Events in Kursk and Donbas regions. On preparations for elections
The stream covers the fighting and the political games unfolding at all levels.
I haven’t streamed for a while. During this time, I was relocating between the Sumy region and Donbas. As a result, I was able to observe some important developments, key operations in this war.
We’re hearing a large number of political initiatives and appeals: some for peace, some for a ceasefire, others for an offensive against Ukraine, or for concessions from Ukraine. There is currently a lot of informational noise, however, there are also specific facts and clear signs that the Ukrainian authorities, including the Presidential Office, are preparing for elections—this year. How all of this aligns is hard for me to say, especially given that there are no indications of any suspension of hostilities on the enemy’s side.
Let’s take a look at the situation on the maps—what’s currently happening in the Kursk region.
So, we are observing a situation where our forces have withdrawn from the town of Sudzha and are now holding two separate footholds on the territory of the Russian Federation. These positions consist of advantageous hills and forested areas. They allow control over the border zone. These hills are located on Russian territory, and whoever controls them controls the border zone. Given the advancement of drone technologies, it is clear that this control extends up to 15 kilometers in both directions. Therefore, these footholds—these hills currently being defended by Ukrainian soldiers of the Kursk operational group—hold significant strategic value. The enemy has attempted attacks and continues to launch assaults, but the intensity of these attacks has dropped notably since our forces regrouped along these lines. The enemy retains a considerable advantage in drones, infantry, and armored vehicles in this direction. Nevertheless, the front line has now contracted significantly. The rear areas of Ukrainian forces are no longer as vulnerable. The enemy is no longer able to strike our logistics routes from the flanks with all types of weapons. As a result, our defensive line has become more consolidated, and our defense here is effective. The enemy is taking losses. Our troops are receiving effective fire support. The use of unmanned aerial systems is improving—primarily because competent personnel have finally been appointed to oversee drone operations. Overall, the situation appears stabilized. This does not mean the front will remain static—the enemy continues its offensive. The objective of the Russian command is to completely push Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region and from Russian territory by the end of March. These plans remain in force. The enemy continues to attack. However, whereas just two weeks ago the situation in the Kursk region was catastrophic—because the enemy had full control over our logistics and communication routes—this is no longer the case. The front has narrowed, and our forces are now fighting with determination, inflicting substantial losses on the enemy, which at this stage significantly exceed our own.
In addition, there are other factors. Our troops are attempting to conduct active defense operations in this sector of the Sumy region. I would like to highlight our assault units—first and foremost, those of the Ukrainian Ground Forces. I cannot fail to mention the 24th Aidar Assault Battalion, the 253rd Assault Battalion, the 33rd Assault Regiment, and the 225th Assault Regiment. Indeed, the actions of the assault unit soldiers here deserve the highest recognition and utmost respect.
I would especially like to emphasize the effective results achieved in the defense by the 225th Assault Regiment, under the command of Oleh Shyriaev. What they are doing now clearly demonstrates that the 225th Regiment does not forgive enemy mistakes. The other units—the 33rd, 24th, and 253rd—are also operating effectively. Great respect to all of them.
Next, I want to note that the enemy is suffering significant losses in this area, and those losses are actually increasing with each passing day. At this point, it has become much more difficult for the enemy to pose a threat to the Sumy region. That is why I do not currently see any risk that the enemy could break through our front line, quickly approach Sumy, or make any significant advance. According to Russian Telegram channels, Russian forces are now trying to drive Ukrainian troops out of the Kursk region and are already engaged in combat in the Belgorod region. Somehow, after continuously advancing in the Kursk area, they have now transitioned to defensive operations in Belgorod. This demonstrates that our soldiers in this direction—in the Sumy region—do not appear in any way incapable or unmotivated. Despite suffering considerable losses during the disorganized withdrawal from the areas around Sudzha, our forces have preserved their combat effectiveness and are delivering highly effective strikes against the Russian occupiers. As for the reasons behind what happened in the Kursk region, I will provide a detailed post in the coming days, and we will dedicate a separate stream to this topic.
Now let's look at the situation in the Pokrovsk direction.
So, in Pokrovsk, active combat operations are also ongoing. Here is the DeepState map—it is reliable, and our colleagues at DeepState are monitoring the situation very closely. I want to emphasize that the situation here is also extremely difficult for the enemy. Our forces are conducting active defense in this area as well, and it is important to highlight the assault troops of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operating in the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad area. These include the 425th "Skala" (Rock) Assault Regiment and the 1st Separate "Da Vinci" Assault Battalion. It is also essential to note the important and stabilizing role played by the soldiers of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade and the 59th Assault Brigade of the Unmanned Systems Forces in this direction. The enemy has suffered heavy losses near Pokrovsk and is finding it difficult to achieve any breakthrough. In several sectors, our troops have carried out a series of successful counterattacks. Enemy losses here are several times higher than ours. The fighting is intense and extremely heavy. However, in certain areas, our forces have seized the tactical initiative and managed to take control of several key positions, which significantly reinforced the defense of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. As of now, the situation in this area is stabilized.
I hope that if such adequate decisions are reinforced and continued, it will be possible to significantly improve the situation and successfully defend Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. We have both the forces and the means to do so in this area.
What is happening in the Chasiv Yar-Toretsk area.
The enemy continues active offensive operations in this direction. The Russian command is launching numerous attacks against the soldiers of the 28th Mechanized Brigade. They are also attempting to capture Chasiv Yar by attacking the positions of the 24th Mechanized Brigade, the 5th Assault Brigade, and the 18th Brigade of the National Guard. The fighting is extremely intense. The enemy has seized the tactical initiative in these areas. Our troops are inflicting heavy losses on Russian forces. However, this sector is currently under direct attack, and our troops there undoubtedly require reinforcement—reinforcement with all necessary forces and assets to decisively defeat this Russian offensive.
In the Toretsk area, it is important to highlight that our troops are doing everything possible not only to hold their existing positions in the city but are also conducting successful counterattacks and strengthening our defensive lines. Soldiers from the Presidential Brigade are fighting in Toretsk, along with troops from separate special police battalions and the "Liut" (Rage) Special Police Brigade. They are engaged in combat inside the city and are eliminating large numbers of Russian occupiers. The fighting there is extremely heavy. The enemy is exerting maximum effort to encircle Toretsk and cut off all communications and access routes into the city. The situation in that area is extremely difficult.
It is also important to acknowledge the combat actions of the 12th Brigade of the National Guard, "Azov," which is playing a critical role in stabilizing the situation and is conducting counterattacks—not only within its designated zone of responsibility but also in adjacent sectors.
Kupiansk–Dvorichna. The enemy is attempting to advance and has indeed approached very close to Kupiansk. Kupiansk is under threat and under attack. Russian forces are suffering heavy losses in this area. Our troops are inflicting significant casualties on the armies of the Moscow Military District—on elite Russian formations. Every step forward comes at a very high loss for the enemy. In the area of the village of Nadiia, units of the 3rd Assault Brigade carried out a highly successful counterattack, pushed the enemy back, destroyed its assault units, and significantly improved the situation in this sector. It is also important to note that on this map we do not see the Lyman direction—it lies slightly further south, there, the enemy is also attempting to advance. It is attacking the positions of the 60th and 66th Mechanized Brigades, trying to fully capture Terny and the next village, Yampolivka, aiming to break through the front line. The enemy is suffering enormous losses there on a daily basis. Nevertheless, it continues its attacks. In this sector, the enemy currently holds significant tactical initiative and maintains superiority in manpower, equipment, and drones.
In the Kharkiv direction—also near Kharkiv—our forces are continuing active combat operations near Vovchansk. In certain areas, they have managed to improve their tactical positions. I believe there will be some official updates on this later. The enemy is also suffering massive losses in these areas.
The situation is serious in the area of Siversk and Bilohorivka. Russian forces are attempting to fully capture Bilohorivka and the dominating hills. Intense fighting is ongoing, involving soldiers of the 81st Air Assault Brigade, the 54th Mechanized Brigade, and the ‘Svoboda’ (Freedom) Battalion Tactical Group of the 4th National Guard Brigade ‘Rubizh’ (Boundary). Reinforcements are urgently needed in this direction, the frontline of this Siversk Salient is being held in a fitting manner, it should be noted that the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade are effectively destroying enemy forces, but special attention should be paid to the situation along the front held by the 81st and 54th Brigades. The enemy is concentrating significant forces in an effort to break through the defenses of these brigades and the junction between them—aiming to defeat Ukrainian troops, seize control of the Bilohorivka hills, and thus establish a foothold for a direct assault on Siversk.
It is a highly threatening situation that demands a serious and immediate response.
Answers to questions
What can be said about the Koreans in the Kursk region?
The first Korean strike group in Kursk was completely eliminated by our forces. It was pushed out, and the Korean special forces were wiped out in battles back in November and December. After that, the Koreans regrouped, and in February a new Korean formation launched active operations in two directions. They advanced in large numbers but were also destroyed in significant numbers.
At present, the Koreans have been pulled back, and their presence on the frontline is no longer observed. Nevertheless, we understand that they are likely being regrouped, treated, replenished with fresh personnel, and will once again prepare for assault operations. For now, there is no recorded activity. However, several hundred of them were killed and several hundred more wounded there.
We are currently observing the career rise of Pavlo Palisa—he is even participating in negotiations with the United States. How would you assess his current role?
I believe it is appropriate for Pavlo Palisa, the Deputy Head of the Presidential Office for Defense, to take part in the negotiations. The Minister of Defense also participates, as does the official within the Presidential Office responsible for defense policy. This is a logical step; I don't see anything unusual about it. Based on the information available, I know that Pavlo Palisa supports and implements certain useful initiatives for the Armed Forces.
I think Pavlo Palisa is not a professional politician. I believe he is still learning the position—what politics entails, what the relationships are, the opportunities, the scope of formal and informal authority, where and over whom he can exert influence, and with whom. Therefore, it is still too early to evaluate his role as an independent political figure. For now, he is an officer, a commander who has transitioned to civilian leadership within the state, working in his area of specialization. We’ll see. I think in the near future we will understand whether he will be admitted to the inner circle of five or six key managers who make all major decisions under President Zelenskyy, or whether he will remain more of a public-facing figure for press releases—someone who can help resolve specific, limited issues. And whether he will have influence over strategic and systemic decisions—that remains to be seen. I think it’s best to hold off on making any assessments for at least a couple more months.
What’s the story with Poroshenko, the flash drive, and money from Moscow?
To be honest, I can’t say much about that—I haven’t been following the matter in detail. I’ve always believed that if the authorities accuse an opposition politician or any citizen, there should first be an assessment from law enforcement agencies. To me, any assessment—if there are accusations—should come from law enforcement. If such actions are taken, then what has been made public carries weight. And I think it’s obvious that the current authorities—if there is even the slightest basis—can and will present charges against Poroshenko. So I’m simply waiting to see whether any accusations are brought forward. As far as I know, no formal charges have been brought against Poroshenko at this time. Regarding the videos—someone allegedly carrying a flash drive in a Moscow airport, someone handing it over—I can’t say anything definitive. I’m waiting to see what our law enforcement agencies will provide. They were all appointed by President Zelenskyy; he is responsible for them, and he has repeatedly instructed them to open cases, launch investigations, and look into Poroshenko’s activities. I hope that state institutions will eventually present findings and clarify whether this is true or not. Because if they remain silent for a long time and no legal action follows, then there’s nothing behind these accusations. That’s it. In that case, it would also be just information noise. So I’m waiting for some official decisions from law enforcement agencies. Until those appear, I don’t know how to assess the situation. I’m waiting for the results.
What about the strike on the Cherkaskyi training ground in Dnipro? Are there any guilty parties?
I’ve already spoken about this strike. And who exactly could be held responsible? The way our system of general irresponsibility is structured, at best they’ll designate the battalion commander as the guilty. So the commander of the reserve battalion was removed from his position. But what’s next?
What about all those who gave the orders to send thousands of mobilized soldiers, thousands of personnel marked as AWOL, fighters who arbitrarily abandoned their units. What about those who failed to provide shelter, who failed to disperse the reserve battalion, who concentrated it in an area of the region that lies directly within the active flight paths of Russian drones. Where are those people? As I’ve said before, this is a question for the leadership of the Ground Forces Command, the General Staff, and the Eastern Operational Command, which oversees this training ground. Where are the answers? I haven’t heard any results so far. Once again, everyone understands that there are corpus delicti here—but law enforcement agencies remain silent. They say nothing. They show no reaction. Everything I said during the broadcast dedicated to that strike—to that tragedy—still stands. I expect that specific officials will be identified and that their level of responsibility in this situation will be properly assessed. This requires an investigation, which for now remains classified. I hope that if no official information emerges for an extended period, journalists will be able to obtain some materials from the investigation or speak directly with those involved, and find out what really happened.
Q: Is it true that there are 200,000 Russian troops in the Sumy region?
No, there are not 200,000 personnel in the Sumy region. According to current estimates, the Russian strike group in that direction numbers around 80,000 troops as of this week. The Russians may reinforce it—there are likely an additional 20–25 thousand in reserve. That’s based on what I’ve heard from military personnel operating in the area. Of course, it’s possible that the enemy could concentrate somewhat larger forces there, but at this point, there are certainly not 200,000 troops deployed.
What’s next for the Kursk direction? A full withdrawal and a return of hostilities to Ukrainian territory?
As I’ve already said—no, I don’t believe our troops will be withdrawing from the Kursk region anytime soon. From what I observe, our forces are conducting combat operations there with all persistence.
Sumy region is being prepared for defence. Will there be another Kharkiv region?
Look, we have enough troops there. The failure in the Kharkiv region happened because there was neither adequate engineering fortification nor sufficient forces capable of digging in and organizing the defense on their own. So what’s the difference in the Sumy region? The difference is that the fortifications there are just as poor and performative—it’s essentially an imitation of defensive positions. In reality, what happened was the budget was siphoned off—completely incompetently and irresponsibly. The money was effectively stolen from the army, from the people, from taxpayers. But in the Sumy region, our combat-ready forces are covering the area, which is why a defensive collapse won’t happen there. It won’t. There are people there capable of eliminating the enemy—and our soldiers are doing that every day. But the state of the defensive structures there, unfortunately, evokes not laughter, but a very sad ones. These showy, dug-in positions in open fields are never used by our troops. Why? Because they’re built in an extremely primitive manner, there is a need to ‘spend the budget’, they bring a tractor into a field, where it is convenient, dig a trench, install some prefab structures and wooden elements—and leave it at that. Who is supposed to take up that? Sometimes rear units might take shelter there overnight—but that’s it. Combat units don’t take up these fortifications at all. Who needs exposed, uncamouflaged positions in an open field, with frontal fire embrasures, fully visible to direct fire weapons and entirely open to drone surveillance, without any overhead cover? Who would use that? No one. No one takes up those positions. And yet the government is allocating billions of hryvnias for this. Soon, I’ll show you a video of a typical strongpoint, I won’t say in which direction but you’ll see for yourself how tens of millions of hryvnias are being spent on positions that are completely useless. This is a siphon off of money, a show, a lie by the authorities. The 20 billion hryvnias allocated in 2024 for the construction of defensive structures have been spent with zero effectiveness—siphoned off by construction firms linked to government officials, with Servants of People, to President Zelenskyy himself.
When will the promised corps start working, and do they exist?
The corps are already part of the army, officially approved by order, and are scheduled to become operational in April.
The second topic of the stream is the political situation in Kyiv.
Ukraine’s leadership has begun to speak seriously about upcoming elections. The Presidential Office is circulating information that as soon as a truce or peace agreement is reached, President Zelenskyy will initiate a decision through the Verkhovna Rada—not six months later, in order to avoid losing popularity, but rather one or two months after martial law is lifted. The idea is to prevent any other candidate from having enough time to deploy campaign headquarters.
Bill — No. 10311 — "On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine ‘On the National Guard of Ukraine’ regarding the improvement of the legal framework for the use of coercive measures by servicemen of the National Guard of Ukraine" has been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada.
This is a great threat to democracy. This is obviously being done for one reason.
Zelenskyy is planning to run for re-election. He intends to create conditions favorable to himself by violating the laws and the Constitution—pushing through the Verkhovna Rada a voting framework tailored to his advantage. The aim is to prevent his opponents and competitors from launching full election campaigns, and then to suppress any protests against violations of the law and Constitution during the elections he plans to hold this year. This is a serious threat to democracy. A serious threat to every citizen of Ukraine. You might assume that this is simply an initiative by certain individual deputies—for example, the President’s associate, Ionushas, who at the time of submitting the proposal was still a member of parliament and is now the Prosecutor General. So what I want to say is that, according to my information, certain units of the National Guard of Ukraine—specifically those assigned to public order duties—are engaged exclusively, that is, while the National Guard includes operational brigades that are fighting on the front lines, there are also units responsible for guarding, escorting prisoners, and performing other auxiliary functions, including maintaining public order. And this year, several companies from various National Guard units were sent to Lviv, they were issued new gear—new batons, new shields—and are being trained specifically not for combat, but to engage in public order enforcement during potential confrontations with demonstrators. In other words, they are being deliberately trained to confront protesters. And all of this is happening in wartime.
I want to tell you, friends, that this information—taken together with what we now know about Bill No. 10311—should be a matter of serious concern. This is a real threat to Ukrainian democracy. The government should not adopt its usual ostrich pose, as it so often does when engaging in illegal actions—remaining silent while President Zelenskyy says nothing until the issue reaches a level where society begins talking about it en masse. That’s why I’m calling on everyone to join the public discussion of Bill 10311, to demand explanations from the authorities, and to support posts on social media. What I’ve just shared with you on air is important, because the government only responds to public outcry. Zelenskyy doesn’t respond to the law, nor to common sense—he only reacts when there’s a big mass of likes and views. Nothing else concerns him. The only threat he sees to his power is when something negative about him appears in the information space. That’s all. So, friends, this is indeed a real threat to Ukrainian democracy and to our civil liberties. Bill 10311 is a direct restriction of the constitutional right to peaceful assembly. It grants unprecedented powers to suppress any protest or demonstration. This is entirely contrary to the interests of the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian society. These are the kinds of things that Zelenskyy’s friends from the Party of Regions —people who regularly invited "Kvartal 95" to their corporate events and Yanukovych did this many times; this is no secret—Zelenskyy himself has spoken about it. He performed at Mezhyhirya for Yanukovych, at Surkis’ birthday parties, in other words, for all of them So I don’t know what he learned from them, or what he was playing—what kind of tunes he played on the piano—but he definitely learned something very wrong. And it wasn’t just those hosts from the Party of Regions—he was also taught by Oleh Tatarov, who, as we can clearly see, has learned nothing from the Maidan, nor from what he and his superiors did at that time.
So I want to issue a warning to the authorities: do not take this extremely dangerous step. Because when you grant certain parts of the security forces such excessive powers, it clearly signals that you intend to implement them in practice—powers that are dangerous to society. I strongly advise those sitting on Bankova Street not to attempt to use special means or weapons against demonstrators—not to mention drones. I understand that you are completely disconnected from real life, from ordinary people, from the problems facing the country. But those problems will come back to you much faster than you realize—if you try to apply the anti-people provisions of Bill No. 10311. That’s why I urge citizens to help generate public outcry around this bill —to prevent it from being adopted through pressure from society and to force the authorities to abandon this dangerous initiative. Make no mistake: this is not the independent action of individual People`s Deputies from the "Servant of the People" party, who sign whatever they’re told to, this is a top-down initiative from the Presidential Office. We will continue to cover and highlight this initiative. Next week, the "Servants of the People" plan to bring this bill to a full vote in the Verkhovna Rada. In my opinion, this is madness—pure madness driven by an unchecked desire for absolute control on the part of Zelenskyy, Yermak, and Tatarov. They are afraid that their power will eventually come to an end. And that when it does, they will be held accountable for everything they’ve done—just as they now target others. Illegally applying sanctions, restrictions, confiscating property and funds. They are billionaires. Just so you understand—Tatarov and Yermak are now real billionaires. As for Zelenskyy—I don’t know how much money he has, but I believe he was already a well-off man even before all this.
Excerpts from the bill. Article 17: Use of Special Means. You can see what changes are being introduced—what is now allowed with the use of weapons: the use of special means, devices for suppressing and restricting a person’s will, means of active defense, military and special-purpose equipment. In other words, military personnel are granted the right to use and apply such special means. I strongly advise everyone to read the text of this bill. There are many such novelties in it. The Bill has not been adopted yet—and I hope it never will be. What I want to emphasize is this: the authorities are extremely afraid of losing power. Once they get into office, they begin to think it’s permanent. To them, remaining in power is the only guarantee of impunity. They will do everything they can to hold on to that power under any circumstances. And this presents a very serious challenge to our democracy and to the Ukrainian state—a threat that carries very real dangers. It destabilizes the country from within, precisely because it is being pushed by those in power. I sincerely hope that this truly authoritarian, even dictatorial Bill will not be adopted under any circumstances.
Will the war end this year?
The real situation is as follows: the enemy is intensifying its offensive and concentrating its forces.
Russian assault troops have physically disappeared from the battlefield for a time, but are now replenishing their troops, Their primary targets are, unsurprisingly, the key cities and logistical hubs of Donbas and the Kharkiv region. There is a serious threat to Vovchansk, to Kupiansk, to Siversk, Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kostiantynivka. The situation in this entire area—under the Luhansk Operational-Tactical Group—is extremely critical. There is also a serious threat in the Zaporizhzhia direction: the enemy is preparing an offensive on Orikhiv. Likewise, the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration is under threat, and the enemy is preparing to seize it as well. The situation is critical, difficult, it requires systemic decisions at the front. If we want to conduct any successful negotiations, we must first stop the enemy on the battlefield. That is the only political reality we currently face. All the words being said right now have not been converted into real actions. As for the so-called "30-day ceasefire"—when, how it will be. We see no sign of it at the moment. We will only see movement if and when Trump reaches some kind of agreement with Putin. After that, certain conditions may be presented—and we will have to assess whether they are acceptable or beneficial to Ukraine at all. We will need to coordinate our position with our European allies, and only then will it become clear whether this would be a truce or the surrender of Ukraine. As of now, we see none of those conditions. What is deeply concerning is the internal situation—the political games, the manufactured tension inside the country. Instead of preparing reinforcements for the front—where every soldier, every infantryman counts—they are preparing to suppress domestic protests. This is simply absurd. And somehow, there are people available for that. We have plenty of law enforcement officers. There’s practically an entire army stationed at checkpoints in the rear, made up of personnel from various law enforcement agencies. So yes, the forces exist—but what they are actually being directed toward is not entirely clear.
So I don’t believe the war can end this year. I want to see real steps. End the war—how? On what terms? How exactly would a ceasefire happen now? Who is supposed to pull back, and from where? In some areas, our positions are just 100 meters apart. On certain parts of the frontline, in some settlements, the enemies are literally sitting across the street from each other. Who will withdraw—and how? Who will act and how? What, are they just going to spend 30 days silently walking past each other? Staring at each other with weapons in hand? Doing nothing—and then suddenly resume fighting on day 31? Or will it all break down even earlier? Honestly, at this point, I don’t understand this whole scenario at all. And I fully admit—it could just be a political performance that leads nowhere. And we may have to continue this war, only now with some vague hope in the air.
To be honest, I don’t fully understand the current situation. So it’s important to recognize that there are two possible outcomes. Either the war ends this year—or, based on the data I’m currently analyzing, it is more likely that it will not end this year, unfortunately. That’s the reality on the frontline, and it’s this reality that dictates the conditions we face. That said, I want to point out: right now is actually one of the most favourable moments for negotiations, in the sense that the Russian army has suffered such heavy losses that—yes, they are still conducting a few offensive operations—but across a significant number of frontline directions, the enemy has completely halted its advance. They’ve simply run out of assault troopers. There’s no one left to storm positions. The scale of Russian losses in military equipment has led to a complete depletion of their reserves. Russia was once the country with the largest number of tanks and armored vehicles in the world. Ukraine has now completely reversed that. All of Russia’s stockpiles of armored vehicles have effectively been destroyed. Satellite images of Russian storage bases for armored vehicles and artillery clearly show that nearly all repairable equipment has been exhausted. Russian defense factories, likewise, have highly limited production capacity. They are unable to meet the demands of supplying an army spread over a 1,200-kilometre front. So the enemy’s losses—both in manpower and in equipment—are extremely high. And in principle, if we had the necessary organizational and command-level measures in place to stabilize the front, this could absolutely be achieved. I’m convinced that Ukraine could then be negotiating from a completely different position, a much stronger one. From a position where the enemy is in no condition to break through our lines or to issue ultimatums. That would fundamentally change the political situation—and the context for any political initiatives.
Dear friends, thank you for the broadcast. Please support us. Thank you to all the viewers of Butusov Plus. Thank you to all the sponsors of our channel. Thanks to you, we’re able to keep broadcasting. And please share this video, especially express your position on Bill 10311.
The fight for Ukraine continues.
Glory to Ukraine!
Yurii Butusov
