Biletskyi’s Doctrine: "100 fallen fighters—that’s ₴1.5B. $2B to secure entire frontline"
Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov interviewed Andrii Biletskyi, who was recently appointed commander of the Third Army Corps. They discussed command structure principles within the Armed Forces, the importance of timely funding, and the "Biletskyi’s Doctrine."
- Greetings, friends! The Third Army Corps has just been formed, and it’s now led by Andrii Biletskyi, commander of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade.
You officially announced its creation on March 14 — Volunteer Fighter Day. That made me recall an event from exactly eleven years ago, on Rymarska Street in Kharkiv, where you, with just a small group of fighters, engaged a Russian sabotage group led by Arsen Pavlov, a notorious Russian militant. Back then, while repelling the assault, you had just a few dozen men and several hunting rifles. And now you command an army corps that, by structure, likely includes over 40,000 service members. Tell me, how did you manage to walk this path in just eleven years, becoming a corps commander without pursuing a formal military career or graduating from any military academy?
Well, I guess I built my career in war, even if back then it wasn’t officially called that. I’m not a professional soldier — that’s a fact. But I had the will. I had the will, and so did the guys I was lucky to command in Kharkiv. At that moment, Ukrainian security forces still weren’t willing to open fire or resist — not in Donetsk, not in Kharkiv, and largely not in Odesa. Crimea was already lost, and most believed eastern Ukraine would follow the same script, as in Crimea. But we wanted that fight. We wanted to keep our city ours. We wanted Kharkiv to stay ours, Ukrainian.
Yes, that was the first firefight, probably a bit unexpected for all of us. We had barely two dozen people, six hunting rifles, and a Makarov pistol loaded with 9×17 Kurz rounds, usable but not in semi-auto mode. And a couple of non-lethal pistols. That was pretty much our entire arsenal. That’s where the first exchange of fire took place. They opened fire, and we fired back.
- But how do you motivate people? How did you pull that off — having dozens of people ready to go into the assault with you?
First off, people have to believe you’re actually going to do it. It’s a kind of instinct. People are incredibly intuitive creatures. Especially in combat, they just know who you are. I don’t know, maybe it’s scent, maybe something else. In moments like that, people sense dishonesty, whether you're lying to them or to yourself. That’s the first thing.
Second, people need to see that you’ve walked the path yourself. I’m a commander and most of my company commanders last fired a weapon back when they were squad leaders, assault troopers. Rarely, if ever, as platoon commanders. If a company commander opens fire — that’s a serious incident in itself. But everyone knows these company commanders walked that path. Everyone knows the path I took — from the street, from prison, from that spring face-off in Kharkiv, when no one wanted to take responsibility, no one wanted to shoot, and we all knew they’d burn us alive like dogs on Rymarska Street. They know what I went through in this war — and that I wasn’t commanding them from some far-off room, or a vehicle over the radio, or anything like that. I was there — with them. That matters to people.
People need to feel that you’ve been in their shoes. No doubt, I’m fully aware of this, like, you can’t compare the war, the intensity of 2014 with what we’ve seen since 2022. But we shouldn’t forget: back then, the whole idea felt unreal to most people. They didn’t want to be part of it at all. There were nowhere near as many volunteer fighters as in 2022. It was a shock for everyone. Only a handful were the first to step up — in that moment, in that situation. People need to understand this: when it’s time, you go to the trenches. When it was Bakhmut, I was there. When it was Moshchun, I was there. I’ll be honest. I don’t even think that’s the main thing. People need to believe you’re smarter, more competent. That you get them and you make them a team. Not some god handing down clever orders from above. If there’s one thing to say about Triika (3rd Assault Brigade), it’s that we’re a team, first and foremost. One hundred percent. Everyone feels it. Even the rank and file say it. They say, "I show up here and I feel like I’m part of a family, a team." They need to feel they’re part of something — that they’re the ones holding it together, building the team every day. And yeah, you do need to be smarter, qualified, and luckier. At the very least, better than whoever’s on the opposing side. Because that matters too. Even belief in your so-called luck as a commander plays a role.
A person must show character. They have to serve as a standard-bearer for others — not like some Soviet honorary title, but like an actual battle flag, something people rally around. Leading from the front or being the last to make the call. Their paramount task is to command their troops so that, as far as possible, they survive and most remain intact, while accomplishing the mission and eliminating as many enemy forces as possible.
In Andriivka and Klishchiivka, we advanced, we pressed, and we held the line. We didn’t lose a single position, even though it fell within the Lyman direction — one of the enemy’s primary axes of attack. Their losses were absolutely staggering. Off the charts. There was Moshchun. There was the Bakhmut campaign, a defensive operation where we held the line, endured Wagner, and ground them down. Then came the offensive, when we pushed forward. But as the brigade commander, what I take the greatest pride in, perhaps unexpectedly, is the Avdiivka campaign. Because…
-That’s very interesting. Why?
I’ll tell you why. Because, first of all, we had never faced such an overwhelming advantage in enemy manpower and firepower. I mean, the advantage was real. Now, I personally hate all those stories about the enemy outnumbering us 15-to-1, 12-to-1, 10-to-1. Maybe I missed something, though I’ve been part of some of the fiercest campaigns, but I’ve never seen anything like that. The real issue is something else: The enemy has a 4-to-5-fold advantage in everything today and tomorrow, the enemy still has a 4-to-5-fold advantage. But for the enemy, it’s different people every day. For you, it’s just the same people. And within ten days, they burn out — not just physically, but mentally. Exhaustion takes over completely: constant stress, fear of death, and everything else. Because people burn out, deeply. In military history, organized withdrawal campaigns are considered the most complex operations. And as harsh as this may sound, only fools brag about cauldrons. The only ones who have any right to speak of heroism in cauldrons are the soldiers who had to show that heroism because of the incompetence of their senior commanders.
Then we were redeployed to the Lyman direction. There, the brigade holds over 50 kilometers of the frontline — at one point it stretched to 60. But thanks to offensive actions and the recapture of Nadiia, Nadiia village, we managed to shorten the line. We had an unfavorable salient, we cut it down, and the line naturally shortened. Over 50 kilometers of the frontline — plus, the brigade fully serves as the rapid response force for OTG (Operational Tactical Group).
- Right now, it’s still 50–60 kilometers. And 60, I’m pretty sure, is an absolute record among all brigades in the Armed Forces for the entire war.
Plus, this isn’t some border area or a quiet sector like it sometimes happens. This is a constantly attacked section of the frontline. Constantly under attack.
- You’ve got two armies in a single brigade’s sector?
Yeah, that’s how it is now. The 1st Tank Army and the 20th Combined Arms Army are in our sector. On top of that, the brigade is constantly being used as rapid response unit for OTG and that’s just the harsh reality. Sadly, there’s probably no other way. The brigade has been sent out multiple times — to Terne, to Nevske, and now, for instance, to Dvorichna.
- Beyond their designated sector, supporting other units.
That’s right. To Makiivka and so on. And whenever things start collapsing somewhere, they tack on even more kilometers to our responsibility. But the brigade holds up well. Performs at a high level. Our loss ratio compared to the enemy hasn’t been 3-to-1 or 5-to-1 for a long time. When the enemy goes active, it can reach 10-to-1, even 12-to-1. Why is that? Because we’ve got better infantry. We’ve got better command. Among infantry brigades, we currently have the best artillery in the country. That’s not just my opinion — that’s hard data. But the key point is: we’re operating on a different technological level. Airborne UAV systems, UGVs, ground-based robotic platforms, control systems, technical and signals intelligence, electronic warfare — across the board, we outperform the enemy. And in the 21st century, that creates massive asymmetry. Sure, the enemy might be well-equipped, determined to win, maybe even not complete idiots in command but they’re stuck on an outdated tech level.
And second, this is the 21st century. If you're talking about volunteer or Ukrainian fighting spirit, the Cossack spirit and all that — it has to take shape in something real. If you believe in something, you start turning it into action. And we turn it into action: training, learning new technologies and tactics or creating them ourselves when there’s no good example to follow. Basically, it’s about developing tech. For us, that means advancing our capabilities. Without it, with the kind of sector we’re holding, we’d have been wiped out anyway.
- You’re talking about the 3rd Assault Brigade operating on a different technological level compared to the enemy. Well, at this point, almost everyone’s saying it. Everyone’s talking about drones and electronic warfare (EW).
This is about integration into a single, large-scale system. It’s a massive setup. These components don’t operate independently. Think of it like an orchestra or a manufacturing plant. The design bureau doesn’t work in isolation from the production line or other parts of the process. No, it’s all part of a single cycle. The same goes for unmanned systems. They must be fully synchronized with electronic warfare capabilities. Otherwise, your own trench-based EW units will end up jamming your own FPV drones first. Picture this: your drone is flying toward the enemy; your control unit is here, your EW unit is here, and the enemy is over there. The EW system ends up positioned between your control unit and your drone as a whole. Meaning, the drone is flying toward the enemy’s forward line. Link it all together with air defense, which currently plays a massive role. And what’s the point of all this? To destroy artillery-spotting fixed-wing UAVs, Lancet loitering munitions, and similar assets, and also to destroy reconnaissance-type Mavic drones. To destroy FPV drones and enemy fiber-optic systems. That’s what air defense units are doing now, using their radars and other sensors. It all has to be tied together. In order to strike effectively, whom should you suppress first? Operators and their assets. That means targeting artillery, mortars, SPG-9s, and AGS systems. But how do you find them? Radar. You need radar systems capable of indicating where UAVs are taking off. Then comes technical SIGINT to locate the source of the signal. Once it’s triangulated, conduct aerial reconnaissance, identify the launch site and neutralize it. Only once the launch sites are suppressed can you engage enemy infantry. By then, they’ve lost their drone support. All of this has to work like a coordinated orchestra.
Don’t buy into the idea that a single system can work both for protecting personnel and supporting the unit as a whole. It doesn’t. Every servicemember knows what happened when trench-based EW systems started appearing in significant numbers, it was a disaster for FPV operators. An absolute disaster. A complete desynchronization. One system designed to protect infantry ended up fully neutralizing another system meant to destroy enemy infantry. Later, we managed to more or less synchronize them. In our case, the integration is at a very high level, in many brigades, it's top-level. In some, the coordination is a disaster. And we know it. These issues haven’t gone away. Then there's FPV channel capacity — every drone operator knows what that means. The number of available channels isn’t unlimited. To launch 100 to 200 FPV drones per day, it’s not enough to simply have 200 FPV drones. You need a proper system to organize and manage the flights and I mean literally, you need dispatchers. People who will coordinate those launches so that — whoosh — all 100 take off at once. None jammed another. So that they strike the right targets in the right directions — not just whatever a pilot happens to see. This is complex math. These are systems, we can’t go into much detail, but we’re constantly referring to EW, unmanned aerial systems, and UGVs.
There’s another component no one really talks about and we won’t go into it either. It is system of electronic battle management, or more specifically, digital battle management system, including administrative tools. How advanced these systems are — and how well operators know how to use them effectively — plays a major role in whether operations are successful or not. Russians currently have large numbers of FPV drones. But from what I’ve seen and not just in the 3rd Assault Brigade’s sector, their overall effectiveness still appears to be lower than ours. Yes, we fell behind in the fiber-optic revolution. We’re catching up now — that kind of thing happens in war. They’ve missed a few revolutions too. They missed the heavy bomber revolution. They missed the FPV revolution early on. In that regard, they followed us, not the other way around. We, on the other hand, missed the Orlan and we missed the fiber-optic transition. That’s just how it is. You won’t find anyone to blame, there isn’t anyone. Someone came up with a good idea, and they scaled it quickly. I believe we’ll catch up and close that gap.
- So there you have it, friends, the doctrine of modern high-tech warfare, as laid out by the commander of the 3rd Army Corps. How much does such high-tech warfare actually cost on the front line of your brigade? What’s your monthly budget or how much do you need each month to keep fighting this effectively, as you’ve just described?
I know it sounds big, but I’d say 3 billion. I don’t have anything close to that, not even on an annual scale. But I believe 3 billion would be enough to fully cover the technological needs. Radar systems, reconnaissance, and everything else. That`s required for a sector like this. What does that mean on a national scale? Let’s break it down, the math isn’t complicated. Fifty kilometers is about 5% of the current frontline. This sector is active, not the most intense but still very active. There are areas that are much quieter. So if we take this sector as a reference, we’re talking about 60 billion hryvnias. Maybe a bit more. Let’s say 80 billion to meet every need, top to bottom. 80 billion hryvnias — that’s 2 billion dollars. Enough to secure the entire frontline properly. Is that a lot? Let’s look at it differently. It’s uncomfortable math, but it’s real. The Ukrainian state, in theory, even though the payouts are often delayed, owes nearly 15 million hryvnias in compensation for each fallen soldier. A hundred dead means 1.5 billion. And we all understand: a system like the one I’m describing wouldn’t just save hundreds — it would save thousands. Maybe several thousand. The conclusion’s simple. We’d come out ahead, financially, at least. But the real value isn’t in the money, it’s in the lives that would be saved. That’s why, in my view, 2 billion dollars to fight this war properly across a thousand-kilometer frontline is not that much.
- Friends, that’s the arithmetic for a thousand-kilometre front line, first from a brigade commander, now from a corps commander. Let’s compare those figures with Ukraine’s current defence budgets. The Ministry of Defence’s weapons-procurement budget for 2025 is roughly 750 billion hryvnias. So…
Not counting on receiving a large amount of MTA, materiel-and-technical assistance.
- This ties directly into what you said earlier — that savings can come from saving lives. Because right now, everything is measured in monetary terms. In war, every action or inaction has a price. You either spend that money to eliminate the enemy or on posthumous payments for your own fighters. The money goes one way or the other. And it’s the state that sets the priorities. So what you’re saying is: infantry brigades may receive ₴80 billion, but targeted spending on high-tech weaponry makes up only about 10% of the total annual defense procurement budget. So if I understand you correctly, it’s really a question of priorities, not a shortage of funding.
At the very least, you and I can agree, this seems like a solvable problem. Let’s put it that way. Personally, I strongly oppose a certain ignorant view that’s been floating around lately, the idea that we shouldn’t be procuring artillery shells because drones now eliminate 70% of enemy infantry targets. Friends — by that logic, why give a soldier a rifle at all? After all, the Russians calculated that only 4% of their casualties were caused by bullets. And that’s not just assault rifles? that includes machine guns, heavy machine guns, even sniper fire. So if you break it down, only about 2.5% of deaths come from assault rifles. So why should a soldier have a rifle at all? There are military vehicles that can’t do anything against a tank — simply because that’s not their role. They serve a different function. That’s why it’s obvious we still need to procure serious artillery. But I’ll say this, I’m convinced we can optimize the budget and find the funds to acquire the systems we actually need. I believe that. Maybe that optimization is already happening, who knows, maybe that’s why we haven’t received anything for three months.
- Are they saving it for the Corps?
- Maybe they’re optimizing and then one day they’ll hand it all over at once. It’s obvious that…And on top of that, the lion’s share of these technologies, here’s the kicker, is almost entirely Ukrainian.
- Equipment?
Right, almost all of it is Ukrainian. They send us a radar system and in some aspects, it’s better than the Ukrainian one, in others — worse. But it costs six times more. Other than that — yeah, it’s great. Have you ever seen (Ed. note: Western) FPVs? I haven’t. Who’s ever actually seen a French, German, Israeli, or even Turkish FPV drone? All FPV drones assembled here. Everyone uses Chinese parts now—there’s literally no alternative on the market. EW assets. Yes, the West has high-end EW systems—won’t argue. But look at the price tag. Ukrainian systems offer more or less analogues. The lion’s share of electronic warfare systems, trench-level, both large and small, are produced by established Ukrainian defense firms. Signals intelligence systems and so on. Sure, Rohde & Schwarz will always exist—it’s the Mercedes of this field. Still, these systems are being produced in Ukraine, at scale, and while they cost up to ten times less, the drop in quality is only marginal. All of this, EW, SIGINT, ELINT, anything that flies, except Mavics. Fixed-wing drones. We used to operate Polish FlyEye, back then it was the only option. Now FlyEye quality’s slipped and Poland isn’t really selling; they’re gearing up for their own war. Sales are tiny. Today almost everything in the sky is Ukrainian-made. When you put money into this kit, you’re investing in your own defence industry. You’re investing in local jobs, and the national economy. That’s why I believe it’s worth finding the resources, first and foremost, for the Ukrainian manufacturer and the Ukrainian soldier.
- So now we really do have a full-fledged military doctrine. A doctrine with a clear logic for how to deploy forces and assets, defined priorities and, for the first time, I’ve actually heard that you outline an approximate budget that gives us a real sense of scale. In other words: how to keep infantry alive, how to eliminate the enemy, how to hold the line across dozens of kilometers — and what it actually costs. Tell me, where does your brigade get its drones and EW systems? Are you really receiving significantly more from the state than other brigades?
I want to thank the Ministry of Defense. Over the past three months, the 3rd Assault Brigade hasn’t received a single FPV drone. We don’t have enough. Without the state-supplied FPVs, we’ve basically been running dry these past three months. Because again, we’re covering a massive sector.
What percentage of your drones and EW systems does the 3rd Assault Brigade receive from the Ministry of Defense?
At times, we’ve received around 30 to 40% — and that’s significant. At other times, like now — zero. And that’s absolutely not okay. Some supplies come through subventions, through volunteers — I mean, even local communities help out. That initiative has been fairly effective. It works differently in different places, but I’m talking about the system where brigades are assigned so-called curators. I think the Office (Ed.note: of President) introduced it back in 2023. For a long time, our brigade didn’t have one assigned. But the system itself works and it’s a good idea.
-Brigades now have curators who provide material support.
Yes, that’s right.
- Can you say who that is?
I’d rather not. Honestly, I don’t know if that information is public or classified, so it wouldn’t be appropriate to name anyone.
- Is it some private company?
- Well, in 2023, the President’s Office, as I recall, assigned brigades to large enterprises, ministries, and certain MPs — they were tasked with the (Ed.note: brigades’ equipping). In some brigades, it doesn’t work at all. For a long time, it didn’t work for us either. In some brigades, this system works really well. It varies. There’s no system to it. But overall, this way is better. Honestly, that’s a solid advantage compared to what we had before. So how much comes from volunteers, these so-called brigade curators, and subventions? I’d say it breaks down to roughly a third from each, more or less.
- So 30% of the brigade’s support comes from volunteers? Wow.
This is a substantial, a very substantial resource. There was a downturn; I keep hearing the country has grown tired. It hasn’t grown tired; it has simply become poorer. Those are two different things. Those who have helped—continue to help. Their capacity has at times diminished over this period. Yet they stay the course; I’ve seen it myself. And it felt like it was about to reach some sort of… But it didn’t. It flattened out at a certain level, and, as I see it, hasn’t dropped below that. And people keep going — gritting their teeth, they still push through, push through, and continue supporting the army.
- Let’s put the brigade’s achievements into perspective, especially now that official rankings have emerged, compiled and centrally monitored by the state. There’s a strike drone effectiveness ranking jointly maintained by the Ministry of Defense together with Ministry of Digital Transformation, as well as artillery effectiveness rankings that reflect the use of high-tech weaponry. As of now, 400 units are being tracked in these rankings. So it’s interesting—where does the 3rd Assault Brigade stand in these rankings, after everything you’ve described?
Look, I haven’t even checked the data for March, to be honest. I’ll need to take a look. But as of February and I don’t think much has changed since then Triika consistently held the top spot among all non-specialized units.
As for artillery, it’s exactly the same story. The 3rd Assault Brigade is not only leading in the number of confirmed destroyed targets, but also, in one of the months, it even outperformed all of the country’s artillery brigades. Once again, was it difficult or not? Well, it was rather difficult. The 3rd doesn’t even have two fully staffed artillery battalions. So how does the ranking system work? The entire process — including drone strikes and artillery hits captured on video — is analyzed using artificial intelligence, analysts, and so on. All drone strikes, as well as artillery hits captured on camera, are documented and uploaded to the database. The database links each strike to a specific location and date, and then generates the rankings. Each target type has a point value — an infantryman counts for this much, a tank for that much, and so on. And that’s how objective control works. Can’t show how you hit a target with an FPV or a Mavic? What happened — the camera fell off? No recording? And so on. You’ve been to command posts at various levels more than once — you know how this works. So if the 3rd Assault Brigade says it's the best in target elimination, there's solid proof to back that up. Not someone’s opinion — not mine, not some general’s, not a neighbor’s. It’s confirmed by the system. And by video. That’s the whole picture.
When we say we eliminated 149 personnel in a single day — we can back it up with video showing hits on 100, maybe 20-something more. You can clearly see the strikes, the intercepts, and so on. Nearly all of those 140 are visually confirmed. In a single day, for example.
- Where did that happen? When was this record set?
It was an incredible day. I think it was about a week and a half ago. They launched an assault across a front held by four battalions at once. And that was an absolute record for the entire three-plus years of this war — to get that many in a single day…
- What were the brigade’s losses while repelling the attack across the entire frontline that day?
If I’m remembering correctly, we lost five soldiers that day, and around twenty were wounded.
- I recall an unprecedented event in 2023, one that, as far as I know, has occurred only once in the history of Ukraine’s Armed Forces and caused quite a stir in professional circles. After the successful offensive at Andriivka, the liberation of the town and the rout of enemy troops, you, as commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade, submitted a report that criticized the actions of your superior, the commander of the operational-tactical group, General Bohomolov. Tell us, please: why did you decide to go public with that conflict and insist on a formal review of the operation, and what were the results?
First of all, it wasn’t openly, it was behind closed doors. And because of that, I can’t fully explain my position right now. Yes, I’ve had multiple situations, even back in 2014, where I voiced my personal opinion regarding command decisions. There was a situation where I felt it was entirely about the treatment of personnel, mission. And it always mattered to me, these are my people. I feel that, I believe it. I hope I’m not the kind of commander who pities his soldiers, but I do try to protect them whenever possible. And I hope the soldiers of Triika know that. It’s not just me, that’s the way I raise my officers too. That’s how we do things. We complete every mission, but we aim to do it rationally and intelligently, minimizing casualties as much as we can. And I didn’t agree with everything.
And in the end, they actually listened to me. There was a moment where, looking back, I think I may have overreacted a bit. Honestly, Bohomolov is far from the worst general out there, he’s a competent person, with his own quirks. Those who know, know. But he’s a capable and professional officer.
I’ve had situations like that more than once. I always responded, I never stayed silent. And in about 90% of those cases, I managed to prove my point, the missions got done, and as a result, we either reduced our losses or avoided them.
- Well, it’s important to note that you filed an official report, and there was a formal review, a service investigation...
- There was, that’s correct.
- The investigation was ordered by Syrskyi, but it happened after the operation had already ended, after you had taken Andriivka and the brigade had secured 40 square kilometers.
We fully completed the mission, but I believed there were issues that needed to be addressed. At the time, Syrskyi was the commander of the "Khortytsia" (Ed. note: OTG), and he responded quickly. And I can say that Bohomolov also acted with integrity and decency, especially in relation to the soldiers who were personally affected.
So, once again: one of the army’s big problems—though in my brigade it isn’t one at all—is that once the concept of operations is basically laid out, an officer can come up and say, "Commander, this plan is unrealistic; if we do A, B, and C, we’ll actually trigger the opposite effect. He doesn’t worry that I’ll think, "You scumbag, how dare you challenge my grand plan? I’m the great commander here; everything’s already written up and signed off and here you are!" We’ve reworked plans at the last minute, postponed them, and so on and it’s the same at every level. A huge number of people are involved in planning — huge. The staff brings in battalion commanders and unit leaders who will be part of the operation. They leave, do their work, come back, and say: "Everything you planned here at brigade HQ is a crap." We listen. I tell them: we’ll keep this, we’ll drop that, because you didn’t take such-and-such into account. Those battalion commanders then go to their company commanders, the company commanders sit down with the platoon leaders, and the platoon leaders talk to the squad leaders who will carry out the assault. And it’s exactly the same in every area. That is the norm. We’ve inherited this Soviet mindset: the senior officer states his opinion, and if you disagree—if you have another view—you’re making the senior look like a fool, so you must be what? Punished, because you exposed the senior as a fool. With me it’s the complete opposite: unless you’ve heard from the widest possible circle, you could be the one who ends up looking like a fool later.
- But an important question remains: to what extent, and how, should a brigade commander defend his position during wartime? Is it true that at one point during the war, you submitted a report requesting to be relieved of your position as commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade?
Yes, and I stated the reason: that I no longer had the moral right to assign such a task to the brigade’s infantry, because I believed it would lead to the actual destruction of the company — with zero result for the unit itself, frankly speaking. Again, I never just criticize — I always propose alternatives. I offered other options. That’s what happened, yes.
- And how was it resolved after you filed the report and disagreed with your senior’s actions?
It was handled normally: they denied the request but called off the mission. They refused, mission was called off, and said it was pointless to reassign me to a lower post.
We were just talking about the responsibilities of leaders. And no one can say the 3rd Assault Brigade tries to spare its people or dodge combat. But you have to fight smart. If something starts to fall apart, and your response is to try and stabilize the situation by endlessly throwing in more units, especially assorted small ones, into the breach, you only create more chaos. A catastrophe sets in with communications, first it cripples command-and-control, then fire direction and the entire fire-support system. What’s worse, these fragmented units end up demotivating each other. None of them understands the situation, they’re completely disoriented, heavily demoralised, and they end up radically demotivating each other. So you can’t just keep throwing more and more troops in, hoping it’ll somehow... Sometimes it’s just a fight over a shrub, and the result is that the shrub is lost and the units take casualties. Worst of all, they’re demoralised. When a unit starts to fall apart, just like a person, that’s it. It’s fall apart, stopping it and getting it back into order is extremely difficult.
-So just to clarify, the conflict that led you to submit a resignation report, it was about someone wanting to take a company away from you?
I feel like you’re pushing me toward another conflict with everyone again. There was an operation I was certain would eliminate an entire infantry company. And I’m absolutely certain of that, a thousand percent. I asked not to go through with it and proposed an alternative. It didn’t work. So I submitted a report. A formal request—"I ask for this and that," etc. In the end, they rejected it, but they called off that mission and assigned another, arguably tougher. Still, the brigade remained intact, not torn apart, accomplished the new task, and took far fewer casualties than it would have otherwise. End of story.
- Would you say that the main problem in communication between subordinates and commanders during war is lying?
Yes and that’s exactly what I’ve been trying to say, albeit in a softer form. For example, we have this massive… I’ll say it again, there are officers who, in the true sense of the word, reach out and say: "The situation is critical, we’ve been assigned insane objectives," and so on. They write to you journalists, probably to you first, and to others too. But that very same officer reported something completely different to his senior commander just an hour earlier. Lied about the existence of positions that have been gone for three or five days. Failed to report that he had effectively lost control of one company, and that another was down to zero infantry personnel. Not because they were all killed, some are sick, some went AWOL, all sorts of things happen. And it goes both ways. The same kind of thing comes from the top down.
- And how does it go top-down?
Look, it comes from company commanders, battalion commanders, brigade commanders and probably senior leadership too. Isn't that how it works? You’re senior leadership yourselves. Now, from above, this can play out in a few different ways. One of the most common? They deliberately downplay the enemy’s strength. They say: "You need to push in here, do this and that, in this particular way."
- No one there?
- No one there. Or they say: "That regiment has been withdrawn, clearly preparing to shift to defensive operations," and so on.
- False reports open the door to career advancement.
And this system runs through everything and it works both ways. Where do false reports from senior commanders come from? It’s because they can frame…Because he assigns you a frontline position here but it’s actually over there. And what did he base that on? On the brigade commander who was here before. And what did he rely on? On the battalion commander’s report. That’s how it works, right? It goes both ways. Everyone’s afraid to report bad news.
Do I enjoy picking up the military line and saying unpleasant things? Of course not. I have that feeling — I’m the commander of the 3rd Assault Brigade. I have my own sense of responsibility. I don’t like it. Well then, what’s the point? What’s the point? You report the issue, explain it, offer alternatives — most situations can be resolved. Most of them really can be solved.
- Tell us about a situation that couldn’t be resolved. There’s a well-known story within the brigade back when it was just formed and you were thrown into Bakhmut to close a breach. The brigade was thrown straight into combat, and one of its battalions, on the very day it took up its position, was pushed out of several positions at once. Command and control was lost and the whole brigade says that on that very day the battalion commander and the chief of staff were dismissed, relieved of duty and, on top of that, badly beaten with a stool. Afterward, the Military Law Enforcement Service had to pull them out of wherever they were. They were even sent back to the frontline and made to hold the position with rifles themselves. Please tell us about that tough situation, when everything happened in a single day and such extraordinary measures were taken. Why did it come to that?
What I can say and I’ll be completely honest is that the easiest thing for me would be to say: "I wasn’t in command of the brigade at that time." And that would be absolutely true. I was actually forbidden from going to Bakhmut then.
-You were not formally in command.
Yes, I was at Bakhmut the first time, but during this campaign, I wasn’t formally in command of the brigade. When I arrived and saw the unit was really falling apart, I called Valerii Fedorovych and said, "Valerii Fedorovych, I really don’t want to take this brigade right now, the situation is critical." Things were so bad they were even planning to withdraw the brigade. I called again: "Don’t pull the brigade out. Give me the authority and I’ll stabilise the situation." That night, at two in the morning, he called back and said: "You’ve been appointed commander of the Tactical Group (TG) formed from this brigade and a Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) battalion." And that was it. We started working to fix the situation. You were there too, you saw some of it yourself. As for what happened, there was panic in certain units. I’m not ashamed to say that, for one simple reason: I believe those who got knocked down, like boxers, and stood back up to win the fight, showed far more character and are far more deserving than those who just had everything go smoothly and were always a step ahead of the enemy. So yes, some units panicked. And in one, actually in two battalions, there was a complete loss of command and control. In one of the battalions, the problem wasn’t a lack of experience or anything like that. The real issue was the blatantly disgraceful attitude of the battalion commander, a career officer, but someone who clearly wasn’t one of us.
- Were all your battalion commanders former enlisted men?
Yes, all of them came up from the ranks. That one was the only career officer. This says nothing bad about the professional military... But in that particular case, it was just blatant disregard for people. When you treat your soldiers like cattle from the start and then refuse to even try to put yourself in their shoes.
The troops didn’t even have food at their positions, not even hot meals. In fact, they barely had anything with them at all. There was nothing left to discuss. As a result, changes had to be made… new officers were appointed, given clear orders, and they had to make some tough calls. One of those tough decisions is the very one you're referring to. Yes, there was a situation, and the officers acted the way they did. The chief of staff wasn’t largely to blame. But unlike the battalion commander, this man — though already older, so to speak, said, "I understand everything. I accept it. I’m an officer. I was responsible for those people. Give me a rifle," because they had taken it away from him, "I’ll go to the positions." Well, honestly… And that person now holds a serious position in the corps — not in an infantry unit, but in one of the most capable branches we have in the country. He’s proven himself, showed that he understood one simple thing: that soldiers deserve to be treated with more care than you treat yourself. And that’s it. The battalion commander didn’t act the way he should have and he stopped being a battalion commander. Now, as for what happened next — a so-called "man-to-man conversation", I’ll be frank: I’m against physical confrontation and things of that sort, but sometimes, in all-male combat units, during a critical moment involving matters of honor, I believe it can be acceptable. That’s it. It wasn’t the only incident. For example, the second battalion commander — who, in my view, simply lacked personal experience at the time is now someone absolutely critical to the brigade. Back then, he quietly picked up his rifle and went to the positions he was supposed to hold. Of everyone assigned to those positions, he was practically the only one who survived, the rest were killed. It comes down to the individual’s competence. He was an excellent platoon or company commander. At that moment, maybe he wasn’t quite ready for more but now he’s grown into an entirely different level of responsibility. What matters is that he was an honest soldier.
Things work a little differently in our brigade. If something needs to be done, it gets done. When we were in Avdiivka and worried the road might get cut off, and we had no reserves left, the brigade’s chief of staff started drawing up a list of HQ personnel who would go out to retake the road. I was planning to go with him. When we couldn’t get people to certain positions in Avdiivka, when troops had pulled back and others couldn’t be brought in under fire, the then acting brigade commander, sorry, I mean the deputy brigade commander at the time, grabbed a vehicle, a helmet, a flak vest, gathered some troops, and personally led them into position under enemy fire. They made it through, purely on grit.
That’s how it works with us, I’ll say it again. Your responsibility is different. You’re not a rifleman, not a machine gunner, not a grenadier — you’re an officer. But if you can’t carry out your duties, or if you’ve run out of people — you must be ready. You don’t get to say, "I just give orders, I’m in charge." You have to understand that if the moment comes, it’s going to be you. And you shouldn’t just treat that as acceptable, it has to be an unquestionable duty. That’s exactly what changed the situation, a few counterattacks made purely on grit. The troops started believing that ... Because why did people start to fall apart again? Because they felt… Why the same people? We're talking about the 1st Mechanized Battalion here. By many metrics, at least according to some, they’re considered the best battalion in the brigade. Now, the other three battalions would 100% disagree with that, and rightly so. But still, a lot of people see them as the top-performing battalion. Those very same troops later showed themselves to be absolute tigers. It was this battalion that launched the first counteroffensive actions, the very first steps of the counteroffensive came from the 1st Mechanized. By that time, though, they had a new battalion commander and a new chief of staff, people the soldiers barely knew at first. But those leaders quickly proved themselves as part of the team: fighters, smart, competent, and genuinely concerned about their troops. And the battalion changed.
I know there’s a patch with a stool — it was issued by the brigade.
- It originated in the 1st Mechanized Battalion. I was gifted one.
-Then the logical question is: will you be granted the authority to replace brigade and battalion commanders across the entire 3rd Army Corps?
First of all, I’m not planning to just go in and start arbitrarily dismissing people, so to speak. You absolutely have to take a close look at the units and the individuals. I’m convinced there are plenty of highly competent people. In some places, there are people who simply aren’t competent; in others, the system simply hasn’t been built. The people might be decent, but they’re not an orchestra, there’s no structure. That’s one thing.
Secondly, those I deem incompetent, poor team players, or lacking integrity, first and foremost as human beings, I will, without exception, explain and justify their removal or reassignment. One thousand percent. But I want to rely first and foremost on the officers and sergeants already in place. That said, we’ll make sure to quickly bring them up to speed on the system and fill in the gaps in their training — not formal education, but practical preparation. That’s the gist of it. Yes, I will always provide justification because this is an ongoing process. Even in the 3rd Assault Brigade which by then had already earned a solid reputation we still had to relieve certain company commanders, deputy battalion commanders, and chiefs of staff. Some burned out. Some simply didn’t meet the required level of competence. And others, younger guys, had matured to the point where they were ready to handle the job better. It’s a constant cycle. And it’s normal. Personally, I take great satisfaction in knowing that the staff officers responsible for specific sectors are more advanced than I am in their fields. I consider that a compliment.
-What are your priorities in organizing the Corps? What specific programs do you intend to scale across all brigades?
The question is vast and complex, but I’ll try to outline the key points. The first issue is command and control, implementing proper command procedures, including basic processes like MDMP, and doing so at a high standard across all brigades, battalions, and so on. We must all speak the same language.
-That is, NATO statutes and operational procedures.
Exactly. That includes command and control down to the battalion level. We need to teach people to move beyond things like: "Be at the point by such-and-such time and unleash ruthless fire," and so on. They must be trained to conduct high-quality action planning for absolutely every action.
Second, the corps is divided into infantry, line brigades, the ones that will stand in the line and hold their sector. There are five such brigades. One heavy mechanized brigade and five (four –ed.note) others of various types. This could be assault or mechanized. That makes five brigades, plus the so-called corps package. This means creating a regiment of unmanned systems, to rapidly scale up the Triika system in this regard, and to immediately provide brigades with that umbrella, for defense, for strikes, and for offensive operations, that will cover them from the air. Most brigades already have them — no doubt about that. In some cases, the level is quite decent. But we want to scale this up. So we’re standing up this regiment on our own initiative, on the tightest timeline possible. Right now, every available resource is being thrown into the regiment.
Now we move on to the brigades. The first thing I want to build is esprit de corps. And what builds esprit de corps? Understanding, common training, that’s why we’re creating a large, corps-level training unit that will function at all times. From there, even in the worst-case scenarios, we’ll always be able to pull out trained sergeants, officers, soldiers. Every brigade will go through this system.
- All soldiers and sergeants?
All soldiers and sergeants — every single one. Maybe it’s three to five days of training, then rest, combat, and another three to five. But in most cases, we’ll try to put them through proper courses. I want to retrain practically every soldier. Right now, the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of the General Staff, the General Staff itself, and the Ground Forces Commander, they’re actively supporting the development of the Corps. What I want is for every soldier to understand how to survive here and how to complete the mission. Not just be some guy with a rifle, like the Russians. But a reasonably professional fighter in the Ukrainian army. And for me, training sergeants is absolutely critical. We all know that in the 3rd Assault Brigade alone, over the past year, we put more than 500 sergeants through full-scale training courses.
First and foremost, the most critical roles are the squad leader and the platoon sergeant at the company level. These positions are absolutely essential. We’ve appointed, I personally appointed, the best sergeant we have as the Corps Sergeant Major. There’s simply no one better. He started out in Azov. He completed all commander training at the Azov military leadership school. He served as a reconnaissance operator in Azov, and continued in reconnaissance throughout his time in the 3rd Assault Brigade. An absolutely legendary figure.
-What’s his call sign?
Druh Bob. That’s why I’m sure: building the NCO corps won’t be easy but it will be done right.
-NATO generals and senior officers from various countries visit your brigade quite often. What is their main impression, and what do they ask most frequently?
They’re mostly interested in our employment philosophy, what we do, how we do it, and why, and which communications systems need further development.
-They study the environment.
They want to understand how it affects battlefield dynamics, how it shapes a commander’s decisions. These days, you walk into any battalion command post and it’s covered in screens. We’ve somehow decided that the more screens you have, like in a Hollywood movie, the more professional and promising you are as a commander. But at the brigade level, let alone the Corps, that logic is questionable. They’re fine for operational staff in the Combat Operations Center. But for a brigade commander — that’s another story… A brigade commander must be engaged in planning. When a brigade commander just stands there, mesmerized, cigarette in one hand, coffee in the other, watching for the third day in a row as two more degenerates get taken out by Mavics, then he’s not doing his job. Those who carried out the strike did their job. Communications personnel who set up the communications did theirs too. But the he isn’t doing his job because he’s not planning. And instead, it’s just "give this, give the other one this," and so on. And that’s exactly what the NATO officers are interested in — how all of this affects actual decision-making.
- A lot of our people need to learn that too, what you just said.
Yeah, we need that too.
- To keep commanders off the screens.
I believe a corps or brigade commander should spend 50% of their time in the planning room. If a commander is just sitting in the Combat Operations Center— take the Khartiia Brigade, for example — they’re actually doing a great job and are very advanced in terms of command practices. When it comes to combat, I still believe we’re number one. But I’m not ashamed to say Khartiia influenced us. After visiting them, I called in my chief of staff, set up a commission, sent people over — we adopted some of their methods, improved others. That’s how we constantly share experience.
Take "Khartiia," for example. The brigade commander says, "I entered the combat control center," and it’s treated like some kind of extraordinary event. As if, what am I even doing there? That’s the Battle Captain’s domain. But you know — you’ve been to command posts and all that — tell me honestly: how much time do most brigade commanders actually spend at the combat control center, in front of the screen?
- Some of them live there.
Literally live there. The Americans are learning from this too and they’re genuinely curious.
They get it: back then, a brigade commander had two Reaper drones. A division commander, maybe a few satellite photos etc. Limited intel. Now, there are sensors everywhere. And they’re trying to figure it out: where’s the line? When does it become overload? What should go to the operators — and what should actually reach the commander? That kind of thing.
- Right now, Russia is on the offensive. Putin first announced a so-called ceasefire, then scrapped it. And the main question people are asking is this: When will the war end? And can Ukraine stop the Russian advance? It’s a global issue but without some kind of strategic answer, it’s probably impossible to plan further operational or tactical decisions. What’s your take: do we have the strength and capability right now to stop Putin?
The war could technically end at any moment. The real question is how it ends and how final that ending actually is. Could there be a ceasefire tomorrow? In five minutes? Sure. But on what terms — and for how long? The kind of ceasefire I believe in is a solid one. Not necessarily far off, but one that would hold for a significant period, without the threat of another invasion. And for that, Russia needs to be pushed into a deadlock. That means putting Russia in a complete deadlock, where they can no longer advance, and the losses would be too high to justify the cost. I don’t think they’re far from that red line. In February 2024, Russia launched the Avdiivka offensive. I saw the quality of the personnel they had prepared — it was impressive. They had massive stockpiles of ammunition, up to 100 guided aerial bombs per day. During the Avdiivka offensive, they were launching 60 guided aerial bombs daily, just like that, without any issue. They had overwhelming superiority in both firepower and manpower. That steamroller kept rolling for almost all of 2024. Now, we don’t even know if they’ve started the 2025 campaign or not. If they haven’t launched anything by now — and we’re already at the end of April — well, that says a lot. They’re wasting good days for offensive action: good weather, long daylight hours, everything. And if they have started, then sorry, but it looks more like a cripple stumbling forward. In a slapdash way. Their losses right now are insane. Instead of armor, they’re using motorcycles and Chinese ATVs, right? So where’s the armor? Sure, it still exists but in what quantity, and what condition? So what’s my point? Russia is clearly running out of steam. If Ukraine wants a solid ceasefire, we have to stop them now. And that will be the moment when neither the West nor the East will be able to impose openly humiliating, one-sided terms on us. It will be clear that there’s no way around negotiating with us. I’m not going to shout here and now about the 1991 borders I never have, and I’m not about to start. I believe in them. A historical moment will come and I believe it’s not far off when Russia starts facing its own internal problems, and we’ll take it back. But that’s not today. Today, our task is to make sure we don’t lose any territory, any settlements. To stop the enemy completely. To shift to a strategic defense, across the board. That’s how I see it. Does Ukraine have the strength to do this? Ukraine has more than enough strength to achieve it. Increase effectiveness. Raise the efficiency of your units. Change certain approaches to training personnel, commanders, and planning operations. The Americans love to talk about "command teams" and all sorts of "mission command" concepts. What kind of "mission command" are we talking about, when officers are still lying to each other and afraid to speak honestly at every level? Change that culture and so on. Can it be done? Yes, it can. That’s it. Very soon, our losses will be relatively minimal, while the enemy’s will be maximal and they’ll be exhausted. Ukraine has every chance and every capability. We just need to pull ourselves together and approach this properly. We have enough resources. We ran some numbers in our heads, not 100% precise, but close enough. And if we can boost our effectiveness just a bit, we’ll stop them. If we stop them, we’ll be able to sit at the negotiating table from a position of strength. A position of strength means a sustainable peace and that peace will need to be protected. Strong, capable army. That’s now a condition for our survival and our reality for the next hundred years. This is not, in any way, just a response to the moment.
