Russian command is preparing new offensive
Against the backdrop of numerous peace negotiations, intense fighting continues along the entire frontline, and there are systemic indications that the Russian command is preparing for another offensive in Donbas.
The enemy continues to conduct active hostilities in Donbas and the Kharkiv region. The enemy's activity in the Kursk region has currently subsided due to the fact that our soldiers are conducting active defense there and have inflicted heavy losses on the Russian strike group. Nevertheless, the enemy continues preparations for an offensive, increasing strikes in certain sectors of the frontline, and no doubt, whether the negotiations are successful or not, it is obvious that in order to raise the stakes, Putin will launch attacks in the near future.
Firstly, to demonstrate that it is he who can dictate the terms of a truce or peace—although we do not know whether this is even possible. Or, even if these negotiations lead nowhere, to continue pursuing his strategic objectives. And to try to advance as quickly as possible.
All these statements currently being voiced by the American side and our American partners, regarding a ceasefire based on the existing frontline, of course, encourage the Russians to advance further. To shift the frontline as far as possible before any potential ceasefire takes effect. Or perhaps there will be no ceasefire at all. That is why it must once again be emphasized: the negotiations taking place in Saudi Arabia, which are scheduled in the coming days, do not constitute a guarantee of a cessation of hostilities. The United States and President Trump are now making every effort to find a formula that would be acceptable to both Ukraine and Russia. However, this is, of course, a scenario that offers no guarantees. And the primary confirmation of this is the current situation on the frontlines, where intense fighting continues.
The situation in the Kharkiv region.
These sections of the frontline in the Kharkiv region have remained virtually unchanged since the very beginning of the Russian offensive in May 2024 in northern Kharkiv. Here, our soldiers are heroically defending Vovchansk and the northern part of the Kharkiv region. The defense of Kharkiv. There are certain changes on the map here that, I believe, will be noted in the near future, because in some areas our soldiers have managed not only to stop and defeat the enemy but also to achieve certain tactical gains. I think this information will be released a bit later, but for now, the situation here involves heavy fighting, the enemy is redeploying reserves, but at this moment, the situation appears stable.
The situation in the Kupiansk direction is quite difficult and, unfortunately, continues to deteriorate. It is worsening due to the fact that the enemy, particularly north of Kupiansk, continues offensive actions and has crossed the Dvorichna River. Unfortunately, in this area, our forces consisted of rather weak units that lacked sufficient personnel, firepower, and—most importantly—control organization and the quality of command. It has not been possible to stabilize the front there and although the enemy is forced to operate at this bridgehead exclusively with infantry forces, with fire support, and to carry out all logistics exclusively across the river—which is currently impassable for military vehicles. Nevertheless, it has not been possible to stop the Russian advance, as a result, the situation north of Kupiansk is deteriorating, enemy continues its offensive, commits reserves into battle, and attempts to attack. This is not visible on the map here, of course, but there are advances in certain areas, and where our troops are repelling all attacks, intense fighting continues. They are attacking almost the entire frontline around Kupiansk. We can see that the enemy has managed to envelop Kupiansk from two flanks, and the situation with the city's defense continues to worsen. It is clear that the enemy will attempt to break through our defenses along the Oskil line at any cost—at least in certain sections. They need Kupiansk. The situation is threatening: they want to seize Kupiansk in order to collapse this section of the frontline along the border.
The situation in the Terny-Yampolivka-Ivanivske area.
Here, the enemy has also forced crossing, crossed the river, and is developing an offensive. Again, there is a problem with the organization of defence and a shortage of forces. The enemy is attempting to break through the defences of our heroic 60th Mechanised Brigade, which, along with support from neighbouring units, is fighting off two Russian divisions. Unfortunately, however, the enemy has significant superiority and continues its offensive. In fact, the village of Terny has already been almost completely lost, and fighting is currently ongoing for Yampolivka.
The situation in this sector is extremely difficult; the enemy is pushing towards Torske, It aims to seize control of the supply routes of our grouping defending Serebrianskyi Forest, thereby securing the flanks of our forces in Siversk and protecting the flanks of our units in Lyman. The situation here is also highly complicated. The enemy is concentrating its efforts in this area and is attempting to breach our defences near Makiivka, Yampolivka, and Ivanivske. Very heavy and intense fighting continues.
Map of Siversk.
The enemy continues to conduct very heavy fighting in the surrounding area. The enemy has entered certain sections of the high ground near the village of Bilohorivka, which has been defended by our soldiers for nearly three years. It is also continuing very active and extremely heavy attacks in the area of the village of Spirne. Soldiers of the 81st Air Assault Brigade, the 54th Mechanised Brigade, the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, and the Svoboda (Freedom) Battalion of the National Guard are engaged in very intense fighting in this direction. The attacks are constant, the enemy is acting with significant force, and only the heroism and well-organised defensive actions of our troops make it possible to repel these assaults. Nevertheless, the enemy has managed to advance in some areas and to break through certain sections of our defences. The situation in Siversk is very difficult, and without a doubt, our soldiers in this area require support and reinforcement.
Pokrovsk. At this stage, the enemy is attempting to advance south of the city, expand its breakthrough, push through our defences and reach the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region. In doing so, it aims to envelop Pokrovsk from the south. In this area, our soldiers have been holding back the enemy for an extended period, In fact, since the beginning of February, the enemy’s gains here have been minimal and have come at the cost of massive losses. Moreover, in certain areas, our troops have managed to drive the enemy out and carry out a number of successful counterattacks. This is thanks to our fighters—there is a significant concentration of our forces here. Special thanks must also go to the soldiers of the 425th SKALA (ROCK) Assault Regiment and the 1st DA VINCI Assault Battalion, who are conducting strike operations under extremely difficult conditions, helping to restore positions and eliminate a significant number of Russian occupiers. Our UAV units are also operating effectively here, nevertheless, I want to emphasize that the enemy has suffered very heavy losses in this particular section of the frontline, yet continues to reinforce its troops and conduct assault operations in several areas. There is a continuous exchange of strikes here: our UAV units are operating effectively, and our artillery is active and generally supplied with ammunition, artillery crews are effectively striking numerous important targets. Still, despite these losses, the Russian command continues to send reinforcements into this area. These reserves are replenished and are attempting to fight for every metre, every settlement, launching relentless attacks. Nevertheless, our forces are also achieving successes in these areas. They are demonstrating a high level of combat readiness, and everything possible is being done to prevent the capture of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, and to stop the enemy in this particular sector of the frontline.
Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, and Kostiantynivka directions. This is the most active sector of the entire frontline, particularly in the areas of Chasiv Yar and Toretsk. This is the most active area of the entire frontline, the enemy is attempting to fully seize Chasiv Yar and the entire surrounding area, to capture all of Toretsk and the Toretsk district, and to continue its offensive towards Kostiantynivka. In other words, the advance on Kostiantynivka is underway from two directions— I have repeatedly spoken about on air, and which has already been widely reported and discussed, this offensive continues, and the enemy is building up its forces in this direction. Despite suffering heavy losses, Russian forces are redeploying additional units here, and a large number of marching reinforcements are being sent in. Everyone who can be forcibly mobilised is being thrown into battle, loaded up and forward, forward. The enemy is bringing in both equipment and manpower, concentrating a large number of drones in this area, as well as air support.
The enemy is making every effort to break through our defences as quickly as possible, to force our troops to withdraw, to fully seize Toretsk and Chasiv Yar, and to engage in further fighting to capture Kostiantynivka.
Orikhiv. On the Zaporizhzhia front, the enemy has intensified its activity and continues attacks, attempting to advance deeper into Zaporizhzhia region. There is particularly high activity at the junction of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, where the enemy is trying to push our forces further back from Velyka Novosilka and from the defensive line we are holding there, attempting to break through and expand its offensive deeper into Zaporizhzhia region. Additional enemy forces are being redeployed to these areas, and the enemy continues to conduct hostilities with high intensity.
Answers to questions
Putin will not give up Odesa or the corridor to the PMR (Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) enclave.
Undoubtedly, Putin can enter wherever he wants. And undoubtedly, we understand that there is no ceasefire at the moment, and there may not be one. Putin's primary objective is the destruction of Ukraine. There is no interest in simply breaking through somewhere. Ukraine is unacceptable for Putin as such, with the very existence of Ukraine. We must understand that regardless of any talk about a truce, the enemy even under the guise of such a truce, which at this moment does not exist and whose form remains unclear will do everything to prepare for the complete destruction of Ukraine. And we must understand that these diplomatic talks may be the same kind of game Putin played with Zelenskyy for two years. Remember how Zelenskyy sincerely said he wanted to look Putin in the eyes. We had an agreement, a comprehensive ceasefire. It turned out that Putin was preparing for an invasion. The game may be the same now.
We have to understand that no matter what sanctions Trump imposes, Russia has close contacts and trade markets in China.
And no export restrictions or blockades can fully stop this. Russia possesses sufficient capabilities to continue the war, and its current goal is the complete destruction of Ukraine. This has been declared, and now it is even more relevant for them. Therefore, regardless of anything else, Putin has no local objectives. The main goal is the elimination of Ukraine. The threat is extremely serious, and it remains ongoing. And I want to emphasize: whatever is being said now about a ceasefire, the war continues — and that is the only fact we have today. It is impossible to allow ourselves to be deceived by these statements.
In your opinion, are there any chances of a ceasefire before Easter?
We have absolutely no clear understanding of whether a ceasefire is possible. Only at the end of March, on the 25th–26th, meetings are scheduled to take place in Saudi Arabia. These will be held by U.S. representatives, separately with the Ukrainian delegation and separately with the Russian delegation. These are not meetings between Putin and Trump. These are not meetings between Putin, Trump, and Zelenskyy. These are not meetings that will immediately stop the war. These are discussions. Such meetings have already taken place. I want to remind you that in March 2022, there were talks in Istanbul, which ultimately led to nothing. Similarly, there is a strong desire on the part of President Trump to reach a peace agreement, but we must be realistic: Trump is not omnipotent, and he cannot simply declare that he will go to war on Ukraine’s side if Putin violates any agreements.
Now we see that Trump is trying to use this moment of political transition to find a way to reach an agreement with the Russians. And he is using it. And we are merely observing. Nevertheless, if Putin gains the upper hand on the front and our front is pushed back, Putin will drag out the negotiations. He will not try to do something quickly. And now we can see from the situation on the frontline what the actions of the Russian leadership indicate. They are not relying on diplomacy, they are not seeking peace. They are trying to intensify their strikes against Ukraine. They are trying to demonstrate that they are prepared to continue their strikes and continue the offensive. And we have absolutely no understanding of what the framework of any potential agreements might be. What will be proposed? There is no peace plan. We cannot say at this point when it might be possible. A truce — how? Based on which positions? Who would control it? Would there be a withdrawal of troops, for example, in areas where positions are 50–100 meters apart? How would this be implemented? None of these issues have been discussed. What will be the legal status of the territories captured by the enemy? Will Russia give up its claims to Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, which Putin continues to insist on even now? We do not know any of this. So let us not deceive ourselves, create inflated expectations. In our war with Russia, there have already been far too many such inflated expectations and peacekeeping efforts. Let us recall that pro-Russian parties are still operating in Ukraine. And throughout all these 11 years of war, they have been saying—and continue to say—that Russia is, in principle, ready for peace, that there is no need to seek war, that Russia is ready to negotiate. All of this has turned out to be a lie, a smokescreen created by the Russian Federation to conceal the attack, the preparations for the attack, the deployment of troops, and the invasion itself. Therefore, we must not rely on the Russians for anything. I believe there should be only one conclusion. So do not ask when the war will end. Let us begin, at the very least, by seeing a single step from the Russian leadership that would indicate a willingness to end the war. So far, I have seen no such step.
The situation at the frontline is very concerning. What is most concerning now is the situation in Donbas. For the enemy, it is of critical importance to collapse the frontline, our frontline. And we are seeing systematic efforts by the enemy to break the front from Yampolivka to at least Toretsk. They are carrying out attacks in order to capture a number of our cities. The Russians have not abandoned the objective of rapidly capturing Pokrovsk. They were stopped by losses and by counterattacks by Ukrainian forces. But judging by what is happening, they will attempt to attack and advance on Pokrovsk from the south and will likely try to move on Pokrovsk after the capture of Toretsk—if they succeed in taking it, they will undoubtedly deploy a grouping in the direction of Pokrovsk as well. They need to capture as much territory as possible. They want to demonstrate that they are capable of seizing those regions of Ukraine which they have incorporated into Russia by military force, without any negotiations. That is Putin’s goal. And he will pursue it without regard for Russian lives. As many as needed will be sacrificed to keep pushing this cannon fodder forward—until the very last day, for as long as Putin has the means to wage war. That is the reality. The only reality.
If there is no ceasefire, will there be a counteroffensive?
The enemy has a significant numerical advantage on the frontline, as well as in the quantity of ammunition. The enemy holds complete air superiority, including in aviation. It can apply significantly greater force—many times more—in the air. The enemy also has an advantage in the number of drones. And we must reckon with reality. Offensive actions are possible. If we eliminate more Russians than they can mobilize or contract and throw forward as cannon fodder. If we organize combat operations in a way that enables us to eliminate the enemy on a larger scale, then, without a doubt, conditions will be created for effective and deep counteroffensive operations. At the moment, in some sections of the frontline where the enemy has suffered heavy losses and defeats, where our forces have managed to gain tactical advantage, we are able to conduct limited local counterattacks. In fact, this is a significant achievement by Ukrainian soldiers and a demonstration of the high combat capability of the Ukrainian army, which is able to defeat the enemy even under conditions of its overwhelming superiority in forces.
Yurii, what is this new tactic of carpet-bombing a new city with drones every night?
In reality, the enemy is systematically increasing the use of attack drones and guided weapons, including both ballistic and cruise missiles. Accordingly, it is intensifying strikes on all of our infrastructure facilities. The objective is the destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure, the weakening of our defence capabilities, the weakening of the country and the state, and the terrorizing of the civilian population. Putin wants to demonstrate that he is capable of destroying any city. The enemy has increased the production of drones.
The ending of the video featuring the repeat criminal offender is quite telling — when asked what he would have done, he replied:
"I’d blow up Panda. Along with his Pernatyi. I’d take Dub and hand over the rest." But what are we supposed to do with this guy?
I hope everyone had the chance to watch, I highly recommend it, Russian serviceman Yegor Zagorodnev, he is from the Leningrad region, near St. Petersburg. He signed a contract after spending 17 years in prison for serious crimes, including murder and for the Russian army, he’s a perfect fit, because the so-called "second army of the world" — the Russian army — is made up of criminals, looters, madmen, and murderers. They need convicts because the mindset of the Russian leadership is that of convicts — a criminal, gang-based mentality. And here is a vivid example: the soldiers of the 13th National Guard Brigade "Khartiia" inflicted a complete defeat on the enemy and the 7th Russian motorized rifle regiment, to which Zagorodnev was assigned, was practically wiped out near Lyptsi — massive losses, several commanders surrendered, along with a large number of soldiers. And one of the dramatic episodes of those battles was when, in full view of a drone, Zagorodnev surrendered to a Ukrainian drone — but not before throwing grenades into the bunker of his own company commander, then he raised his hands to show that he was surrendering, that he had killed his own and was now giving himself up. I honestly don’t know what to do with someone like this. I think he has made his choice. He started an armed struggle. He voluntarily went to war, signed a contract, received money — and he talks openly about all of it. He is a repeat criminal offender. So what is his path? I believe that if he has already started eliminating Russian commanders, if he hates them, then he should be given the opportunity to continue fighting against the Russian army. In what form — I don't know. We have a significant number of structures that could offer him such an opportunity. In fact, I believe that since a large number of Russian prisoners are surrendering — many of them surrendering voluntarily — they are already killing their own commanders, throwing down their weapons. That is, they are ready to fight against the Russian Federation, against Putin’s army. And Putin does not want to exchange these people. In fact, all of these prisoners, as well as ordinary infantrymen, are practically never included in Russia’s exchange lists. Who do they exchange? Certainly Kadyrovites, certainly certain officers, career commanders. Certainly, those who have personal connections in Moscow. But of course, we understand that conscripts are always included — because it creates negative publicity for Putin when conscripts, children, are taken captive. He had promised they would not fight. But all the others — they are nothing more than cannon fodder. They have no value for Russia, and they are not being included in the exchange lists. That’s why POW swaps are stalling — because these thousands of POWs we are holding, Putin does not want to exchange them. What do I think? I believe that those Russians who demonstrate they are ready to destroy Putin’s army — by their actions — should, perhaps, be given the opportunity, to use them, within the units that are engaged in combat and that captured them, if they want to switch sides and fight against Putin’s army, they should be given that opportunity. That’s my view.
Where would he go now? If he’s sent back in an exchange, he’ll simply be killed in Russia. I believe that if someone wants to fight and continue eliminating Putin’s army, they should be given that opportunity. That deserves respect. This person was there, saw firsthand what Putin’s army really is, and now wants to go on eliminating Putin’s occupiers. Let him. That’s my view. Of course, it must be a voluntary decision. He must state it himself, make it clear — just like in this interview. As you understand, I did not force Yegor Zagorodnev to say anything; everything he said was of his own free will. And I think you understand that I never go beyond the boundaries of journalistic work in my interactions. And the same applies here — I had no aim. So, look — if a person wants to continue fighting, let him. Only now, he’ll be fighting against those who abused him.
Why is the situation at the front so difficult? Is it the lack of weapons or manpower?
We understand that the main issue is simply the size of the population in the Russian Federation. Their population is at least five times larger than Ukraine’s. That is the reality. Russia is currently importing millions of migrants from Central Asia—primarily, and on a massive scale. They are resettling these people in Russian regions so that there is someone left to work. Meanwhile, all Russian men are being conscripted under various pretexts to be sent to war. We are a democratic country. We respect human rights. We do not have a system where people are sent to the front or into an assault under threat of execution. If a soldier in the Ukrainian army is wounded—even lightly—and the situation allows, they are immediately taken to the rear and receive treatment in a military hospital. We do not have a punitive system, we have a significant number of individuals who may desert for various reasons. In Russia, such cases are rare—perhaps not just a few, maybe hundreds—but they are few overall, and they are constantly being chased and caught. Russians understand that there is no way to avoid participation in senseless meat assaults. It’s a one-way ticket. You’ve seen the interviews with prisoners I’ve published—every one of them says they fear their own commanders more than they fear the Ukrainians, more than Ukrainian bullets. That’s why Zagorodnev made the choice he did—he simply killed his commander. Because it is forbidden to leave one’s position. The Russian system relies on rounding people up from the streets, bribing, deceiving, forcing them into the army—through prison, through criminal charges, through debts. All of this is used to round people up, and those people are then sent 100% into the assault. That is impossible here. We have legal and medical restrictions in place. In Russia, no such restrictions apply—even people on crutches are being sent into assaults.
We do not have the kind of rigid coercive system that exists in Russia.
Why is recruitment so totally ineffective in Ukraine?
Recruitment cannot exist as an isolated phenomenon — to say in brief words. Recruitment is part of the broader process of manning and ensuring the army’s combat readiness. That’s why we are facing major problems with command organization, personnel requirements, career advancement, operational planning, and the preservation of life. Unfortunately, we live in a fragmented state, where each institution functions independently, according to its own chaotic rules. We keep addressing local issues instead of solving the overarching problem. There is no global approach. The state has no long-term strategy for manning the armed forces. They keep trying to come up with a panacea — "Let’s give a million hryvnias to young people aged 18 to 24." But did that solve the problem of recruitment? No. And it couldn’t have — people warned about this in advance. The requirements currently placed on recruitment are completely disconnected from reality. You don’t need to entertain people with flashy advertising or search for gimmicks to attract them to the army. There’s no need to rush to hand out money, because the person may be unfit for military service, and the funds will simply be lost. We need to build an army based, first and foremost, on strong, capable commanders — those who inspire trust, who are real leaders, and who have the authority to independently form high-quality units. If this is absent, and if we try to solve the issue of recruitment ratings in isolation from the problem of preserving personnel and their effective use in the army — where each person finds their role, where there is a proper provision, proper planning, where every soldier sees their perspective, has a chance to survive in combat, and sees who is supporting them and how. What we need are systemic changes. And we are looking for what to do with recruitment. How it can be? No one is solving the problem systematically. It is impossible to fix one or two elements of the military in isolation from the larger systemic crisis. The army is a system. If you want change — start at the top. What needs to be changed? The requirements for leadership, the distribution of command authority, the accountability of generals, and the constant monitoring of their competence. After Action Review has been brought up a thousand times — yet the Ukrainian leadership stubbornly refuses to implement it, despite all the mistakes made. Well, here are the consequences. There can be no miracles.
Comment on Venislavskyi's statement that military commanders have combat immunity and on Zelenskyy's role in the withdrawal from Kursk. Is it only Zelenskyy and Syrskyi who have this?
In fact, the law on combat immunity applies to all commanders — but this is a rather broad concept because no one has ever been exempt from responsibility for the deaths of people in wartime. No one has been exempt from responsibility for incompetent decisions. And we can see that in the case of the generals from the Kharkiv OTG (Operational-Tactical Group), the article on official negligence is being applied. If it is being applied to certain commanders, it means it can be applied to all commanders — including the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Zelenskyy. So all legal mechanisms exist. And as for Venislavskyi’s words — well, look, he’s just a Servant of the People. Do you really think Venislavskyi has any understanding of what is happening at the front or inside the army? These are people specifically appointed to give comments and praise the authorities — and do nothing else. They have no responsibility. Servant of the People is a party of "Talking heads." And he is one of those "Talking heads" who bears no responsibility for what he says.
In your opinion, do we need private military companies, and what is their feasibility and use?
I believe that private military companies are necessary. They should be part of a broader systemic reform and reorganization of the Armed Forces. Private military companies should be established, for example, to operate abroad — to carry out missions outside Ukraine. Because we understand that the war with Russia is a war that will last for decades. We don’t know how long the active phase will continue — there may be a truce, or there may not. But there should be no doubt that Russia — and this generation of Russian politicians currently in power — will continue for a long time to do everything possible to destroy Ukraine. And of course, we need instruments for action, including operations abroad. Abroad, the best Ukrainian fighters — professional soldiers — should be the ones operating. They should receive appropriate compensation and be able to take part in contracts with our allies, in joint operations with our allies on a contractual basis. These are people who want to follow the military path, to take part in combat operations, and who will be able to do so on a continuous basis — gaining modern combat experience, hands-on knowledge of military technologies, and practical skills in contemporary warfare. In this regard, private military companies are definitely needed. Private military companies would also serve a useful role inside Ukraine — for example, in training, exercises, and facility security. These tasks are necessary and should be carried out based on the experience of seasoned Ukrainian soldiers. But this is a matter of comprehensive reform. It cannot be addressed in isolation — it must be part of the broader transformation of the entire military system. A private military company must not become just someone’s business project. There must be clear requirements, responsiveness to command, and transparency — the way private military companies in the United States operate, where many such companies exist and perform a wide range of tasks, including combat missions.
What is the current situation in the 155th and 110th brigades?
The 155th Brigade is in a difficult situation. Currently, a significant number of personnel have gone AWOL. At the same time, many soldiers fought heroically near Pokrovsk, and the brigade has sustained significant losses. A considerable number of personnel continue carrying out combat tasks, defending Pokrovsk. It is worth noting the UAV units in this brigade—they are genuinely combat-ready and highly effective, particularly to the south of Pokrovsk. These include the battalion of unmanned systems, as well as drone platoons within individual battalions. However, the systemic problems I previously mentioned prevent this brigade from becoming fully combat-capable at the frontline. The brigade was sent into battle completely unprepared, poorly organised, and subsequently thrown into chaos, its commander, Dmytro Ryumshyn, was unlawfully detained and imprisoned without any valid grounds, based entirely on fabricated charges. All of these events severely demoralised many soldiers. This reflects the irresponsible approach of the authorities. The brigade must now be formed practically from scratch—in wartime conditions. Nevertheless, there remains a cadre within the brigade that maintains combat capability.
In the 110th Brigade, the completely unjustified removal of the brigade’s entire command staff has resulted in disorganisation and misunderstandings within certain command structures, currently, the new command is trying to find common ground there. It's a difficult situation as well. The brigade has been exhausted due to totally inadequate combat tasks, issued without taking into account the situation, was not replenished with personnel, nor given the opportunity to train replacements, were ordered to stand their ground to the death in absolutely disadvantageous tactical positions, and the brigade was further disorganised by the removal of its commanders. The situation remains difficult. Personnel within the brigade are trying to sort things out, there are hardened veterans in the 110th Brigade who have been fighting for many years—some have served in the brigade since March 2022. This core still provides an opportunity, given sensible command decisions and sufficient reinforcements, to restore the brigade’s combat capability. I sincerely hope so. The brigade continues to carry out combat operations, and there are tangible results. I recommend everyone follow this brigade’s channels. Personally, I watch the channel of the 110th Unmanned Systems Battalion every day—a unit which my foundation has supported, and to which, thanks to donations from all viewers of Butusov Plus, we provided substantial targeted assistance worth several million hryvnias near Avdiivka and addressed all their immediate problems. A great deal has been accomplished. I hope—and indeed, I am certain—that the brigade will now be able to recover, and its combat capability will improve.
What do you think about the UAH 51 billion in arrears on contracts of the Ministry of Defence?
Yes, such contractual arrears—meaning the failure to fulfill contractual obligations—indeed exist. I've received confirmation about this not only from the Anti-Corruption Action Centre. Unfortunately, it's true. This situation arose due to a large number of contracts, particularly in 2022-23, but even in 2024, being hastily issued and subsequently not fulfilled. Then the arrears become overdue, accumulating over time. Yet, there is no accountability for this. Take those infamous mines, whose supply we managed to halt thanks to public attention, my broadcasts, and the active participation of viewers, concerned citizens, and military personnel who reposted and disseminated information. For example, tens of billions of hryvnias were transferred to a state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of Strategic Industry, yet the contract remains unfulfilled. They simply draft supplementary agreements, shift deadlines, add clauses, extend terms, and that's it. No accountability whatsoever. That's how the state apparatus operates—someone proposes something, it's approved hurriedly, and no one cares about the outcome. There are no audits. The Verkhovna Rada Committee—as exemplified by Venislavskyi—is comprised of individuals who merely talk without substance; they are part of Zelenskyy's administration, and their role amounts to zero. Parliamentary oversight is entirely absent. All they do is praise the government and the president while neglecting their actual duties, including those of the Defence Committee. And it's precisely the Servants of the People who fail to carry out their responsibilities. They continue to allocate money to contracts that aren't fulfilled, and unfortunately, this persists. What should be done about this? The monopolistic government acts however it wants. All law enforcement agencies are under its control and lack independence; no one listens to them, decisions are made by a small group of 5-6 managers within the President's Office. What matters most to these managers? Ensuring that substantial sums of money flow to the right people. Those right people then report back in ways that always satisfy these managers. Everything is great for them—especially financially. This is clearly corruption—corruption on a massive scale. As long as this monopolistic, irresponsible government controls all funding sources, how can we possibly hold them accountable? They won’t prosecute themselves; they came to profit, not to accept responsibility. Sadly, this chaos continues.
The Anti-Corruption Action Centre reported overdue contracts worth UAH 51 billion for arms procurement. But where is the government’s reaction? No denials, no comments, no statements about how we're going to resolve this issue. As usual, it's ostrich politics à la Zelenskyy—just hide and stay silent. The boy has been caught, and now he remains quiet. He pretends that nothing has happened. With such an irresponsible stance, is it even possible to restore order there? They lie and steal, lie and steal. Unfortunately, nothing else. All their hopes rest on Western allies stepping in and covering all our needs, hoping the West continues to supply weapons. Meanwhile, here they continue to squander budget money however they please.
There was a breakthrough below the village of Komar, within the area of responsibility of the 141st Brigade. Why are there no equipped positions? Where are the soldiers supposed to withdraw to? Now we must build second-line positions, dig trenches under drone attacks and artillery fire, all at the cost of human lives. Who will be held accountable?
Dear friends, who will take responsibility for the recurring issue of unequipped positions? Neither the second nor the third defensive lines are prepared. Who will be held responsible? No one. In 2024, about 20 billion hryvnias were allocated for defensive fortifications. And yet—where are they? I have personally seen these dug-in strongholds on various fronts. It's life-threatening even to take up them. Our troops refuse to use them. Near Pokrovsk, I've witnessed inexperienced soldiers ordered to occupy several such strongholds. Later, the enemy openly showed footage of how, tragically, they used drones to kill our soldiers. Because these strongholds, dug by state and civil-military administrations, have zero combat value. Tomorrow or the day after, I will show you what they look like. It's horrific. Regarding the situation in the 141st Brigade: these 140-series and 150-series brigades entered combat in 2024 and have identical problems. Unfortunately. Organizational chaos, poor management, absence of qualified commanders, and lack of trained personnel. What should we do friends? The only solution is to assign these brigades to more combat-capable units. We had a positive example when the first DaVinci assault battalion effectively took command of the second mechanized battalion of the 153rd Brigade near Pokrovsk. After some time, logical management structures began to emerge, and planned combat actions finally began. Before this, it was an absolute nightmare when unprepared personnel were thrown directly into combat. Therefore, I hope the leadership will stop this practice. Apart from creating publicity, we have no other way to compel the country's military and political leadership to care about people's lives. Their approach is limited purely to hype.
We will look into this situation by brigades.
What do you think of the Drone Line project?
I think it's a good project because all the people involved are competent, high-quality combat commanders. The only thing I want to say is that the forces that were included in this project are only 5 units for some reason. Why is that? I want to tell you that 5 units are very few. And the units that are being created, unfortunately, will not be able to be deployed for a long time; they will be deployed, at best, by the end of this year. This is very fast, I want to tell you. And even if they reach their full strength, they will be able to start their planned work sometime next year in full scale with these forces that are drawn there. And there is the issue of funding for their combat operations. There is the question of whether they will be able to cover a large section of the frontline with their activities. This is a matter of great work. Personally, I think that these projects, the drone lines that Magyar said, need to be done, but in fact, we need to create a drone front, not a separate line. And the drone front should not be created there now, if the state has the resources, it can invest and create something new. But the main problem is that we don't have a department to adequately organize the supply of the existing units that hold the entire front. And even if these five units, the drone lines, start fighting in full force, most of the front will continue to be controlled by other drone units. Because the number of drones, the density has to be very high in modern warfare. And still, it is necessary, first of all, to strengthen and improve the organization of interaction between drone units. Those troops that hold the frontline, because the first task of drones is to save the lives of their infantry. The second task is to destroy enemy infantry. And the third task is to destroy equipment and weapons to the depth of the enemy's battle lines and in Russia itself. Therefore, in order to do all this, you need a huge number of units and you need to streamline their organization, management and interaction. One of the reasons we suffered a defeat in the Kursk region, resulting in such a disorganized withdrawal of our troops, was the lack of a competent UAV and electronic warfare (EW) control headquarters within the Kursk command structure. UAV and EW operations were not organized effectively. Unfortunately, by contrast, the enemy had established precisely such a headquarters within its strike grouping. I also want to emphasize that currently, our best results are achieved in sectors where temporary headquarters have been created—headquarters formed within tactical groups of operational-tactical commands—which coordinate the actions of all UAV units in their area of responsibility. For example, this is precisely what has been done in the Pokrovsk tactical group, and even the enemy has been forced to acknowledge this fact in their Telegram channels. Therefore, without improving organizational interaction among existing units, it's impossible to systematically develop drone forces. It’s not enough simply to hide behind the fact that the president has once again gathered drone commanders and wants to demonstrate that he's doing something about drones. But what about all the other units holding the frontline? What is being done for them? Where is the systemic support? Where is it? It's missing. Where are the Mavics? Where is the systematic supply of night drones? Where do we have big problems with drones on starliners that work with supply? With fiber-optic drones? And all this needs to be purchased systematically. Where is it? The state's supply is completely inadequate, not even covering 40% of the need for drones of all types, and some drones are less than 10% of the need. For example, for reconnaissance Mavic drones. What to do? That's why we need to increase funding, we need to plan defense spending. And without such planning for the entire army, no single project will win the war. At the same time, I want to say that it is really good that the best UAV units, these 5 UAV units, are now able to do their job. These are the commanders who will improve the quality of work in certain areas of the front. And this is also a good and right direction.
What are our actual losses in the Kursk region? Friends, as I've already said, even if I knew the full detailed information, I don't think it's appropriate to disclose everything right now; this information might be more relevant later. However, regarding the POWs, as a result of this disorganized and unprepared retreat—based on the videos I've seen—we lost approximately 30 servicemen captured as POWs, and up to 20 soldiers, unfortunately, were captured and subsequently executed by the enemy. This is what I currently know. There were also substantial casualties during the withdrawal due to drone strikes and artillery. Overall, however, the troops withdrew swiftly, thus avoiding even heavier losses. Nevertheless, our losses remain substantial—indeed very substantial. Fifty soldiers who were honestly stationed in the area performing combat missions: some of them are now in captivity, and their fate must be urgently clarified, as their lives are now in the hands of the Russian occupiers. Unfortunately, we have also seen enemy reports and videos documenting the execution of Ukrainian soldiers in the Kursk region. Those commanders whose negligence or incompetence led to this failure must be held accountable. I will write about this issue in more detail very soon.
Thank you for the broadcast and glory to Ukraine!
