Why our military and political leadership is incapable of effective resistance
I am writing with moderation because I am a military man myself, which imposes certain restrictions.
1. The predominance of personal (political, career) interests over the main goal - a tactical and global victory
In short: the entire top command is thinking more about how to stay in positions they like (except for the President, for whom this issue is resolved by the absence of wartime elections). Therefore, in critical situations that used to be associated with basic survival-life, freedom, etc.- more attention is paid to formalities rather than creativity. The initiative is punished. Bending over backward to superiors prevails over authority among subordinates - this was not the case at the beginning of the war when the main thing was the result. Now it is necessary to maneuver with shifting responsibility to the person who gave the order from above by literally executing it, instead of creatively. The higher the command, the more blatantly it manifests itself. The command now has to prove that it is stupid in only one way - by executing a stupid order, sometimes at the cost of lives (the higher the level, the worse the consequences). And if you don't follow a stupid and meaningless order, you will be dismissed, and your successor will kill even more.
In political terms, the situation is mirrored, but the manifestations are slightly different. There is a sense of caution and uncertainty, because everyone is afraid of discontent, falling ratings, whining from the opposition, and so on. They screwed up the law on mobilization, which was supposed to be much tougher in terms of "soft power", and now they are obtaining results of using brute force, which works mainly in favor of the enemy. They say that it is not the people's deputies who are bad, but the disgusting TCR officers who are actually just doing their job. But I will write about this separately.
2. Absolute detachment of all levels of leadership from reality (the higher the level, the stronger) and unwillingness to hear bad news. All the f#ckups are shifting onto "inept subordinates" instead of working on mistakes. They don't hear real problems from their subordinates, assuming they are insincere. The higher the general, the more blatant these manifestations are.
No commander of a brigade, army, etc. can boast that his reports on problems were heard by the top. No one can claim a timely response.
And when the system is built on a hierarchy with many levels, immediate resolution of issues is simply impossible because it is slowed down at each level.
3. Building all systems on Soviet principles of control (terrible bureaucracy, resistance to digitalization, false assessments of combat capability based on paperwork, etc.) and, most horrifyingly, on the Soviet-Russian strategy. The latter means that the enemy imposes its principles of warfare on us, and predicts our actions from its textbooks, which were studied together with our generals. Yurii Butusov has explained this in detail in his latest videos.
I would add that many actions that need to be taken immediately and on time are not taken by the command in anticipation of positive events. Bonaparte said: "War is a science in which nothing can be left to chance." Instead, general officers follow events, not anticipate them. They learn nothing until the failures become apparent.
4. Indecision. This is closely related to point 1. It's scary to take initiative when it's not expected or encouraged. That's why most senior executives are stupidly waiting for some kind of "approval" or "coordination," even when they don't have time for it. Returning to Bonaparte, I'll remind you of another quote: "Great things should be done, not endlessly pondered." Now everything is working exactly the opposite.
5. Inadequate policy in the use of professional personnel, starting with the placement of soldiers and sergeants and ending with the dismissal of talented creative senior officers. Evaluation of the success of certain officers is based on PR or formal criteria. Plus loyalty to the leadership.
I personally heard one stupid general (a hero of Ukraine, by the way) instruct his subordinates back in 2015: "It doesn't matter how you fight, the main thing is how you document it."
6. Corruption in the supply chain. This is also a separate topic that I can talk about endlessly, and I will write about it in part only after the end of the war.
There are many people who systematically steal from the provisioning. And the damage they cause is not so much material as outright treacherous - the army receives not the best weapons or ammunition, but the ones with the biggest kickback. And no one is fighting this, except for the use of brutal police methods in some cases.
Critical elements of supply are being shifted to volunteers or special funds, because the public procurement system, despite all its improvements, is still bureaucratic and corrupt. To give just one example: the latest technology for small air defense laser systems developed in Kharkiv has not yet found funding because there is no interest among those who are developing other means. Why shoot down shaheds with lasers when we have great contracts for machine guns?
7. Lack of systemic discipline; this issue is mostly shifted to unit commanders, but it is not being resolved globally. Tens of thousands of deserters are on the run, and the Military Law-Enforcement Service is meanwhile checking car registration certificates or taking care of captured weapons.They only interfere with the fight. War crimes are being dealt with by prosecutors and judges who have never been on the front lines for a single day.
I finished my report.
I hope they won't shoot me.
There are no military secrets here.
