On role of commander

In today’s realities, with the shortage of infantry, when the bulk consists of forcibly mobilized, poorly trained people, and given the multitude of challenges a unit faces while carrying out its missions, one of the key criteria for success is a professional command post. Anyone who knows what it means to command people in battle can clearly describe the role and significance of a commander.
The absence of a commander's evaluation system, development plan, responsibility and motivation (in addition to all the desired certificates, well, reprimands, of course), leads to the fact that we have insufficiently competent officials at various levels.
In this case, unqualified means a lack of understanding of the specifics of combat operations in modern warfare, inability to make quick decisions, inability to organise the work of a unit (both work with people and planning, task distribution, control), lack of evaluation skills, etc.
In the structure of the Armed Forces, everything is based on rank rather than competence (you may have nothing in your head but be in charge of a corps because you were once given a "star") or on a lack of personnel, which reduces our efficiency and increases losses. A qualification assessment system would help improve the quality of work.
The full-scale war caused civilians who had neither combat nor army experience to join the Armed Forces, including officers who came after the department of university. The absence of a system of proper training and adaptation created a gap and even a certain prejudice between the "staff" and the "mobilised". Staff commanders do not always understand (usually not at all) that a mobilised person does not know the professional things they have been studying for 5 years, and then wonders why this or that work is done wrong or not done. The most frequent answer I have heard when asked to explain is: read the statute. It is not clear what to read, which of the statutes, and it also shows that such military personnel are unable to explain in concrete steps and examples how to perform this task, which in turn may indicate that the person has learned only the letter, but not the principle.
Often, a "colonel from the OTG" reduces complex processes to a single word: "I order", which in his mind ensures successful execution, even if it does not comply with the laws of nature.
The lack of combat experience of commanders affects the management of units, because in addition to all of the above, there is also a moral and psychological component - people have their own limited resources and capabilities, there are specifics of work in the field, etc. People tend to get physically and mentally exhausted. Everyone has their own physical and moral capabilities. An important component is fears and the ability of the military personnel to manage them. If people are not selected and trained in the same system (the same criteria), it is difficult to assess these skills.
It is impossible to set a task based on a "statutory" soldier or a universal fighter who knows neither hunger, fatigue nor fear. If a commander does not experience this firsthand, he will not know, like the guy in the trench, what he feels and when he becomes incapacitated in such conditions. The absence of these moments leads to "demanding" the impossible, neglecting people - mostly people are perceived as a "soulless unit" with further consequences (loss of combat capability and failure to perform tasks, which leads to failures, complicates "life" and poses a threat to neighbours, etc.) "Those who are being ‘ridden’, if they fight well, we end up losing them as KIA or WIA. Under such conditions, combat capability declines, and then the entire unit starts to falter when they see that their best-trained fighter is out and there is no one left to lead them."
It is important to train (or select) commanders who are able to THINK: to quickly process information in the conditions in which they find themselves and make decisions, constructing the implementation of it in their heads, according to which to give commands to their personnel. You can have poorer firearms training, but use your head to achieve better results.
It is also worth talking about motivation and responsibility. Lack of adequate support or equal pay for less challenging work that does not carry a burden of responsibility, such as for people's lives, narrows the pool of "the willing" for critical positions. Ranks should be based on competence, not years of service and tenure (these things may contribute to a shorter procedure, but should not be the determining factor). The title of a combatant and the title of "head" of a department in a university cannot be the same. These are different efforts, different experience, different requirements, etc. A careerist will choose the path of least resistance and get a rank with all the privileges in the rear without doing anything, without losing sleep at night and losing people, etc. There needs to be a fair "grid" of ranks and privileges based on knowledge and experience.
Irresponsible decision-making creates either permissiveness or chaos. Negative incentives (punishments) now - reprimand, random criminal case, etc., positive incentives (rewards) - medals, certificates, leave (already deserved) - are a very limited set that should be enriched and developed, and they should be of value to the personnel. In other words, responsibility should become desirable and aspirational.
Part of the solution may be to introduce a system of training for NCOs or officers only that is "appropriate" to the current situation, to achieve critical skills (I think it is worth adding a civilian management component, because the army and civilian life are different planets). A mandatory element of combat experience (at least minimal). One way to do this is to create and live through scenarios close to combat with the appropriate level of stress, fatigue, etc.
It is crucial to conduct a high-quality AAR (After Action Review) and implement its findings in the units. At the moment, if it is done, it is only for the sake of formality, not for the sake of improving actions (of course, there are units that use it in good faith and have positive results). There should be an analysis of not only successful tasks, but also unsuccessful or failed ones. For each "interesting" event and new experience, the f#ggots write a methodology, combine AARs into Lessons Learned, and distribute and implement them further.
This is far from an exhaustive list of challenges and problems (described in general terms) that we need to address in terms of the management component.
P.S.: This is only the author's subjective misconception, do not take it into account.