Old generation of generals, lacking knowledge of real combat potential of our units, cannot plan military operations adequately - former Brigade Commander of 53rd SMB Anatolii Kozel (Kupol)
Anatolii (Kupol) (Dome) discussed the key mistakes of the military leadership. Why did the spring 2023 offensive fail? What caused the loss of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and other cities? Did the operation in the Kursk region meet expectations?
Anatolii Kozel, a former commander of the 53rd SMB (Separate Mechanized Brigade), gained worldwide recognition after an interview with The Washington Post. He disclosed statistics on casualties in the Ukrainian army during the war. These figures were deemed exaggerated by the Air Assault Forces. The officer was subsequently demoted to the position of deputy battalion commander at a training centre. Later, he faced criticism from the higher command and was relieved of his post.
-My name is Vitalii Deineha, I am the founder of the Ukrainian Witness project, on whose YouTube channel you are watching this video. I am also the founder of the Come Back Alive Foundation.
Our hero today is one of the few people who is competent to talk about the military aspect and can talk about it quite freely. I have known this man since 2014, through such operations as the battles for Sloviansk and Donetsk airport. During the full-scale war, he took part in various positions in the defence of Kyiv, the defence of Bakhmut, the defence of Soledar, the defence of Toretsk and New York, and the defence of Avdiivka.
His name is Anatolii. Most people know him by his call sign Kupol.
Let's start with 2014. Deputy Battalion Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 95th Brigade, defense of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk.
Yes.
Then you held the same position defending the Donetsk airport.
Yes.
Defence of Avdiivka.
Yes.
What happened next? Remind me, please.
Next, in 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, there are also New York, Teretsk, and then the South. The south is where the bridges were not blown up, Chonhar. In 2018, I joined the University of Defence. More precisely, in 2020, from 2018 to 2020, I served as the brigade's Deputy Chief of Staff. Then came 2022...and the defence of Kyiv. I was the commander of the Battalion Tactical Group of the 95th Brigade, which was formed in just two days. We gathered 500 people at the checkpoint, using what uniforms and weapons were available from the 95th Brigade, we were then transported by bus to the Makariv area, both north and south. That marked the beginning of the Kyiv operation.
After that, I served with the 46th Brigade as the commander of the 3rd Battalion. For almost a year, I participated in the southern Kherson operation. At the end of 2022, we were redeployed to Soledar. In January, it was...My battalion, by the way, was the last to withdraw from Soledar. We defended the city while being almost surrounded. Then there were battles near Soledar, followed by battles in and around Bakhmut. After my now-famous interview with The Washington Post, I was punished by being reassigned to a deputy battalion commander role at a training centre, later, the Air Assault Forces commander changed his decision, and I was assigned as a battalion commander at the training centre for 10 months, then I was commander of the 53rd Brigade, where I served for approximately 7 months in 2024.
Both under the previous leadership of the General Staff and the current one, they tried to take repressive action against you for criticizing and saying things that everyone is talking about now.
Yeah.
Let us recall the interview in the Washington Post. The main problems.
Training, planning, adequate leadership, reform of the Armed Forces. In other words, temporary governing bodies cannot permanently manage the troops. That is, there must be a pope general, a division commander, for example, or a corps commander who has his own brigade commanders. And these are his brigades. This is much more effective than just having a bunch of OTGs (Operational-Tactical Groups) who are not responsible for anything.
You gave this interview at the beginning of your 23rd year, almost 2 years ago.
Yes.
And after that, the punitive measures started against you. You gave it up after the unsuccessful defence of Soledar, when your unit was actually the last to withdraw, you were simply told to withdraw because everyone else had already fled.
Well, the flanks were failed, we were surrounded. All that was left to do was to dig up the road, mine it, and that was it, complete encirclement.
Two years have passed. Let’s try to conduct what NATO armies call an After Action Review: assess what was planned, what happened, and draw some conclusions. At the time when you faced the General Staff's wave of repression, everyone was focused on the counteroffensive and the idea of achieving victory by the end of the year. It was the beginning of 2023.
Well, for a professional military officer, it seemed like a cosmic phantasmagoria. What kind of counteroffensive could we launch? The sky was not ours, the enemy held superiority in combat capabilities across all major types of weaponry, and we were advancing with unprepared brigades trained abroad, lacking combat experience.
We launched the counteroffensive, and the outcome was what it was—clearly not what had been envisioned.
Of course, as always, the plan was to reach the shores of the Sea of Azov within 10–11 days, cut through their lines, and move on to Crimea. More or less, I suppose. I don’t know the exact plans.
And what do you know?
Well, that is how it was planned. Approximately.
And in your direction—you were in Bakhmut and Soledar. Were there any plans there?
There were no plans. None. Only plans for defensive actions, so to speak.
But there were attempts to plan. There was some success in the Bakhmut direction. And if this success had been built up then, it might have been a completely different story than it is now. A little bit different. But in general, nothing would have changed there. Because we need to change the system. Systemic changes and systemic reforms are needed.
We will get to that point. What were the main events in the war in 2024?
But there were too many events. A lot of losses. Loss of territory.
In the Bakhmut direction, we withdrew to Chasiv Yar and have already...
But, relatively speaking, Chasiv Yar is no longer ours. Almost.
Kurakhove is not ours. We have reached the edge of Pokrovsk. In the Zaporizhzhia direction, we are preparing to defend Zaporizhzhia.
Realistically speaking, the enemy is constantly advancing along the entire frontline. There are a lot of small villages and towns. And there is a constant loss of territory. This is a systemic problem. And the strategic mistake of our top military is that we are fighting for territory. The right thing to do is to have an adequate manoeuvrable defence with the task of maximum elimination of enemy personnel. How does it work in NATO? We identify the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. We identify our strengths and weaknesses. The enemy's strength is a large number of personnel. So what do we have to do? We need to eliminate as many personnel as possible. This is our strategic task. Not to fight for every square metre of our territory. Of course, this is necessary. If in the long run it will be more effective to eliminate the personnel, and they will not be able to conduct offensive operations, then each brigade commander should be given authority over his own brigade's defence line, and conduct manoeuvre defence in the way he does. And we don't have that.
Please explain to an ordinary viewer what maneuver defense is and how it differs from the defense we are conducting.
We are trying to conduct, let's say, defensive-offensive operations. Almost every brigade commander receives a combat order every day to restore the lost position. These are offensive actions. A brigade commander cannot even conduct a defensive battle. He does not have enough resources. There aren't enough people, ammunition, or equipment. And every day, the OTG headquarters sends him a combat order — to conduct offensive actions, to restore the lost position. So every day, positions are lost. Every day. The main thing is the number of personnel. It's many times more. Then, the military-industrial complex is much stronger, the economy — well, that’s part of the military-industrial complex. Then, there’s an authoritarian form, or not even an authoritarian form, but an autocracy that has already turned into a dictatorship.
Let’s take Ancient Rome. When there was a war in Ancient Rome, there was an emperor. That is, there was autocracy. And when there was peace, the Senate ruled. It was a republic.
Well, look, we're not really a republic right now either.
You know, we have this and that, and the other, and...
You mentioned their advantages. Do we have any advantages at all?
Yes. Motivation. It is still there. There are a lot of motivated people in the army. Patriotic, motivated people. There are many people who have a really, let's say, high level of intelligence, who understand that if we lose this war, let's say, the Ukrainian nation may cease to exist.
Creativity. But it is there and then it is not. The military and political leadership stifles almost everything.
So, what is creativity?
Creativity is the adoption of non-standard solutions in a critical situation.
As in the defence of Kyiv?
Well, you could say it was like the defence of Kyiv.
You took part in the defence of Kyiv as a BTG (Battalion Tactical Group) commander, and it was said that we fought then, we used regular army but adopted the tactics of guerrilla warfare. To what extent is this true? And is it really such creativity?
Yes, this is creativity. Small group tactics. Plus, there’s the use of the same UAVs. This was the first use of Mavics. Small UAVs. But back then, there was no live streaming. I flew it, got the flash drives, set up a laptop, looked at it, and used it. The reaction time was fast. Now it’s all a bit lost and slowed down.
Why?
I don’t know, because the system probably doesn’t work that way. Because, you know, we don’t even have a Soviet system, we have a mutated Soviet-Novo-Ukrainian system, let’s say. And it’s mutated for the worse than the Soviet system.
There are two armies. One is more motivated and creative, and the other is simply bigger. And behind it is a bigger economy, more metal, more cannon fodder. How can this one not lose to this one?
It’s very simple. It has to be adequate leadership, adequate, correct, in-depth planning, and national unity. We must have trust in the top military and political leadership. We don’t have it now. And the top military and political leadership, at the level of each commander and above, must adequately perceive what is really happening on the battlefield.
I agree with these theses, but they sound abstract. What an adequate reaction should have been after the change of the Commander-in-Chief, we clearly have a problem in Avdiivka, a very big problem. And we are still solving it. In 2015-2016, we withdrew, we withdrew the second line of defence in the area of Ocheretene without even being prepared, and then we broke through it. And now we have reached Pokrovsk, and it is unclear where the point where we will stop it will be. What should be the adequate response of the military and political leadership to this?
First and foremost, it is an adequate assessment of the combat capabilities of its troops and the enemy.
We are well aware that there are more of them in this area.
We do not understand what our real combat potential is. The same OTG commander, I won't name names, Donetsk, Luhansk, he really doesn't understand the combat potential of the units we are subordinated to.
That is, he has a number on the map, the 46th Brigade, for example.
Yes, he is fighting with combat-effective personnel. Well, to avoid revealing any secrets about the actual numbers, they'll accuse you of disclosing classified information. Let’s just say 10,000, a brigade of 10,000 troops, with a conditional manning level of 40%. That’s 4,000. So, he thinks, "I have 4,000 men, I have 20 kilometers of the front line, I'll position them there immediately, and everything will be fine." But who makes up that 40%? These are support units, combat support units, artillery units. And the rest are other units. These are people who have already served two years, were wounded, and stayed on in the support units. But, in principle, as one general acquaintance of mine says, "Doesn’t matter, they all went through BGMT (Basic General Military Training). Helmet, body armor, rifle—and into the trench." That’s the attitude there.
But what if there are no others?
What’s the real issue? Since 2022, our generals have incompetently wasted the best, elite combat potential of motivated, patriotic Ukrainians who joined the military. How incompetently? Through senseless frontal assaults. Well, it happened, I participated in these wasteful frontal attacks. In the Kherson region, for example. It was just "forward, forward, forward." That’s it. But this combat potential isn’t infinite. And while we counted on having 5 million motivated, patriotic reservists, we actually had only 1 to 1.5 million. That resource was depleted by the end of 2022 or early 2023. Now we have forcibly recruited personnel who surrender or go AWOL.
The problem with AWOLs is estimated to be around 100, 150, or even 200 thousand. These are rough figures, don’t hold me to the numbers and later say "a guy said so." These are ballpark estimates. They’ve been reported in the media. What I see in the media is 100-200 thousand. At a minimum, 100, and at most, 200 thousand. That’s around 20-30 brigades.
If I put you in Syrskyi’s place a year ago, when Zaluzhnyi was replaced by Syrskyi, and you were dealing with Avdiivka, which was collapsing. And, in fact, it was a miracle that we didn’t get surrounded. Quite a few of our soldiers were captured, though more could have been. What would your actions have been? The reserves are limited to what we have.
First of all, I would have prohibited attaching units to other units. Meaning, taking battalions from one brigade and giving them to another brigade. This leads to senseless personnel losses. If you have a brigade, let the brigade fight. If it needs to be replaced, then replace it with another brigade. Don’t hand out these ad hoc combinations; it’s just a terrible mix. There was a brigade fighting there, and it had a bunch of attached units that were not managed properly at all. Absolutely not. And look, if Avdiivka is conditionally lost, we won’t be able to hold it, well, it’s already clear that we won’t be able to hold it, so let’s prepare the second line, the third line, but adequately. Open the YouTube chronicle of the Berlin operation, see how Berlin was prepared for defense. I understand that we are far from that level right now, but at least something similar can be done. How was Moscow prepared for defense in 1941? Well, how would Avdiivka be handled in 1941? They would have evacuated the entire population of Avdiivka, right? About two or three months before the enemy’s approach, they would have dug a solid anti-tank ditch, about a kilometer long.
How can an anti-tank ditch be dug in such conditions?
I say when it is still possible to do so.
It was not possible. Well, there was already a range of Russian artillery. We would not have deployed the equipment
Then we have to forget Avdiivka. It is lost. So, the next settlement? Which is 20-30 kilometres away, right? When there is still a chance to prepare it.
If it's 15-20, it's Pokrovsk.
Well, okay, Pokrovsk. Let's take Pokrovsk. The east. It's an industrial region, right? There's a lot of different, diverse equipment there. Agricultural, construction, civilian. Well, we need to make a political decision. All this equipment should be used to build adequate fortifications. And now those towns that are 40-50 kilometres away need to be prepared for defence very seriously. No one is doing this either. Do we have to dig in the Dnipropetrovsk region already? Of course, we should. It's about time we did. One soldier is a warrior in the field. One motivated, well-trained soldier in the field right now. He holds the position by himself. There are no people. And if this is a normal, adequate... First of all, it's the brain. He can hold the position alone. It shouldn't be like that. But it really happens.
Is this what kind of war is going on now? A war of small tactical groups. That is, the enemy, yes, uses equipment, but massively, if we take 70 per cent of the entire front, small tactical groups are used. The enemy does not have enough personnel to use them like they did in 1941. Bayonets fixed, hurrah - he ran to the attack, as it was in 1941. Remember the excavations—there’s a Kurgan, a German machine gun unit, MG 42 or 39, and a Soviet battalion that stormed this hill. Russia doesn’t fight that way anymore, but it’s somewhat similar, they fight in small tactical groups, and there are also retreat-blocking detachments, with their personnel going one way. The motivation is simple: either you’ll be shot, or you go there, capture some prisoners, and get yourself a helmet, body armor, night vision device in battle. That’s how it works—it is like that.
You think that we should have trenched Pokrovsk, relatively speaking, a year ago.
Yes. Avdiivka, conditionally, should have been dug in in 2022.
What do we need to dig in now? Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia regions, Kherson. Kherson needs to be fully prepared for a defensive operation. The Dnipro River is flowing. Kherson is on the right bank. It's on a high ground. If the enemy establishes a bridgehead in Kherson, it will be on the right bank of the Dnipro. This is strategically important. There are some brigades there, conditionally. But this is not serious. And we need to stop deceiving ourselves. We have total deception at all levels. From the very bottom to the very top. That is, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is already receiving information that is distorted by up to a hundred per cent. It's not that he's so great - he's not. It's just the way it is. It is real.
Imagine he is watching this interview. What would you say to him?
We need to become a Churchill-type national leader, roll up our sleeves and work. Less populism, more action. And you can go down in history as a populist, or you can go down in history as a national leader. Half a thousand years of the Ukrainian nation's thousand-year struggle against Russian occupation. Moscow's occupation.
But if we go back to what you said, you say that he is being fed distorted information. Imagine that he is watching you. What is the situation at the front?
Critical, very critical.
What does this mean?
In the absence of people. In 2022, the decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief was based on what? It was based on the fact that the Odesa military commissar, the head of the TCR (Territorial Centres of Recruitment and Social Support), was taking some money there. He pulled out a shashka (a kind of North Caucasian sabre - ed.note), waved it, and all the regional TCR chiefs were dismissed. What is the head of a regional TCR? This is a person who knows the whole region. A region is about how many millions on average? Three, four, five. Well, roughly. You need to know all the enterprises, know all the heads of administrations, know where there is a potential mobilization resource. That is, where there are people who can be called up and who will go to defend the homeland. They were all removed from office. To know all this, you need at least one year, or even two. You need to have been in office for at least a year or two. And know the whole background of the region. In order to carry out normal mobilisation. Adequately. This person is removed and replaced by a conditionally combatant. A colonel, a lieutenant colonel of some artillery brigade, a combat brigade. And this chief of staff or deputy chief of staff or brigade commander comes in. And for the most part, what does he know about mobilisation? He knows nothing. Well, he has heard that there is such a thing as mobilisation. He fought in the war. Or he did not fight. Or he was somewhere in the rear. Well, I know cases. A new head of the regional TCR comes. He says, do you have a room for storing weapons? No, we don't. Well, let's build one. That is, the person does not understand that his goal is mobilisation. And he asks how many tags we have there from the floor to the wall? A metre.
You're saying that the replacement of military commissars, such a large number of them, led to the disruption of mobilisation. That’s one of the reasons. Now, the president is watching you. What else do you have to say to him?
There’s a lot to say to the President. We are in a critical, very dire situation. Well, yes, I apologize for the blunt language. What does this mean? It means there could be a collapse, a failure of the frontline, and possible strategic miscalculations.
Nowadays, many people are throwing around the phrase "the front has collapsed." But has it really collapsed? And what does it actually mean for it to collapse?
Here's the deal. Tactically, the front has collapsed. Operationally, it hasn’t collapsed. Strategically, it hasn’t collapsed at all.
Well, take an average statistical brigade. It holds 15 km, and 30% of it is a gap in the defence. That is, conditionally, 30% of our frontline has gaps in the defence. That is, the enemy can easily infiltrate there in groups. There are no people to put in positions and then change them. That is, people are leaving, mostly in one direction. Either they come back and are evacuated as wounded, or they go missing, or they die there, or they hold the line for a while. Because, for the most part, there are not enough people to carry out a full rotation and replacements at the front.
Now, if you go back to Facebook, YouTube, and so on, everyone is saying drones, drones, drones, that you can only fight with drones. To what extent is this true? To what extent do drones replace, for example, artillery?
Look, everything works only as a system. Drones, artillery, and soldiers in trenches. It only works when integrated together. The drone itself also has a lot of shortcomings. What are they? Let’s say you have several crews. Day and night shifts, the so-called "carousel." You think you see everything. You’re monitoring clearly, seeing the enemy. There are crew payload drops, crews handling the payload drops. There are FPV crews. There are night crews—vampires, the bat teams, dropping more... TMs (anti-tank mines) dropped right onto the enemy’s head. But despite all that, the enemy is still infiltrating. No drone, no night Mavic, no 24/7 night vision camera replaces the soldier in the trench. There are always shadow zones, always. And the enemy will always find a way to infiltrate. That’s why it all has to work as a system—artillery, infantry, a UAV battalion, plus UAV units in each battalion. Only then will it work properly, only then will it function as it should. Right now, the most scarce resource is not drones—not even close. It’s the simple soldier: one with courage, who’s well-trained, well-motivated, and holding his position. He has an adequate company commander, an adequate battalion commander, and an adequate brigade commander. But most importantly, there needs to be an adequate commander of the OTG. This is the core problem. Now, only the TCR can provide you with this soldier by catching him on the street and shoving him into a bus. Can you turn that person into a soldier? Yes, you can. I’ll tell you from my own experience. When I was subject to repression for that interview, I was a battalion commander of a training center. So they were sending us men that were recruited by force. There were still some volunteer fighterts, but only a few remained. What was the mission? The mission was to prepare a capable, well-trained soldier. So what does a soldier need to know first and foremost for war?
The first priority is combat psychology. He must not fear death—that’s the most important thing, number one. It's crucial, but… It’s a long path, but you can get him reasonably prepared in about a month. Next, he needs skills and reflexes—tactical medicine and firearms training. And engineering training. So digging. What are we digging? Trenches and foxholes. You give the recruit an AK-74. He spends a month with it. And after that month, you can already see: Has he fired it? How many times? How does he handle it? Where does he place it? How does he clean it? How does he store it? How well does it fit him? If you’ve taught him how to properly shoulder a weapon, handle it, and fire it correctly, then, basically, one soldier on the battlefield, with whatever ammunition he has—one box, two boxes, three, or maybe standard ammo with 450 rounds—can stand his ground. With a radio, he can alert you to an enemy group approaching. He pops out of his camouflaged hole, fires at them quietly. The group halts or retreats, or they’re finished off by FPVs or payload drops. Right now, we’re short of that kind of soldier. Looking at YouTube and social media, it seems like we could just dig in, set up positions for the payload drop operators and FPV crews, and bit by bit withdraw, exchange territory for enemy soldiers—for Russian soldiers. If people are a scarce resource, we can withdraw, conduct mobile defense, mainly with drones, and in doing so, exchange our territory for their lives. Vitalii, nothing works in isolation. Drones alone won’t work. Without soldiers in the trenches, drones won’t function properly. Everything has to work as a system. There has to be coordination, reconnaissance, and firepower. Soldiers in the trenches. And there needs to be a competent commander who understands all of this and manages it effectively. But here we are with TikTok, Facebook, social media—all shouting that the company commander should run at the front of the company, lead them in the attack, or charge in an armored vehicle, rifle in hand, bayonet affixed, leading his company into battle. Right?
When you were a battalion and brigade commander, did you do this?
When I was a battalion commander, especially a BTG commander in 2022, I did it. Because it was a two-day-old BTG. I had four IFVs, we were taking a village, I gave a command to the radio station - let's go, the IFVs are standing. I drove forward in my armoured vehicle, went forward, followed by my four IFVs. And the rest of us were moving in small groups there. We were going to take the village. I opened the door a little bit, thinking that if there were tanks now, I might jump to the side of the road. And it happened. But it shouldn't have been like that.
What can we say about the phrase that a general should be in a trench?
Well, this is nonsense. A general is a person who already thinks in terms of an operation, an operational operation, a strategic operation. This is the level of ideas. Do you understand the problem with our generals? I was told this by a commander of the OTG, but anyone who wants to know will be able to guess. He said, "Move the battalion's command and observation post from this spot to that one in five minutes." I asked, "How?" He replied, "Well, we just come, grab the monitors, and set them up over there." This is coming from someone who has never commanded a battalion or a brigade during full-scale combat operations. In other words, to command a unit, you need to have walked the path yourself and understand the processes happening down below. And down below, oh, there are a lot of processes going on. This is a mobilized unit. Sure, technically, you can move the battalion's command and observation post in five minutes, but such a move will be useless.
Do you consider the Kursk operation a success? Was it necessary to do it and what did it give us?
Well, it's hard to say.
Well, it looks like a great success. At meetings with various military bloggers, the Commander-in-Chief said that we had saved Zaporizhzhia, conditionally.
Look, in order for this to be a success, the enemy had to move troops from some direction to the direction of Kursk. Did he do it? No, he didn't.
But he threw reserves there that could have ended up in Donbas, Zaporizhzhia and other places.
He partly sent reserves there and partly gathered FSB officers, conscripts, and Kadyrovites. Remember, conscripts and Kadyrovites were captured there. He gathered some forces and means and pulled up some normal brigades, partially redeployed them from the front. This is a partial success. But to consider it a colossal success... it did not happen. What was actually planned and what actually happened are different things. We did not achieve the scale that was planned.
So there was much more planned than what happened?
Yes, much more was planned than what happened. And, look, how can an operation be considered a success if it is an impromptu operation? What can be the combat potential of a brigade that has been pulled from the front, which needs to be restored, coordinated, and then used? And it is being pulled right out of here and put here. That is, without restoration, without replenishment. And with such brigades we went to fight in Kursk. Well, not all of them, there were more or less brigades with better combat potential.
What do you think about North Koreans as soldiers and their influence on the fighting?
This is a wake-up call, a very wake-up call. Putin used them where? On his own territory. That is, if they were on the territory of Ukraine, it would be one thing. But when they are on the territory of Russia, it is another question. How many are there? Ten thousand Koreans? Well, judging by the way they are fighting now, and by the way my comrades speak about them, they are normal soldiers. I mean, they are, you know, like communist soldiers used to be, soldiers of the communist-socialist camp, that is, they have shiny eyes. That is, they are infected with some kind of ideology. Maybe the ideology of North Korean communism. Juche. Something like that. And you give them an order, and they give their lives against the background of this ideology.
What are we fighting for? What are you fighting for?
My national idea is the liberation struggle of half a millennium for the 80 million Ukrainians who were tortured and starved to death in 1933, in 1946, during the First World War, the Second World War, and for those sent to Siberia. When parents ate their children just to feed their families during the famine. That’s the kind of conscious patriot I am.
Were 10 years of war enough for you? Because you've been at war for almost 10 years straight.
You could put it that way, something like that. I would have kept on fighting. It wasn’t my decision to stop. But it’s easier to fight the enemy than to deal with our generals. One yells, "I’ll destroy you," another yells, "I’ll put you in jail," and the third one yells, "I’ll send a commission after you." I’ve been in situations where four commissions were working on my brigade at the same time. One from the SBI, one from the OTG, and another from the OSGT (operational strategic group of troops).
They were unleashed on you just to shut you up?
Not to shut me up, but simply because the brigade is fighting, and we’re losing positions. Why? Because there are no men, no ammunition load, no ammunition. For example, I need 300 120-mm mortar shells per day of combat for the brigade. We also need 200 122-mm shells, 100 152-mm shells, and 200 155-mm shells. This is the bare minimum. But we’re given 10, 15, 20. And now, the situation is about the same. Nothing has changed.
What are our top five mistakes for 2024?
Well, it’s hard to name five just like that. The main mistake is that we aren’t progressing. We’re regressing. That is, we’re not moving forward; we’re moving backward. There’s no national unity. There’s no national idea of a liberation struggle against the Moscow invasion. This is a mistake. The whole war is in people’s heads. And that’s where mobilisation comes in. The second mistake is the failure of mobilisation. And it’s ongoing.
Mobilisation is a very problematic topic for politicians, who try to push it on each other like a hot potato.
Next. The military and political leadership, starting from the very top, is not focused on solving specific problems, but on populism. Ratings. That is, everyone is already preoccupied with the upcoming elections.
Which will not be.
Well, they will, they won't, it doesn't matter. But one day they will be. Ratings are number one now in our country. That is, there is no historical, national and patriotic consciousness of our national leader. He should read Churchill's memoirs. I would recommend it to him. Take Churchill's memoirs, open them and read them.
By the way, he won the Nobel Prize in Literature for this memoir.
Well, maybe so. Churchill understood in his time that unpopular decisions had to be made, but these unpopular decisions led to the victory of his nation.
But he lost the election right after the war.
Well, elections are such a thing. But he remained a national hero of his country.
Two months after the end of the...
Yes, yes. He lost the election.
He lost the election to Attlee. Does anyone know who Attlee is?
I don't know, but everyone knows who Churchill is. That's all.
And there are a lot of such mistakes. As the saying goes, if you criticize, offer a solution. It's very simple. Let’s look at all our allies and see who has the most combat experience, who is constantly engaged in war. That’s the United States of America, right? We have a problem with systematic training. Somewhere, there are a few training centers with a few good instructors, a few companies that train properly. But overall, the training system... we don't have one. Why? To shoot, you need to shoot. We don’t even have ammunition in the training centers anymore to practice shooting. Did you know that? We no longer produce 5.45 caliber rounds. They are made by Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan. Bulgaria. Bulgaria. Maybe. We had 5.45, we used to use it in training centers, but then it ran out. We were supplied with Soviet-era stocks of 7.62 from the former Socialist bloc of nations, but those are running out now too. And soon, there will be nothing left to shoot with. Next one. Moreover, for two years or more, mobilized soldiers who come to the training centers haven't thrown live grenades. They throw imitations because there are no real grenades. Let’s take a standard example, like the F1 grenade. This is a French grenade from the First World War. These are technologies that are over a century old. What’s the problem with manufacturing a century-old technology somewhere in an abandoned mine in Zakarpattia, producing millions of them? What`s the problem? There isn’t one. It’s the budget. It’s the political will. But as our people say, we need to steal less. And they would be right to say so, because that’s the truth. There’s total corruption. One of the problems is fighting corruption. People demand sacrifices. And not just any sacrifices, but of those at the highest political levels – People`s Deputies, ministers, judges, prosecutors. They know that there is across-the-board corruption corruption there. Do you remember a prosecutor or judge being jailed? I don’t. Or a deputy being imprisoned for corruption? You know, with the full confiscation of their property, their mother-in-law’s property, their mother’s property, and so on. Is there such a situation in the country?
I know some people who I hope will be imprisoned next year. The war. Our main mistakes are in the context of war.
Preparation. Planning. Management.
What kind of management should be in 2025?
There should be a comprehensive reform of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Well, maybe not too comprehensive, because you can't implement such large-scale changes during a war. But an interim command body cannot effectively manage the set of troops it is given. Why? Let me explain. A guy comes to the OTG for three months on a temporary duty leave. He sits it out and then goes on leave. So, guys, keep fighting. The brigade has been in these trenches for two years, or a year and a half. And that's how they remain. OTG commander comes in, off-duty, stays for three months, but doesn’t manage to cope, so they replace him with someone else. All the responsibility is diluted. I should have it like a brigade commander, on-line dad-general. A division commander, a corps commander. It doesn't matter. But he takes care of my brigade because it is an organizational brigade. We know each other's moral and business qualities very well. And he manages that set of troops more effectively, because he knows the moral and business qualities of each brigade commander and the real combat potential of each brigade.
What are the main mistakes? What should we do in 2025?
We need to reform the command system. An organizational management body should be in charge at the front. That's 100% necessary. Whether it's a division or a corps doesn’t matter. What matters is that it should be a full-time headquarters with a full-time complement of troops.
Additionally, we should minimize the secondment of battalions to other brigades as much as possible. This practice leads to the loss of personnel, loss of command and control, lack of coordination, and ineffective combat operations.
Next. Create a normal training system. A system, it must be systematic. I'll tell you how to do it. I say, criticize and suggest. I am very grateful to all our allies for training our brigades in Europe. But this is not the same war and not the same training. The closest thing to this is the American Basic Combat Training system. They have a six-month cycle of BGMT, so to speak. It can be cut to three months. It can be modernized a little bit to fit our combat conditions. Next, we should ask the US to send its instructors to each of our training centers and monitor this training system. Next, to ensure the training of the mobilized. At a minimum, soldiers should fire a thousand or two rounds of ammunition in these three months. We have a lot of mobilized soldiers at the front who do not shoot at all. There is a position with five people sitting there, and the enemy passes by it quietly. Why? Because they are hiding in the basement, locked up and sitting there. People do not shoot. They are not mentally prepared. And they did not shoot. Throwing a grenade is morally and psychologically difficult. It can explode in your hand. Reform the training system.
What else do we need to do? Reform of the command and control system. You think it's adequate when you have a loss of positions, you have 20 kilometres of the contact line. You can't secure them, you don't have enough people. And every day the OTG headquarters sends you a combat order. Do you know what it is? To conduct offensive actions. Restore the lost positions. It's just kind of surreal.
Because, apparently, they are required to do so from above.
Well, yes.
I understand that this inadequacy originates from the top.
Yes. Inadequacy comes from the top. I'm saying you need to become adequate. You need to admit all the problems that exist, roll up your sleeves and work. But we don't recognise the problems. We fight against those people who voice these problems. But we will never win the war in this way. The economy must work for the frontline, for victory. Three shifts, ammunition, shells, grenades. Military equipment. We ourselves, our economic potential was, is and remains very strong. We just, I don't know, I think it's the inefficiency of managing the economic potential of the state during the war. Why did the Muscovites switch their economy to a round-the-clock economy, i.e. their military complex? And they are producing missiles that they should have already run out of. They produce shells, they produce IFVs, they produce the main battle tank, whether it's a T-80 or T-90. What do we produce? We don’t have ammunition, we don’t have grenades, we don’t have RPG rounds. We’re asking our allies for these supplies, but by now, we should have been producing them ourselves. We need to promote young commanders who have experienced full-scale war—battalion commanders, brigade commanders—into positions of leadership, such as commanders and deputy commanders. Why? Look, all the generals from the old guard were brigade commanders back in 2008-2005. I understand they participated in the full-scale war, coming and going. But that’s not the same as leading a battalion in an assault or commanding it in defense—truly getting a hands-on understanding of the mobilized army. In my opinion, the old generation of generals, lacking knowledge of real combat potential of our units, cannot plan combat operations adequately. And there is no effective combat planning, that’s a fact.
What will the Russians do in 2025?
The Russians will do what they do. They’ve found their system. It’s like a swimmer who’s found their rhythm—they just keep going, steadily and consistently. They’ll keep moving forward in the same way. At the end of 2022 and the beginning of 2023, they managed to execute those Wagner-style assaults, whether it was assault Z, assault B—it doesn’t matter. They’ve adopted that tactic. They flood their ranks with cheap manpower, give them a bit of money, feed them the narrative of ‘Great Russia,’ and that’s enough. These troops march forward for ‘Great Russia,’ some for the money, some for the booze, they die in waves. However, it’s still enough to hurt us and push us toward losing the war.
Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kharkiv.
Look, strategically, it's Kherson, it's the right bank. So if they take Kherson, they will have a foothold on the right bank. Zaporizhzhia is in a similar situation.
Where do you think their main offensive will be this year?
I think it’ll remain focused on the Donetsk direction, particularly Pokrovsk. If they take Pokrovsk, they’ll have direct access to the Dnipropetrovsk region. All the key routes and strategic infrastructure are there. Once they control those routes, Dnipro will be next. Dnipro needs to be fortified like Berlin in 1945 or Moscow in 1941. The same goes for Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.
If you were in Gerasimov's shoes, where would you attack next year?
Well, I wouldn't say that. I would attack and strategically look for a foothold on the right bank of the Dnipro. This is Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, this is the Dnipro somewhere to the side.
Please tell me, in the current situation, are there too many politicians speculating on the topic of demobilisation?
Okay, look. Right now, absolutely everyone is speculating on the topic of war, mobilisation, demobilisation. Well, politics is speculation. I mean, there is no pure politics there, there is no one anywhere.
Politics can be populism, it can be statesmanship. We have populism. Unfortunately.
Nevertheless. Demobilisation. People say this as if it were possible.
At this point in time, this is impossible. In order to carry out demobilisation, it is necessary to mobilise someone to replace those who will be demobilised. That is, there must be an adequate rotation system, which does not exist in nature at all. That is, it should stand like this, in the direction of the brigade's defence line. There is a round-the-clock formation there. Three brigades. One brigade is fighting, the other is preparing to replace it, and the third brigade is resting. And they change each other.
Managers are shifting responsibility to avoid being the ones left to blame when everything collapses. But I have a question: what if nothing changes? Let’s say we continue fighting in 2025 the same way we’re fighting now. Maybe we’ll slap on some cosmetic fixes, paint the vehicles, and call it progress.
But we’re continuing to degrade.
What’s the result of this?
The result is the loss of our national identity, the loss of the state, and our disappearance from the political map of the world. Perhaps it will lead to some sort of negotiation process where Ukraine loses everything—nearly all of its statehood.
Before any negotiation process, there will be a military process. Can you describe it? For example, I’ve long said that military defeat is a real possibility. Can you describe what that might look like?
Political negotiations are determined by the military processes happening on the battlefield. Right now, we are losing on every front.
But what will be the dynamics of this if we do not change anything?
At best, it will be a tactical loss of territory. In the worst case, we will start losing territories quickly. That is, half the region. Tactically, it is 20 km, operationally, it is 100 km, and strategically, it is 500 km. That is, we will start losing territory not by 2-3 km, but by 20-30 km. This will be the enemy's entry into the operational zone.
In what time frame?
In a day. This is a shitty case that is also possible. If everything continues to move as it is now, we will not lose 300 metres at a time. We will lose 5 km to start with, then we will lose 20.
Now, after listening to you, dear man, she basically takes an air mattress and runs towards the Tisza.
Why not?
Look, in fact, this is a rather demoralising interview. On the one hand. On the other hand, you, as a person who was subject to repression twice in this army, continue to rush back to war. Can you explain this somehow? And why do you want to go to war? And why should a person who has just heard about the not-so-great situation in our army go to, I don't know, either the TCR or at least to a training course...
I’ll tell you frankly: this all comes down to the level of national consciousness and patriotism. That’s it. If you’re a patriot, you need to prepare for war. In war, it’s not about building big muscles. What matters most is endurance. Start running slowly—3 to 5 kilometers at a time. Build your stamina. Take a tactical medicine course—it’s absolutely essential. Get yourself a model of an AK-74 or an M4A1, or any assault rifle you like. A model. And practice with it. Dry fire, as they say. Train yourself. Ukraine will remain. Governments come and go—one today, another tomorrow, and yet another the day after. If we, as a nation, don’t want to disappear from the political map of the world, we must prepare for war. The world is constantly changing. The Russian Federation, yes, is a foot of clay —I agree with you. But it hasn’t fallen yet. And when it will fall, no one knows. Our goal will be achieved when the Russian Federation collapses. It only understands the language of force.
How realistic is it for them to occupy Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Dnipro, Kharkiv next year?
50/50. No one can predict 100% what will happen next year.
Do they have enough resources for the occupation? At the moment, yes. What are resources? Human potential? They have enough people.
It seems to me that they have thrown the last reserve now and they are replenishing it, but they have not replenished it yet.
By and large, they have reserves. They just don’t want social upheaval. Whom are they using first? Сonvicts and national minorities. They still have their middle class—those with some brains—who might become a source of unrest in Russia later, but they’re leaving that group untouched for now. However, they can call on them as well. How many more are there? Five million? Their entire tactic, from late 2022, through 2023, and into 2024, has been based on flanking maneuvers—the classic Prussian school. Guderian's playbook. Pum-pum, Blitzkrieg. Guderian was one of the founders of blitzkrieg. Well, they don't use tanks, because the parts are completely different, and they just use flanking tactics. It's classic. Avdiivka has fallen. Kurakhove has nearly fallen.
Soledar.
Soledar fell to their flanking maneuvers. Everything is textbook, everything is predictable.
Counteroffensive. Well, that’s a complete absurdity. These are people who graduated from military universities, some with honours, medals, sabers, and even Queen Victoria’s swords. And yet what’s the plan? Three minefields, the Surovikin Line, and let’s throw uncoordinated brigades straight into the frontlines. Did it really take graduating with a Queen Victoria sword to come up with this? And these were all the reserves we had for the future. We went va banque. With the sky not ours, with the combat potential not ours, we made this move—and we lost.
Have we lost the war yet?
Not yet. But we need radical changes.
Is there anything positive?
Of course, there is. Hope for adequacy. There’s a book called Absolute Responsibility: Leadership Lessons from the Navy SEALs. I recommend every general and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief read this book. The book’s message is simple: If you're a leader, you are responsible for everything. If you're the leader of a nation, you're responsible for the entire nation, for every specific action taken or decision made. You bear that responsibility. And right now, as I’ve said, we are facing the threat of disappearing from the political map of the world.
Even with such a difficult conversation, first of all, what will it be...
There is hope, there is a chance. But we must stop fighting those who point out problems. We need to stop lying to ourselves. We’re not moving forward, we’re not progressing, we’re regressing. That’s the problem. But there’s always a chance, because God is on the side of Ukraine.
On this optimistic note, I still hope that we will not come to fighting within the cities, I mean overland fighting. Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kharkiv. And in fact, I hope we will still hold... I thank you for not being afraid to speak the truth. Thank you for this interview.
Thank you, my friend.
