air Assault Brigade, which just joined the battle on the spot. The 71st Ranger Brigade. All these people just saved the situation. Because, I want to tell you, Vovchansk was empty. It was just empty. There were no buildings, no military units, nothing. If the enemy had gone straight into Vovchansk on the evening of the 12th, they could have really captured the city. Without a fight at all, without firing a shot. That's the level of preparation.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
Maybe the other two battalions of the 195th Brigade are better armed? What's the difference? Your own battalions or those of another brigade?
Of course, there is a big difference. A team is a team. People know each other. They are coordinated, they have interaction. And, of course, battalions and brigades are created in a certain set to better interact with each other. And then there is the administrative logic. They are all controlled from one headquarters. There is a management system from one headquarters, a document flow that is huge. All these things are interconnected. And, of course, the combat stability of brigades and battalions in brigades is much higher when they are used within a single combat organism, where there is better trust and interaction. So these are really basic truths.
Construction of fortifications in the wrong places. Why does this continue?
I don't know why this goes on, friends. I'll show you a video soon, for example, there is one stronghold that is dug out, they just set up a good stronghold, big dugouts, but it was dug out, I don't know by whom, for whom, because in the loopholes of all these dugouts and all the firing points, they go out, there is still a big mound of earth in front of them. That is, the person who built this position did not take into account the height in front of him. It should at least be cut off to provide some kind of overview. It's just unbelievable. This is a planning problem. I don't know who is responsible for planning. I understand that it's not the head of the military-civilian administration, Syniehubov, who is responsible for planning in Kharkiv region, but he is responsible for all the work that has been done. And someone in his office told him to dig this way, that way and so on. I approved the work plan, and the Civil-Military Administration began to implement it. That's why we need to ask Syniehubov who this person is. I hope he will tell us, because it is very strange. To put it mildly, it's strange. And the investigators have to make an assessment.
Are there any defensive lines in the Dnipro area and will there be fighting for Dnipro by the end of the summer?
The situation at the front is not catastrophic. Wherever our troops can build a line of defence, have a certain density of combat formations, have ammunition, we are beating the Russians everywhere. They can't advance where we are resisting. Right now, we have brought units of three brigades to the area held by the 125th Brigade. And that's all, and the enemy was stopped. It's not easy, it's hard fighting. But the Russians are now being killed in much greater numbers, and they have not been able to advance a single metre for a week. In a large area, in this whole area. So there's nothing surprising here, no battles will be fought by the Dnipro. The enemy is advancing very slowly, with very heavy losses. There are problems in the organisation.
I've told you many times, friends, if the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office had organised and built a normal defence line along the front line, properly tied to the heights and shelters, with access roads and shelters for manoeuvring firepower in the rear, the Russian army would not have been able to break through this defence line. You need troops, you need shells and drones. Nothing so unusual. No more so than it is now.
Who in the Ministry of Defence is responsible for the supply of mines?
The Ministry of Defence is a big question. No one is responsible for anything in the Ministry of Defence. There is always Minister Umerov, who is trying to do one thing - to avoid any involvement in any problems, crises, scandals. And to absolve himself of responsibility for anything. He is not even perceived as a person who solves problems. I don't know.
In your opinion, is a bridgehead on Krynkyi appropriate? If so, what makes it favourable?
To be honest, looking at the line, yes, at the war strategy and assessing what is happening, to be honest, I can't tell you now, I can't sign for the command. It always seems to me that, as I understand it, there are people whom the state has entrusted, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, with the management of the war. It was created during the heavy fighting in the south near Robotyne and Urozhaine, that is, near Velyka Novoselivka, and this bridgehead in Krynky was created. As I understand it, his logic was to draw back Russian troops, to ease the pressure on our troops in the area of Robotyne, Novoprokopivka, on this ledge that we had formed as a result of the summer offensive, and in the area of Velyka Novoselivka. There could be some logic in this. That is, the enemy reacted very sharply to this crisis, constantly attacking this bridgehead. There was a certain logic. Now, to be honest, I don't see it. It is not clear to me. If we had continued active combat operations to attack Robotyne and tried to advance somewhere, it would have made sense, because it is one direction. The logic is that the enemy forces are dispersed. To be honest, I don't quite understand what the logic is now. Perhaps it exists, but when I assess the situation, I don't see any such logic. Perhaps there is. Holding a bridgehead across the river on boats bought by volunteers is a very complicated and very expensive story. Expensive in terms of lives. And, of course, to do this, to distract the enemy at great cost, you have to do a lot of maths. Who loses more and how many times? I can't take on the responsibility to answer who is losing more. But we are holding it at a very high price, and the military command must be aware of what they are doing there. If I had data on our losses and the enemy's losses in the area, I could make this conclusion unequivocally. At the moment I cannot, I am just expressing my views, I do not understand.
What does the phrase in your article about the Kharkiv region mean? You write that the battle in this format will last until October. What is the basis for this assessment? Does this mean that the enemy will not advance further until October, according to your forecast?
I see no reason to do so now. I wrote in an article about the enemy's advance on Kharkiv. Our troops are beating the enemy with enough confidence, intensifying their attacks. The battles are tough, but the defence is holding. When I was writing before October, I was really tied to the climate factor. In fact, now it is very convenient for the enemy to manoeuvre under the border. These plantings of greenery absolutely hide any manoeuvre. The deployment of troops takes place on Russian territory, and no damage is done. And it is convenient for the enemy to manoeuvre in these plantations when the logistics bases are so close. Therefore, until the green leaves fall and the drones have a better view of the Russian infantry, they will continue to act in small groups, and the terrain there is conducive to this.
Donbas has been and remains the main focus of the enemy's efforts, as well as the east of Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia. The main thing that Russia is focusing its forces on is the capture of Donbas. And they will seek to capture Zaporizhzhia, as well as Kupiansk and the Oskol frontier. That's why the enemy is throwing its main forces there. There are heavy battles going on. Unfortunately, the enemy manages to advance in some areas. It is also very slow and with very heavy losses. But we still understand that we cannot stop the enemy. Not yet. Reliably. Because of the lack of a defence line, organisation and planning. This is the only reason. I guarantee you that, well, not that I guarantee. Friends, it is absolutely true that wherever our people enter, they go into defence, dig in, organise intelligence, communication, interaction, set up firepower, have the forces to save the infantry, so that people are not exhausted, not worn out, the enemy does not pass. Nowhere. The Russian army cannot impose any miracles or surprises on us. Our soldiers can even tolerate the enemy's superiority in firepower. But we need an orderly organisation.
How do you assess the extent to which the Russians have succeeded in implementing their offensive? What part of Vovchansk is currently controlled by our forces?
Well, in fact, we control about half of the city for sure, reliably. And, in principle, we can't be driven out of there. Even more, it's more like half on the map. Yes, at least 60 per cent of the city is under our control, probably even more. But the problem is that the enemy is in Vovchansk itself, and we cannot drive them out of there yet. We don't have enough forces, and we can't get through them. It's a bit of a stalemate here. A positional war in the city itself. Well, I don't think they have realised their plan, judging by the way they did it, with the amount of firepower. Still, I think they were planning to break the chain of our strongholds completely, to destroy them, and still reach, judging by what they are doing, the same dominant ridge of heights. This is an obvious solution if you look at the map of the situation and the map of heights in the area. The one who controls the dominant heights, if they take them, they will create a buffer zone along the border. Because these dominant heights will allow them to deploy the antennas of their drones and interfere with the operation of our drones. That is, to create differences in altitude. And, of course, this will allow the enemy to control us in depth and cover the Russian territory. So I think that until they... they will be fighting for a long time to gain a foothold along the river, to capture Vovchansk. And to capture the dominant ridge of heights in the Kharkiv direction.
A question about Kharkiv. We have UAVs hovering over the city all the time. The question is why and what to do with them. What should we do with the GABs? They just destroy everything.
Friends, there is nothing else we can do. There are no other means but to shoot down UAVs of all kinds, to develop technologies that will allow us to shoot them down, these drones are Russian, by all means. We have to put up obstacles. It is very important to set up warnings when a drone starts broadcasting. The fact is that the Russians switch on the drone, and it does not immediately turn on the video signal. When it transmits a video broadcast, it turns on a powerful radio transmitter, and this signal can be understood as a sign that there is a robot working there, a transmitter. And at least to give a warning, the drone is broadcasting over us. This is done either by turning on the radar and looking at the drone's location, or by using the enemy's radar to hunt and knock them out, or by passive electronic intelligence. But, unfortunately, this system does not work in Kharkiv. I don't know how everything is organised in the air force, but the quality of electronic intelligence and air power in the Kharkiv area is absolutely unsatisfactory. Who should check it? Generally speaking, the enemy's drones are outnumbered, they have the advantage. And what should we do about it? Where are our million drones? I would like to ask the question again to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office, which promised this. And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself promised it. This million drones is exactly what Kharkiv region needs. Most of the drones that are fighting here, which are used for strikes and reconnaissance, are drones purchased by volunteers and local governments, not by state central authorities. So, friends, strengthening air defence, strengthening interceptor drones, but I want to say what we can do now. Our losses would be much reduced if we had deployed electronic intelligence assets, which we do have. They will simply record the coordinates, track the location of Russian drones broadcasting. They broadcast before the strike, when they adjust or transmit information online. This is the most dangerous thing for us. Unfortunately, this is not the case. There is only one story here. There are only two ways to deal with the GABs. First, strikes on airfields where Russian aircraft are based with our attack drones. And I hope that when our allies come to their senses and start looking at the massive sacrifices that Ukraine is making, the Ukrainian civilians and military, they will allow missile strikes on Russian airbases. And secondly, of course, there are the Patriot systems, long-range anti-aircraft missile systems that can destroy the carriers of the GABs. That is, to shoot down the aircraft themselves at a great distance. Well, that's the only way.
I want to say that I hope for justice, I oppose the accusations, because the last thing you should do in a war is accuse soldiers in the trenches. Soldiers, what I see at the front, are the same people everywhere. There are, of course, bigger heroes somewhere, smaller ones somewhere, but a person on the front line who has been sitting at zero for many months under fire is already performing a feat by his very presence there. And by the fact that they are working and doing their job. Therefore, the key problems in the army are always problems in management. It is there that we must look for mistakes, first of all. When there are no people, no troop density, no necessary number of positions, no means of destruction, no weapons, no training, no inspection, no control of the troops. All this is the responsibility of the specific people in power, who are all so handsome and respectable. Until the Russian offensive begins, and suddenly they all disappear. And then they send investigators from the State Bureau of Investigation from Kyiv to look for the culprits among the soldiers. I categorically reject this, and we will never change like this. Never. We need to change, first of all, that before the SBI investigator comes, we have the military command itself and the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should assess the actions of the generals of the senior leadership, and the generals should assess the actions of their subordinates and their own, what was done right and what was done wrong. And then, if the facts of the crime have been established, then the investigation begins. And on 10 May, we have an offensive, a change of command, loss of communication, Starlink breaks down, the RPGs are crushed by motorbikes, units have no weapons or reserves, complete chaos in command, soldiers are withdrawing from their positions. Oh, let's try them. Would you, gentlemen from the State Bureau of Investigation, sit in a trench for at least an hour in such conditions? Mr Sukhachev, we left the office with our investigators, checked what was happening on the frontline before we gave any stupid orders.
Friends, I hope for justice, we will keep this situation under control, I will report on the progress of this criminal case, and at the same time I understand that we need to talk about the situation in the 67th Brigade, 61st Brigade, 115th Brigade, where there were also problems related to management, which led to serious consequences. And we need to draw conclusions from this, because this is how the war will be fought for a very long time and with very heavy losses. We have to stay ahead of the enemy, we have to learn, at least learn from our mistakes. No one can teach us but ourselves.
Today, when our troops have stabilised the frontline near Kharkiv, when Ukrainian heroes, despite the great superiority of the Russians, are fighting back and inflicting heavy losses, and have stopped this much-hyped Russian offensive, I want to say today that I am more confident than ever in our victory, that our free democratic society will be able to force our government to change, and the government will want to rely on some reasonable advice, some logic, and draw conclusions from those who present and report it. Thank you for the programme and Glory to Ukraine!
