On appointment of Mykhailo Drapatyi as Commander of Khortytsia Operational and Strategic Group of Troops
This livestream is dedicated to a major and significant appointment in the Ukrainian defense forces, which could have a profound impact on the further course of the war, directly contributing to halting the Russian offensive and defeating Russian strike groups.
Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy has officially announced the appointment of a new commander of the Khortytsia operational and strategic grouping of troops. Major General Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed to replace General Hnatov.
This photo of Mykhailo Drapatyi was taken in June 2014 on the border, when he was still in command of the Second Mechanised Battalion of the 72nd Brigade.
The significance of the OSGT KHORTYTSIA
The previous role of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, was the Commander of the Ground Forces – Commander of the Khortytsia Operational and Strategic Group of Forces (OSGT).
Drapatyi is now the commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine and, as declared by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, also holds administrative authority over the Ground Forces, which make up the majority of the Defence Forces. This is the primary institution responsible for the defense of Ukraine.
Drapatyi has been appointed as Commander of the Khortytsia OSGT, which currently represents virtually the entire main front of the battle, stretching from Kharkiv to Zaporizhzhia. This includes numerous Operational and Tactical Groups (OTGs). Beyond that, the Odesa OSGT begins to take charge of operations along the Dnipro River, while the Kursk region OTG leads operations and establishes a buffer zone outside of Ukraine.
What is the importance of Drapatyi’s appointment? Up until that point, President Volodymyr Zelensky had consolidated almost all of the war management structures under one person, Oleksandr Syrskyi. Syrskyi was not only the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces but also appointed his own people to key positions across all administrative and command structures. The only exception to Syrskyi’s appointments was Vadym Sukharevskyi, the Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy made a political move. We’ve had a similar situation in our army before when Oleksandr Syrskyi was the commander of the Khortytsia OSGT, the commander of the Ground Forces, and Valerii Zaluzhnyi was the Commander-in-Chief. At first glance, it may seem like the same situation, where Zelenskyy and Yermak are compensating for the influence of one military commander with the influence of another. However, at this point, I don’t see any political motives behind this decision or any intention to pit the generals against each other, because Mykhailo Drapatyi is a person who is completely unconnected to politics. His entire career has been that of a military professional, entirely focused on serving in the armed forces. In my opinion, his appointment isn’t about personal influence over the Armed Forces. Rather, it reflects the understanding that the Russian offensive in 2024 could not be stopped, and the consequences of that failure are devastating: significant losses and the loss of a large territory — more than 4,500 square kilometers of Ukrainian land.
When Zelenskyy replaced Zaluzhnyi and appointed Syrskyi, giving him full powers, the president stated overconfidently that the frontline was being stabilized. There were several statements from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief stating that the frontline was already stabilized, that stabilization was underway, and that everything was fine. However, it turned out that all these strategic assessments were incorrect. The sets of decisions prepared by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Staff in 2024 unfortunately proved to be failures. The main resource of mobilized personnel was directed to the 150-series of Brigades, which were new and were used entirely inefficiently. At the front, all these reports of "hold on, hold on, hold on, stand to the death, fight for positions" — where brigades and battalions were being ground down — led to a loss of combat capability and a chaotic retreat. After capturing Velyka Novosilka, reaching Pokrovsk, and taking the city, the enemy has practically reached the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk region and is already there. It is impossible to continue the war in 2025 the same way it was conducted in 2024. Because if the enemy enters Dnipro, it would demonstrate that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters no longer controls the situation and is unable to reverse the unfavorable course of hostilities. Something had to change. That’s why Hnatov was replaced — he was simply Syrskyi’s man and not an independent leader of the Khortytsia OSGT.
In fact, we have no true leaders in the army. The entire command structure isn’t functioning properly, because Oleksandr Syrskyi appointed people to all positions in the OTGs and OSGTs whom he could call at any time and instruct to do things his way. And through them, he could interfere with the management of brigade and battalion operations. Now, this command and control system will change.
Many people may feel the urge to contrast Syrskyi with Drapatyi. Frankly, I don't see it. Mykhailo Drapatyi is not someone who made a career in the army to compete with others. And I believe that, in fact, if Oleksandr Syrskyi looks at the course of events in a few months, he will realize that Drapatyi’s appointment is not a competition with him, but rather a strengthening of the Armed Forces' command structure, an enhancement of the authority of the Armed Forces leadership, and an increase in the authority of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Of course, all of this will only happen once Drapatyi is granted real powers.
What Mykhailo Drapatyi can do
To understand what kind of commander he is, I wouldn’t want to rely on emotions here. The assessment of any leader should be based on measurable indicators that you can evaluate objectively, analyze, and assess their performance. It's not about how good a person they are or what people write about them — "a fighting general." The army is a hierarchical structure. There’s nothing Napoleonic about it right now. The army depends on achieving quality results at every level.
Mykhailo Drapatyi's career
When I found out about Mykhailo Drapatyi and wrote the first article, which turned out to be the first about his combat path. It happened on 7 August 2014. Yes, it happened that at that moment I was in touch with the command of the 72nd Mechanised Brigade, which was commanded by Colonel Andrii Hryshchenko at that time. The day before, I had been in sector D, saw with my own eyes the situation on the border, how our troops were actually forced to fight the Russians, how Russian troops were shelling our soldiers on the border with impunity.
What happened on June 7, 2014
On June 7, 2014, the Ukrainian command began an operation to block the state border of Ukraine. From the side of Mariupol, a group from the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, consisting of two battalions, mechanized personnel battalions of this brigade, units of the 79th Airborne Brigade, and some other units, was supposed to move along the border, set up a network of checkpoints and strongpoints, take control of the dominant hills, and reach the Krasnodon-Izvaryne supply route. If our troops had reached Izvaryne along the border and taken control of all supply routes, we would have cut off all the main supply lines of the Russian occupation forces in Ukraine. Of course, this would have prevented the enemy from expanding the scale of the war in Donbas. Unfortunately, the enemy was fully aware of our plans and put up desperate resistance. As our troops advanced along the border, the Russians, from the territory of the Russian Federation, constantly launched missile and artillery strikes and conducted reconnaissance. When our troops reached Izvaryne and deployed several battalions along the border, it turned out that only two companies had reached it. We needed to block the border with large forces over a vast area. The enemy took advantage of this situation, concentrated its forces near Izvaryne, and, unfortunately, we were unable to capture the village. This was, sadly, a turning point in the summer campaign of the Defence Forces in Donbas. The enemy held Izvaryne, retained the key supply route, and as a result, the war began to intensify. All of our units holding the border were subjected to powerful, massive attacks by Russian artillery, as well as assaults by Russian mercenaries who attempted to force some of the key strongpoints out along the border.
One of the most distant positions from our forces in the area of Chervonopartyzansk was the position of the 72nd Brigade. They were holding the front, and a large number of Russian artillery was hitting them. There were significant losses in equipment, losses in people. The main problem was that there was no supply. The enemy managed to cut it off. n fact, our group was holding on there only because our soldiers and patriots of Ukraine, who were living there on the border with Russia, in the occupied territory, were supplying our troops with water, giving them food, and our soldiers were surviving in very difficult conditions, with very little water, almost no fuel, no way to replenish their supplies. And the situation was so difficult that in early August, the Russian regular army began to move into Ukraine. And the Russian regular army joined the offensive against our positions.
Breakout of Drapatyi's battalion
At that moment, the Ukrainian command was forced to make a decision to withdraw. But how? The withdrawal had to cover more than 40 kilometers, under constant shelling and with roads heavily mined. It’s important to note that at that time, there were no Starlinks or similar communication systems. Communication was conducted over open phone lines, and radio communication, though rare, was extremely unstable. In such conditions, decisions were not dictated by a commander simply saying "forward" or "halt," but depended entirely on the commanders who were with their soldiers on the ground. On 3 August 2014, when a breakout was necessary, two commanders of the 72nd Brigade made different decisions. The commander of the first battalion, faced with severe losses and the enemy's resistance, chose to destroy all weapons and evacuate personnel to the territory of the Russian Federation, although Russia was technically the enemy, it was not officially recognized as such at the time, the plan was to intern the troops and then transport them through Russian territory to the areas under Ukrainian control. The first battalion of the 72nd Brigade followed this course of action. However, the second battalion of the 72nd Brigade decided to break out to their own forces despite the difficult conditions, to break out of the territory that was not controlled by our troops. More than 40 kilometers with last reserves of fuel and without any hope that someone will go to break through the corridor for a breakout.
This second battalion was commanded by Major Mykhailo Drapatyi. On 7 August, Drapatyi's battalion successfully broke out of the encirclement, leading other units as well. In total, 410 Ukrainian soldiers were able to break out under Drapatyi's command. I wrote about this that very day because at that moment, it was truly an act of heroism and a remarkable feat. Drapatyi, left to make a command decision in an extremely challenging situation, chose to break out and his decision was carried out with minimal losses. During the breakout, one soldier of the 72nd Brigade and several border guards were killed, but the forces broke out with their weapons, combat-ready, and continued their mission.
Several officers managed to break out alongside Drapatyi. In fact, nearly all of the Ukrainian units in the area broke out as well. Other commanders of the 72nd Brigade, including Volodymyr Blanutsa, the commander of the rocket artillery division, and Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Khrapach, the commander of the self-propelled howitzer division, all of whom also broke out. Units from the 79th, 24th, and 51st brigades, along with the 3rd Special Forces Regiment and border guards, all managed to break out of the encirclement.
The breakout took three days, and since then, Drapatyi's career has continued to grow and develop.
He was sent for training after this real combat experience. In 2016, after completing his training as a battalion commander, when he studied at the academy and then held the position of the brigade's chief of staff, Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed commander of the newly created 58th Motorised Infantry Brigade in 2016, which was created almost from scratch. For three years, Drapatyi created this brigade, formed it from scratch in the Sumy region and gained his first experience as a combat brigade commander, leading it into the combat zone and the anti-terrorist operation.
He commanded combat operations as a brigade commander for a year and a half. Then there was more training and service at higher headquarters.
In 2022, we all remember the full-scale invasion and the critical situation that developed on one of the frontline sections, specifically in the Kryvyi Rih direction. After the enemy broke through in the south, our defense completely collapsed—it was very weak and, unfortunately, poorly organized. The enemy quickly seized large areas of southern Ukraine, breaking through into the operational space. At that time, there were two strategic directions, and the enemy advanced into the right-bank region of Ukraine. Two Russian military groups advanced on two strategic objectives. The first objective was Voznesensk, and the second was bypassing Mykolaiv to reach the nuclear power plant. Voznesensk was where our arms depots were located, and it served as a key logistics hub. The nuclear power plant was nearby, and the enemy aimed to surround Mykolaiv. The situation was extremely dire. The second enemy advance occurred along the Bashtanka-Novyi Buh road towards Kryvyi Rih. Their goal was to bypass Kryvyi Rih and potentially cut off the strategic Kirovohrad road, a key supply route for all of Ukraine. By mid-March, intense fighting was underway in the Bashtanka-Novyi Buh area, with the enemy advancing to within 15 kilometers of Kryvyi Rih. Russian patrols reached as close as 12 kilometers from the city.
The situation was further complicated because the Southern group of troops, responsible for defending this area, had withdrawn from Chonhar. The group's commander, General Sokolov, was removed from his position, and new leadership was appointed. Unfortunately, after one of the newly appointed commanders assessed the situation, he tragically took his own life. The very next day, Mykhailo Drapatyi assumed command of the group. Coincidentally, I arrived in Kryvyi Rih with Dmytro Kotsiubailo (Da Vinci) and his unit because the situation was critical. There wasn’t a single combat-ready unit in the city. The 60th Mechanized Brigade, which was forming, Inhulets, consisted of untrained civilians, armed with assault rifles and filled with patriotic spirit but lacking any proper preparation or organization, with a few experienced officers and commanders, and with virtually no heavy weapons and even a few grenade launchers. Some units were hastily redeployed, but everyone understood that the main battles were taking place around Voznesensk. It was impossible to allocate enough forces to secure Kryvyi Rih and protect access to the Kirovohrad road, which lay deep within our territory. I remember that when Drapatyi arrived, the entire group of troops was given eight malfunctioning D-20 howitzers and about 7-8 tanks from a reserve arsenal. These tanks had just been taken out of storage and needed repairs before they could join the battle. At that point, Dmytro Kotsiubailo arrived, repaired two of the guns, and began carrying out combat missions, striking at the Russian occupiers. Those guns became the primary striking force at the time.
We arrived with DaVinci just on the day when only Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed, and I saw how quickly he makes decisions in such a critical situation. He makes decisions quickly and creates trust among his subordinates, so he immediately made a decision and included DaVinci as a reconnaissance and strike unit in the first place in order to strike at the Russian occupiers and prevent them from accumulating ammunition and military equipment.
I have a video on my channel that shows how just outside Kryvyi Rih, right after Drapatyi gave DaVinci two guns, we went out for live firing. DaVinci's unit found a large Russian ammunition depot, where they had brought a significant amount of ammunition, in one of the hangars near Kryvyi Rih. It was about 20 kilometres from the city, and the guns precisely hit the hangar, resulting in a huge explosion. After this event, Drapatyi officially took command of the Southern group of troops. This group was later renamed the Kherson group of troops.
Fighting for the Kherson region
At that time, Drapatyi did what he could in his area, even though the troops were not the most combat-ready. Despite this, he established a command system and organized the troops effectively. His main task was to block the Kherson bridgehead and gradually reduce its size. As we remember, there were very heavy battles for the Kherson region. On August 29, 2022, the Ukrainian command prepared a large-scale offensive operation aimed at breaking through the enemy's defenses from several directions. However, the enemy had concentrated its best elite forces in the Kherson region at that time. These included the full strength of Russian airborne troops, all major divisions and brigades, several special forces brigades, and units from the 22nd Army Corps, as well as marines. This represented the elite of the Russian army, equipped with a large amount of weaponry. Unfortunately, due to certain tactical issues in organizing the offensive, which was led by General Moisiuk as a representative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it was not possible to break through the defenses. The enemy was tied down in combat, and from 29 August through September and October, our troops carried out heavy frontal attacks. The enemy was unable to transfer its reserves from the Kherson region to the area where General Syrskyi was conducting the Balakliia offensive operation in the Kharkiv region.
Positional Warfare in the South
After these battles, Drapatyi took command of the Kherson group of troops, with the South group being renamed the Kherson group of troops. Our soldiers liberated Kherson, and a positional war began along the Dnipro River, involving battles for the islands and control of the coastal strip. In these battles, I have already taken note of General Drapatyi's work, as he organized what I consider a very effective interaction and intelligence system on the Kherson direction.
A true command and intelligence structure was established that enabled significant losses to be inflicted on the enemy. The integration of drones and electronic warfare units was particularly successful, and the considerable losses suffered by Russian troops in the Kherson region and later beyond the Dnipro River are the direct result of the well-coordinated and skillfully managed operations of the Kherson OGT.
It should be noted, however, that the operation in Krynky, which had rather questionable results, was not related to Drapatyi, this operation was fully commanded by General Sodol, who was the commander of the Marine Corps at the time.
Appointment to the post of Deputy Chief of the General Staff
The next stage of his career began on 8 February 2024, when Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy made the decision to replace the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, with Oleksandr Syrskyi. The following day, Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed as Deputy Chief of the General Staff by a Presidential Decree. Why did this happen? Before replacing Zaluzhnyi, Zelenskyy's team conducted a survey within military circles, asking those who were deeply interested in the war—military leaders and heads of departments involved in the war—who they believed deserved promotion among the military ranks. As a result of this, Vadym Sukharevskyi was appointed as Commander of the Unmanned Systems Forces, while Mykhailo Drapatyi was named Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Combat Training. However, Drapatyi could not serve in this position for long because, on 10 May 2024, the long-anticipated Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region began. This offensive was long-anticipated for quite some time, as there was no element of surprise, thanks to intelligence, Ukrainian command knew about the nature of the enemy's actions a month and a half in advance and had a detailed understanding of the Russian troop deployments, plans, and composition. From the end of April, Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region were placed on full combat alert. Nevertheless, on 10 May, a major failure occurred, which has since led to a high-profile criminal case. Two generals and one colonel of the Armed Forces were detained. Unfortunately, on that day, there was a loss of control over Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region. What was the reason for this? A complex of reasons.
First of all, I believe that the responsibility, of course, partly lies with the leaders who were detained, but primarily with those who appointed them. Neither General Halushkin nor General Horbenko had real combat experience in commanding troops during the anti-terrorist operation or the Joint Forces Operation, nor before the war. They had not gradually moved from commanding one group of troops to another. Suddenly, they were put in charge of this direction, and then the leaders who appointed them—General Sodol, Syrskyi, and Zelenskyy himself, who inspected—wondered why they could not fulfill their tasks. This happened because people were appointed without the proper experience in managing combat operations in complex environments. There were also other factors involved. Indeed, the enemy attempted to organize a well-coordinated offensive, managing to suppress Starlink signals for several hours, and the broadcast from our reconnaissance drones was interrupted. Additionally, there were very few forces in the area, and they were spread too thin, with no established coordination, and reserves could not intervene. There were many miscalculations. However, the result was so emotional, with such significant political consequences, and such a loud information noise on the internet and widespread publicity, that our troops had to withdraw. It was unclear where the line was and where they would be stopped. On 10 May, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief convened—not in a formal meeting, but to discuss the situation. Syrskyi, Zelenskyy, and Sodol admitted that control had been lost for some time, and the situation was unclear. It was decided to dismiss General Halushkin, the commander of the Kharkiv OTG, from his position and appoint a new commander. General Drapatyi, who was in Kyiv, was appointed as the new commander of the Kharkiv OTG. Drapatyi left and took over on 12 May. By the 11th, he was already in Kharkiv, starting to take command, get familiar with the situation, and by 12 May, he officially assumed command of the Kharkiv OTG.
Kharkiv region
In this situation, it is worth noting the quick operational decisions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, who immediately deployed new combat-ready troops to this area to remedy the situation. In other words, our 13th Brigade of the National Guard "Charter" was sent directly to Kharkiv, to the Lyptsi area. And a battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade entered the village of Hlyboke. These forces stopped the enemy's breakthrough to Lyptsi and Kharkiv. The area of Starytsia was covered and defended by the soldiers of the 42nd Mechanized Brigade. And in Vovchansk, units of the 57th Motorized Infantry Brigade engaged in combat. And the units of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade arrived there on an alert state.
So, the fighting began, and with the arrival of reserves, the situation was, of course, stabilized. However, it is important to highlight Drapatyi's role in these events and battles. I was also on the ground, and the situation initially seemed truly uncontrollable. When I arrived, I saw our units immediately engaging in battle for Lyptsi. As they moved out of the Serebrianskyi forest, they headed straight towards Lyptsi and Vovchansk. The situation was extremely difficult—there was no front line. There were no serious fortifications, only a few dug-in strongpoints that were unsuitable for defence and poorly constructed. There was no supply line or defensive perimeter. The situation looked difficult, and the enemy was advancing in a very organized manner with serious air support and drone support on the plantations. In these circumstances, I saw how Drapatyi assessed the situation and made decisions. It was a critical moment, similar to situations he had previously encountered in Kryvyi Rih and on the border. Drapatyi wasn’t like Napoleon, arriving with all the answers and immediately giving orders. Instead, he constantly studied the situation, assigning areas of responsibility to each brigade commander. His focus was not on controlling specific points on a map or fighting for individual positions but on establishing coordination and the effective application of forces at the brigade and unit commander levels. After some time, it became clear that the enemy, following the arrival of our reserves, launched ferocious attacks. These assaults came from the 18th Army Corps, with large masses of infantry and large reserves. However, our troops deployed effectively, established proper coordination, reconnaissance, and a system of firepower. Eventually, the situation became solid, like concrete, and the enemy could no longer advance. Every attack was met with massive losses.
I remember a story from one of the first days when our troops were engaged in counterattacks near Lyptsi, and one of our strongholds was captured. One of our newly arrived units, deployed across a large front, entered an open stronghold but was unable to hold it, and the enemy stormed it. The position was, in fact, very unfavorable, as the approaches to this stronghold were completely exposed across open fields, making its defence extremely difficult. Whoever designed it clearly had no understanding of combat operations. What stood out to me was Drapatyi's reaction when he received the report. I expected the usual response we often see from generals—especially those newly promoted and terrified of losing their positions—hysteria, demands to immediately retake the stronghold, and an order for a 6:00 AM attack, concentrating all available forces. However, Drapatyi assessed the situation calmly and concluded, without emotion or panic, that defending this forward-facing, isolated stronghold was both difficult and tactically pointless. He shifted focus to the bigger picture, not on restoring the lost stronghold at all costs but on first building a proper defensive line. Without any dramatic overtones, he tasked the brigade commander with adjusting his operations in the area. It's important to note that this was the only stronghold lost in a large sector following the deployment of our reserves. In fact, after that, our soldiers regrouped and conducted a series of successful offensive operations, pushing the enemy far from Lyptsi—several kilometers away. This story exemplifies Drapatyi's balanced, thoughtful approach, which I witnessed firsthand in a critical situation. Instead of acting like a bureaucrat, hastily reacting without understanding, he took the time to study the situation and make informed decisions. Unfortunately, we have many military bureaucrats who only fight based on maps, failing to grasp the reality of what's happening on the ground.
Drapatyi was at the brigade headquarters, he studied the situation on the ground, checked the real front line, checked it in various ways, not only based on reports from various units but also by aerial reconnaissance. This contributed to the rapid stabilization of the situation.
On 13 May, I wrote that although the situation was very difficult, it had been stabilized and the enemy would be defeated on the Kharkiv front. It was a team effort, and there's no need to exaggerate Drapatyi's role by saying he saved Kharkiv. He played a stabilizing role in his position, but it was the team that ultimately contributed to stabilizing the front, first and foremost Oleksandr Syrskyi, who quickly concentrated combat-ready reserves in that direction. The commanders of those brigades were also sensible, and most importantly, it was the soldiers themselves who played a crucial role. At that time, people felt that the enemy might once again enter Kharkiv, approach it, or even capture Vovchansk, and the entire frontline relied on them. I remember how inspired the soldiers were, and everyone was doing their utmost in a situation that had never been experienced before. I had never seen such a large number of drones as the Russians used to support their offensive at that moment. It was truly an enormous number, being used en masse along narrow sections of the frontline. In those tough battles, everyone proved their worth. The Ukrainian infantry played a key role, particularly the infantry of the 125th Territorial Defence Brigade. In some positions, they never retreated and held their ground throughout. The 415th Rifle Battalion, which had withdrawn to Lyptsi, fought there and suffered significant losses. And of course, the soldiers from the Charter Brigade and the 13th Brigade of the National Guard played their part as well.
The infantry of the Charter Brigade showed an exceptionally high level of performance in the encounter battles. After some initial lack of coordination and a few setbacks, they successfully held the entire defence line and pushed the enemy back by a significant distance. Special Forces, including the 8th Special Forces Regiment, performed extraordinary feats during the early stages of the Russian invasion. Soldiers of the DIU, including Shaman's unit and various other DIU units, as well as the 57th and 82nd Brigades, also showed remarkable skill and determination. I want to emphasize that our soldiers performed at the highest level. Moreover, the command matched the scale of the tasks at hand. The command, with Drapatyi as the commander of the OTG, demonstrated itself at a consistently high and competent level.
Following this outcome, another critical situation emerged in the Kharkiv region, which Drapatyi was also sent to solve. Due to some dubious decisions, unfortunately, the Ukrainian high command carried out an unjustified rotation of forces. The 24th Mechanised Brigade was withdrawn from the Toretsk and New York defence zone and redeployed to Chasiv Yar, with the 41st Mechanised Brigade taking its place. I have written about its commander, Colonel Romashko. Unfortunately, the results were tragic. The brigade suffered significant losses at Chasiv Yar. When it entered the positions previously held by the 24th Brigade, it was physically unable to defend the area. The reports from the brigade's commander, however, suggested otherwise. This decision by Oleksandr Syrskyi ultimately led to the enemy rapidly dislodging the 41st Brigade from positions that our troops had been defending for 2.5 years. The enemy was then forced to fight intense encounter battles in Toretsk and New York. There was a critical situation, and, regrettably, the individual appointed to oversee the area was someone who had never commanded a battalion or a brigade. Colonel Ledovyi from the Ground Forces Command, who for some inexplicable reason had earned the trust of Oleksandr Syrskyi, was placed in charge. For unclear reasons, as Ledovyi's career had never been focused on command positions. This situation was comparable to the one in Kharkiv, where Halushkin, an individual with no experience in commanding troop groups or brigades, was appointed to lead the OTG. The result was the same. Ledovyi effectively destroyed the command structure. There was total chaos, lies in reports at every turn, a complete breakdown of trust among commanders, and poor coordination between the troops. It was an utterly disastrous situation.
After some time, the country's leadership realized that this approach could lead to the сollapse of the entire front. As a result, Ledovyi was replaced in September 2024. This incompetent management cost our country and army dearly, both in terms of human lives and resources. Mykhailo Drapatyi was appointed to the position to replace him.
Luhansk OTG
What did Drapatyi do first? He gathered all the staff officers from the Luhansk OTG and sent them out to verify the actual situation on the ground. These officers visited each military unit with the task of not just checking the map, but using drones to confirm that the soldiers were indeed at the positions marked. In some instances, units didn’t allow infantry to be on the surface for most of the day to hide from enemy drones. In one case, a representative of the Luhansk OTG headquarters stayed at the command post for 24 hours to ensure that when soldiers were leaving the position, everything was verified.
These brief moments, when infantry would leave their positions for reinforcements, rotation, or supplies, allowed Drapatyi to verify that they were indeed our fighters, properly controlled, and there was communication. He did this along the entire Luhansk OTG frontline. Quickly, Drapatyi was able to establish the real front line, not the one shown on the map. It turned out that during Ledovyi's command, a huge number of positions marked on the map were actually empty, with no one there, a different line, a different line of the Luhansk OTG. This was crucial because Drapatyi immediately exposed what the actual frontline looked like. Just as he did in the Kharkiv and Kherson OTGs, Drapatyi did not punish commanders for having withdrawn from certain positions. Instead, he punished them for lying in their reports. He was fiercely opposed to this dishonesty. Drapatyi worked with brigade commanders to find solutions to stabilize the defence. Not by saying "Forward and retake it, I'll open an internal investigation against you, I'll punish you, I'll kill you", but by the fact that he and his commanders are looking for solutions and trying to find the best solutions in the situation, trusting people and giving them the opportunity to make decisions, which was entirely absent under Ledovyi. Drapatyi also demonstrated the ability to stand firm on his decisions, because in some areas we had to recognize that our troops had withdrawn. In one brigade’s sector, it was discovered that 16 positions marked on the map weren’t actually held by them. There was deception in the reports, which was forced due to Ledovyi's demands, intimidation, and the general chaos under his command.
So, the stabilization of the Luhansk OTG wasn’t about Drapatyi acting like some kind of Napoleon, a unique figure, or a messiah. It was a coordinated work. He didn’t try to be flashy; instead, he focused on being effective in his role and avoided interfering at levels below where he had direct responsibility. It turned out that the solutions needed to stabilize the situation on the frontline in the Luhansk OTG, while seemingly simple in concept, were difficult to implement. The real challenge was the complexity of assessing the situation in a specific brigade’s sector, which changes during the enemy’s offensive and determining what actions could be taken. It’s incredibly difficult to decide what the brigade can do or not, what higher command can agree to, and what they cannot, in fact, it is the most difficult story. This is the essence of military strategy during a defensive operation. And this task was successfully tackled.
What changes can we expect at the frontline?
I’ve identified certain traits of Drapatyi that I believe the troops should see. And should Drapatyi have the independence to act.
Firstly, Drapatyi will assess the real situation—not based on reports or points on the map, but through drones and reports from neighboring units. In the Kharkiv region, Drapatyi repeatedly encountered contradictory information from adjacent units due to differences in commanders, and he always worked to resolve these discrepancies. Even if he personally knew someone but they provided misleading information, he didn’t try to cover it up. Drapatyi has no favorites, unlike some of our senior military leaders. There are permanent brigade commanders who can seemingly get away with anything—surrendering towns and villages, failing operations, losing personnel—yet they are still kept in their positions. Drapatyi, however, has not allowed such favoritism to exist under his command.
There will be a thorough analysis of where real positions are located. This is critical because many of the complaints from personnel to the generals stem from the fact that superiors demand falsehoods in reports. The chain of lies starts at the top. If Drapatyi succeeds in breaking this chain of deception—from Kyiv to the troops—where unrealistic demands and threats for impossible tasks are imposed, it will make a massive contribution to our victory. In summary, the first priority is understanding the real situation.
Second. Responsibility.It is crucial that Drapatyi does not shift responsibility onto his subordinates, as most leaders in our Armed Forces—unfortunately, almost all of them—tend to do. This behavior often serves to report to the president, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, or someone else that "it’s not my fault, everything on my end is fine, orders are correct—it’s just bad soldiers, battalion commanders, or brigade commanders." Fortunately, Drapatyi does not engage in such absurdity. He is not a mean or deceitful person, unlike, unfortunately, many of those with high-ranking positions. For this reason, I expect that the practice of "raising" brigade and battalion commanders, generals, and other officers through threats, ultimatums, internal investigations, and criminal cases will cease. This criminal practice of intimidation in the army must end. It discredits the leadership of the army and the country, which allows these foolish threats to military commanders at all levels. Responsibility in the army should be shared. It starts with leadership. Someone at the top must take responsibility for what happens below, rather than deflecting blame onto others.
Assessment of the situation. Decisions must align with the actual situation on the ground. Too often, we see political objectives taking precedence. In many battles, our troops have been tasked with achieving unrealistic goals that provide no tactical benefit, solely to maintain reports that we are holding a particular settlement for a few more days or weeks. Take, for example, the current situation in Velyka Novosilka. It’s a disadvantageous position. Why are we keeping people there? It offers no tactical benefit and cannot realistically be held. Similar issues occurred in Bakhmut and Avdiivka. This pattern has repeated numerous times: instead of conducting a proper assessment of the situation, staff in Kyiv sit in headquarters, scratch their heads, and declare, "We need a few more days—it’s political. We don’t want to deliver bad news or admit setbacks because it would require recording video, to admit. We don`t want to" This unwillingness to confront reality leads to unnecessary loss of life and a reduction in the combat capability of our units because they are tasked with impossible objectives. I hope for a shift towards proper, adequate assessment of the situation and the adoption of a professional, pragmatic approach to command, leaving behind the harmful practice of politicking in military management.
Next, very important. Drapatyi does not interfere with lower levels of command. Unfortunately, we have a situation in the army where, for example, Oleksandr Syrskyi wants to interfere in the management of a company or battalion, and he directs himself from Kyiv, this is Muzhenko's practice, to direct the battalion or company's battle from his office by phone. And this continues. Unfortunately, we have not learnt all these lessons in 10 years, and our army is still a telephone command by a general who simply has not had any experience of commanding a company, battalion or brigade in combat, but wants to control something from the safety of his office.
So, this needs to be put to an end. I had the opportunity to tell the leadership of the Armed Forces that Syrskyi's interference with the command of the troops—through the OTG commander, the tactical group commander, the OSGT commander—has led to problematic decisions and used the 155th and 32nd brigades near Pokrovsk under his own orders, deploying them to areas where our forces hadn’t been for a long time. And what were the consequences? These absolutely misguided decisions led to losses and the failure of combat missions. . You can't interfere through management levels. The command system is hierarchically structured to work effectively at each level, with every commander taking responsibility for their own domain. I did not see Drapatyi interfering with his subordinates' management of troops, overstepping the authority of brigade or battalion commanders. Thankfully, and I hope this won’t happen. And finally, the OSGT Khortytsia will manage the OTG. It will control tactical groups and brigades, but will not interfere in the management of tactical groups and brigades through the head of the OTG. There will be a normal management hierarchy, which is not present in the army now. Because this continuous firefighting mode and one sleepless person who gives instructions to 100 brigades along the frontline by phone has to end. This is an absolutely absurd practice of commanding troops. If a general wants to command a brigade or a battalion, he should simply inform the country's leadership honestly and change his position. And command a brigade in battle or a battalion in combat. To feel what it is like. Do not interfere four steps down the hierarchy. This only interferes with management and has an absolutely negative impact on the management of troops.
Fifth. Drapatyi focuses on establishing interaction. This is crucial because there are numerous units at the front, each with varying combat capabilities and sets of weapons. They all face issues such as flanking vulnerabilities and challenges in supporting one another. This kind of interaction is developed through an ongoing process—it cannot be achieved with a single order. It is a creative and flexible process. The leader, the commander, must, of course, devote significant attention to this. Building interaction is one of his key tasks. Often, we encounter situations where there are strained or even hostile relations between units—attached units, units operating within another's area of responsibility, or neighboring units. These units often share common or adjacent flanks. Such problems arise because interaction needs to be organized from the top down—it doesn't occur naturally. Someone has to guide personnel, saying, "You, you, and you will operate according to this common plan."
Next. I hope there will be professional communication within the troops—free from hysteria, shouting, or swearing, which are unfortunately often used by leaders who lack professional skills. Based on what I saw from Drapatyi in Kharkiv, and later in Kherson, he is someone who doubts himself and his decisions until the moment they are made. He seeks solutions, consults with various people, and gathers opinions. He is not the type of leader to slam his fist on the table and declare, "My opinion is the only correct one." Instead, he actively searches for the best solution, particularly in critical situations. He becomes firm and decisive only after he has made a decision and is ready to implement it. He is not someone who simply charges forward without thought or consideration. Unfortunately, such an approach is still seen among some of our leaders.
The next is the use of new methods of warfare. At the Kherson OTG, Drapatyi successfully established an intelligence system and an effective interaction between drones and electronic warfare systems. When I wrote about and welcomed his appointment as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, I highlighted that this interaction and the effective use of drones and electronic warfare represent a vital development. This is a practice that must be scaled up across our forces.
Eighth, and last, but not least. Drapatyi tries to be independent and responsible for his direction, to prevent interference in his area of responsibility. This is also very important because there are many managers - careerists in the army who are afraid of any reprimand from their superiors, even when it’s necessary to correct something that’s completely mismatched with the real situation. So these are the eight main traits of Mikhailo Drapatyi that I expect. Correct proper assessment of the situation, branching out the level of responsibility, stopping the interference of the command of the troops at the tactical level, adequate logic of use, building interaction between units, building interaction between electronic warfare intelligence and means, and drones, drones of all kinds and types, and, of course, responsibility, independence for the front, for the Khortytsia front, and what responsibility the commander shares with his subordinates who are trying to build a team, not to be a star who takes pictures, comes once a week to some command and observation post (COP) of a battalion or brigade, takes pictures, posts them on Facebook and tells what a popular person he is in the army. And a person who, without PR and without these endless photos, photo shoots, is trying to build trust in himself, trust that is based on deeds and actions, not on the fact that he runs into some offices and condescendingly tells how he loves everyone, respects everyone, and fulfills any even stupid order. This flattery of the top leadership, this condescending tone is just a disgrace. For the army, of course, all this is absolutely unacceptable at the highest level, because it leads to nothing, to no results, as we have seen over the past three years. We need a different professional tone of voice in the army. For me, it is also important what kind of leaders Drapatyi will bring closer. I evaluate commanders by who they bring closer. Very often we see that people are appointed who have no management experience at all, who are not independent commanders. This is absolutely unacceptable.
I was pleasantly surprised to see that Drapatyi appointed the commander of the 128th – at the beginning of the war, he was the commander of the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade – Oleh Honcharuk as the chief of staff. Oleh Honcharuk was one of those brigade commanders who took the first enemy attack. They proved themselves absolutely worthy in these difficult, challenging battles, taking responsibility, acting independently and proactively. Unfortunately, most of them, almost all of these brigade commanders, were removed from their command positions, removed from their brigades, because they were disobedient, they did not fight for points on the map, they were responsible for their subordinates, and they could not turn a blind eye and send a few dozen of their subordinates to their deaths, because they had grown these brigades and were responsible for their people.
Unfortunately, we often have such commanders, and well, almost all of them were removed from their positions. Those who said "no" to generals who gave inadequate orders. Honcharuk is a commander who has come a long way; he was both a brigade chief of staff and a brigade commander. Now I hope that commanders like him, with a reputation, who have real experience and who can truly prove themselves during this full-scale war, will be appointed to responsible positions both in the Khortytsia OSGT and in the OTG. And the tactical groups subordinate to Khortytsia. I hope that we will see these appointments and that we will stop the practice of appointing favourites, random people to high command positions. And then putting them on trial. I hope all this will be done, and these changes are coming.
And I will keep you informed whether Drapatyi will really be able to do what I have just told you at the operational and strategic level.
Thank you for continuing the fight for Ukraine together with you and we believe that the changes in the leadership of the Armed Forces, the Defence Forces, will strengthen us all.
Glory to Ukraine!
