Command has lost control over situation in Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka
The situation in Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka has slipped out of control of the Ukrainian command. The leadership of OTG (Operational-Tactical Group) "Donetsk" (Tarnavskyi) and OSGT (Operational Strategic Group of Troops) "Khortytsia" (Hnatov) lost control, and the enemy is advancing almost daily.
Just four more kilometers, and the enemy will cut off the critical Dnipro-Pokrovsk highway. We are losing Pokrovsk incompetently, without strategy, and irresponsibly.
Individual brigade commanders, and battalion commanders are fighting, infantry soldiers, and drone operators are fighting heroically: we have a large number of motivated personnel, as well as sufficient ammunition and equipment, and they are eliminating Russians by the dozens and hundreds. However, relying solely on drones and "search operations" or defending isolated positions in forest plantations, we are failing to stop the day-to-day advance of new small enemy infantry groups, supported by firepower and drones.
The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces have demonstrated an inability to influence the course of events. The enemy's advance is officially attributed solely to its significant superiority in manpower and resources. However, our soldiers in Pokrovsk strongly disagree and believe that halting the Russian offensive and organizing defense is entirely feasible. Yet, no attempt has been made to stop the enemy along a specific line of defense. Our troops are almost continuously being sent into encounter battles, fire means are not being fully utilized, drones are deployed in a limited capacity, there is no coordination between drones and electronic warfare systems, engineer activity is absent, and our infantry suffers significant losses without adequate time to prepare or establish defensive positions. A system and organization are needed.
At the tactical level, unit commanders highlight the irresponsibility of higher command in setting unrealistic tasks, the absence of coordination between units, and a lack of planning and organization in defensive operations.
Currently, the only way to prevent the rapid encirclement and capture of Pokrovsk is to change the command of the Donetsk OTG. For instance, General Mykhailo Drapatyi, who has a proven track record in leading OTG and OSGT "Kherson", OTG "Kharkiv", and OTG "Luhansk", has effectively organized defensive operations in the past. Drapatyi excels at fostering trust among unit commanders, ensuring effective interaction between drones and electronic warfare systems, and is open to constructive criticism, he maintains honesty with his subordinates—an uncommon trait—and, most importantly, takes responsibility for his decisions. There is no point in keeping Drapatyi tied up in meetings at the Ground Forces Command—he is needed at the front.
If there are no changes in management, Pokrovsk and Velyka Novosilka will be lost in short order, and the Russians will proceed to advance into the Dnipropetrovsk region. Such developments would present a highly unfavourable impression of our defence capabilities to the new US administration. The appointment of a competent commander would not only inspire the troops but also bolster confidence in the country's leadership and the Armed Forces. Leadership is urgently required at this critical moment.
Moreover, if the current passivity and prolonged chaos remain unaddressed, V. Zelenskyy and O. Syrskyi will bear primary responsibility for the loss of these strategically significant cities in Donbas and for the Russian advance into central Ukraine.
Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET
