Three high-profile personnel appointments in Armed Forces of Ukraine and Presidential Office

Author: Yurii Butusov

The stream is dedicated to new appointments in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Presidential Office of Ukraine.

The first appointment, the most high-profile, is the appointment of Mykhailo Drapatyi, a general, as commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The second appointment is the appointment of Oleh Apostol, the commander of the 95th Air Assault Brigade, as Deputy Chief of the General Staff. The third appointment is the appointment of Pavlo Palisa, the commander of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, as Deputy Head of the Presidential Office for Military Affairs.

The appointment of good people, quality people, who are not just good, who have a reputation as professionals, who have real merits at the front, who are respected by their subordinates, is always an event.

Everything that is happening in our country should be treated as pragmatically as possible and the logic of the processes should be seen, so I want to say right away: changes will begin when the appointed people, all three of whom are well-known military professionals, will receive the necessary powers, when they will gain the necessary trust, when they will be really expected to give quality advice and when this advice will be used by the leaders in the plans, proposals, and decisions they make, when all these actions will be given maximum support and they will be able to realize their experience, their character, and their will to bring about changes. So let's not talk about changes now, because there are no changes yet. There are three appointments, and all three are highly qualified. 

Mykhailo Drapatyi. I have mentioned Drapatyi many times before. The first time I wrote about him was on August 7, 2014. I didn't know him then personally, but on the eve of August 6, Mykhailo Drapatyi led the breakthrough of our units and his second battalion of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, which was surrounded by Russians near Chervonopartyzansk on the border with the Russian Federation. The battalion and some attached units fought for a long time without any support. Completely surrounded by Russian artillery and Russian missiles, the battalion suffered losses and a critical situation developed. They had to drive through, break through to their own, which meant crossing more than 40 kilometers of uncontrolled territory. At that time, there were no drones, no reliable intelligence, and not even reliable communication with military units. So, of course, such a maneuver was very, very difficult. The order for the breakthrough was given at the last moment when there had been no fuel or anything for a long time. It is in such moments that the true character and resolve of a commander are revealed.

There were two battalions surrounded. The commander of the first battalion decided to destroy the weapons and withdraw the personnel to the territory of the Russian Federation. That is, in fact, to surrender, intern his unit in the Russian Federation, and then return to the territory of Ukraine unarmed. And this was done. The first battalion returned home unarmed through Russian territory. This was used very loudly by Russian propaganda at the time as a demonstration of the incapacity of the Ukrainian army and its unwillingness to perform combat missions at all. But Mykhailo Drapatyi led the second battalion in the same conditions to a breakthrough and on August 6 withdrew his battalion and other units. One of our soldiers was killed. But the battalion returned with its military equipment and weapons, rejoined its own troops, and continued to perform combat missions after the reorganization. At that time, I wrote about Mykhailo Drapatyi, and I am honored to say that Drapatyi acted in the same consistent and decisive manner during the Russian-Ukrainian war, which began in 2014.

So, Drapatyi has already become a general, and many people who rise in rank are not given the ability to do so, not everyone has the opportunity, which may stem from their upbringing or level of intelligence, there is nothing wrong with that, but not everyone is able to transition from a position where they interact directly with soldiers, such as a company commander, to one where they must manage structural units. Such positions require constant critical thinking about oneself, first of all, the ability to analyze events, listen to people, draw conclusions and learn, learn what is happening in the war. And it is important to say that during his 2022, Drapatyi showed that he still had such abilities as a general. In March of 2022, in a very difficult situation, Drapatyi took command of our tactical group, which was defending Kryvyi Rih at the time, and there were battles in the Kherson region. There, he managed to stabilize the situation quite quickly, although it was extremely difficult, complicated because there were no combat-capable troops in that area, no weapons, and nothing. There were such motivated people with their own clothes and assault rifles, and it was not an easy task. After that, Drapatyi was appointed some time later, in 2023, to the position of commander of the Odesa Operational and Strategic Group of Troops. In other words, we have four operational and strategic groups of troops, and one of them, which was fighting in the south, was entrusted to Mykhailo Drapatyi by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi. It turned out that this appointment was again successful because Drapatyi began to pay maximum attention to the development of drones, the development of electronic warfare, the coordination and interaction of these new means of fighting with the troops, and the management in this area was quite clear and professional. It was a command that tried to reduce the losses of our troops, despite the fact that there were operations in the area that were directly commanded by other structural units, such as Krynky, but the OSGT Khortytsia was as effective and dangerous to the enemy as possible. After the change of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, when Oleksandr Syrskyi was appointed instead of Zaluzhnyi, I should note that I personally hoped that Drapatyi would be able to get promoted and extend his experience of managing the Odesa OSGT to other parts of the front, perhaps become the commander of the Khortytsia OSGT, our main OSGT. But a different decision was made, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy appointed Drapatyi to the high position of Deputy Chief of the General Staff, responsible for combat training of the troops. At that time, I also want to remind you that everyone was talking about this very favorably, rejoicing. They congratulated Drapatyi, and I see that this is also a great position, in fact. In terms of its importance, in terms of its status, it is also important, no less than the command of the ground forces. Nevertheless, that position was an administrative one, and in this position, Drapatyi did not receive any real powers and did not have time to do anything to change the combat training. The position was administrative, and in our government, such positions work only if there are specific, clear tasks set by the higher command. If they don't, it just turns into a process of shuffling papers and holding meetings, with almost zero effect. Drapatyi, in fact, did not want to do administrative work, as can be seen from what people who communicate with him directly say, and he wanted, of course, to command the troops. And so it happened that he was not in the General Staff for long, and on May 10 of this year, the Russians launched an offensive in the Kharkiv region, directly on the city of Kharkiv and the city of Vovchansk. General Halushkin served as the commander of the Kharkiv OTG for a considerable time. However, during this offensive—which was well-known in advance and thoroughly detailed by our intelligence, including where, when, and how the enemy would act—there was complete information about all enemy actions, routes, concentrations of forces, numbers, and command structure. Nevertheless, when the enemy launched their attack, it suddenly became clear that the troops in the area were unprepared. For various reasons, control over several units was lost. And on the same day, after discussing the critical situation near Kharkiv, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, decided to dismiss Halushkin for losing control of the troops and appointed Mykhailo Drapatyi to this position. In other words, he was the commander of the OSGT, which is the operational and strategic level, the deputy chief of the General Staff at that time. But he was put on a lower position, the commander of the OTG because it was necessary to save this crisis immediately in the most difficult situation, without having time to prepare, to study the situation, nothing. But on May 12, Drapatyi actually arrived at the troops immediately, and on May 12 he officially took over, took over the affairs and responsibility for the area. He started working, and our commanders in the area said that Drapatyi was not the kind of person who would shout, use obscene language in such a critical situation, as many of our not-quite-adequately-appointed commanders at various levels often do. Drapatyi listened to the commanders of some units as much as possible and tried to make adequate decisions according to the situation. There was no constant back-and-forth, immediately restore something, repel something, go ahead, hold on at all costs. There was trust, first of all, there were no brilliant Napoleonic plans, no ingenious, let's say, moves. There was just normal trust in the unit commanders, the ability to take responsibility independently, support for effective decisions and adequate perception when our reserves were deployed on high alert, when certain things did not work out immediately. This was particularly crucial because our reserves had to engage in battle on the move to defend Kharkiv. In this context, overall, if we compare across the entire front, Drapatyi’s decisions were appropriate, and he managed to establish a level of trust similar to what existed in the Odesa OSGT. Over time, this same trust also emerged within the Kharkiv OTG.

Drapatyi also appointed Oleh Honcharuk, a respected military officer, as chief of staff. At the beginning of the war, he was the commander of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade. Drapatyi gave him an effective headquarters and team, and there was trust, honesty in the situation, and real information. After some time, all units in the area began to report accurate data on their real positions. This led to effective and well-coordinated interactions. The enemy was quickly stopped, and the area was stabilized. Since May 12, when our troops were deployed in these sectors, the enemy has been unable to advance. On the contrary, in some areas near the village of Lyptsi, Russian forces were even pushed back.

After the situation in Kharkiv was stabilized, in July there were already problems, the enemy went on the offensive in Donbas. And in September 2024, Drapatyi was assigned to a new direction. He was appointed commander of the Luhansk OTG. Before him, Colonel Ledovyi was the commander of the Luhansk OTG. A man who had never commanded a brigade at all, in fact, never. I'm not even sure if he commanded a battalion. Some people say he didn't even command a battalion. In other words, the man was shuffling papers at the headquarters of the Ground Forces Command for most of his service, and suddenly Oleksandr Syrskyi appointed him commander of the OTG. The situation would have been ridiculous, because, in fact, Ledovyi learned about war and decision-making while he was a commander. But, unfortunately, he failed to learn, and it was a real sorrow when unit commanders said that at a meeting with him you want to laugh at his decisions, but, unfortunately, it is a very bitter laugh, because as a result of such an absolutely incompetent, talentless commander commanding the OTG, we are losing ground, a very critical situation is created, and our soldiers are dying. When the situation has already reached a complete collapse of command in the Luhansk OTG, Colonel Ledovyi himself is primarily responsible for this, as he obviously wants to become a general or receive some kind of star, and he is simply incapable of doing anything else in life. After that, in order to save the situation, Oleksandr Syrskyi appointed Mykhailo Drapatyi. And by this point, in fact, Drapatyi had been in command of the Luhansk OTG for three months. And, in principle, all the feedback on his management was also quite adequate. The unit commanders knew that, first of all, he demanded that they not lie, and it was impossible under Ledovyi. He punished truthful reports, dismissed brigade commanders from their posts, and encouraged Syrskyi to dismiss adequate battalion commanders if they reported true information about the critical situation. And, of course, after that, Drapatyi first of all, again, as in Kharkiv region, had to create trust in the command staff. That is to say, he had to ensure that the front line was actually defined, real, and not drawn in words, according to reports.

He achieved this, he made sure that brigade commanders no longer lied, but trusted their command. And this was done. And the situation in the Luhansk OTG is very difficult. There are no such reserves there that were sent, for example, to the Donetsk OTG. But, nevertheless, the situation became manageable, and this allowed us to solve a lot of problems, to reduce the losses of our troops and increase the losses of the enemy. And in such conditions, the decision to appoint Mykhailo Drapatyi as the commander of the Ground Forces was made.

I believe that the appointment itself should be welcomed. It is very good that Mykhailo Drapatyi has been appointed to the same position that Oleksandr Syrskyi himself held recently when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. This is an honor and trust from Oleksandr Syrskyi and from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy. I think this is a proper assessment. But will there be any changes? We should not be euphoric. Because Drapatyi was already in a high position, not all positions allow a person to implement changes. Now we will see whether Oleksandr Syrskyi and Volodymyr Zelenskyy will allow Mykhailo Drapatyi to make any changes. And we will see this very quickly because the first thing that shows whether a commander is independent is whether he can make personnel changes. There are many such indicators. If we see Drapatyi's management style, people like Colonel Ledovyi, he would never appoint such people to any position. For some reason, Oleksandr Syrsky likes to appoint people who have been working with him in the same office for many years, submitting reports and certificates. It seems strange to me. Fortunately, Drapatyi does not do this. But, for example, within the Army Command, there is a figure like General Oleksandr Nesterenko—a highly illustrative example. He is a very notable individual. The question is whether Drapatyi will be allowed to appoint someone else to this position. For me personally, this will be a key indicator. I would like to point out that Oleksandr Nesterenko, like Colonel Ledovyi, represents a striking example of a Ukrainian military career, where our senior political and military leadership appoints individuals who lack experience in commanding actual combat units during active hostilities. It's simply paradoxical. This likely happens only in Ukraine, or perhaps in other countries with feudal-like systems.

Oleksandr Nesterenko commanded the 30th Mechanized Brigade in 2014. But at the very beginning of the fighting on the border, in July and August 2014, in mid-August, the 30th Brigade, after several attacks by Russian troops, artillery shelling, two battalions of this brigade, one newly formed battalion and another third battalion and some other units lost control after another shelling, people simply started to withdraw to our territory on their own, a significant amount of military equipment was left behind, and some of the personnel returned to the brigade's permanent base by bus. Colonel Nesterenko himself lost control and was unable to make adequate management decisions in this difficult situation. Nesterenko showed himself as a person who is personally brave, he was in the area of events, he just could not establish control in combat conditions, in real combat conditions. Where there is a loud voice, where you are, when you are shouting with profanity, go ahead, hold on, if there is no understanding of people behind these orders, if there is no understanding of the situation, if there is no logic behind these orders, no resources, if there is no trust in such orders, then no miracle will happen. This approach might work during peacetime exercises, but in a military setting, during combat operations under fire, this style of feldfebel-like command simply doesn’t work. And so Oleksandr Nesterenko tried to do something, but in fact he became a brigade commander without a brigade, trying to gather scattered units and failing to do so. And because the brigade had just arrived in the area and such events immediately took place there, Nesterenko was then dismissed from the position of brigadier. He commanded the brigade in the war in 2014 for about a month. And from that moment on, there were other commanders in the brigade. He has not commanded any other unit since then, he has no experience in managing units during active combat operations. After that, he held rear headquarters administrative positions in the Operational Command, in the Forces Command and in other structures. Nevertheless, he is making a great career, no matter how strange it may seem. As for his leadership of troops, I believe many military personnel would recall the events of April-May 2022 when Oleksandr Syrskyi entrusted Nesterenko with command of a grouping that launched a head-on attack on Russian positions near the village of Kozacha Lopan in the Kharkiv region. Again, this was a demonstration of a complete lack of understanding of modern tactics, which led exclusively to losses for our troops, who were launching head-on attacks on heights where the enemy's anti-tank weapons were positioned. The attacks were unsuccessful for us and resulted in significant losses. Nevertheless, this did not hinder Oleksandr Nesterenko's career. He is now the Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces. His understanding of war, his methods of management, which he demonstrated, have absolutely nothing in common with the way Mykhailo Drapatyi makes decisions, collects information, and analyzes the situation. Therefore, if we are talking about whether Drapatyi will be able to make changes in the ground forces, won't it just be an honorable exile to remove Drapatyi from the front and plunge him into the paper world of the ground forces command. We will see. Will he be allowed to change personnel? There will be a result. Will they not? Let's hope then that he will be sent back to the front in the near future, because Mykhailo Drapatyi is a man of action and he shows his competence best at war, and not to waste his time and talent on shuffling papers. I think it would be unwise. 

The next appointment is that of Oleh Apostol, Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Training.

This position was previously held by Mykhailo Drapatyi. The position became vacant, and the commander of our combat-ready 95th Air Assault Brigade was appointed. It is good that someone with authority among the troops is appointed to a high position. Will he be able to implement any changes? Will Apostol be able to make changes in combat training? Drapatyi simply did not have enough time. Will Apostol be able to do this? It remains unclear. According to our tradition, such appointments in our government are never accompanied by setting tasks or analyzing problems. That is, no one ever says, "We want to change this, this, and this." Unfortunately, no one in our government does this. Appointments are made, and then the authorities assess the media effect. The media effect is positive. Everyone congratulates, everyone is happy. There have been many such appointments, and we can only hope that these appointments will lead to real changes, with the powers granted to both Apostol and Drapatyi.

And now, as they say, last but not least, this is an important appointment for the first time in a long time - personnel changes in the Presidential Office. And for the first time, Volodymyr Zelenskyy appointed a professional military officer, who is also respected in the army and has experience of modern warfare, as Deputy Head of the Presidential Office - Pavlo Palisa.

Pavlo Palisa is the commander of the 93rd Mechanized Brigade. Pavlo Palisa said goodbye to his personnel at a small ceremony and left for Kyiv to take up his new position. And this appointment is very important. Perhaps this is one of the most important appointments that has taken place in Zelenskyy's team in recent years. I don't know who advised it and I don't know how it happened, but the decision really commands respect. Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy has made an encouraging appointment that will now force everyone, including the army, to look at its consequences and expect positive changes as well.

We know that for a long time, for many years, since 2020, I think, Mashovets was in charge of the military direction in the Presidential Office. Mashovets was not a military officer of that level, and, of course, there was no question that there was any authority in the army in military matters in the Presidential Office. Mashovets was a friend of the Chief of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, Budanov. They actually took up their positions at the same time, it was a complex decision. And it was Volodymyr Zelenskyy's decision, and for a long time Mashovets was a voice, a channel of communication with the defense forces between the president, Yermak, and the defense forces. In fact, it turned out that this position, in the context of active hostilities, requires, first of all, a different type of person who is trusted in the army, who understands what modern warfare and a modern army are. And, secondly, we understand that contradictions in Volodymyr Zelenskyy's environment have recently escalated, and the head of the Presidential Office, Andrii Yermak, is destroying or depriving of influence one by one all those who have independent access to Volodymyr Zelenskyy through his office and somehow form his information field.

Only this year, Yermak managed to remove Oleksandr Kubrakov, Deputy Prime Minister, from Zelenskyy's entourage, and now Yermak has actually limited the powers and taken away the influence on the drone development program from Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. And there has been a conflict with Budanov on several occasions, ermak has repeatedly attempted to remove Budanov. By the way, I do not believe that these games are the result of a struggle for some competencies or decisions, but simply a political struggle and a struggle for control of financial flows, including shadow flows. And if Yermak has a trusted person in these corruption and criminal matters - Oleh Tatarov, his deputy - then, of course, Budanov was an undesirable competitor for him in these matters. Therefore, Yermak is trying to systematically deprive Budanov of his influence. And first of all, Yermak was interested in removing Mashovets, as an ally of Budanov, from Zelenskyy's entourage. But this is very important. Very often, the government appoints other politicians, just obedient people who do not think anything and have no influence or authority, instead of any one figure, to important positions, like what is happening now with drones, for example, or how Yermak appoints defense ministers. But in this case, it must be said that the appointment of Pavlo Palisa is a decision of an absolutely huge scale. Pavlo Palisa is really a person who has authority in the active army. I mean, not in the army in the office, not among some administrative staff, but among those people who actually make the war and make the result in this war. Palisa has studied, he speaks English, which is very important and, unfortunately, not so common among our combat commanders. In our country, English is often spoken by people who either have not yet been promoted to a higher level, or, let's say, do not have the necessary management skills, but are simply someone's acquaintances. So Palisa, at the beginning of his 22nd year, studied at the US Army Command and Staff College and immediately left a very comfortable, safe America and returned to defend his homeland. This is a very significant act. He was appointed commander of the newly formed 5th Assault Regiment, a unit that had to be created from scratch. After that, at the end of the 22nd year, one of the best combat units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the 93rd Brigade, Oleksandr Syrskyi decided to replace its very authoritative, competent commander Ruslan Shevchuk. And after Shevchuk, he was put in charge of the 93rd Brigade in a way that would not destroy this unit, and there were not many such candidates in our army. Not everyone immediately understood the decision to appoint Palisa, but it should be noted that Pavlo Palisa has proven that he is a worthy successor, a worthy combat leader who did not destroy the brigade, who did not destroy it with some hasty decisions, who preserved its traditions, preserved its combat capability, and who has the real respect and trust of his subordinates. Therefore, of course, Palisa is a person, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in his address, who is a real combat commander and can give a truly reliable vision of the frontline commanders. And the brigade commander, I want to remind you, is the highest operational unit in the army, we have no divisions or corps, so the main responsible person behind the front line is the brigade commander, this is the highest level. Then there are the watchmen, people without troops, commanders of the TG (tactical group), OTG (operational and tactical group), OSGT (operational-strategic group of troops), who manage the forces that were temporarily assigned to them. So the brigade commander is responsible for the people, for its lane, for the result, for the destruction of the enemy, and for the restoration of permanent combat capability. In other words, a brigade commander in our conditions must be a leader who has a comprehensive view of the war, who knows how to predict his actions and how to plan his actions. Palisa has great authority, and those units that fought alongside him near Bakhmut, where the 93rd has been operating for a long time, give very positive feedback. We can truly welcome the fact that Volodymyr Zelenskyy will now have someone in his inner circle who has an in-depth understanding of the front line situation and the challenges within the armed forces. This person can provide a sound assessment of any orders, fully comprehends what is happening in the army, possesses the necessary competence, is fluent in English, and can communicate effectively not only in Ukraine but also with our partners and allies. Their word holds authority and respect within the military. For the first time, perhaps, the Presidential Office will include someone who is both respected and trusted by Ukraine’s defenders. This is a significant step forward for all of us, regardless of our political stance toward Zelenskyy. As the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, it is crucial for him to have authoritative individuals by his side, people respected by the military, who can provide valuable feedback to both the army and the Commander-in-Chief's office, and whose voice carries real weight.

I would like to add one more important thing, without which, in fact, a modern effective brigade commander and a modern combat leader is impossible - character. And to be able to teach all your knowledge and competencies, you also need a certain amount of courage and character. Sometimes you need to defend your position even in front of your superiors, even when your superiors have a completely different opinion. Unfortunately, not all of our commanders have this kind of character. A large number of people who go up the ranks in the army are people who, unfortunately, try to be conformists, who always say "Yes, sir, sir, yes sir!" And they don't think about the consequences of their decisions at all, they don't defend their position. And the consequence of this conformism and flexibility is the lives of the soldiers who perform the mission. So it is important to note from the words of everyone who communicates with Palisa that he is a person with critical thinking, who is able to see his own mistakes, who is able to defend his position, even when those above him are not always satisfied with him. I want to say that there is criticism from some circles in the Servants of the People that Palisa is Syrskyi's man, as they always say, that he is a relative of Syrskyi, and this is a stain on many of our commanders. I want to say that Palisa is not a relative of Syrskyi, his appointment is not lobbying by Syrskyi himself, it is actually the selection of a person according to his qualities, according to a certain set of characteristics. He was selected, it was not a spontaneous decision. And it is very important that Palisa can defend his position. In other words, he is not a person who immediately and silently agrees with everything. For me, a story that is not talked about, that everyone in the 93rd Brigade knows about, is very illustrative, and it happened recently. One sergeant, a very well-known person in the brigade, a reputable person, a combatant who performed many combat missions, got into a very difficult situation, where a criminal case was opened against him under certain circumstances. And the situation was very unpleasant, and for many commanders it was very easy to say that I have nothing to do with him, it's some sergeant, it's his problem, he's wrong, there is evidence, I'm standing back, don't involve me in these cases. I want to say that in this case, everything happened completely differently, and when two battalion commanders of the brigade came to Brigadier Palisa with a request to stand up for a fighter who had proven his capability, courage, competence, and usefulness to the brigade, Pavlo Palisa vouched for him in court, he advocated that this man be taken on bail so that he could continue to fight at the front at zero line, where he had been from the first day of the war. For me, in ordinary life, maybe it's such a small thing, but in fact, in a military team, it's a very important thing, when every soldier, every sergeant knows that your case will be considered and that if you are right, if you have not betrayed your comrades-in-arms, you will always get support, you will never be abandoned, no matter how difficult or unpleasant situations you get into, even if you are not right in everything, but if you are a team, part of a team, if you continue to be in the ranks, you are supported. And in this case, which really allows such an attitude, I want to say, this is not a crime related to any physical harm to a person, theft, anything, but this is a story where there were really all the grounds to protect the sergeant. In this situation, the brigade commander made a decision and took responsibility. He didn’t say, "Let some political officer go to court," or, "Let the battalion commander, if he wants, or the company commander, take responsibility for him." Instead, the brigade commander demonstrated that he bears responsibility for every person in the 93rd Brigade. For me personally, this is a very important story, a very correct story and a very motivating story that shows that not everything in war can be measured solely by career, position, and holding a seat but very often a combat leader has to do things that may be unpopular and dangerous for his career, for his position, but which are important for the people he leads into battle every day. I am pleased to point out that Colonel Palisa exemplifies this kind of leadership. So, to summarize, I want to say that I welcome this decision of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, I consider it balanced, reasonable, and I have great hope that now, after the appointment of such a deputy, such an adviser, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief himself, will also listen to the advice of Pavlo Palisa, give him responsible tasks, assignments, and trust him with his work, and the country's leadership will also listen to Pavlo Palisa's advice, give him responsible tasks and instructions, and trust him in his work as they do in the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, one of the best military units and the most capable of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. So I can only wish him good luck and patience.

This is not an independent position. Palisa is supposed to assist in this position, to ensure the work of the president from the army's point of view. And he is not independent in this position. He has to receive and fulfill the tasks that are assigned to him. And he has to provide an honest, objective situation, a vision of what is happening at the front. We don't know what conclusions the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the President himself will draw from this. But it is important that for the first time the head of state has engaged a person who has authority in the army. And who really understands what modern warfare is.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

Was it too late to appoint Drapatyi? Should we expect improvements without the necessary weapons and people?

What powers will Drapatyi actually have? Because Oleksandr Syrskyi is known as a person who likes to manage everything manually. That's why he needs people like Nesterenko and Ledovyi. Because these are people without imagination, they are in office, they can be told anything, they will not be surprised by anything and will always say: yes, sir, yes sir! Syrskyi also likes to appoint such brigade commanders. I hope that now Oleksandr Syrsky will actually have more opportunities to convey objective information to the president. Pavlo Palisa will be by his side. I emphasize once again that I do not consider him to be Syrskyi's man. I consider him to be a person who has a working, adequate relationship with Syrskyi, a service relationship. I hope that this will allow Syrskyi to be less afraid of constant mutinies and to read less Facebook, where he spends too much of his working time. And still, organize a system of command and control of the troops adequate to modern warfare.

Drapatyi will only do what Syrskyi allows him to. If Syrskyi continues to act as the manual-mode commander of the Kursk OTG and persists in creating chaos in the Donetsk OTG zone, for which he is responsible—lacking a defensive line, lacking coordination, engaging in chaotic maneuvers, and throwing numerous units into battle without any planning or logic, and without proper interaction—then unfortunately, no capable commander will be able to manage this level of mismanagement. If trust is established, and instead of micromanaging battalions, companies, and platoons, our Higher Military Command finally begins to oversee structural units like OTG and OSGT, delegating tasks and trusting their commanders, then changes will come. I don’t know. Of course, when you talk to the military, to our soldiers on the front line, no one immediately says there’s a lack of personnel or weapons. Those issues are mentioned, but the first concerns raised are always about the adequacy of management—that’s what the military needs most. Secondly, it’s about organizing and planning their operations. Only then do they mention the lack of people or weapons. But organizational and managerial decisions always come first. We’ll see what comes of this. By the way, in the next broadcast, we’ll definitely discuss the General Staff’s statements and Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi’s claims that we don’t need divisions but instead need corps.

What do you think about the statements about the mobilization of 18-year-olds?

I do not think that 18-year-olds should be mobilized. I think that the mobilization age should be lowered, but not to 18, but at least to 21. And those young people who are mobilized when the mobilization age is lowered should not be sent to the front immediately after a month or two of sitting in training centers, just sweeping the training centers, as is currently done. We need to mobilize young fighters in order to train them for a long time, to form operational reserves, to give people high-quality comprehensive training for a long time so that they can survive in modern combat. And then, when these people have undergone a long course of training, when they are coherent, they can help and perform combat missions as trained units. But this should be a long training course that will be held both in Ukraine and abroad, and will not be used in the same way as it is now. In other words, this mobilization resource we have in Ukraine should be used with the utmost care, avoiding such a mediocre attitude as we have now. Therefore, I do not consider 18 years to be adequate. I believe that the main problem with our mobilization is that people who are being mobilized even now do not receive any quality training at all. This is the problem that needs to be solved first. There should be dedicated training units within combat units, as these units already have experienced personnel among their sergeants and officers capable of conducting high-quality training. Combat units should be allowed to establish their own training facilities, a practice seen during both the First and Second World Wars.  In these training units, soldiers should undergo extensive, multi-month courses. For younger recruits, training might need to last up to a year. They must be comprehensively trained before being considered full-fledged fighters. Currently, however, soldiers often spend only one or two months at training grounds managed by units uninterested in properly preparing infantrymen. These units fail to provide recruits with adequate attention or resources. This creates significant stress from the very beginning. I'm not even talking about losses in combat, but losses because people get scared, they go AWOL from their units, run away, and all that. This attitude towards people, all people, not just young people, is shocking and what we still have in the army and in the state. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is not able to pay attention at all and adequately plan the use of the priceless resource of our people. It's just terrible, it's a crime in fact. I think it is a crime to use mobilized people as we are doing now. In our country, they receive proper training only where it is done additionally at their own expense, at the expense of individual brigades, which additionally train people, allocate additional time, ammunition, and supplies.

Your assessment of Sukharevskyi's work.

I still consider the appointment of Vadym Sukharevskyi to be a good one, because Vadym Sukharevskyi is a good combat commander. I think that the situation simply shows that in our drone sector, the first thing that needs a person who can be trusted and who can independently pursue his policy on the development of this type of troops. Unfortunately, Vadym Sukharevskyi failed to earn such trust from either Volodymyr Zelenskyy or Oleksandr Syrskyi. Therefore, from the first day of his work, Syrskyi tried his best to discredit him and block his activities. And secondly, to be honest, I saw that when Vadym Sukharevskyi was being promoted, I still thought that his promotion would follow the general military line. First of all, I thought that he would be a commander of the OTG, a commander at a higher level over time because Sukharevskyi was a very competent commander of a motorized infantry brigade. I welcomed his appointment as a quality person, but, of course, to create a branch of the army from scratch that requires, in fact, rather a technical specialist who would understand all the details of drone development, who could plan it, who would have experience in managing drone units, yet Sukharevskyi was a general combat commander, and drones were one of the components of combat operations. So I can't say that this decision, as it was implemented in our country when Sukharevskyi was appointed, immediately became an enemy for Syrskyi, whom we tried to get rid of with all our might, because the main reason is clear. No one wants to delegate the right to distribute financial flows to determine the needs of the Armed Forces for drones. When the state announced, "We are allocating billions of hryvnias to the army, submit your needs," and appointed Vadym Sukharevskyi as the Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, he inevitably found himself caught in the crossfire. Sukharevskyi was suggested to Syrskyi by Mykhailo Fedorov, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Digitalization. Mykhailo Fedorov, I understand his logic in this case, he wanted to appoint a hero of Ukraine, a popular military man who has authority in the army, to that position, realizing that Volodymyr Zelenskyy does not think rationally, without planning any actions, but he thinks in the information plane. He needs a person who he likes and who will strengthen him with information. Therefore, when Sukharevskyi was appointed, there was no question of anyone giving Sukharevskyi the rights, the authority to do something on his own, to be responsible for something.  The idea was for Sukharevskyi to be photographed at the right time with the right people, so there would be fewer complaints about Zaluzhnyi’s removal. It was a simple, primitive logic behind the appointment—"Let’s just do it." As a result, we see that this approach is, unsurprisingly, a weak one for the systemic development of unmanned systems forces. It would have been necessary to either grant him full authority and clearly define his tasks while strictly overseeing what Sukharevskyi could and could not do, what he understood and didn’t understand, or appoint him to another position within the general military structure—such as the commander of an OTG or a branch of the military. For the unmanned systems forces, a true specialist should have been appointed, perhaps the commander of an effective drone battalion who, being familiar with the specifics, could expand on their successful experience. This did not happen. Instead, when Fedorov introduced Sukharevskyi to Zelenskyy, Zelenskyy approved, leaving the question: why did Syrskyi had such immediate hostility? Because in the President's Office, Andrii Yermak was fiercely trying to destroy Fedorov's influence and started whispering in Syrsky's ear that now... Sukharevskyi will be appointed, and then Sukharevskyi can go over your head, the president likes him, he can appoint Sukharevskyi to the position instead of Syrskyi, well, these are just ordinary under-the-carpet intriguess. And of course, when the military is told such things, we have generals, they love to read social media, they love intrigue, they love to listen to who said what about them. Commanders don't always have enough time to conduct combat operations, but they have a lot of time for such nonsense at this level. So, of course, this caused a very sharp mental reaction. And they began to treat Sukharevskyi, who had never really thought about it, as a competitor, and to destroy him, of course, with all the military methods that are well mastered there. Papers, orders, decrees, decisions, orders. And the administrative apparatus in our army is the main weapon of destruction in the General Staff. They fight with papers and think about papers. So, of course, instead of appointing a person who can develop the military, Zelenskyy has actually appointed a person whom the commander-in-chief, whom he also appointed, sees as a competitor, fights him as a competitor. And, of course, there are no powers here, and experience must be gained. But how? This situation, unfortunately, demonstrates the great chaos in our public administration, the mess in the minds of leaders who, instead of developing a systemic new kind of troops, are simply creating information and political games. And as a result, the development of unmanned systems forces is very limited by our own political reasons. We still don't have, and no one asks, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has created a new type of military, appointed Sukharevskyi. Well, have you achieved the goals you set, Volodymyr Oleksandrovych, what has changed? Have we developed a tactic of using drones? No. Do we have a system for supplying drones to the troops? Do the troops provide the system over the drones? No, they do not. We used to buy Mavic, and the situation has become even worse over the past year because they took money away from local governments. Previously, local governments bought Mavics, Autels for reconnaissance brigades, and FPVs. Now volunteers have to buy them. They just took the money and shot it somewhere into some hole in the budget, it's not clear where. That is, we have no lobbyist for unmanned systems and no development of unmanned systems forces. Because instead of planning, analytics, and development, we have a stupid information political struggle provoked by the Presidential Office itself, which is not able to understand what they do and what decisions they make. So, you know, when we talk about such appointments and the results, we have to understand that a good commander in an administrative position will not make a miracle. An administrative position is not a Napoleonic war. If Napoleon were to be put in charge of some department of the General Staff, I want to tell you that he would never have become either emperor or consul.  The generals would have crushed him under a mountain of paperwork and internal investigations before he even reached the rank of major. That’s what would have happened. Therefore, I believe that no decision in the state can rely solely on an individual—it must be systemic. You cannot appoint someone to a position and assume they are a messiah who will fix everything. Unfortunately, this is a form of infantile thinking, typical of how mass consciousness is manipulated, primarily by populist politicians. There are no messiahs—it’s impossible. War is a complex, systemic process. To achieve victory, the system of government decision-making must be improved. A good person alone cannot work miracles. Real changes in the state are achieved through systemic decisions. Systemic decisions require competent individuals—those who are appointed to positions with clear authority, trust, and sufficient resources. When these elements are in place, results follow. Only then can you hold someone accountable. And when something is missing, chaos, competition, and irresponsibility take over. Then, all these officials sit around pointing fingers, saying, "It’s not me, it’s him who’s to blame. It’s not me, it’s him who failed." This kind of nonsense is what the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief spends most of their working time on.  They never discuss the results they are supposed to achieve. Instead, they just ramble on about processes. The outcomes of these discussions, as we see, end up in the President’s evening addresses, filled with information that has no connection to what is actually happening on the front lines. The issue of the effectiveness of unmanned systems likely deserves a separate broadcast.  And we will do it in the near future. In more detail, with more examples. 

How did the story with mortar shells end?

Well, this also requires a separate program. I won't go into all the details now. There is a very large number of events. I am glad that thanks to the resonance that was created, including thanks to my broadcasts, more than 20 of our brigades filed complaints with the state, with the mine manufacturer, demanding to take back the defective mines that cannot be used at all and provide them with normal mines that can actually cover the troops and kill the Russian occupiers. The damage from this story has not yet been calculated. I also plan to talk and write more about this topic in more detail in the near future, and to make a stream on this topic.

I welcome the new appointments made by Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but I wish that, apart from this information hype, these appointments would have produced results. And then, and above all, these results, in order to achieve them, they require authority, trust and the allocation of the necessary resources. So, we hope that we will move forward, that there will be some steps towards the changes that we all need in order to achieve a turning point in the war and stop the Russian offensive that continues along the entire front. The enemy continues to advance and every day captures new areas of Ukrainian land in different places. And our soldiers are suffering very heavy losses. They are beating the enemy, but we have losses. So, in order for our struggle and all our sacrifices to be a path to victory, we need systemic solutions and quality leaders, combat leaders in all positions, who would act on a plan that really leads to victory. We hope for this. Glory to Ukraine!

Yurii Butusov