Since 1993, Ukraine’s population has been steadily declining, and nonetheless GDP has been growing. Therefore, whether there will be labor shortage after war is question - Demographer Oleksandr Hladun
How many Ukrainian refugees will be returned from abroad and how will they be returned? Will Ukraine have to attract migrants, how many and on what terms? Will there be an uninhabited strip on the border with Russia and how wide will it be?
Should all the destroyed Soviet mines and giant factories be rebuilt? The Russian-Ukrainian war is far from over, but questions about Ukraine's postwar future arise regularly.
In making their predictions at the request of the press, demographers urge us to think not only about the future but also about today, that is, to remember that much will determine the conditions under which Ukraine will emerge from the war with Russia.
Censor.NET talked to Oleksandr Hladun, Deputy Director of the Ptukha Institute of Demography of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, about the relevance of such forecasts and what can be done in demographic policy now.
UNTIL THE WAR IS OVER, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO CONDUCT A NORMAL DEMOGRAPHIC POLICY
- Demographers have a certain understanding of how many people Ukraine is currently undercalculated because of the war. You say it's about 7 million.
- At the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, our institute estimates that 42 million people lived within its borders in 1991. The war brought large external migration and a very high mortality rate, both at the front and among the civilian population. It is estimated that today, approximately 35 million people live in Ukraine within the 1991 borders. If we consider only the government-controlled territory, this number should be reduced to 29-30 million.
- You mentioned that at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, 42 million people lived in Ukraine. So, don't you agree with the data from what the authorities called the 2019 census when they announced the figure of 37 million? It is important to understand what to start from when we assess the losses due to Russia's attack.
- What the then Minister Dmytro Dubilet did cannot be called a census. He was personally told about this, but he smiled and continued to call it a census. What was done was called "population estimation by indirect methods". This is indeed a scientific approach, but it has nothing to do with the census. The census is conducted on a different methodological basis. In 2019, the State Statistics Service conducted a trial census and was already preparing for a real one. But Dubilet said that they had allegedly spent a lot of time preparing and were asking for a lot of money and boasted that he would conduct the census in two months. Thus, he disrupted this important step.
A population census is not only about the number and location of the population. It is also about the gender, age, family, ethnic, language, educational structure of the population, the employment situation, and housing conditions. These data are essential for the normal functioning of the state.
But the key point is the coverage of the territory. They provided data only for the territory controlled at that time, that is, without Crimea and ORDLO. We are making an assessment of the entire territory within the 1991 borders. And if we are serious, they should have received one or two million less than they announced.
- You called the demographic blow that Ukraine received almost a catastrophe. People started talking about how much population Ukraine would have post-war and how to overcome the demographic gap in the first months of the full-scale invasion. So what are the prospects now?
- War always has a bad impact on both the economy and demographics of the country at war. But if we look at demographic processes in historical retrospect, the demographic crisis and population decline in Ukraine began in 1993, when the historical maximum was 52.2 million. That is, in 30 years, the population has fallen by about 10 million. In addition, the gender and age structure is changing: there are fewer young people and more elderly people.
Population decline, increased mortality, transformation of the age structure and changes in reproductive behaviour pose threats to the continued existence of the state. Can the situation be considered catastrophic? I would not use such terms at the moment, but it is worth acknowledging that the situation is very difficult. Much will depend on further demographic policy. But above all, it is the end of the war. Until the war is over, it is very difficult to conduct a normal demographic policy.
- So preliminary analytics and strategy development before the end of the war will not be of much use?
- The Strategy of Demographic Development of Ukraine until 2040 has been almost developed and is awaiting approval. Some of its provisions can be implemented now. However, implementation means the development of effective programmes and mechanisms with specific goals, deadlines, objectives and responsibilities. This includes funding. Much depends on security. Another important point is how well the strategy will be funded.
- What points can be implemented now?
- This is a certain policy to support families with children. There is also a reduction in premature mortality, but this is more of a behavioural area and healthcare financing. But now life-saving behaviour does not always depend on people themselves.
Migration policy also needs to be developed and regulated by the state. With regard to the labour market, this policy includes identifying the needs for attracting migrants and determining the shortage of workers in specific professions. If decisions are made to attract people from abroad on the basis of this, a clear procedure should be prescribed - through which government agencies, for what period and on what conditions. In general, the need for foreign labour will be determined after the war, when it is clear what the state of the economy is and what sectors need to be developed in the future.
The issue of population settlement on the territory of Ukraine is also one of the goals of the Strategy, and this should be developed today. We are not going anywhere from Russia, and Russia is not going anywhere from us. Therefore, we need to decide whether to create uninhabited zones of 15-20 km in the northern and eastern regions. Plans can also be developed in this direction for internally displaced persons. The location of strategically important enterprises can be planned from the same perspective. A parallel issue is recovery. Should all mines be restored and thus facilitate the resettlement of people in the eastern regions?
In a sense, this will be imprecise planning, but at the development stage, this can be clarified and discussed with local authorities and territorial communities. At least after the war, there will be no need to waste time on this.
THERE WILL BE NO QUESTIONS ABOUT WOMEN WITH CHILDREN WHO HAVE LEFT AND WILL RETURN LATER
- The most important factor in the future demographic situation is how many people will return. There has been a lot of talk about this since 2022, surveys have been conducted at different stages among Ukrainian refugees in different countries, and there are a number of studies on this environment. How relevant are these studies if you believe that everything will be revealed by the end of the war?
- It is impossible to make a realistic forecast. If we rely on the data from various surveys, there are a lot of them, but the organizers of these surveys admit that they cannot guarantee the representativeness of the respondent samples. Therefore, these data should simply be taken into account and we should see how people's moods change. According to such surveys, between 25 and 50% of those who left plan to stay abroad. It should be borne in mind that we are talking about intentions, and when a person answers the question whether they plan to return to Ukraine, practically nothing changes in their life. But after the war is over, we will have to make a choice: either to return to Ukraine or to stay abroad. Then, we will make an informed decision. People will look at whether there is housing and work in Ukraine, how the social infrastructure is being restored. They will ask the same questions in the host country, and then make a choice.
We believe that if half of the population returns, it will be good. At the same time, after the war is over, we predict counterstream: some people will return to Ukraine, especially women with children, and some men will go abroad to join their families.
- What does the experience of previous defensive wars in other countries say?
- If we look at this issue from the point of view of the experience of other wars, the pattern is as follows: the longer the war lasts, the fewer people return. That is why we need to contact Ukrainian refugees now, so that they do not feel abandoned by the state and do not lose their virtual connection with Ukraine. This is primarily the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Education and Science is taking certain steps to ensure that everyone can study online in Ukrainian schools.
- They speculate that there will be a certain watershed between those who left and those who did not. Obviously, as well as between those who fought and those who did not. It is clear that there will be a line, but is it necessary to emphasise it so much now?
- I agree that it is better not to raise some issues, but simply to take them into account in the current work. Dividing people causes discord. I think that women with children who left and will return will be treated normally because they saved their children. As for the men who avoided mobilisation, I assume that there will be a negative attitude. This is understandable: they abandoned the state in a very difficult time. We need to conduct research on how the state should conduct policy and communication in this regard.
However, pushing these issues in the public sphere can really push back. People abroad have a different idea of what is happening in Ukraine. We perceive the shelling here in one way, and they perceive it differently. And if, on top of that, they are made to think that they will become second-class citizens, it will not help them return.
WHETHER THERE WILL BE A LABOUR MARKET SHORTAGE AFTER THE WAR IS A QUESTION
- How does mobilisation affect the labour market? It is clear that all recruits leave their jobs. But is this really as critical as people sometimes try to convince? After all, don't those who are demobilised for one reason or another eventually return to the labour market?
- We need to distinguish between the current situation and the end of the war. At present, due to mobilisation, some people going abroad and the occupation of parts of the eastern and southern territories, a number of companies are experiencing a shortage of labour.
I read one serious survey of entrepreneurs about the risks they faced, and they named problems with energy supply in the first place (65% of respondents). 54% said it was a threat to life. 46% - rising prices for materials and equipment. 42% - lack of labour. So there is a certain problem.
You are right that a significant part of those mobilised will find their place in the labour market, but this will happen on a massive scale only after the war. That is, we should understand the current shortage, but distinguish it from the future. The question is whether it will really exist in the future. Many businesses have been destroyed. Whether they should be rebuilt, especially mines or steel mills in the size they were, is a question that needs to be thought about strategically now.
- There is evidence that a number of construction companies are already hiring Asian workers. So, is the process underway?
- Regarding the discussion about the need to "import" foreigners. Generally speaking, if there is a shortage of labour, it is possible to hire foreigners under a contract for a certain period of time - for them to earn money and leave the results of their work here, but after the contract expires, they cannot just stay here. In other words, there is no urgent need to attract migrants at the moment.
Attracting foreigners for permanent residence is another issue that needs to be addressed, taking into account the number, country, settlement, mentality, and religious beliefs.
- If it comes to that, which countries would you target first?
- It's one thing to say who we would like to attract, but it's another to say who will come to us. Citizens of those countries whose economic development is worse than Ukraine's will come to work and possibly live with us. These are mainly some Asian and African countries. Will people from Europe come to us? I have great doubts. Perhaps some of them will, but there must be business conditions and a legal framework for this.
Perhaps it is not worth focusing on one country or region, but rather attracting a little bit from everywhere.
- Some people are afraid of an "Arab invasion" because it will affect the level of anti-Semitism, which is negligible in Ukraine, while others are afraid of "Chinese occupation". Are these issues discussed at the highest level?
- I haven't heard any serious talk about this at the highest level.
I agree that there is a danger when there are many people of a religion other than the dominant one in Ukraine, another ethnic group. This is evidenced by the experience of Europe. 20-30 years ago, they were actively talking about multiculturalism. Now the then leaders of Europe, who campaigned for multiculturalism, have admitted that this policy has failed. These are Merkel, Cameron, Hollande. They thought that people from other countries would come, adapt and assimilate in a few years, but in reality, most people live in their own separate communities, and this partly creates tension. That is why the policy of attracting foreigners for permanent residence should be pursued very carefully. The consequences can be worse than the planned economic benefits.
- If the population decreases, especially in the case of a bad scenario when less than half of the refugees return, then someone has to serve this territory. Who will do this if we have a demographic hole and do not systematically attract migrants?
- We should take as a basis the creation of enterprises with high added value, automated production processes, where fewer people will work. Since 1993, our population has been steadily declining, and yet GDP has been growing, except for the 2008 crisis, the war factor, and COVID-19. In other words, labour productivity has been growing.
On the other hand, there is no need to pursue policies that push people out. For example, the Ministry of Education and Science has a policy that all higher education institutions must enroll students on a paid basis, except for teachers, doctors, and military personnel. The process of redistributing state-funded places is underway. At the same time, many countries in Europe, such as Germany, the Czech Republic, and Finland, have made the system of higher education free for foreigners, including Ukrainians. And according to some polls, about 20% of Ukrainian high school students plan to pursue higher education abroad. And let's face it, they probably won't come back. Moreover, depending on the country, a former student is given from one to three years to find a job.
So, on the one hand, Ukraine is encouraging young people to go abroad, and on the other hand, it is talking about an aging population and problems in the labor market. Domestic policy is at odds with the demographic development strategy.
In order to attract young people, we need to make higher education free. And I think that higher education should be available to everyone, because nowadays education is not only about acquiring knowledge, but also another stage of socialization.
We have analyzed the cost of education in our leading higher education institutions, and it is quite comparable or even higher than in higher education institutions abroad.
The struggle for young people is through education, and in this regard, Europe is simply sucking young people out of Ukraine. And the Ministry of Education, instead of taking steps to attract students, is doing the opposite.
- It is believed that Ukrainian education has lost its quality to such an extent that there will not be many applicants.
- This is the other side. However, tuition fees will not improve the quality of education. Nowadays, many students go to work from the first year of study. Of course, this also affects the quality of the process. And universities are afraid to expel students who don't study, because then they have to close a group or a speciality - these are state requirements that create contradictions.
Olha Skorokhod, Censor. NET
