Adaptation is something that is decisive in war
For example, adapting tactics in conjunction with engineering solutions and taking into account our own capabilities. Having more resources, the Russians still seek to rationalize their use to increase efficiency. They have their own pragmatic logic.
The losses they suffer would be unacceptable to us in any case. Instead, the enemy is ready to put at stake heavy losses in people and means to achieve its goals. Adapt infiltration tactics to the appropriate speed to build up pressure. They expect to lose a lot, but they will push us.
For more than six months in the Pokrovsk direction, we have seen various variations of Russian offensive tactics in different areas - from a quick breakthrough in Ocheretyne or Novohrodivka, traditional banzai attacks in Novooleksandrivka, to overwhelming pressure in Hrodivka and outflanking and forcing out in Selydove.
The review does not claim to be exhaustive. We have been working in different parts of the sector during this time. And we continue to work. I can describe what our unit has encountered from our own experience on certain sections of the frontline. After that, I will add some thoughts. This will be a rather long thread.
After the breakthrough in Ocheretyne, in addition to advancing westward, the Russians continued to try to drive our army out from the hill on which the village was located. For further movement along the railroad, they needed to secure their flanks, one of which was Novooleksandrivka to the north of the railroad.
So they launched a series of attacks towards Novooleksandrivka to capture the village. There, we faced a combination of two tactics - armored assaults and infiltration.
On the one hand, the enemy sent small groups of soldiers to move along the forest belts and accumulate for assaults. On the other hand, there were regular attacks by small armored groups. Usually, it was a combination of two (rarely more) ACVs for landing soldiers (IFVs or APCs) with one or two tanks that served as fire support and pressure on our positions. Ocheretyne became a convenient concentration point and cover for these actions.
Mortars and towed guns were located in the village, firing from the northern and northwestern parts of the settlement. The accumulation of material resources and personnel began in the village. From time to time they tried to hide equipment there. They used hangars or clusters of trees.
Sometimes there were more massive attacks on Novooleksandrivka. They involved more armored vehicles than usual. It is difficult to hide the preparations for this, given that there is constant surveillance. Therefore, this part of the Russian tactics required speed in implementation. In order to reach the line to storm the village, it was necessary to cover 5-6 kilometers from Ocheretyne along the forest belt.
This was the most suitable route. Often, during such attacks, we hit the largest number of enemy armored vehicles in a short period of time. If the equipment remained intact in the battle, the motor driver mechanics would try to pull it out of the line of attack.
The speed of reaction of drone crews and firepower was important. Sometimes the equipment was detected in advance. Sometimes it was already in Ocheretyne, which had to be reached by a considerable distance from Coke Plant or Krasnohorivka. The road from Avdiivka to Ocheretyne became a very important communication route, where they tried to destroy equipment and vehicles on the approach.
From the same area, the enemy attacked Berdychi, Stepove and further west. The Coke Plant area also became a convenient place to accumulate assets, and the roads nearby became a place where a constant hunt for equipment was conducted. The videos were shot in June and July.
For the Russians, capturing Novooleksandrivka was a matter of principle. By the way, this is part of the sector where there are very unpleasant questions about how our fortifications were built. But that's another story. The occupiers did not spare a significant amount of equipment for their assaults in this direction, expanding the wedge they drove into our defense. There were frequent contretemps. Sometimes the motor driver mechanics lost their guiding landmarks, sometimes they panicked under fire and tried to escape through an open field without the cover of forest belts.
The capture of Prohres and the forest near the village was an important success for the infantry of the Muscovites by using infiltration tactics. This place became a convenient hub for the accumulation of infantry and, later, for the location of command and control centers and electronic warfare systems. It was the final or intermediate route for infantry movement on road transport.
Now, the drone operators were tasked with not only destroying enemy forces and equipment on the road between Ocheretyne and Avdiivka. The roads near the towns of Prohres, Vovche - Sokil, and Yevhenivka - Soloviove became important lines of communication. Through them, the Russians tried to quickly redeploy infantry to the area of Prohres for further assaults.
As soon as the opportunity arose, the enemy began to reinforce the area with electronic warfare systems, as it was here that he suffered serious losses when soldiers were moving on foot and by transport. There was another pile of destroyed equipment and vehicles on these roads. If not for this work, the Russian advance on the front would have been faster.
This is generally a well-established practice. Where the enemy has gained a foothold, stabilized the area and got the opportunity, he deploys his EW systems/ELINT assets to cover logistics, movement of equipment and personnel. He protects himself from our drones' work on his nearest rear.
The rest you know. The offensive along the railroad towards Novohrodivka and the advance to the outskirts of Hrodivka. Two different stories. A quick capture of the first one and fighting from house to house in the second. Until the Russians covered one or another route for the transfer of forces to the front, especially when their penetration into our defense was not wide, several death roads were formed for them.
When they expanded the penetration, increasing the number of alternative routes, they began to cope with this problem better. Heavy fighting continued for some time in Hrodivka. Here, our unit took part in the elimination of enemy infantry, which was being deployed there in small groups along the forest belts.
There is a situation where the Russian invaders have formed an advantage in certain components, where we, on the contrary, have a shortfall.
Total air superiority. We have no effective countermeasures against the GABs at the front. That is why the only hope is that we will have the means to destroy enemy aircraft in the rear, bomb depots and enterprises that produce them.
Total advantage in the infantry. The numerical superiority of the Russians, even at the expense of huge payments to contract soldiers, makes it possible to "buy" advances at the expense of losses in the infantry, which is seizing our land and our positions with its own hands and feet. Instead, our infantry is exhausted.
A clear vertical is when each direction has a responsible division or corps command that is directly responsible for the result. As opposed to a confusing system of diverse units and an unclear situation in each direction, when it is not clear who is really responsible for defense, except for brigade commanders.
This is, of course, an incomplete list. The Russians have an advantage in terms of resources and are adapting to the need to use them effectively. At the same time, they obviously have a calculation of what losses they can afford to achieve their goals at this or that stage.
The enemy is adapting, and it is obvious that one way or another they have a system of transferring combat experience that is scalable. In addition, a system of searching for engineering solutions is constantly working. One of its main products is GABs, which over time have been flying deeper. Where they detect our positions and resistance that they cannot overcome, they destroy any structures with aerial bombs and artillery.
The effectiveness of using drones at the front has become one of the factors that allow us to inflict significant losses on the Russians. Without this, the situation would have been even worse in terms of enemy advancement. Of course, not everything is perfect here either. This is a reason to talk about tactics, supply and organization.
One of the ways to seriously hold up the Russians as they advance along forest belts and other objects that provide visual cover is to be able to massively use FPV (kamikaze and drops). If we have 3-4-5 or more options for routes for a redeployment or assault, we can provide shuttle work of attack drone crews along these routes.
Firstly, to destroy the enemy. Secondly, for containment — to prevent them from advancing freely until they are visually detected. This is not a panacea, but it relates to how the drone strike system can work under such pressure at the front.
It rests on the problem of resources - human and material. You need a large number of crews, drones, ammunition, and other material assets. Moreover, it is a matter of coordination. That's why even this brings us to the issue of creating a divisional structure, where there will be a place for coordination of all drone operators on a wide section of the front.
Instead of tactful silence about the issue of fortifications and who should defend them and how, I will say the following. Not everywhere, of course, we dig in the middle of the field so that the infantry will never sit there. We have seen some good examples, but the problem exists. The only question is who and how should solve it in a situation where few people want to hear the unpleasant truth. In short, we have seen quality fortifications at the front.
What else we could do: first of all, we should restore order in the command structure at the front. When a brigade receives a huge section of the front under its responsibility and 15 other units attached to it, this is not normal. When we [do not] know who is responsible for the defense of, let's say, Pokrovsk, this is not normal.
On the surface, there is a solution whereby based on the most effective brigades, led by effective officers who have their own high-quality training system and trust in the army and society, it is possible to create, say, divisions. It also seems obvious (perhaps not to everyone) to create an algorithm for systematizing combat experience, which should have been done long ago.
Similarly, it is high time to stop the political demagoguery around the mobilization and manning of troops, which has been going on for a long time and has caused irreparable damage. There should be strict but fair rules for all persons liable for military service, along with a transparent and logical military exemption system for those on whose work and skills the defense depends. There should be full support for recruitment efforts for brigades that do this on their own initiative. It is also abnormal when no one is de facto responsible for mobilization.
Along with this, we should raise starkly the question of the qualitative realization of human potential in the army. Fear is an objective factor, but it can be partially overcome by training. In particular, preparation for a real war in which a person will have to take part. It is a criminal approach when young people under the age of 25 do not prepare for possible mobilization. We may not lower the age of mobilization, but these people need to be prepared now for what they may face. This can save their lives later.
It's not normal for a person to be in charge of a technology unit or a leadership position in a branch of the armed forces without knowing anything about the industry, simply because they have a rank and length of service. If you are incompetent, take a back seat. If you are competent, get responsibility and authority. If people want to transfer from your unit en masse, stand aside. The ironclad attachment of a rank to a position is an evil that drags us all down. Then we won't have to make excuses that all our problems are due to the TDF (Territorial Defense Forces - ed. note).
And it should be said separately that this should also include the issue of communication culture and the transfer of information about the real state of affairs at the front because one single lie or inaccuracy in reports on the ground can easily lead to human losses that could have been avoided. Therefore, the dismissal of competent officers who say objective things is also unacceptable.
And one more thing. At the first sign of a Russian army-style attitude toward personnel in a particular brigade, heads will roll. [For] disregard for the lives of personnel, commanders must be held accountable in a clear vertical.
If we want to become nothing more than a testing ground for the Russian army, if we want to survive as a country and a nation, we need to adapt and change. Technologically, organizationally, and to form the appropriate culture. Otherwise, we risk a fate worse than a century ago. Partisan resistance will be impossible with today's level of technology. Russia will simply annihilate Ukraine, and the world will stomach it. That’s all there is to it.
Oleksandr Solonko
