"FPV drone is best tool for criminals to eliminate someone or damage property. That is why we must be able to detect drones as they take off and know who is operating them," - National Police Chief Ivan Vyhivskyi
How do MPs propose to change, at the legislative level, the rules governing the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, and what role will the police play in this process? What is the situation with the voluntary declaration of weapons found in de-occupied territories, and what can be bought on the "black" market? Can law enforcement ensure security if elections are held during wartime?
National Police Chief Ivan Vyhivskyi addressed these and other questions in an interview with Censor.NET.
NEW RULES FOR UAVs
– The Verkhovna Rada Committee on Law Enforcement has approved a draft law that sets rules for UAV use and recommends adopting it as a framework at first reading, with subsequent revisions ahead of the second reading. You have publicly stated that the oversight of all UAV flights needs to be regulated. Can you explain why this is necessary?
– This concerns offences committed using UAVs. If a drone is used to damage property or inflict bodily injuries on people, there must be administrative and criminal liability for that.
Such cases do exist. And the severity of these offences has been increasing year by year. If in 2022–2024 UAVs were used to smuggle cigarettes, deliver prohibited items to places of detention, or disrupt the work of state bodies by issuing bomb threats using a drone carrying explosives, there are now cases of extortion through intimidation with threats to use combat drones, or even attempted murder.
The police’s core tasks are to ensure public safety and order and to counter crime. To fulfil these tasks, in 2023, the police were granted powers to prevent, detect, and stop violations of the procedure and rules for the use of Ukraine’s airspace by UAV operators, as well as to use special equipment to intercept remote-control signals and to disable or destroy such aircraft and components of unmanned aircraft systems. This is why the National Police support and are initiating comprehensive legislative changes, which this draft law is intended to launch.
It provides for mandatory registration of UAVs, their entry into the State Register of Aircraft, and record-keeping by National Police units. It also codifies flight rules, including user identification and document requirements that authorize flights. This is because more than 100,000 people in the Defense Forces alone know how to operate drones, and it cannot be ruled out that, over time, criminals may seek to recruit some of them. Because there’s no need to involve snipers or invent anything complicated. An FPV drone is the best tool for criminals to eliminate someone or damage property. That is why we must be able to detect drones as they take off and know who is operating them.
The draft law provides for administrative liability for operating unregistered drones, flying without documents, or flying while intoxicated, and for criminal liability if such violations cause harm to people or significant material damage.
This is about protecting Ukrainian citizens, and it must become the norm in the post-war period. Drones will remain part of our everyday life, so their use must be controlled and safe.
– There are so many drones now that it’s hard to even imagine the total number.
– Millions… A lot of people manufacture them. The National Police, for example, also produces FPV drones using 3D printers. We supply them to our combat units. It’s cheaper than buying them.
– There are no plans to register drones at the moment, only after martial law is lifted. How will people be able to use them then?
– People who hold the relevant certificates to operate drones and who have them will submit an application to carry out flights. For example, journalists worry they will be prevented from filming with quadcopters. No one plans to do that. You will simply need to file an application in advance. That is already how it works now. Because if a drone falls on someone’s head, there must be liability for it.
– How will the drone registry be maintained?
– State registration of unmanned aircraft is already provided for by the Air Code of Ukraine, and once martial law is lifted, it is planned to be expanded and detailed in line with legislative amendments.
The drone register will operate as a state information system, similar to vehicle registration, but tailored to the specifics of UAVs. Registration is planned in an electronic format, via a state online platform or the Diia app.
During registration, the operator or owner will enter their personal and contact details and the drone’s technical specifications (type, weight, manufacturer).
After registration, the drone will be assigned a unique number linked to that specific unmanned aircraft, which may be physically affixed to it or stored electronically.
The register will not be public. The owner will have access only to their own data, while full access will be granted to authorized state and law enforcement authorities. This is necessary for security reasons.
– What restrictions are envisaged for operating drones?
– At present, restrictions on drone use are already set out in Ukraine’s aviation legislation—the Air Code and the Aviation Rules for the Use of Airspace. In particular, it is prohibited to fly in prohibited or restricted zones without authorization, or in breach of established altitude limits, distances, and safety requirements. In addition, it is prohibited to use drones without proper registration or approval where this is mandatory, to operate a drone while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or to take actions that pose a threat to people, facilities, or aviation safety.
In addition, the issue of age restrictions for drone operators is being considered, depending on the UAV’s technical characteristics and potential hazards.
– Who will bear liability, the person who operated the drone or the owner?
– Liability will be clearly delineated. Regardless of whether the drone is privately owned, service-issued, or borrowed, liability for the flight rests with the person who operated it.
– At present, not all citizens can obtain a permit to purchase weapons. Could there also be restrictions on owning or buying UAVs?
– I don’t think so. At least, there is no talk of issuing permits.
– If a person does not want to register a drone but uses it anyway, does the draft law provide for any liability?
– Yes, administrative ones. And if there are adverse consequences from such use, then criminal liability.
– What if a person brought drones from the front and sells them to someone else, too?
– We do not treat this as weapons trafficking. However, if it is an FPV drone with explosives attached to it, there will already be liability for that. The draft law regulates the rules for the use of drones specifically.
– Regarding weapons. Last year, the National Police of Ukraine actively urged people to voluntarily declare firearms found in de-occupied territories and in the combat zone. In your view, did this declaration program achieve its objective?
– For the most part, yes. To date, more than 15,000 people have registered more than 16,500 units of weapons. That is not a small number.
At first, people approached this very cautiously: they did not understand the procedure and were afraid of liability. But we carried out outreach so they would know that everything is quite simple. You come in, register it, and you can keep it until the war ends. If you do not want to register it, you turn it in.
We also publicly explained that those who unlawfully keep weapons will be held criminally liable if they are discovered and the weapons are seized.
After the war ends, there are several options. If it is an automatic weapon, it can be modified into a hunting firearm that fires single shots rather than bursts. Or it can be converted into a blank-firing firearm or turned in.
In my view, voluntary declaration is an effective mechanism. And of the number of declared weapons I have mentioned, more than 10,000 are automatic weapons; 5,539 units of rifled carbines, rifles and shotguns; and 943 units of pistols and revolvers.
In addition, over 8.87 million rounds of ammunition have been declared.
Voluntarily turned in, without declaration, were 409 units of weapons and more than 69,000 rounds of ammunition.
On average, up to 45 units of weapons are declared per day, and this pace has remained steady.
– Does it happen that a member of the public reports to the police that neighbors are hiding weapons, and then the person in whose possession the weapons are found says they had planned to declare them?
– If the police, having operational information, carry out searches and seize unregistered weapons, the person who kept them is held liable, because at that point there can be no question of declaration. If a person genuinely wanted to declare the weapons, they would have done so.
– Has the voluntary declaration campaign ended?
– No, it is still ongoing. That is why I urge citizens who possess weapons to do so lawfully. I understand that people who lived under occupation fear for their lives and think they may have to use weapons against the enemy. However, as I said, we do not confiscate registered weapons until the war ends if a person wants to keep them and complies with storage rules.
– Could members of criminal groups obtain weapons under the guise of declaring them?
– The police do not register firearms and related ammunition for individuals who are subject to legal restrictions due to systematic violations of public order, breaches of specific rules on weapons possession, domestic violence, having been served with a notice of suspicion of committing criminal offences, a prior conviction, or being wanted. Weapons submitted for declaration are checked through the National Police Information Portal to determine whether they have been used in crimes or are listed as wanted.
– What is the situation with illegal arms trafficking? Have any cases of weapons being sold abroad been detected during the full-scale war? International partners are paying close attention to this.
– Countering illicit arms trafficking is one of the National Police’s priorities. In 2025, 990 controlled purchases were conducted.
We have repeatedly reported in the news on the results of special operations to uncover hidden caches and seize weapons. Of course, this work continues, and we understand that given the amount of weapons that may be in the hands of the public and criminals, this is not an issue that will be resolved in a single year.
In 2025, 14 criminal groups engaged in illicit firearms trafficking were identified, documented, and referred to court.
As for the illegal movement of weapons abroad to EU countries, this is indeed an issue we discuss at every international meeting. We verify information that sometimes comes from our colleagues through Europol and Interpol channels, but so far not a single case of illicit firearms leaking out of the country has been recorded.
– It’s not entirely clear what information you are verifying. Are things being seized in other countries and you are being notified about it?
– No, operational intelligence that there may be channels and intent to move weapons. We checked it, and the information was not confirmed.
– Are weapons being sold to criminal circles inside the country?
– Yes, they are. There are fewer such cases now, but in 2022, when the police began working actively in this area, they were finding advertisements offering weapons for sale even online.
– Can you buy anything you want?
– Almost. As I said, last year police conducted about 1,000 controlled purchases, involving: 268 units of automatic firearms; 151 units of rifled firearms; 135 units of converted and other firearms; and 74 grenade launchers.
In addition: 2,031 grenades, 282 kg of explosive substances, and more than 122,000 rounds of various calibers.
According to operational records, last year 3,401 units of firearms, 14,037 grenades, 5,275 kg of explosive substances, and more than 1,135,000 rounds of various calibers were seized from illicit circulation.
"VERY OFTEN, THOSE WHO CARRY AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE THEMSELVES BECOME VICTIMS OF TERRORIST ACTS AND DIE"
– You have repeatedly said that Russian special services use recruited citizens to carry out terrorist attacks. And when you read about such cases in official statements, you notice that these people, at first glance, seem unremarkable, with nothing out of the ordinary. They lived their lives, and nothing in them supposedly foreshadowed such actions. Recruitment happens regardless of age. For example, there was a case at a school where a 14-year-old attacked a teacher and one of the students. A statement by the National Police said that investigators found messages showing he had been in contact with Russian special services. What conclusions has the police drawn regarding prevention of such crimes?
– It all started with arson attacks targeting military vehicles; the active phase of these offences has been recorded since March 2024. The Russians began recruiting primarily young people via Telegram channels, job-search platforms, second-hand marketplaces, social media, bots, and quick-dating websites. While working to solve these crimes, together with the Security Service of Ukraine we began publicly explaining how the enemy’s special services operate and which groups are most vulnerable to recruitment. As a rule, these are low-income citizens and minors who do not yet fully grasp the actions they are committing.
Offenders create anonymous Telegram channels or groups that operate under the guise of patriotic movements, anti-war initiatives, or "opposition" Ukrainian projects. In addition, Russian agents look for groups focused on quick earnings or employment in general, identify people in difficult financial circumstances, and then exploit this to recruit visitors to these platforms.
We see that at first people are given a task: "Set a car on fire, send a video." They may transfer some money for this, but more often they do not, and instead blackmail the perpetrator by threatening to provide information about them to Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies. In this way, they push the person into committing more serious crimes. One recent case: in Kyiv, a girl blew up a National Guard of Ukraine serviceman’s car. Her first task was also to set a car on fire; for that she was given just 3,000 hryvnias. But when she refused the next task—blowing up a person—they began blackmailing her in the same way and forced her to go through with it. They gave her 4,000 hryvnias for materials so she could make an improvised explosive device out of them. We detained her the same day the crime was committed.
In Ukraine, 61 terrorist acts have been committed since the start of 2025. Of these, 52 have been solved and 27 prevented. It has been established that 55 terrorist acts were being prepared or were carried out using improvised explosive devices. The remaining six involved the use of munitions. Police officers are among the targets of these criminal attacks. In Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, during an inspection of the site of a person’s bombing, a secondary detonation occurred, and an explosives technician was injured in the blast. In addition, an improvised explosive device was planted under a patrol police service vehicle parked near the building of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional TCR and SS; however, fortunately, the detonation was prevented. In Odesa Oblast, a recruited local resident brought a package containing an improvised explosive device into the administrative building of the police. As a result of the explosion, three police officers were injured, and the perpetrator of the terrorist act was killed.
I want to reiterate: people who are involved in carrying out terrorist attacks are used by the Russians as tools. Very often, those who carry an explosive device themselves become victims of terrorist acts and die, unfortunately, without realizing it.
Attempts to recruit Ukrainians, including children, are ongoing. The enemy looks for teenagers eager to make money, manipulates them and sometimes, as I said, blackmails them. On an ongoing basis, we meet with children in schools and lyceums and explain the danger and the liability for agreeing to such proposals. Afterwards, we receive feedback from teachers: students report attempts to recruit them. And there have already been dozens of such reports.
– Do you not feel that you are doing something wrong? Because as this story with the 14-year-old showed, prevention did not work.
– This is a somewhat different situation. However, at this stage I cannot disclose details because the investigation is ongoing. A forensic psychiatric examination has been ordered, and its results will be used to assess his condition and actions. I would note that these are highly latent offences. First and foremost, children are raised by their parents or those acting in their place. They are the ones who must communicate with the child in order to understand their mood, behavior, and circle of interests. As the police, we do as much preventive work and explanation as possible, and we do not disclaim our responsibility either.
– Last year, hostile special services organized attempts on the lives of state and public figures who support Ukraine’s Defense Forces and counter Russian influence. How can such people legally obtain weapons for self-defense so they are not helpless in the face of criminals?
– If there is any information about a threat to a person’s life and health, they can contact the National Police, and within criminal proceedings, by decision of the investigator, we can provide protection.
– But people may not even know such a threat exists. So let me clarify: are they legally allowed to possess weapons for self-defense?
– No, they are not. After Parubii’s murder, MPs raised the issue of security and providing protection, including for former members of parliament. This is because the State Guard Department of Ukraine may provide protection only to a circle of persons clearly defined by law. But I will repeat: if there is a threat to life and health, a politician can request personal security measures from the National Police as well as from other law enforcement agencies that have a pre-trial investigation body. The investigator conducting the pre-trial investigation will consider the request and, if necessary, issue the relevant instructions.
In addition, there is the Police Guard. If a person is concerned for their life and health, they can enter into a contract for physical security services.
– But that is already about paid services. I am talking about something else. Besides, as "Mindichgate" showed, information can be collected on hundreds of people, people can be surveilled, and they may not even suspect it.
I am referring to 529 dossiers in which, according to information voiced by the leadership of the anti-corruption agencies, data was accumulated on politicians, journalists, and law enforcement officers.
Recently, MP Yaroslav Yurchyshyn said that criminal proceedings had been initiated, at his request, over surveillance of journalists and the collection of information about them. Have any MPs approached the National Police of Ukraine with a request to initiate criminal proceedings and investigate the collection of information on them?
– Not yet. Following Yaroslav Yurchyshyn’s request, criminal proceedings were entered into the Unified Register of Pre-Trial Investigations under Article 182 of the Criminal Code, "Violation of the inviolability of private life". We did not have any materials, so for now this legal qualification is based on the information set out by the MP on social media. Next, we will work through this with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, and if there are grounds, we may add an additional legal qualification—Article 171.
– Did any of the journalists personally file statements?
– No. They may have contacted the Security Service of Ukraine.
– According to Ground Forces data, since the start of the full-scale Russia–Ukraine war, 272 attacks have been carried out against TCR and SS service members. Four service members were killed in the line of duty. What are the results of the investigations into such cases?
– Since the introduction of martial law, the police have documented 526 instances of resistance to TCR and SS personnel in connection with the performance of their official duties. Perhaps the Ground Forces have incomplete data. By oblast, the highest number of such cases is in Kharkiv Oblast—59. The lowest is in Kherson Oblast, where only one such case has been recorded.
Overall, between 2022 and 2026 there has been an increase in cases of citizens resisting TCR and SS personnel during the notification of the public. If only 5 such incidents were recorded in 2022, their number rose to 38 in 2023. In 2024, 118 cases were recorded. In 2025, the total number of incidents reached 341. In 2026, there were 24 cases.
– What explains this?
– By the unwillingness of most people to join the military. We also carry out notifications together with the TCR and SS, and this has a very negative impact on the National Police’s image.
On the other hand, we document corruption in the TCC and SS, when, for money, people who fall under mobilization are let go. Society is aware of this as well. That is why trust in the TCR and SS is very low, and people react negatively right away, even when someone is stopped simply for a document check. And attacks on TCR and SS service members occur almost daily. For example, recently a man fired a traumatic weapon at a district TCR minibus, even though they did not even stop him—he was just driving past.
– Mobilization measures are continually being tightened in the country. Police, together with TCR representatives, detain citizens during document checks. And information periodically appears on social media that someone was taken by force and beaten. Are such allegations investigated? What are the results?
– Such cases are investigated by the State Bureau of Investigation. If complaints about police officers are submitted to us, internal investigations are conducted. Very often, such allegations are not confirmed. But if they are confirmed and involve violations of procedures during detention, the police officer is held disciplinarily liable. If bodily injuries are involved, the investigation is carried out by the State Bureau of Investigation.
– Why does the police generally take such an active part in these measures? In an interview with RBC-Ukraine, Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko previously said: "I think the TCR can do this without the National Police—they have the relevant authority." Has anything changed since then?
– Of course, the TCR and SS can deliver notifications without National Police officers. Police involvement in notification is provided for by the 2023 Law "On Mobilization". If TCR and SS representatives go on their own and a person does not comply, only the police can officially detain them under Article 210 of the Code of Ukraine on Administrative Offences.
– How many police officers are currently fighting?
– The minister recently spoke about this publicly. As of today, almost 9,000 police officers are fighting on the front line. Tens of thousands more law enforcement officers are serving in near-frontline regions and at checkpoints.
"MURDERS ARE AT THEIR LOWEST IN THE PAST SEVEN YEARS"
– We last spoke with you two years ago. How has the crime situation in the country changed over this period? Back then, you noted that the war had affected the level of street crime, in particular armed robberies and robberies.
– Now, as then, we are also recording a decline in street crime, as well as in property offences, including those committed against individuals. Murders are at their lowest in the past seven years. At the same time, we are documenting more so-called latent offences—illicit trafficking in weapons and drugs, because we are paying even more attention to this.
And when we detect and document latent offences, we also reduce the level of street crime, because a person with a weapon will be less likely to go out and commit an offence on the street.
We objectively understand that after the war the situation may change, because criminal circles will, one way or another, try to draw trained warriors into their ranks—people who know how to look death in the eye. We understand that if these people do not receive enough attention from society and the state, and if they are not materially supported and employed, then perhaps some of them will turn to crime.
In addition, the experience of all countries that have had to fight shows that crime increased in the post-war period.
– Who replaces police officers who are fighting? Where do you find people to fill the vacancies?
– It is a very complicated process. Since the beginning of 2023, we have not recruited applicants over the age of 25 through competitive selection, in order to maximize replenishment of the Armed Forces and to avoid hiring people who are evading military service.
And now that we have announced competitions, people are reluctant to join the police because the lion’s share depends on pay. Today, in addition to the assault brigade "Liut," rifle battalions staffed with police officers from the Main Directorates in each oblast are fighting.
And we truly have a problem now—an 18% staffing shortfall. At the same time, the workload is not decreasing, and we have numerous additional functions. For example, police officers together with the State Emergency Service are the first to arrive at impact sites; they rescue people and assist them on the spot. There are units that evacuate people from localities that have ended up in the combat zone. They also help deliver humanitarian cargo.
And we do not cut the positions from which people went to the front—we are operating with fewer resources, so the situation is difficult.
– How do salaries compare with other law enforcement agencies?
– We are working on increasing them, because right now we are not competitive with other law enforcement agencies.
– How much do investigators earn, for example?
– The minimum level of police monetary allowance, taking into account the additional remuneration of 10 000 UAH provided for by Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 168 of February 28, 2022, "On certain payments to servicemen, rank-and-file and commanding personnel, police officers and their families during martial law," is 27 000 UAH (17 000 base monetary allowance + 10 000 additional remuneration), while the average is 35 414 UAH (25 414 base monetary allowance + 10 000 additional remuneration) for the category of police officers with longer length of service.
– What is the caseload per investigator?
– 300–400 cases, and more if these are near-frontline areas or a combat zone, since a significant category of proceedings in these regions concerns persons missing under special circumstances.
Of course, we would like to increase police officers’ monetary allowance.
The interior minister and I, as head of the National Police, have been working since last year to introduce amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On the National Police" and relevant legislative provisions to tie this to the subsistence minimum, because the law does not provide for such a linkage—unlike for other law enforcement bodies.
The National Police of Ukraine, together with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, has proposed enshrining in law a minimum level of a police officer’s monetary allowance, which should be no less than ten subsistence minima for able-bodied persons set as of January 1 of the calendar year—33,280 UAH—with the average to be 45,000 UAH accordingly.
Why is this important? If, after the war ends, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Resolution No. 168, which sets the additional payments, is repealed, police officers will receive even less money and staff outflow will be even greater. And in the post-war period there will be a great deal of work.
Even now, many people are moving to other law enforcement bodies, and we would not want to lose them. That is why we are asking for police officers to have a competitive salary compared to other law enforcement agencies in the country.
– Which three key results of the police’s work over the past year do you consider the most important, and why?
– First, keeping the crime situation in the country under control. Second, our police officers’ participation in repelling armed aggression. When we established the Liut Brigade, the military were skeptical of police officers, but now we have full support and cooperation, and the servicemen who are with us on the front line speak very highly of the police.
An equally important result in 2025 was the development and approval by the interior minister of the Strategy for the Development of the National Police for 2026–2030—the first strategic document in the history of the police. It sets out the main goals to be achieved over the next five years.
Given the state policy of decentralization, the Strategy emphasizes deepening cooperation with local communities. This provides for bringing police work closer to people’s needs, in particular by expanding the on-the-ground presence of police officers to address citizens’ problems promptly.
– That only sounds good on paper.
– That’s not the case. In Kyiv and major regional centers it is more difficult, because there is not enough manpower, but in rural areas it works very effectively. The community police officer, for instance, is usually someone who lives in the same area they serve. Everyone knows them and turns to them.
– In early January, two police officers were appointed to the positions of heads of regional military administrations – in Chernivtsi and Dnipropetrovsk. How do you feel about the police suddenly becoming a talent pipeline?
– Why unexpectedly? Before that, two more police officers were appointed—in Kherson Oblast and Sumy Oblast. As for why police officers specifically, I think the country’s leadership chooses effective managers, including among those with combat experience.
For example, Ruslan Osypenko, who was appointed to Chernivtsi, had headed the Main Directorate of the National Police in Donetsk Oblast since 2021.
– Is this not related to the fact that the topic of possible elections is being actively discussed now, and that there is a need to place security officials in the regions, which would be easier to manage if necessary?
– I think it is related to the need for smart, level-headed people who will keep the situation in the region under control and have management experience. And it is not about elections.
– At the president’s instruction, MPs are developing proposals regarding the possible holding of elections. Are the security aspects of conducting them offline and cybersecurity if they are held online being discussed at this stage?
– We understand that this process will take place sooner or later, and we must be prepared for it.
One of the issues here is the number of personnel that will need to be deployed to provide security at polling stations.
Representatives of Opora have approached us. My deputy, Oleksandr Fatsevych, is in contact with them; joint meetings and discussions have been held. We would like other law enforcement personnel to be present at polling stations alongside police officers—possibly the National Guard of Ukraine—because we will not have enough police officers to ensure a presence at every polling station, given our day-to-day duties.
What the exact format will be is currently unknown; that is not within our area of responsibility.
– Elections during wartime are an extremely difficult task. You cannot install a metal detector frame at every polling station, and you cannot search every voter. How can you ensure that nothing dangerous, weapons or explosives is brought in?
– There are certain response protocols. If we detect dangerous items or suspicious persons, we will, of course, respond immediately.
– How? If teenagers and women are being used to carry out terrorist attacks?
– We understand all the risks, but if elections have to be held under wartime conditions, we will do everything to ensure security and public order.
Tetiana Bodnia, Censor.NET
