Iskander strike on 168th reserve battalion: what had happened, who was responsible and how to avoid recurrence?
On 1 March, at 15:20, an "Iskander-M" ballistic missile, guided by a hostile drone, struck the location of the 168th reserve battalion of the "East" operational command near the village of Cherkaske, Dnipropetrovsk region. According to sources, up to 39 Ukrainian servicemen were killed and up to 90 wounded.
What is the 168th Reserve Battalion?
This is a military unit of the Land Forces within the "East" operational command, whose task is to redistribute personnel from one military unit to another. The battalion command is the permanent staff of the battalion, and most of the people are there temporarily; at the time of the strike, there were many hundreds of soldiers. There is no combat training. The unit is a tent camp in an open area near the 239th training ground of Land Forces, approximately 130-140 km from the front line. The tents are located close enough to be visible from the air, a significant number of tents are buried, but there are no dugouts, all tents are not protected from above, and the part of the camp where meetings and formations are held is also not protected. A large car park for dozens of cars was located near the camp. People were constantly arriving and leaving the unit, and there was constant traffic.
What is the need to keep crowds of people in one poorly equipped and poorly protected place?
The main method of transfer in the Ukrainian defence forces is a chaotic and poorly regulated process through unauthorised abandonment of the unit. AWOL has ceased to be a criminal offence, so all those who for various reasons left the service earlier or are going to transfer without the consent of the unit command are transferred to the reserve battalion, so they are overcrowded. There is also a stream of soldiers with regular transfers, but the main contingent now is the AWOL. The reserve battalion was receiving soldiers for transfer, and every day there were "buyers" - representatives of those units that were given permission to select people in the battalion. Therefore, there were constant meetings and line-ups - people arriving, people being counted, people being gathered to talk to recruiters, people moving on their own, people being sent. There was constant traffic. It is extremely difficult to maintain order - people come temporarily, many of them are motivated, but there is a large number of unmotivated and undisciplined people, some stay in tents for several days, and some for two months, constant raids to check for illegal alcohol, sometimes even fights, constant hikes to the nearest settlements. There is no military justice in Ukraine, so all discipline and order in the crowd is controlled by a small number of commanders, who are not enough for such circumstances. The military command at all levels constantly monitored the battalion's activities and was aware of all the problems.
How is the air defence and air cover of the camp organized?
The airspace is protected by the "East" Air Command. Russian reconnaissance drones fly in these areas on a regular basis, daily, and there are frequent reports of a possible missile attack. Some of the reconnaissance drones are spotted and intercepted, others are not. Sometimes no warning is given to ground troops about drone flights. However, on 1 March, a Russian drone was spotted and monitored, and attempts were even made to destroy it, but they were unsuccessful. This Russian drone was flying over the territory of the Dnipropetrovsk region for about 6 hours, but it was not shot down during this time. The 168th Reserve Battalion itself was apparently not the main target of the reconnaissance, but was part of the planned reconnaissance targets. The missile strike was caused by the enemy noticing the formation and the gathering of people who were leaving the formation. At 15:07, the "East" Air Command, according to Censor.NET's sources in the Air Force, issued a warning about the threat of a missile attack, and information about the drone's flight was also reported.
Why did they fail to avoid large losses?
Due to frequent drone overflights and warnings of a missile attack, most military units do not respond to them. The soldiers who were on the territory of the 168th battalion during the attack told Censor.NET that the unit operated as usual even during the warnings, and the movement of people was not restricted during the warnings, there were no commands to take shelter, and no dispersal was carried out. Lining up, meetings, i.e. normal work were continuing. Most people were in tents that were not protected from above, or moving around the camp, some were at the assembly area. The Russian missile was equipped with a cluster warhead that covered a large area.
Who is responsible?
Attacks on deployment points are constant. However, even in the fourth year of the war, it is not possible to guarantee the safety of troops and avoid heavy losses. The reason for this is the basic irresponsibility for the lives of personnel on the part of the military leadership at all levels. Orders are issued that are not controlled, or that contradict other tasks for which orders are also issued. There should be questions to all those who managed and controlled the organisation of service of the 168th Reserve Battalion, the "East" OC, the Land Forces Command, the "East" AC, and the Air Force Command. Currently, the blame is being placed solely on the battalion commander, who has been dismissed.
What can be done to avoid the recurrence of such tragedies?
1. Mass gatherings of people that cannot be disguised and their daily activities organised covertly should be prohibited in areas where enemy drones are constantly flying in - that is, all training and reserve camps to accommodate thousands of people should be moved at least 400-500 km from the front line.
2. Coverage of the frontline areas should be strengthened with radar and our own interceptor drones to increase the density and quality of enemy drone strike capabilities. A 6-hour drone flight over our rear is unacceptable, and there are now enough means to intercept it.
3. The location of troop concentrations in the frontline area must be provided with shelters, and troops must be dispersed to avoid mass gatherings, especially if they are repeated in the same place.
4. Interaction between ground and air forces regarding warnings of drone flights and the organisation of human security should be the first priority for commanders and officers at all levels. The leadership of the Armed Forces should introduce an after-action review procedure to quickly identify the causes of significant personnel losses outside of criminal proceedings and to quickly make changes to the organisation of the service. Because over the three years of war, attacks on deployment points have been carried out constantly, dozens of times resulting in casualties, several times in large numbers, and we need to start drawing systematic conclusions and prevent large simultaneous losses, and this can be achieved by basic measures.
5. Not only direct commanders should be held accountable for violations of requirements and orders on the safety of personnel, but first and foremost commanders responsible for the organisation and control of military units.
