Analysis of interview with former Commander of Joint Forces of Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Serhii Naiev

Author: Yurii Butusov

The stream is dedicated to the interview with former Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Serhii Naiev.

Ukrainska Pravda has published an interview with General Serhii Naiev, focusing on key events, preparations for the outbreak of war, and the first days of the full-scale invasion. Why did Russian forces manage to penetrate deep into Ukrainian territory almost unimpeded across multiple directions of the front? There was no organized resistance, no coordinated defense, and the enemy was able to advance simultaneously in several directions. Let me remind you that on the second day of the war, the enemy captured one of the largest cities in southern Ukraine—Melitopol, on the first day, they seized Nova Kakhovka, advanced on Kherson, and by the sixth day, Kherson had fallen, by the seventh day, Mariupol was encircled, and within the first week, Ukraine lost control over vast areas in the South. Similar rapid advances occurred in the Kyiv region. In the first two days, the enemy advanced to Kyiv 200 kilometers from the border. It is obvious that the investigation into military commanders and some generals over the failure to prepare for the defense of Kharkiv in May 2024, as well as the detention of former 155th Brigade commander Colonel Riumshyn, makes people think that Volodymyr Zelenskyy is not just trying to restore order in the army, but first and foremost, he is trying to distance himself from the real problems at the front and in the war. He wants to paint a picture where certain bad soldiers are to blame for this mess of problems—mobilization issues, territorial losses, heavy casualties. There are bad soldiers, and then there is the man in white—the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who is only ever associated with the good, in his videos, he speaks only in positive tones, takes no responsibility for anything, and never acknowledges the problems, he always says everything is fine, with the soothing voice of a retired psychotherapist, just calming people down and he is only for everything good. 

Of course, in the situation with the investigation of the defense failure in the Kharkiv region, it is striking that there are appointed scapegoats, executors, managers, but there are no senior leaders in the case at all. There is no commander of the OSG (operational-strategic group), no other officials, no one. Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself and his entourage are not involved in this case, as they were there to check the state of defense and preparations for the offensive in the Kharkiv region, and it turned out that they did not check anything. And now there is a suspicion, obviously, and there are obvious thoughts that Volodymyr Zelenskyy will want to loudly mark the anniversary of the beginning of the war by appointing those responsible for such an unprecedented failure of defense. The whole world was warning: 'Ukrainians! You will be attacked! Tomorrow!' And the Ukrainian leadership kept saying until the very last moment: 'These are all provocations, we are not going to give in to them and we are not going to do anything.' It was still not clear who was to blame. And it is not clear now. A criminal case has been opened, and on the second anniversary of the beginning of the war, Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced and law enforcement agencies confirmed that there is a case on the loss of southern Ukraine and that two key officials are being investigated. These are General Sokolov, the commander of the 'South' military grouping, and General Naiev, the commander of the Joint Forces. There were no detentions, but potential charges were immediately announced. And, obviously, a year has passed, the SBI, the institute, all the forensic experts, everyone is working on this case, nothing has been forgotten, some testimony is being written, interrogations are being conducted. But interrogations, again, as in the Kharkiv case, are conducted only up to a certain level. No higher than Naiev. No one questions Bakanov, who appointed traitors to senior positions in the SSU, or anyone else. So far, this story is limited to Naiev. Therefore, I believe it is quite evident that, given the relentless efforts of the SBI paper pushers, General Naiev displayed remarkable frankness. This interview struck me because, in essence, it presents ready-made testimony and a clearly defined corpus delicti, outlining what Naiev did and did not do. It unequivocally demonstrates that the leadership of Ukraine took no preventive measures, issued no orders, and implemented no organizational actions to counter Russian aggression, to safeguard Ukraine from occupation, or to prevent the rapid surrender of vast territories. Nothing was done. I was particularly shocked to learn from Naiev’s testimony—now official material that must be included in the ongoing criminal case regarding the surrender of the South—that Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy was aware of the impending attack but failed to inform the senior military leadership. In other words, Zelenskyy was warned that the enemy would launch a full-scale invasion at 5 a.m. on February 24, yet he did not relay this intelligence to the military command—nor did anyone else. To my knowledge, there is no precedent in world history where a nation’s leadership received such critical information and deliberately withheld it from those responsible for the country’s defense. Nor did they take any measures to assist the armed forces in repelling the enemy assault. This interview starkly illustrates that fact. Moreover, General Naiev explicitly stated that, apart from the misleading statements by Defense Minister Reznikov—who claimed that no Russian strike groups were massed—he received no further intelligence whatsoever.

Let’s analyze the interview. To assess all of General Naiev’s statements, some of them present indisputable facts that now require evaluation by law enforcement agencies, while others are either corroborated by clear evidence or remain unverified. First, to establish who General Naiev is—since not everyone may be familiar with him—let’s review the decree regarding his appointment as Commander of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He was appointed by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in 2020. The Joint Forces is an operational command and control body of troops. And according to the distribution of authority, it was Naiev who was in charge of the hostilities in the South. It was directly under his control. He was the commander of the Joint Forces Operation. Notably, in 2022, after Russian forces were pushed back from Kyiv and several successful counteroffensive operations were conducted, Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly praised Naiev and held Naiev in high regard. In March 2022, Naiev was awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine by presidential decree. At that time, there was no apparent controversy surrounding his leadership—on the contrary, it seemed evident that Zelenskyy regarded him as a highly capable military commander.

However, something has since changed. The key shift appears to be in Zelenskyy’s political strategy: in an effort to deflect attention from his own missteps—whether failures, corruption scandals, or military setbacks—he consistently seeks out enemies. The entire propaganda and information apparatus of the Presidential Office operates with a singular focus: identifying and discrediting perceived enemies. For Zelenskyy, nearly everyone outside his inner circle—except for Andrii Yermak and Oleh Tatarov—is a potential target. Nothing personal, only his close associates and their business partners. Virtually anyone else can come under attack from the Presidential Office’s propaganda machine, sock-puppets of Zelenskyy, and other information warfare tactics. Journalists are bad, everyone is bad, and even the Americans are bad. Biden, at different times, keeps kicking up a dust against everyone. Given this pattern, it is hardly surprising that the Presidential Office is now seeking to assign blame to certain military officers. I have repeatedly stated on air that in a democratic country undergoing necessary reforms, no individual—no matter their rank or position—should be immune from investigation. If the rule of law exists, we must always conduct thorough investigations, particularly in cases that result in the deaths of Ukrainian citizens. During wartime, such inquiries are not only about accountability but also about improving and adapting our defense forces to ensure better outcomes.

Of course, I am sure that in such cases, at least an investigation is required. First of all, there should be a professional investigation, as we used to say in NATO armies, an after-action review. Secondly, it should be a criminal case, which should define everything clearly and all the circumstances should be recorded. And thirdly, it must be a court, and this court must clearly determine the degree of responsibility of all officials. This is done not only to put someone in jail, but simply to avoid repeating those mistakes and to improve, so that the leaders feel responsible. These are obvious things, but unfortunately, they don't work in Ukraine yet.

Let's take a look at the fragments of Naiev's interview, which I am sure the State Bureau of Investigation should at least use to take testimony from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to begin with. He will not always be president, and his testimony should be taken now. The head of the President's Office, Andrii Yermak, former Defense Minister Reznikov, that is, all the officials who for some reason have not yet been interrogated in this case of the surrender of the South.

So, fragments.

Naiev: "The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine carried out strategic planning, overseeing different branches, forces, and services — they were responsible for generating military strength. What does this generation entail? It includes training, staffing of military equipment, combat readiness, and development. What is development? It refers to the capabilities of these forces. The Command of the Joint Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which receives units ready for deployment from the relevant military formations, then utilizes them. How does it utilize them? It does so based on the decision of the President of Ukraine regarding the use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations established according to Ukrainian law. The Law of Ukraine on Defense clearly outlines in the first part of Article 4 what is done in peacetime. Then, from Article 4, it details what occurs during wartime. Let me remind you that under Ukrainian law, wartime begins either with the declaration of a state of war or with the actual outbreak of hostilities. In the event of armed aggression against Ukraine or the threat of an attack, as stated in Article 4 of the Law of Ukraine on Defense, the President of Ukraine makes three decisions. First, the use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Second, the introduction of martial law. And third, the announcement of the mobilization."

So, dear friends, this fragment just shows the obvious things, but which are important to record. All three decisions that prepare the country for war, i.e. martial law, deployment of troops and mobilization, all depend on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine. If there are no such decisions, the army cannot act alone. And Volodymyr Zelenskyy has not made such decisions. Let's move on.

Naiev: "I emphasize once again. In order to move the troops further, the military leaders received the appropriate commands. They were on the move, but they managed to do what they could. I am informing you that it takes 45 days to fully mobilize the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It takes days, not hours or minutes, for a general military brigade to cover a distance. So I understand that it's late, but we managed to do what we could. If these decisions had been made in advance, the military leadership would have given the appropriate order legally, and the military brigades would have completed the task well in advance of what we are now discussing in retrospect."

So, here, the commander of the Joint Forces, a Hero of Ukraine, who was appointed to this position and received a Star from Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself, states that Zelenskyy did not give any orders to deploy troops. And this is the main reason why it was not possible to prevent the rapid advance of Russian troops. I would like to remind you that on the first day of the war, the enemy managed to advance up to 150 kilometers in different directions practically without any resistance. This happened precisely because the troops were not deployed at all. This issue concerns both the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Valerii Zaluzhnyi, and the political leaders who were legally obliged to issue the order, as Naiev points out. These are Defense Minister Reznikov and, above all, the key figure whom Naiev constantly refers to—Volodymyr Zelenskyy. That is, if Zelenskyy is not even a witness in the case of the surrender of the south if he does not testify at all, it means that he is deliberately avoiding responsibility, misleading the public, and shifting the blame onto those he was supposed to give orders to but did not. In my opinion, this is not just immoral but also a crime and an attempt to cover it up. And sooner or later, Volodymyr Zelenskyy will have to answer for such actions. It is crucial that this is now recorded on video, so the SBI will no longer be able to claim that they did not hear it, did not know, or did not think the president could be involved. Yet, the commander appointed by the president himself believes that it was Zelenskyy who should have given the order in the first place. The next fragment.

Naiev: "If martial law is introduced, the military will not simply get up and start acting on their own—this will not happen. To put it in civilian terms: a father tells his son to go to the store and buy something. Telling him to go to the store—that’s the command. Giving him money—that’s the condition. He gives a command to go to the store and provides the conditions (money) for the purchase. Only then will the action take place: the son will go to the store and buy the necessary item because he has both the command and the means. But if the father only gives the son money but does not tell him where to go or what to do, the son will have money, but nothing will happen.The same applies here: if there is no official decision to deploy the Armed Forces of Ukraine, then the deployment process does not begin. There is no engineering fortification, no firepower preparation, no air defense readiness. Martial law alone is just martial law—without proper decisions, there will be no preparation for military action."

So, there was no preparation. There were no orders. And the only thing missing from this interview—something I strongly feel should be discussed, and which will be the subject of the next program—is: how much did the total absence of any decisions from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief cost the country? How much did it cost in lives? In lost territories? In destroyed towns? In shattered fates of real, living people? This interview is direct evidence for a criminal case—one in which, sooner or later, Volodymyr Zelenskyy will have to answer.The next fragment.

Naiev: "When I became the Commander of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, I approached the Commander-in-Chief, General Zaluzhnyi, and asked, ‘Are we calling up the troops and sending them to the combat zones?’ He replied, ‘Only by a separate order, by a separate directive.’ On February 21, I was at the command post. I saw that in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, civilians were being evacuated—there was an announcement that a million people would be evacuated. And I realized that this wouldn't just blow over. There were clear signs of escalation. On that day, I was at the command post, in contact with seven commanders. We had proper communication, and I told them all on February 21: ‘Deploy all available forces to their assigned operational areas.’ I exceeded my authority—it wasn’t my decision to make—but I took the initiative and acted on my own."

This is yet another confirmation that military leaders never received any orders before the start of hostilities—none at all. We can see that in such conditions, they had to act entirely at their own discretion. In other words, Volodymyr Zelenskyy shut himself away and gave no instructions whatsoever to his subordinates—the very people he had appointed to lead Ukraine’s defense. They were left to act based on their own understanding of the situation. This is a striking example of the decision-making model that still exists in our war today. If a commander wants to save his soldiers, accomplish the mission, and destroy the enemy, he must act according to the reality on the ground. If he strictly follows orders word for word or waits indefinitely for a command, then we end up in situations like the one on February 24, 2022—complete inaction, while people are left guessing what to do. The next fragment.

"-You didn't have any Ukrainian intelligence data at that time?

"-Every day I received a relevant intelligence report. It was a general statement about this or that, and it showed that there were no strike groups around the country. We also remember that on December 21, speaking to a media outlet, the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, who is in charge of one of our country's intelligence agencies, also said that no strike groups had been created in any direction. And there is no document in the Ukrainian document circulation regarding any military command, signed by any head of the Ukrainian intelligence service, that says that on February 24, 2022, there will be a direct Russian aggression against Ukraine, a large-scale offensive. There is no such document".

These words just... It was one of the most shocking moments in this interview with Naiev. Because there was another interview a year ago about preparations for war. The interview was with the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, Kyrylo Budanov. In his story to Ukrainska Pravda, Kyrylo Budanov adds that "on the 23rd, everything became completely clear. The Russians kept postponing the date. For the last two weeks, they kept postponing it for a day or two. But on the 23rd, at about 2:30 p.m., we clearly received information that the start would be at 4 a.m. And how exactly. This was brought to the first person of the state. He gave the order. But just do the math, there wasn't much time left until 4 am."

Budanov goes on to describe how he informed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyi at 2:30 p.m. and went with his wife to check into the office of the DIU. So it turns out that at 2:30 p.m., Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy received information from the intelligence chief that a full-scale offensive against Ukraine would begin tomorrow. Budanov believes that Zelensky gave some orders. But General Naiev, the commander of the Joint Forces, did not receive any orders from Volodymyr Zelenskyy or any information from Kyrylo Budanov. That is, the Ukrainian leadership and, first of all, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, deliberately concealed information about the exact time of the Russian attack from the top military leadership of Ukraine. I don't know how to call it anything else but a deliberate crime, hiding information from the army, which is supposed to repel the aggressor's attack. At 2:30 p.m., with this information, there was enough time to take a large number of preparatory measures. To blow up bridges, for example. To do anything. To take other measures. But this was not done.

What did Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov say? On February 21, Minister Reznikov publicly stated that it was inappropriate to discuss the possibility of a full-scale Russian invasion happening tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. He also claimed that Russia had not yet deployed any strike groups. I want to remind you that, at that time, OSINT sources were flooded with photos and videos showing Russian troops massing near Ukraine’s borders. The entire internet was full of evidence of Russia’s military buildup. So now we can clearly see the coordinated actions between Reznikov and Zelenskyy. Reznikov reassures society, spreading disinformation: "There will be no attack tomorrow or the day after; the Russians are not ready." Meanwhile, on February 23, Volodymyr Zelenskyy receives intelligence on the imminent invasion—and conceals it from the military command. And this is no longer a rumor. This is now backed by an official statement—an interview with Serhii Naiev, Commander of the Joint Forces. I want to see how the SBI will react to this statement. Will they include it in the criminal case? When? I hope to see official inquiries, and we will also send our own request to the SBI to confirm whether they have included Serhii Naiev’s testimony in the case. And when the time comes for testimony, at the very least, the key figures in this case—Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Oleksii Reznikov—must be questioned as witnesses for deliberately withholding critical intelligence from the military. This is a key issue. So much could have been done differently had Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as Naiev noted, passed the intelligence to the military at 2:30 PM on February 23 and issued written orders. In fact, even oral orders would have been sufficient—but there were none. Not a single one. This is simply bizarre. What did Volodymyr Zelenskyy actually do after he received intelligence from Kyrylo Budanov about the imminent attack? Why don’t we know? Why has he never spoken about it—not in his interviews, not in his nightly addresses? Why is he so afraid to discuss this at press conferences—and why does he avoid journalists who might ask such questions? It’s obvious: Zelenskyy has something to hide. Otherwise, he wouldn’t be so afraid of the very questions I am asking now.

If he is afraid, he feels responsible. His own responsibility. And he feels that he is the one who should be primarily responsible for this criminal case on the surrender of the South of Ukraine and other Ukrainian territories. He should be the first to testify and the first to explain his actions in court. The next fragment.

Naiev:"To deploy the defense forces in time, planning must start months in retrospective. What happened in those last critical days was the result of initiative and independent decisions—from the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Zaluzhnyi, from me as the Commander of the Defense Forces of Ukraine, and from other commanders who took the initiative. That's why the troops moved out.
That's why the troops acted. But once again—there was no legal framework of martial law. Just imagine: the 1st Tank Brigade arrives on the outskirts of Chernihiv. But there’s private property everywhere. An owner here, an owner there. And we couldn’t deploy our equipment where it was strategically planned—because it was forbidden. There were no legal orders."

I talked to the commanders, most of the commanders of the Ukrainian brigades and battalions that repelled this first Russian invasion. None of the Ukrainian brigades, I emphasize, none of those that were sent forward, 12 brigades that were moved to the frontier to repel the Russian attack in Kharkiv, Sumy, Chernihiv, Kyiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia regions, none of these military units made it to the designated deployment areas in time. Not a single military unit. This is the result of what General Naiev said in his interview, that there was no time to deploy troops. All of this was done not by order, as he has now clearly said, of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but solely at the last moment on his own initiative. Naiev talks about a meeting, a decision on February 21, and literally a couple of days the troops were deployed, and in fact all our brigades did not have time to deploy on February 24. And they all entered the battle on the fly. Not a single unit was deployed around Kyiv. The 72nd Mechanized Brigade, which was the only one in the Kyiv area, engaged in combat on the move on February 24 in the morning. The Fourth Brigade of the National Guard had almost all of its personnel withdrawn from defense a few days before the attack, withdrawing from the defense of the Hostomel airfield and deploying to the east to the area of Sievierodonetsk and Rubizhne. The 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade, which was there on February 12, began to arrive in the Kherson region, in Oleshky, to defend Chongar. It did not deploy, but stayed in its field camp near Oleshky, far from Perekop, from the dam of the bridges across the Sivash. And so did all the other parts. There was no preparation done. Everything was done without orders. All these troop movements, it was all without orders. Without replenishment. And in an interview, Naiev recalls that the bridges on Chonhar were to be blown up by units of the 137th Air Assault Battalion, which consisted of 237 people. So, all this unpreparedness, coupled with the fact that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the army said nothing about the attack, and the Minister of Defense deliberately misinformed the army and said that there would be no attack. And in general, Russia is not ready - there should be criminal liability for all this. Because because of this bloody lie, many, many tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens died. Unfortunately, they were not prepared for the war, they were not protected, the troops who had to enter the battle on the move, without defined positions for defense, and who did not have time to deploy. I would like to remind you of the territorial defense brigade in Kherson region and the brigade in Zaporizhzhia. The brigade in the Kherson region was considered one of the most efficient.  It had undergone full-scale brigade rallies, exercises multiple times— in 2018, when it was first formed, and again in 2021. But when the moment came—when it was needed most—it was not deployed. February 24, 2022. The soldiers never received weapons from this brigade. It never entered the battle as an organized force. It failed to cover the bridges. No, it could not help the army. Later, the Russians hunted them down— capturing territorial defense fighters, searching for them, eliminating them. Some were put across, some fought wherever the war found them. The cost of all these decisions not made by Zelenskyy is immense. And there will be no escaping responsibility. Because with every passing day, we see more and more testimonies, more and more facts—all pointing to the accountability of the political leadership.

"The most pressing question in society is: who demined Chonhar? Can you just explain?

The night before the offensive, when I was proving to the commanders that an attack was likely the next day, I also told the commander of the group in this sector to set the bridges to full combat readiness—readiness level one.

-Was that Sokolov?

- Yes, Sokolov. Readiness level one means that all the charges are connected, checked, tested—everything is ready. And when the offensive began, we have to understand that it wasn’t robots who were blowing up the bridges; it was ordinary people, like you and me. Back then, they were just soldiers—people with four limbs, two arms, and two legs. When this was happening, bombs, rockets, and other munitions were flying in. Because before the war actually started, it was impossible to blow up those bridges. On what grounds? What legal basis was there to destroy the bridges? They were someone’s property. A decision had to be made to deploy the Armed Forces of Ukraine and simultaneously declare martial law. Before that, it was simply impossible—it would have been illegal. When the fighting started and the bridges were being blown up, the soldiers, in that intense psychological and emotional state, managed to destroy the railway bridge at Chonhar—one of the three bridges there. On the Arabat Spit, they used a pressure charge to destroy one half of the bridge. That charge was placed by Hero of Ukraine Skakun. What is a surface charge? It’s an explosive-laden trailer directed downward. But in the chaos of real combat, the trailer wasn’t positioned precisely in the middle of the bridge—it was placed slightly off-center, with more weight on one side. As a result, the explosion took out only half of the bridge. The enemy was able to drive over the remaining half."

Here I cannot agree with General Naiev's assessment, because we are investigating what actually happened in the south of Ukraine. And last year, Butusov Plus journalist Iryna Storozhenko made one of the most impressive investigative films I've seen on the war. This is the story of the feat of a sailor from the 137th Air Assault Battalion, Skakun, a Hero of Ukraine. This is a young guy who had just joined the army, and his comrade, who was carrying out the explosions with him, saw and witnessed his comrade's feat, and clearly tells how it happened. In fact, there were preparations for blowing up bridges, but they did not receive commands to blow up. Yes, there is a question here that there was no notification from intelligence. But it turned out that the military command had not prepared, despite such threatening events, to activate and test the charges on the bridges in time. And not just the charges—the trailers that were supposed to be deployed—but also the charges that had been laid there back in 2015. Under each bridge, special explosive chambers were installed near the supports, containing explosives. The condition of these chambers and the explosives was checked annually, and sometimes even more than once a year, during military exercises—any military exercises conducted in the South. Why wasn’t this done now? Moreover, an investigation and an interview with a comrade of Hero of Ukraine Skakun reveal that no advance planning took place. There was a plan of some kind, but it was not reviewed in the final days. And there was no order to deploy to the site and detonate the charges immediately after the first explosions. How did it happen that Skakun, together with his comrade, drove the trailer out on their own—just the two of them—without any other commanders or officers? Two young guys who had just joined the army, mere conscripts, with barely any service experience, went out onto the bridge alone. And why did they do it? They actually went there because the enemy did not immediately advance toward that bridge on the Arabat Spit. According to testimonies, they drove the trailer out without any obstacles, at around 11:00 AM, on their own initiative, without receiving any orders. Suddenly, it turned out that the detonators on the trailer were not working—no one had checked their condition beforehand. Clearly, this wasn’t the work of saboteurs, because they didn’t disable or remove the explosives—the detonators simply failed. At that point, Sailor Skakun took it upon himself to activate the explosive device, sacrificing his own life. Unfortunately, the young soldier didn’t have the necessary knowledge on how to properly demolish the bridge. As a result, he and his comrade placed the entire KZ-6 charge—these cumulative explosive devices—together. It turns out that the entire operation depended on these two 20-year-olds. So, with all the high-ranking leadership, all the chiefs of staff, it was still left to two young men to act on their own, improvising as they went. I strongly recommend watching this documentary by Iryna Storozhenko on the Butusov Plus channel.

It turned out that they simply didn't know how to place the explosive device. So they placed it not in the middle of the bridge but on one side. Unfortunately, only one side of the bridge was destroyed. However, this did not stop the enemy’s advance in this direction, as they had other bridges they could use without obstacles.

As of now, General Naiev has stated that the railway bridge across Chonhar was blown up. However, I can't confirm this—I still haven't seen any video evidence showing the extent of the damage to this bridge that would significantly delay troop movements. Maybe there was some damage, I don't know. But the three road bridges across Chonhar remained fully operational. The enemy also used dams to cross.

According to reports online, we have only one confirmed instance where two Russian BMP-3s from the 19th Motorized Rifle Division were blown up by two landmines on the Kutaran dam. This is the only documented case of the enemy hitting mines previously laid by Ukrainians in the Chongar, Sivash, and Lake Sivash areas to stop the Russian advance. There may have been other explosions, but I simply don't have that information. If you do, please share it so we can piece together the full picture. At the moment, I want to emphasize that, with all due respect, the planning and execution of bridge demolitions and crossings in such a strategic direction were not carried out properly. It was not done as it should have been. Who should be responsible for this? I agree with General Naiev that Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who declared martial law by decree, should have done so the moment he received confirmation of an imminent Russian attack—at 2:30 p.m., immediately after Budanov’s report. By 3:00 p.m., there should have been a decree on martial law, followed by immediate orders to demolish the bridges, especially in the south, where there were no troops. In that region, 150 kilometers of the front were covered by only about 1,200 active soldiers from the 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade, which was understaffed and stationed in Oleshky without being deployed, along with 237 soldiers from the 137th Air Assault Battalion. So after eight years of preparing for the defense of the South, only 1,500 soldiers were allocated across 150 kilometers, and most of them weren’t even deployed for defense. What was the point then? There were inspections, military exercises. On February 12, Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself visited Chongar to check the defense. In fact, he had been there more than once—along with Oleh Kulinich, who is now imprisoned for being a Russian FSB agent.

So what is going on? It turns out that our army has an enormous command structure. So many maneuvers, generals, headquarters, and departments, yet nothing was blown up. And the only fact we know is that a sailor, on his own initiative, when he saw that the bridge needed to be blown up, took his comrade and went there. Their detonators didn’t work. So, to make the explosives go off, Sailor Skakun sacrificed his life. I don’t understand how no one is held accountable for this. A man lost his life due to disorganization, chaos, and irresponsibility. So many officers have served in the army for decades, wearing their ranks and talking about war preparations, organizational measures, and so on. But this is the real cost of what happened. Moreover, other key bridges and dams were not blown up at all. According to data released by the enemy—so you understand whether it was effective or not—when one of the road bridges was hit by several Storm Shadow missiles in June 2023, the supports remained intact, and only the roadway was damaged. Traffic was completely stopped from August 7 to 15. They couldn't use this bridge at all, despite the damage being only superficial. There was significant destruction of the roadway, but since the supports remained intact, the enemy was able to repair it quickly, controlling the bridge without resistance or fire. They restored it over eight days. Had the supports been destroyed in time, the bridge would have been irreparable. Yes, there are routes through Perekop, but these are also mined, under fire control, and unsuitable for maneuvering military equipment. One wrong turn off the road, and that’s it—you get stuck, just like Russian tanks got stuck all over Ukraine. That’s why the enemy’s main supply routes rely on bridges. They ensure speed and maneuverability. And yet, nothing was done to stop them."

At the Kutaran dam, where two IFVs, two BMP-3s, exploded, and the enemy stopped traffic there for a day. That is, they took other routes, and traffic was stopped there for a day, and enemy sappers were demining it to use it in the future. Therefore, these explanations are not sufficient, that there is some kind of morale there. What kind of morale? People had to be ready.

All the charges had been checked—the primary ones on the bridges, the spare trailers, the detonators. There should have been not just two soldiers, but at least a full company assigned to each bridge. They were supposed to be there, controlling the detonation, ensuring all firepower was in place. And the explosion should have been carried out only after receiving confirmed intelligence that the enemy was about to attack. In that case, there would have been plenty of time—on the 23rd, up until 5 a.m.—to calmly deploy, set up, detonate, and even reinforce the area with additional minefields. There was more than enough time. And then there would have been no blitzkrieg in the south. Russian APCs wouldn’t have reached Nova Kakhovka on the very first day, 150 kilometers deep into Ukrainian territory. They simply wouldn’t have made it. There would have been no tragedies, no disasters, no February 26 occupation of Melitopol. None of it would have happened. The entire course of the war would have been different. There wouldn’t have been a need for these counteroffensives, forcing our troops to break through Russian defenses head-on, suffering heavy losses. The strategic situation would have been completely different. And now, we see the cost of these failures. So no, this is not enough. First and foremost, the order should have been given before February 24. But in this case, military command should not have waited for written orders—they should have been prepared to act immediately. And yet, as it turns out, nothing was ready for an immediate detonation. And it never happened. I still haven’t heard who was responsible for the inspections, who was in charge at each position, which commander is standing up and saying, ‘I was there, and for these specific reasons, we couldn’t do it—we checked, but we failed.’ Every decision-maker should be named. Every single one. These are the answers we need. Next one, please.

Why did they end up near Mariupol so quickly and almost reach Voznesensk?

- When the Russian Federation invaded, the deepest penetration occurred in the Sumy-Kyiv direction. The enemy used the old Moscow highway through Hlukhiv, advancing through the Sumy and Kyiv regions, reaching Brovary. That created a 370-kilometer-long wedge. Meanwhile, the distance from Armiansk to Voznesensk was about 300 kilometers, but the breakthrough in the north was even deeper. The enemy aimed to occupy the entire country. They advanced from the north toward Kyiv, from the east, from the south, as well as on the Siverskyi and Slobozhanskyi axes. Their goal was a full-scale occupation. However, thanks to General Zaluzhnyi, the Commander of the Security Service of Ukraine, myself, other generals, brigade commanders, battalion commanders, soldiers, and sergeants of the Ukrainian army, we managed to repel the first attacks, inflict significant losses on the enemy, and continue striking back. As mobilization increased, additional forces joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations, further weakening the enemy. He started suffering losses, and his combat potential declined. As a result, Russia had to make a decision—why withdraw from Kyiv? Because they could not sustain simultaneous offensives in both the southeastern and Kyiv directions. They withdrew forces from Kyiv and redeployed them to the southeastern front. However, if they had decided to focus on Kyiv instead—transferring additional forces from the east and south—the battle for Kyiv would have been extremely intense and devastating. It could have looked something like what is happening now in Kherson.

I agree that the Russian advance was indeed unimpeded in several areas. But in each of these directions, there must have been designated officials responsible for this. There were responsible people everywhere. It was not as if there were no military leaders. They were present. There were reports, maneuvers, numerous headquarters, and departments. So what were they doing? If they are not guilty, then someone should say so in their testimony—who was responsible for demolishing bridges, like the Ivankiv Bridge or those in the Chornobyl zone, or for failing to mine these roads? The enemy had 70-kilometer-long columns, and we did not mine them, we couldn’t block them, as it turned out. And they advanced at such a pace. Of course, there should have been accountable officers for each direction, not just in the south. But in the south, the consequences were devastating—huge losses of civilians and Ukrainian soldiers, who were completely unprepared and had to engage in counter-battles against an enemy that vastly outnumbered them. The enemy’s advantage in the southern sector was overwhelming. In the first echelon, our defenses were held by one of the weakest units—the 59th Brigade and the 137th Battalion. Meanwhile, according to our General Staff, at least 22 battalion tactical groups were concentrated in that area. This meant they had a significant advantage and were fully equipped. In the first days alone, their numerical superiority in this direction was at least 10-12 times, possibly even greater, considering the presence of reinforcement units such as the Russian National Guard, artillery, and aviation. Factoring in all of these elements, their advantage could have been nearly two orders of magnitude. That’s why this investigation, and any potential criminal case, should not be limited to just the South. But what happened there—the fact that the enemy advanced 300 kilometers to Voznesensk, captured the regional center of Kherson—cannot be ignored. Once again, none of the three bridges across the Dnipro were blown up. No one even guarded them. The enemy reached these bridges without resistance. And on their way from Perekop and Chonhar to Kherson and Nova Kakhovka, there were up to 20 bridges they had to cross—none of them were destroyed. Not a single one. Nothing was deployed. The enemy entered Melitopol with virtually no resistance. It happened quickly. So who will be held accountable for this? The argument that ‘the Russians advanced 300 kilometers elsewhere and no one is being prosecuted there’ doesn’t hold up. They should be prosecuted for that as well."

It's not about putting everyone in jail or charging them with criminal offenses. It’s about the fact that people died, and billions—tens of billions—of hryvnias were wasted. Taxpayers’ money was spent on defense, on maintaining the vast and complex infrastructure of the President's Office, the military, the Security Service, and the Border Guard Service. And yet, when they were needed most, all of these institutions failed in multiple areas. Why did this happen? This needs to be documented. It cannot remain a matter of speculation or debate. It must be written down, with all testimonies attached, and responsibility clearly assigned. Now, I understand Naiev’s position—he speaks plainly. The top leadership remained silent. Zelenskyy withheld intelligence. No orders were given—no preparation, no organization, no verification. Nothing. It’s all clear now. Now, we need to hear the same kind of testimony from Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his so-called "effective" managers—those five or six individuals who run the country. From Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov, from SSU chief Ivan Bakanov—who, for some reason, is still not in prison but freely walking around. In reality, this man stalled, remained completely inactive, utterly failed in countering the FSB in Ukraine, surrendered critical positions, and botched several major operations by Ukrainian intelligence services. And yet, he strolls through Kyiv as if nothing happened. Everything is just fine for him. Everyone must be held accountable. No one is above responsibility. Neither power nor the wealth they have accumulated over these years can shield them from answering for their actions. This is why this interview is so important—these testimonies are crucial and must be immediately added to the criminal case. We will be filing the necessary requests, and I hope other media outlets will as well. The public deserves to know who is responsible for these failures. First and foremost, so that this never happens again. And secondly, out of respect for those who, at the cost of their lives, had to make up for the incompetence, lies, and irresponsibility of top officials. This only elevates the heroism of people like Sailor Skakun and the many others—tens of thousands, now over a hundred thousand—who, tragically, gave their lives for Ukraine.

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