"Problem is not arms exports but lack of funding and orders" – Tech Force in UA president Vadym Yunyk

Author: Nataliia Kharytonova

Drone Industry

Vadym Yunyk, co-founder of FRDM and president of the Tech Force in UA, spoke to Censor.NET’s "Drone Industry" project about Europe’s challenges, the effectiveness of drones, government procurement, and the outlook for Ukraine’s defense industry. The conversation draws on fresh analysis of the war’s evolution in Ukraine and its impact on global security. Our interlocutor shares his views on the challenges facing Europe, the effectiveness of drones, government procurement, and the prospects of Ukraine’s defense industry. The interview took place amid tense developments at the front, where Ukraine continues to demonstrate unique expertise in hybrid warfare.

- We have changed the nature of war overall, of world wars. But what should we do to remain leaders?

- You are right: Ukraine has shown the whole world that war is different now. But a war that could potentially break out in Europe would differ from ours. That is due to the different capabilities and the scale of those countries. The Baltics and Finland are already under threat. Over the past month, the Russians have not even held back—they publicly displayed Soviet-era emblems of the Baltic states and said, "These are ours." These are early harbingers. Still, even there, the war would be based on our Ukrainian model. We are the foundation on which subsequent scenarios will be built.

- How might that war differ?

- The Baltic countries are small. In Ukraine, we had manpower, tens of thousands of people joined the army immediately after the strike. And we had territory, the ability to withdraw, regroup, and return. The Baltics do not have that. The Estonian Armed Forces number 7,000. There are also about 40,000 in territorial defense, but they are civilians who keep weapons at home and go to training ranges from time to time. You cannot seriously rely on that.

I have a friend in Estonia’s Territorial Defense. I ask: ‘What’s your plan? How will you fight?’ He says: ‘I’ll buy a thermal-imaging sight and fight when they enter the city.’ I replied: ‘My friend, if you see a Russian already in your city, that means the end of your country. The task is to prevent him from crossing the border. In urban combat against Russians who have been killing for decades, there’s no chance. They are the best in the world at two things: drinking and killing. So they must be stopped at the border, an armada of drones and hardware has to make them think a hundred times before crossing.’"

- And what does the situation look like in Ukraine?

- The Ukrainian army is the best in the world. But even we cannot hold the enemy back 100%. Every month, our territory shrinks. Look at the DeepState maps, we are slowly falling back. That means we are gradually losing.

- As a representative of DEVIRO told the "Drone Industry" project at Censor.NET, NATO air-defense systems, which are too expensive, are being pitted against cheap decoys and other unmanned means. The enemy’s tactic has long been known: saturate air-defense systems with cheap drones to create a "window" for strikes with missiles of various types. And in this war, we need new solutions that are effective yet inexpensive. In your view, what is needed to prevail in such a situation? What should the state be doing to remain a leader?

- The state is inert by nature. It likes to come up with a five-year program and implement it. But in a war that changes every six months, that doesn’t work. We need to constantly rethink what is being procured and how it is employed. If we are falling back, something is wrong. The problem is either in the people or in the means. We won’t find other Ukrainians. Therefore, the problem is in the means. Drones built three years ago were designed for the conditions of the war as it was three years ago. By now, they are no longer very effective. We need continuous analysis and monitoring. If we don’t do that, the front will keep giving ground. It’s like in business: if you’re in the red, you’re doing something wrong.

- Who should be doing this monitoring?

- Those who make procurement decisions. The military provides a clear statement of need, what they require to fight, then it’s logistics and finance. But somewhere between the order placed by the military and what actually reaches the front, "magic" happens, and the troops don’t get what they need. We need analytics here: why this is happening. Oversight must be strict. But not public, otherwise the Russians will exploit that information. I believe war veterans should be involved, people who have already been through the war and have no conflict of interest. They will know what is truly needed.

- What are the prospects for drone procurement by the end of the year?

- Enterprises can fulfill any order. But many are underutilized. The reasons are a lack of orders due to insufficient state funding or a lack of demand for their products. Entrepreneurs need to be told plainly: your product is not a priority right now; retool for something else. That’s normal. People are ready to work. The state should look at all defense-industry enterprises as its resource, regardless of ownership. I’m not saying the state should run private companies; it can give them guidance, what products are currently lacking, and in this way fully meet the front’s needs. Without this, the state is losing a valuable resource, both human and industrial.

- What is the role of Western partners in financing?

- According to open data, more than 50%. So their role is enormous.

-"The ‘drone menagerie’—is it a plus or a minus?

- It’s mixed. On the one hand, variety is necessary: the front is changing, different solutions are needed. On the other hand, logistics, maintenance, training. A soldier has one drone today, another tomorrow and loses time retraining. Ideally, you would have a universal platform, but that’s unrealistic.

- Should the state try to curb the ‘menagerie’?

- No. That’s a market issue. The military should determine what they need themselves, but orders must come from those who are actually in the trenches.

- How does this align with international drone agreements?

- It doesn’t matter whether a drone is Ukrainian or supplied from abroad. The key is that it proves its effectiveness at the front here and now. Without that, it should not be purchased.

- What do you think about the export of Ukrainian drones?

- The main argument I hear against exports is that if we allow drones to be sold abroad, there won’t be enough for the military. That’s manipulation. The front lacks drones not because they are exported, but because the state does not buy them in sufficient numbers. Period. Sixty percent of enterprises are not loaded at all. The problem is not exports, but the lack of money and orders.

Exports, on the contrary, can play a positive role here. If companies can export surplus production, that gives them a lifeline: to pay salaries, keep engineers, and develop manufacturing. Any profit a company makes goes into R&D—improving and creating new models relevant to the front. Without that process, innovation stops.

Moreover, open exports also mean opportunities for cooperation with European partners: access to technologies, joint developments. It also opens the door to investment. What is coming into Ukraine today is a drop in the ocean compared to real possibilities. Major investors will not put money into companies that can sell only to a single buyer, to the state, which cannot guarantee that tomorrow it will purchase your products. That is why exports are a chance. But controlled exports: to make sure drones don’t end up in countries unfriendly to us. With the Ramstein countries, the EU, and NATO there are no issues—they supply us with equipment themselves. We should give them the same access to our developments.

Read more: Four companies to invest over $100 million in Ukrainian defence technology

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Ukraine not only holds its ground in the war but sets the standards. To remain a leader, the state must abandon inertia, move to rapid analysis, efficient procurement, and support for defense companies. Drone exports are an opportunity, not a threat. The war does not stop, it must be won. Ukraine’s experience is becoming a template for allies, but it requires urgent reforms to achieve victory.