Why aren’t our troops taking up strongholds dug by CMA (Civil-Military Administration) in 2024 for 17 billion UAH?
When will the Ministry of Defense start building strongholds that protect against drones and are suitable for modern warfare?
I took screenshots from a tragic video posted by the enemy - it shows our large platoon stronghold near Pokrovsk. A Russian drone was conducting reconnaissance and directing an attack FPV drone to the target. This is one of our firing points at the military stronghold. I won’t show the last screenshot — the drone, without facing any obstacles, flew directly to the entrance of the firing point, spotted two of our soldiers, and struck them directly.
What other conclusions can we draw from this video?
1. The stronghold was dug in a completely open area, with communication trenches, all positions that are not shielded from above or camouflaged, making it convenient for the enemy to identify targets, in the event of a massive drone attack, such a position is nearly impossible to defend. Even by World War I standards, this design for a military stronghold is poorly conceived.
2. Wide, open trenches and entrances to the positions provide no protection against drone attacks or any form of high-angle fire, especially from mortars and howitzers. In other words, the defensive structure offers no protection against the enemy’s primary means of destruction. Our experienced units avoid taking up such structures altogether, while inexperienced units suffer losses and quickly lose combat effectiveness when attempting to defend them.
3. A large position requires an infantry platoon to defend it. Infantry is not used in defense with such forces at the front - it is dangerous. As a result, no more than a squad is typically stationed there. Consequently, the forces are insufficient to effectively defend such a large position from an assault group attack.
4. For such a position to be suitable for defense, infantry must be deployed there in advance, and time must be provided for personnel to reinforce the stronghold and make it fit for its intended purpose. However, our troops are not deployed in advance, instead, infantry typically enters such positions right before the battle, with no materials supplied, leaving them no time to make necessary improvements on their own. In this case, it was evident from the state of the position that our soldiers had just arrived at a position already under enemy surveillance and had no opportunity to fortify themselves or prepare for combat. In other words, the command deployed the unit too late, at the very last moment.
What should be done?
1. Since the construction of defensive structures in Ukraine does not meet the demands of modern warfare – the drone war – projects like the one shown in the photo should be completely prohibited. Projects for frontline positions should be developed and approved with the involvement of experienced combat commanders of battalions and brigades who demonstrate effective organization of defensive positions and minimal personnel losses.
2. Responsibility for the construction and use of defense lines at the front should rest solely with the commanders of the OTG (Operational-Tactical Group), as they are the ones responsible for troop distribution on the frontline and can ensure the timely deployment of reserve units to new positions. Building defensive lines without considering plans for troop deployment on them is a waste of resources. The ditches currently being dug near the Dnipro will soon become unusable because there is no one to maintain them. All resources, construction materials, equipment, and personnel must be placed under the control of a single designated officer with experience in combined arms units and defensive structure construction over the past three years. Dispersion of efforts and budgets must end, and responsibility needs to be centralized.
3. The planning of defensive construction should be entrusted to a single individual – the Minister of Defence – while civil-military administrations should act as executors of orders, not managers of expenditures.
4. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should take control of the construction and use of defensive structures in order to assess the facts when expensive defensive structures are not used by troops or troops suffer unjustified losses when entering such positions.
