Events in Kursk region, Donbas, Trump’s statements
Stream about the events of March 7. What is happening in the Kursk region? What do Trump’s statements mean?
March 7 is a sorrowful date in Ukraine’s history. Two years ago, a true national hero of Ukraine, one of the symbols of the Ukrainian nation’s resistance, Dmytro Kotsiubailo, was killed. The commander of the First Assault Battalion, Dmytro Kotsiubailo, fell during enemy shelling while defending the town of Chasiv Yar near Bakhmut.
Dmytro was always a man who called for struggle. He himself embodied resistance, a symbol of true resilience—without exaggeration—because for many years, he personified this fight and always took responsibility upon himself. In many aspects of his life, he was the first—throughout his 27 years—and we will never forget him. He was a true patriot of Ukraine and a role model for all future generations.
And now, we turn to the situation in the Kursk region, developments in Donbas, and foreign policy affairs.
Ukraine’s fate is being decided on the battlefield. Recognition that Ukraine is strong, that Ukraine is capable of defending itself, that Ukraine cannot be broken, and that Ukraine’s interests must be taken into account—all of this is forged in only one place: the battlefield. The weight of the Ukrainian government's authority, respect for Ukraine’s leadership—all of it is built on the courage, bravery, and resilience of Ukrainian soldiers. It is the Ukrainian warriors, the Defense Forces holding the front line, who give Ukraine strength and leverage in any negotiations. And it is the resilience of our frontline that determines the course of further negotiations. Regardless of what is said about peace, we do not know when it will come. But we do know for certain: as long as Ukraine effectively destroys the occupiers, as long as Russia remains unable to break Ukrainian resistance, Ukraine stands. And no one will force Ukraine into steps that are detrimental to the Ukrainian nation. Stabilizing the front, halting the Russian offensive, and crushing Russian strike formations—these are the key arguments that secure Ukraine’s position in foreign policy.
Now, to the situation in the hotspots along the front. Let's start with the situation in the Kursk region.
The Ukrainian grouping, the Ukrainian bridgehead, has been deeply cut by the enemy. I speak frequently with soldiers and commanders in this area, and I can say that the situation in the buffer zone in the Kursk region is extremely difficult. This is currently the most challenging sector of the frontline. The main issue lies in the very configuration of this bridgehead. Supply routes are severely constrained. The enemy, understanding that our objective is to hold this area, has advanced dangerously close to our lines of communication from both flanks. In modern warfare, while it was once said that controlling supply routes meant the enemy having direct fire on a road from a kilometer or two away, today’s military technologies allow the enemy to establish fire control over supply lines at distances of 5 to 10 kilometers. In modern warfare, while it was once said that controlling supply routes meant the enemy having direct fire on a road from a kilometer or two away, today’s military technologies allow the enemy to establish fire control over supply lines at distances of 5 to 10 kilometers. Naturally, under such conditions, relying on these logistics routes becomes extremely difficult. The enemy is inflicting heavy losses on our supply lines through strikes by drones, aircraft, and artillery. Holding this buffer zone—when it is so narrow along the front and exposed to fire from both flanks—is an extremely complex and costly effort.
What our soldiers are demonstrating in this buffer zone is, as always, an act of mass heroism—just as Ukrainian infantrymen and warriors have always done wherever they fight. Every step the enemy takes, even there, comes at an enormous cost in casualties. Nevertheless, the key question now is whether it is strategically viable for us to hold such a bridgehead—one that relies on a single line of communication, which remains under enemy fire control and constant shelling. This is undeniably a critical issue. I understand that, politically, it is highly disadvantageous to acknowledge that we might need to withdraw from this buffer zone, that we need leverage and a demonstration that we, too, can negotiate over this area. But, friends, every decision in war has its pragmatic cost—the cost of the lives of those who carry out orders. The lives of Ukrainian soldiers.
I believe that if there are no sufficient forces to establish fire control over the Russian flanks and strike groups, to destroy them, and if there are no forces to suppress Russian firepower—particularly their drone units—then, undoubtedly, only those people who are in the area themselves are trying to stand there until the end should say that we must stand there until the end. Every military operation has its cost and strategic rationale. If we are holding tactically disadvantageous positions, I see no reason to hold out to the last solely for political reasons. I know that the current situation is not an encirclement. The wedge that the enemy has driven in is narrow; this does not mean our troops are surrounded. We still have lines of communication, we still have the ability to defend ourselves, but the cost of sustaining this defense is extremely high. This wedge is also not stable. The enemy is advancing through the forests, pushing forward with another wave—this time a new Korean unit, which has literally paved its way forward with corpses. The previous Korean unit was annihilated by Ukrainian soldiers, but now the enemy has broken through this corridor. They continue frontal assaults with infantry, attacking in wave after wave for several days, and they have managed to drive this wedge deeper. Of course, the situation does not appear to be one where everything will be lost tomorrow or the day after. However, the cost of holding such tactically disadvantageous positions remains extremely high. When Ukraine’s leadership orders troops to hold on in such conditions, it must weigh whether Ukraine can afford to pay the price for these unfavorable tactical positions in the lives of our soldiers. I believe that the leadership must assess the situation carefully—if additional forces are available and can be concentrated to strike the enemy, restore the situation, expand the controlled area, and improve supply lines, this must be done immediately. However, if such forces are unavailable, then I see no logic in turning this bridgehead into another Krynkyi, another counteroffensive at any cost. For now, we will continue monitoring the situation. I will keep writing, gathering more information, and very soon, I will be there myself to show whether adequate supply routes remain operational and in what conditions Ukrainian soldiers continue to fight.
Situation in Donbas. The enemy also launched a massive offensive in another area. Pokrovsk and the second section - Chasiv Yar-Toretsk.
In the Luhansk OTG (Operational-Tactical Group) zone, the enemy has launched an offensive aimed at capturing Kostiantynivka. The enemy is attempting to fully seize Toretsk, secure control over Chasiv Yar, and advance toward Kostyantynivka. Capturing Kostiantynivka would allow the enemy to directly prepare for an offensive against one of the key agglomerations in Donbas—the gateway to Slobozhanshchyna, in fact, one of the most strategic hubs in the region is Sloviansk-Kramatorsk. Naturally, this remains the primary operational objective of the Russian army in Donbas, and they are making every effort to achieve it. The enemy has deployed the Eighth Combined Arms Army in the direction of Toretsk and concentrated all its units. Notably, the Russians have massed at least two regiments of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division in this direction, while at least one more regiment from this division has been committed to the offensive in the Kursk region. However, the enemy's resources are not unlimited, and the heavy losses suffered by Russian forces are taking a toll. As a result, they have replenished their 150th Motorized Rifle Division but have been forced to split it into two groups to sustain simultaneous offensives in their two priority directions. At Toretsk, three Russian brigades—the 1st, 9th, and 132nd—were effectively driven out and the 1st Brigade was then redeployed to another axis near Pokrovsk, while the main forces of the 150th Division were brought in to reinforce.
The enemy is also struggling to replenish assault troops. The Russian war machine continues to churn out cannon fodder, throwing more and more people into assaults. However, improvements in command and control, primarily through UAVs, enable Ukrainian forces to inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy. As a result, due to the depletion of assault troops—these human waves—the enemy is halting its offensives in many sectors. It then looks for other weak spots, redeploying the remnants of its reserves and reinforcements, trying to concentrate them in areas where achieving success is critical.
We see the situation in Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, where intense battles are raging, the enemy is also deploying a massive number of drones, so our troops in this direction urgently need support—drones and other essential supplies.
At a time when the enemy is attempting to concentrate all its forces on the neighboring sector, near Pokrovsk, it has suspended its offensive—and not without reason. We can see that the Russians had made significant efforts to encircle and capture Pokrovsk and push further into the Dnipropetrovsk region. However, they were halted by Ukrainian forces, suffering heavy losses, and as a result, the enemy’s offensive in this direction has been effectively brought to a standstill. Massive casualties and reserves are ground down. Specific detail is that in order to continue their offensive, the Russians redeployed the severely battered 1st Brigade from Toretsk, sending all remaining personnel to the Kotlyne area in a desperate attempt to break through and encircle Pokrovsk—but they failed. Regarding the situation in Pokrovsk, I don’t like the term "stabilized situation," because stabilization implies a set of comprehensive measures—establishing defensive lines, fortifying positions, deploying troops, and ensuring security. I wouldn’t say the situation is stabilized. Instead, I would say that Ukrainian forces, in these encounter battles against the advancing enemy, have gained the upper hand in several areas, pushed the enemy back, and launched a series of successful counteroffensives. Most notably, this success was achieved by the 425th Skala (Rock) Assault Regiment, which repelled enemy forces across multiple positions. This is a direct result of the efforts of Ukrainian troops securing positions behind the assault units and holding the front line. Additionally, it is crucial to acknowledge the role of UAV units, which, thanks to effective command decisions, have effectively achieved air superiority in this direction, inflicting significant losses on the enemy. However, it should be noted that this is not a one-sided battle. The enemy has also concentrated substantial forces in the area—its drones are highly active, and its artillery fire is at maximum intensity. Yet, the enemy is unable to regain the initiative or resume its offensive. What can I say, friends? The situation at the front remains extremely difficult. On a more positive note, as of yesterday (March 6), the first appointments of corps commanders have begun.
Prior to this, there were no written orders authorizing corps commanders to assume and perform their duties.
The first appointment was Colonel Andrii Biletskyi, who has been designated as the commander of the 3rd Army Corps. A written order has already been issued, so we can congratulate the soldiers of the 3rd Assault Brigade, which Biletskyi founded and commanded, on this recognition. I hope that we will soon receive good news regarding other corps, where competent commanders have been appointed both within the Armed Forces and the National Guard. Unfortunately, this process has been somewhat delayed, but we expect that in the coming days, all qualified commanders will receive their official appointments. We are eagerly awaiting this, because as we can see from the example of Pokrovsk, stopping an offensive that once seemed unstoppable—where the enemy was advancing by 100 meters every day—is only possible with proper command and control at both the operational and tactical levels. There has to be a systematic approach, something we have discussed extensively. Now, looking at Pokrovsk, we can see that in December, the enemy was advancing, but by the end of January, the initiative had shifted. Something changed—some adjustments in command and control—and by February, Ukrainian forces, with the same composition as before, had seized the initiative.
The changes that have taken place at the level of the Pokrovsk TG (Tactical Group)can be implemented along the entire front line. Coordination of fire control, ground forces, coordination of UAVs, drones with infantry, with assault units, with electronic warfare systems. Even in such a simple form as this, much more can be done. Changes are possible.
I truly hope that the appointment of corps commanders and the establishment of a permanent corps structure will mark a turning point in reorganization, the competent commanders who are appointed will not only be able to reorganize their brigades, but they will also be capable of reshaping the entire front line. We are waiting for the appointment of all the commanders I have frequently mentioned on air.
Answers to questions
Sources from The New York Post suggest that Ukrainian troops could be withdrawn from the Kursk region within two weeks. Could this be a condition for negotiations?
No, this cannot be a condition for negotiations. This is a strictly tactical situation, driven by the large enemy forces that are being thrown into frontal assaults on this military bridgehead. The enemy has achieved significant numerical superiority in the Kursk direction—a much greater advantage than before. In my view, any withdrawal from this bridgehead would be dictated purely by the tactical situation, not by political decisions. Therefore, I hope that rational decisions based on the battlefield situation will be made—and well before two weeks have passed. I expect this to happen much sooner.
To what extent will Russia escalate its shelling in response to the US announcement that it will stop sharing intelligence?
Certainly, the cessation of intelligence sharing by the United States will be a serious blow to our situational awareness regarding enemy actions. I believe this will impact multiple aspects of combat operations. However, rather than directly leading to an increase in Russian shelling, it is more likely to result in fewer Russian losses and, unfortunately, greater casualties among Ukrainian forces. This advantage in situational awareness has been one of Ukraine's key strengths in this war—and remains so. I hope that our allies and NATO partners will continue to provide us with intelligence support. Moreover, our own intelligence agencies possess significant capabilities, which are undoubtedly essential for us.
In your opinion, how can the issue of the TCR be resolved and how can people be motivated, as it was at the beginning of the war?
Friends, it is impossible to recreate what happened at the beginning of the war, or to repeat what once occurred in life. You cannot find long lines of motivated volunteer fighters again—because all the volunteers are already at the front, all have found their place in this war. The problem is that motivation must be created to replenish the army. Every military professional knows this. There is a fundamental concept that our military operates with—the generation of troops. In other words, troops must be generated, formed, and structured. I talk to people every day. If Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCRs) are detaining people at factory front gate entrances—people who pay taxes, work legally, generate added value. If people are caught and sent to an unprepared location, where they receive no attention, have no commanders, and lack proper training, what kind of motivation can they possibly have? Everything happens in life. Sometimes a person is really morally and psychologically unprepared to participate in war. In any position at all. He does not know what it is. He is unprepared. You can wash out like we do. This is why we have a massive issue with AWOL (Absent Without Leave)—those who leave their units without permission. But the alternative exists: these people could instead be integrated into properly structured units, into brigades where they are valued, where training and preparation are well-organized, where they are assigned to experienced, competent commanders and sergeants who treat them as comrades. Proper conditions are provided, individual concerns are addressed, and every soldier understands that they are important. When people feel valued, they perform, they integrate into the team. When they do not feel valued, no miracle will happen. The problem is that our military leadership assumes that every recruit entering the army must already be highly motivated—like the volunteer fighters of 2022, who equipped themselves at their own expense, ignored the fact that nothing was provided upon mobilization, bought their own gear, relied on family, friends, and volunteers. They found their own units, went into battle on their own, fought even without ammunition, coordinated reconnaissance, communications, logistics, cohesion, and training—all by themselves. And the generals? Many of them simply existed to point at maps and issue orders. Of course, the military leadership would like this model to continue. But it cannot continue.Every nation that has fought a large-scale war with mobilized armies—whether in the First or Second World War—has faced the same problem. We should not expect that showing some emotional footage on a TV marathon will suddenly make everyone still at home stand up and become volunteer soldier. People must be treated in the way you expect them to act. The same principle applies to mobilization. The process must be taken out of the hands of indifferent officials in TCRs, who are simply trying to meet quotas at any cost. What happens next? To hand over a set number of recruits with passports. If we need to move from this to the fact that mobilization is part of the process of manning specific troops. Specific troops, specific commanders who are responsible for their people and are directly involved in integrating them into units. From the very first minute a soldier is enlisted, they must immediately understand that they are important. Their life matters from the very moment the state takes responsibility for leading them into battle and requiring them to risk their lives. From the first minute, this responsibility must be understood—and demonstrated. Then this army will receive people whom you can train and in whom motivation is created, generated, not from scratch.
I meet many fighters at the front who have been forcibly mobilized—caught on the street or when they came to update their records at the TCR, only to be immediately sent to the front. Many of them were not initially motivated to enlist as volunteer fighters, but a large number still follow orders with integrity and fight. In the 153rd Brigade, I recently filmed soldiers who had no motivation at first, were sent to war against their will, yet acted with courage and even captured a Russian occupier. And here is what is clear: our people still hold an advantage over the enemy—in both motivation and intelligence. Even those who were forcibly mobilized by the TCR are far more motivated than the Russian contract soldiers, who are pushed into war under deception. it is said that Ukraine has already collapsed, has lost, that all they need to do is reach a certain treeline, and victory is assured. They are promised money, bonuses, and full payments. But, in reality, they are not paid upfront—the majority of their wages are delayed until later, by which time most of these assault troops have already turned into fertilizer. We must counteract a system that deceives people by ensuring that they are treated with honesty. A person who is mobilized should be given transparent information and not be misled. Because when someone is deceived, many of them do not become effective soldiers—they simply run away. As a result, the TCR meets its quota, but the army does not receive a trained soldier. I believe that each region should be assigned to specific brigades, specific military units. This would establish a clear link between the TCR and the replenishment of designated military units. The goal should not be to randomly send people somewhere, but to reinforce specific military units with proper structure and accountability. Right now, it does not exist. The TCR reports that it has sent people, the training center reports that it has trained them—but at the training stage, some recruits deserted, then, they are randomly assigned to units where they are placed in conditions for which they are unprepared, and they deserted again. Then, due to poor deployment or mismanagement, more desertions occur. What do we see? Where brigades and units are well-organized, the number of AWOL cases is minimal—even during intense combat. This is because teamwork exists, and commanders take responsibility at every level. Soldiers value and recognize this—they feel it. They understand that they are part of a team, part of a collective, that they are given full attention and not treated as expendable resources.
We received more mines with the inscription "Examined", 13 shots, no explosions".
Please send us photos, forms, the type of mine itself, and we will study this issue and, of course, raise it again, as we did in all previous cases.
On foreign policy statements
First of all. Another series of scandalous statements by US President Trump:
It is harder to negotiate an end to the war with Ukraine than with Russia. Putin wants peace. I believe Putin, Trump said. I think we are doing very well with Russia. But now they are bombing the hell out of Ukraine. To be honest, it's getting harder for me to deal with Ukraine. They have no trump cards, Trump said. I need to know if Ukraine wants to settle the war. If they don't want a settlement, we're out of there, the US president stressed. He also touched on the issue of cutting off military aid. He says he is doing what anyone would do in his position. Because the United States has allegedly spent $350 billion to help Ukraine. Trump has confirmed that Putin is taking advantage of the fact that the US has restricted Ukraine's access to intelligence and military assistance. Anyone in his place would do the same, the US president said. We are working very hard to regulate the war. And that's all I'm thinking about right now. We are losing 2,000 young people every week. In the case of one country, more older people, because young people are dead, Trump added.
We are witnessing a powerful wave of pro-Russian statements, which are already being reinforced by concrete decisions. The U.S. president has now effectively restricted the provision of intelligence used for strikes against the Russian Federation—intelligence that was of critical importance. He has also curtailed military aid, which, by President Biden’s decision, had continued to be supplied to Ukraine throughout the war. But now, this is no longer just rhetoric—it is the implementation of anti-Ukrainian policies by the U.S. leadership. It is obvious what stands behind these decisions… but I will not even assess these statements. Frankly, in my view, it is disgraceful that the U.S. president is spreading such blatant falsehoods—claiming that Putin seeks peace while Ukraine refuses negotiations. This, of course, demonstrates a complete misinterpretation of the situation within the mindset of the American leadership at this moment. And this is deeply disappointing, because many true friends of Ukraine remain in the United States—people who continue to do everything in their power to support Ukraine, including within the American government. However, we now see that these political statements—already backed by concrete anti-Ukrainian actions—represent a serious threat to us.
Statements that have an important context in this situation:
Ukraine and the United States have resumed cooperation. Substantive meeting could take place next week, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy stated. Zelenskyy said he believes that Russia must be persuaded to recognize the necessity of ending the war—which means halting attacks on Ukraine’s energy sector and civilian infrastructure, enforcing a truce at sea, and releasing POWs. Despite recent anti-Ukrainian actions, Ukraine’s leadership has acknowledged that without the United States, continuing a full-scale war would result in severe losses and major challenges, indeed, without American support—especially its decisive backing—a swift victory over Russia would be impossible. This would lead to a prolonged war and a significant rise in its overall cost. I believe this is the right course of action. From the very beginning—even before the Oval Office meeting—I said that Ukraine must sign an agreement on a fund for mineral resource development in Ukraine. This is undoubtedly a beneficial initiative for us. I have also stated that despite all of Trump’s negative and unpleasant statements, Ukraine must confront reality. The reality is that Ukraine has deep ties and a serious dependence on U.S. support at every level—not only in terms of military aid but also political backing through sanctions and financial-economic assistance. We cannot afford to lose this support—we must fight for it. I welcome the continuation of these negotiations—even though I personally find Trump’s statements unpleasant and unacceptable, the reality remains unchanged. To save Ukrainian lives, to safeguard our nation, we must take all necessary political steps to ensure that dialogue with the United States continues.
Because these negotiations are not between Zelenskyy and Trump. This war is not a conflict between Zelenskyy and Trump—it is Putin’s aggression. The support we received from the U.S. president was not just a personal decision—it was also the will of the American people. We need negotiations not just to engage in talks with Trump, but to establish a broader dialogue with the United States as a whole. I believe that the current strategy of the Ukrainian leadership—where all decisions regarding negotiations continue to be made exclusively by Yermak and Zelenskyy—is weak and fundamentally flawed. First and foremost, these individuals are far removed from diplomacy. This is evident from their public statements. And we must acknowledge that they hold their positions because they have the support of the Ukrainian people. At this moment, Ukraine’s leadership should take a broader perspective and mobilize all individuals in Ukraine who have influence—public opinion leaders, statesmen, and those with strong ties to the United States. We need a Ukrainian task force to engage with public opinion, U.S. politicians, and key decision-makers. Constant interviews in the media are needed there to support the Ukrainian position. Not just within Ukrainian-language social media, but directly in the United States, speaking to Americans in English, engaging with U.S. citizens to shape and influence public opinion at a broader level. This is not happening because Zelenskyy and Yermak believe that negotiations with the United States are exclusively their personal domain. I can still understand the logic behind the president’s decision to prohibit anyone but himself from negotiating with Russia—that, at least, is somewhat understandable. But why the Servants of the People have monopolized Ukraine’s diplomacy with the West is an enormous mistake and a significant weakening of Ukraine’s position. What Zelenskyy and Yermak are doing is undermining Ukraine’s position as a state. Instead of expanding communication at multiple levels across American society and government, they are narrowing it down to just the two of them. Even when it comes to media engagement with American outlets, they are the only ones allowed to speak. This approach is incredibly short-sighted and counterproductive—and frankly, deeply disappointing. I believe that we need to strengthen our relations with America at this very moment at the level of bilateral relations with different states, governments, governors of different states, at the level of American society, with American journalists. There should be a large number of Ukrainians, war veterans, Ukrainian diplomats, representatives of the Ukrainian parliament, all factions, of course, who say that we are united in defending our interests, that it is not Zelenskyy who is the bad one who just quarreled with Trump, that we are all defending certain programs, certain points. And we need your support of the American people. We need to tell Americans to support us as well. We need to go to rallies so that the media would have constant interviews, constant news stories from Ukrainians. This needs to be done systematically, and not as a small, meaningless monopoly, like one office trying to have 5-6 managers manage the whole of Ukraine, and they want two managers to negotiate with the whole world, with dozens of countries at the same time, with America. This is just madness.
I want to say that if Zelenskyy and Yermak continue to monopolize the dialogue with the West and focus solely on tactical maneuvers, we risk losing these negotiations. Through such short-sighted actions—monopolizing and narrowing the scope of negotiations—they are actively weakening Ukraine’s position in foreign policy and in this standoff with Trump. This is my view, and I hope that instead of prioritizing personal ambitions and approval ratings, Zelenskyy will recognize that this is a responsibility toward the people of Ukraine and our nation. We must make every effort to amplify our influence—expanding our impact on American public opinion and strengthening engagement with American society. We need to improve our interaction. I hope for adequate decisions.
It is very important that our European allies support us. They want to quickly develop a peace plan with Ukraine, which will be presented in the United States.The leaders of France and the United Kingdom are actively working to draft a peace plan for Ukraine. This is a positive and necessary initiative for us. However, Ukraine needs financial support. While we can temporarily reduce expenditures on American precision weapons and artillery shells, and we can source some equipment from other manufacturers, we still require significant resources to sustain our army, maintain defensive operations, and procure high-tech weaponry, including drones, electronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems, personal equipment for soldiers, and transport vehicles. All of this demands substantial funding. Right now, Ukraine needs Europe. We must leverage European unity to encourage European nations to expand their direct financial aid to Ukraine—to offset the gap created by Trump's refusal to continue U.S. assistance.
The United Kingdom has provided the first loan to help Ukraine procure specific types of weapons. Additionally, the Netherlands has committed to increasing military aid. Meanwhile, Norway has announced a $3 billion increase in financial assistance to Ukraine. In total, this represents a significant contribution of $7.8 billion. This is a substantial level of support, and if all European nations follow this path, it will undoubtedly be a game-changer.
So, what is happening now? The United States is exerting pressure—specifically, Trump and his team are pressuring Ukraine—to force the Ukrainian leadership into accepting unilateral concessions. Trump is not exerting any pressure on Putin, nor is he creating any difficulties for Russia. He is using his only available leverage—Ukraine—by pushing Kyiv into negotiations with virtually no preconditions. What does this lead to? This approach effectively freezes the current front line, abandons any further resistance, and ultimately creates the conditions for Putin to resume his efforts to destroy Ukraine in the future. However, for Trump, the only priority is securing a rapid ceasefire—at Ukraine’s expense. His strategy is to make Ukraine declare a unilateral ceasefire first. Then, he can leverage this to negotiate with Russia on his own terms, telling Putin: "You see, Ukraine has stopped fighting—they are ready to accept anything. Now I will act as the mediator and negotiate a settlement with Russia so that Moscow agrees to these terms as well." What can I say? We clearly understand that in this situation, our future depends primarily on financial support. Right now, Europe is our key strategic focus. With Europe, as well as with America, we need a Ukrainian lobby, a big Ukrainian lobby. We need these waves of demonstrations in support of Ukraine, a large number of media materials to increase in favor of Ukraine, to explain our position as much as possible, to make Europe and the world better understand what Ukraine is doing, so that we can be even more represented with our position in the information space at such a time as this. And we need to show that Ukrainians are fighting a successful battle, that, as British Prime Minister Starmer said, Ukraine is the first point of his plan to end the war. We need Ukraine to be strong. And now the Europeans are already talking about increasing financial assistance to Ukraine. And this is really what will allow us to survive. Only if Ukraine now shows that even in the face of the US aid cutoff, we are still resilient, we are combat-ready, will this allow us to turn the tide in our favor.
The key story in this is a steadfast defense at the front. Sustainable defense, which must be based on powerful defense lines. On the defense line, on the responsibility of commanders at all levels. The fact that recruits are not just sent to a training camp or some reserve battalion where no one needs them, but that each person gets their own unit. They get their own responsibility, their own commanders, their own team that respects and appreciates them. We need a steady and strong front to stop the offensive right now. Can we do it? Yes. I can't say that it can be done at the current level. Certainly, the configuration of the front line is not favorable to us everywhere. But if the Ukrainian troops, the Ukrainian command, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Office, in addition to just statements, set a task for the military leadership to build a sustainable defense, even by retreating in some areas, so that we occupy only the most favorable lines for us, if the advice of brigade commanders, and now some corps commanders, on how to make the defense sustainable is accepted, we already have the resources to completely stop the Russian offensive along the entire front line. Just as it happened near Pokrovsk. We are capable of doing this. If Ukraine's leadership wants to strengthen its position in the negotiations under such heavy pressure, President Zelenskyy, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, should give the military leadership the appropriate tasks. One should not cling to certain positions just to avoid political repercussions. The real political impact will come when the Russians run into a well-prepared Ukrainian defense line—fortified in advance with drone protection, both at the front line and along secured, concealed logistics routes. This defense includes stockpiles, strategic drone deployment planning, optimal radio horizons, advantageous positions for electronic warfare systems, dedicated power sources, and a well-organized intelligence network that works in our favor. If we accomplish all of this, we will preserve the lives of our infantry—the backbone of this war. We will halt the Russian offensive, and then the negotiations will come. Putin will resort to blackmail, threatening to resume his advance, while Russian forces will continue to throw themselves into wave after wave of assaults. And just like in Pokrovsk, they will be torn apart. Not only in Pokrovsk—we have multiple frontline sectors, near Kharkiv, in Borova, where the enemy was pushing forward relentlessly, only to suddenly run out of momentum and realize that advancing any further was futile. This is what effective diplomacy looks like—not from people in offices, but from Ukrainian soldiers on the front lines. This is where it all begins. This is the foundation—the basis of Ukraine’s political and diplomatic victory, its success. That success starts on the battlefield. Only then can we move forward. Successful negotiations, including with Trump, will follow. When will this be achieved? Once it is, we will see things differently.
I want to address all Ukrainian soldiers. If we receive support from Europe, we will have the resources to continue effective resistance — we will not fall, we will not collapse. We will be able to strike the enemy effectively and continue implementing our main plan: to eliminate and inflict unacceptable losses on Russia. And their losses are already painful. I believe all our soldiers see on every part of the frontline that the enemy continues to launch meat assaults, but their intensity is much lower. They can no longer keep attacking like this for long. Russia is also running out of people who can be driven into assaults with stick. That’s why I want to say: the situation for Ukraine does not look hopeless or catastrophic. This is a situation we must navigate. Yes, the conditions are tough, but we still have leverage. We need to use political agreements and continue dialogue with Trump, his administration, and all of America. We must work with public opinion. And on the battlefield, we need to stop Russian offensives at our defensive lines and destroy their strike groups. We must stabilize the frontline for at least a few months — and do it in reality, not just in words. This is possible. If we succeed, Ukraine will be able to stand firm even without American weapons. I am convinced that, over time, the political situation in the United States may change. And Trump himself will realize that these attempts to "look Putin in the eye," to end the war at any cost, to negotiate a comprehensive truce in Trump's style — are just as futile. Because Putin doesn't really want a war — he doesn't want to stop the war. What Putin wants is the destruction of Ukraine. And he listens to all these "peace" proposals with a smirk. Trump, too, will be deceived by Moscow — just like others before him.
A Brief Conclusion. I want to say that at this moment, I see no ironclad guarantees that the war will end. I simply do not see them. Because so far, I have not seen any concrete agreements between Russia and the United States regarding an end to the war. Trump has announced that he is preparing a meeting with Putin in a month and a half. Will this meeting result in any agreements? We have no guarantees. Under the pretext of negotiations, Putin can continue pursuing his objectives. And his objective regarding Ukraine is nothing less than de facto surrender. Everything that Moscow continues to demand cannot even serve as a basis for negotiations. Let me remind you: Putin is demanding Zaporizhzhia and Kherson—essentially the entire right-bank Ukraine. He wants to legitimize all territorial occupations, forcing us to recognize and concede everything. These are, of course, terms of capitulation—conditions that Ukraine cannot and will not accept. And whether Putin can influence Trump’s perspective remains to be seen. So far, there have been no direct meetings between them, and we have no information on any outcomes. Trump is doing everything to create favorable conditions for his negotiations with Putin. But even if Ukraine does everything he says—if we say we're ready to cease fire, if we sign an agreement and President Zelensky has already said he would sign the minerals agreement, no questions asked—what then? If we agree to that, Putin arrives in Moscow, Trump arrives in Moscow, and Putin tells him: "Donald, I need Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, all of Donbas, maybe some other concessions. You need to legalize all this, give it up. And by the way, withdraw your troops, take back your weapons, and stop defending Ukraine." So what will Trump do? And what will we do? Will Ukraine agree to surrender, to disarm, to give up—and then inevitably become the victim of another wave of aggression that Putin will surely launch? Of course not. That’s why I want to say clearly: there are no signs that this war is ending soon. No signs that Putin wants to end it. Trump may pressure Zelenskyy, pressure Europe, as much as he wants. But so far, he hasn’t created a single problem for Putin. So why would Putin make any concessions? It makes no sense. We are waiting to see what comes next. But personally, I see that this war will go on for a long time. And we must realize that the main trump card—the real "card" Trump keeps talking about—is Ukraine’s Defense Forces, the Ukrainian people. It is the Ukrainian people who can conduct the strongest, most meaningful diplomacy, which we need now more than ever—both in Europe and in America. And we need resilience on the front line. And a clear, objective understanding of the situation—so that we don’t pay with lives for things that are not worth that price.
Yurii, if our troops withdraw from Kursk, will these large Russian and Korean forces follow us into the Sumy region? Has such a scenario been anticipated?
Well, of course, such an offensive is possible. However, the current situation is that this so-called buffer zone in the Kursk region was originally designed as a rather narrow bridgehead, making maneuvering nearly impossible and, therefore, highly inconvenient for us. Had there been an opportunity to execute an operation on a wider front, this issue might not have arisen. But as it stands, this bridgehead—the buffer zone—was created as a narrow wedge, which the enemy manages to control. In the Sumy region, however, where there are no such blockades or restricted communications, eliminating enemy forces would be significantly easier. We would be able to control this buffer zone through firepower. So, if the Korean and Russian forces push forward, the conditions for our defense would actually be more favorable than the current situation in this buffer zone. This wedge is tactically disadvantageous for us. The availability of open communication lines, the ability to maneuver effectively, and the option to choose multiple routes—these are the key conditions for successful mobile defense.
What will happen to individual assault regiments and battalions, such as "Skala"? Will they be part of army corps, or will they remain separate units?
All assault units — and currently, we have four assault regiments and six separate assault battalions — will remain units directly subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, just as they are now. So there will be no significant changes. These assault operations have been, and will continue to be, coordinated through the Ground Forces, but the units themselves will remain under direct command, exactly as they are now. In other words, nothing will change in that regard.
Is there a cauldron on the Kursk direction?
Well, at the moment, I would call it operational encirclement. That is, an encirclement where the enemy has taken fire control over our logistics routes. This is not a cauldron"— meaning the enemy cannot directly cut off our main lines of communication. But they do maintain fire control, which is causing us significant losses. So, of course, this situation is not favourable for our defence. That said, we can still continue fighting for some time. Our soldiers in the Kursk region are fighting very effectively. Russian losses there are many times higher than ours. Our command has concentrated enough drones, military equipment, and munitions there. The real problem is that the Russians and North Koreans simply have a massive numerical advantage. That’s what gives them the upper hand. But every metre of their advance comes at an enormous cost — it’s a real meat grinder for both Russian and Korean assault troops. Still, we must understand that fighting such a meat grinder battle would be better done in other formations and from more advantageous positions.
Why is the death compensation for a soldier higher in Ukraine than in Russia, but the signing bonus for a contract lower?
It just happened. This is a planning problem. That is, the Ukrainian command established a system of financial rewards at the beginning of the war, and the country's leadership acted on emotion. That is, there was no shortage of volunteer fighters, on the contrary, there were more volunteer fighters than weapons. And so there was no need to motivate people financially. And all the money, without any consideration of the budgetary possibilities or the prospects of the war, was simply taken and the maximum payments, very large ones, were set. This is a decent approach, but it just doesn't match the capabilities of our economy. That is why there are big problems with this, and now there are some delays in these payments. But Ukraine has to fulfill all these obligations, there are no questions here. But Russia has a different approach. In Russia, they pay much less in case of death, but they set a high monetary reward for signing a contract. That is, they have a different logic. They try to focus their main resources on getting people to join the army. Why does this work in Russia? In fact, there are a lot of problems with this, scandals, corruption. I want to say that the decision of the Russian command is strategically better than the Ukrainian one. But they have a totalitarian state system. And the enemy has created a military justice system there. If someone signs a contract even under false pretenses, they still can't get out of it. They deceive their people into signing contracts at any cost, and once caught in that system, there’s only one way out — to assault until the end. The only way to leave the army there is through a severe injury — one that makes it truly impossible to continue living a normal life. All other reasons are not accepted. Even multiple light injuries, concussions — none of that is a reason to be released. They send people into assaults even with fractures, even in casts. So nothing can stop them. Summary executions on the spot are a reality. So, we understand that this is a different system, but I want to emphasize that we should not copy the Russian approach. We need comprehensive solutions. As I have said before and will repeat: our main problem is that we’re trying to incentivize the wrong people in Ukraine — those who are expected to sign a contract and just blindly copy what Russia does. Payments in Ukraine should be directed to those who are already fighting on the front lines. This is what needs to be done. Unfortunately, our leaders look to Russia and mislead the public—out of their own incompetence. They propose giving a million hryvnias to young recruits simply for signing a contract. This is completely absurd. Instead, these funds—or even a smaller amount, but at least 300,000 to 400,000 hryvnias—should be allocated to those with the most combat experience who continue to serve on the front lines. Every soldier who has been in the war since 2022 or 2023 should receive proper compensation. They should all be given a bonus: the longer you've been at the front: if you’ve been there since 2022—you receive a triple bonus; since 2023—a double bonus; Since 2024—you receive an annual bonus. The more battlefield experience a soldier has, the stronger their performance in combat—the more financial support and recognition they should receive. Because it is these seasoned, battle-hardened soldiers who are holding the front. Yet, instead of supporting the veterans who sustain the defense, a misguided decision has been made to follow Russia’s example—offering financial incentives to young, inexperienced recruits who have never served before and may not even be able to withstand the psychological and moral strain of war. They are given money, and those who have been at war for three years and are already very exhausted are told that you have a salary. This is just absurd. It's absurd and it demonstrates that we have a completely inadequate approach to planning and encouraging people. If a person actually signs a contract, he should understand that if he fights for a year, he will receive a significant bonus. If they fight for two years, they get an even bigger bonus and additional benefits. If he fights for three years, he will have a large social package and will be able to use it. This is the right motivation, the motivation of the best. In our country, on the contrary, they just want to increase the number of troops. They don't understand the nature of war, that one experienced person in the army is worth a hundred inexperienced ones. And if you create a unit like the 150-series Brigade, thanks to the great public outcry and the investigation into the 155th Brigade, we are lucky that they stopped forming new brigades. Thank God, people are now being assigned to experienced military units. So, this is an example that shows what? That you can create a brigade, spend a lot of money, and these inexperienced people without a backbone, without a core of experienced people, they just run away and cannot fulfill the task. Because they have no experience. So what should we invest in? In recruiting even more inexperienced people, or in increasing the core of experienced people? Certainly an obvious conclusion in modern warfare.
Unfortunately, this is a clear example of the problem we are facing right now. It’s a good question because it highlights the fact that there is a complete lack of understanding of how to manage resources effectively. Instead of studying battlefield experience, analyzing it, and drawing the necessary conclusions, the country’s leadership is blindly copying Russia—thoughtlessly replicating its approach. It’s deeply disappointing.
In the Sumy region, strongpoints are being built in the middle of open fields, with no possibility of secure access.
Unfortunately, UAH 20 billion has already been spent—and continues to be spent—on the construction of engineering fortifications. The government allocated these budgets but did not direct the funds to the army, specific brigades, military units, or newly forming corps. Instead, UAH 20 billion for defensive structures was funneled through civil-military administrations to their own controlled companies. As a result, they took designs for strongpoints dating back to World War II, originally created by Soviet engineers, and are still blindly building them everywhere. No one uses them. The troops do not use them. These positions in the open field are completely useless. Zero effectiveness. Because these massive dugouts and bunkers, designed with frontal loopholes for direct fire, are being placed right in the middle of open fields— Simply because it’s "convenient." There’s no need to disguise them, dig them in—just drop them in place, and that’s it. And these large trenches between the dugouts? They are used by only one group of people—Russian assault teams. Because when the enemy advances, they need somewhere to take cover. At least take cover in such a structure. But Ukrainian soldiers don’t use these ridiculous strongpoints that cost UAH 20 billion—because the moment you occupy such a position, everyone can see you. This bunker will be taken out by a tank, artillery, an air bomb—anything, it sticks out like a sore thumb. A drone will easily fly in, straight through the entrance, hitting anyone inside who’s observing or working. Any combat operations in such open positions are simply impossible. That’s why real defensive lines are being built in the nearest tree lines—at least to provide some level of concealment from enemy reconnaissance. What can I say? It’s just more flawed planning—just like with these so-called "payments." It’s nothing but an imitation of real defense. And it’s the same everywhere. Even in Donbas, these outdated strongpoints are still being built. We’re in 2025—drones account for 90% of battlefield damage— And yet, billions of taxpayer money are still being wasted on defense structures designed by clueless individuals. Structures so primitive that even by World War II standards, they would have been considered obsolete. Because these pillboxes with frontal firing ports became obsolete as early as World War I. In fact, this design was already outdated back then. And yet, we keep building them. Because no one thinks about proper planning or analyzes what will actually happen. And no one cares about taxpayers’ money. In our country, when an official steals a million dollars, it’s news. Everyone reports on it, everyone is outraged. But when you point out that idiots in power keep throwing away billions of taxpayer money on completely useless projects— instead of directing it to the army, strengthening our forces— somehow, that doesn’t cause a public outcry. And so, the government keeps doing this nonsense—for the sake of photos and reports. Then officials show up, take pictures, film promotional videos, claiming they’re "protecting" us. And the next ones to step inside these bunkers? Only the enemy—if they need cover while advancing. Our soldiers don’t use them for defense.
If there is a freeze on the conflict, how quickly will those who have been fighting for more than three years be allowed to go home?
Firstly, I want to tell you that, unfortunately, there is no sign of a freeze. At the moment, there are no concrete steps in that direction. Let's be realistic and evaluate political developments not by statements, but by real actions. When an action takes place, we document it, analyze it, and draw conclusions. I want to emphasize that the war, under such precarious conditions— when Trump has effectively shattered NATO unity in responding to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, when military aid to Ukraine is restricted, and when so-called "peace" is being shaped unilaterally at Ukraine’s expense— yet no one has even asked whether Putin is willing to accept this "peace"— this creates an extremely unstable situation. And we must be prepared for the reality that this war will continue— and it will last for a long time. That is the reality.
We all need strength, endurance and intelligence. Thank you for the broadcast and glory to Ukraine!
Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET
