What is wrong with assault regiments
Regarding assault regiments and assault troops in general. Do we need such structures at all? This discussion is highly relevant in society, given the significant number of complaints regarding human rights violations officially reported by the Office of the Military Ombudsman of Ukraine.
Two critical situations have emerged simultaneously, and in public.
First, Defense Minister’s adviser Serhii Sternenko said that the Russians had released footage showing drone strikes on an assault column of the 425th Skelia Regiment near Pokrovsk, including four vehicles from that column being hit and destroyed. He said such actions had to stop and, in effect, sharply criticized the very practice of carrying out this kind of assault operation by assault regiments. Second, Major Oleksandr Shyrshyn of the Armed Forces of Ukraine gave two major interviews in which he said that, while serving as commander of a battalion in the 47th Mechanized Brigade, he had witnessed heavy losses and the utterly incompetent tactical employment of assault units from two assault regiments. This caused a major public reaction because the context matters. Right now, as is known, a bill on assault forces has been submitted to the Verkhovna Rada, proposing that they be established as a separate branch of service altogether. That bill was submitted by Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi for consideration by the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. So there is a convergence of many factors here, and the situation with the assault regiments really does need to be addressed.
To begin the analysis, let us examine the situation that triggered the recent media outcry, specifically, the assault operations and the strike against our column of the 425th Assault Regiment near the village of Hryshyne, in the Pokrovsk sector. This column was hit, and we saw how Russian fiber-optic drones destroyed one tank and three armored vehicles.
So, was this assault pointless? Based on the information I have received, the situation in the Pokrovsk area is extremely difficult. Our troops control certain positions on the city’s northern outskirts, literally at the outskirts. The enemy, advancing from Myrnohrad to the east and the village of Hryshyne to the west, has effectively almost surrounded the city. The enemy currently controls the greater part of Pokrovsk and has created an imminent threat of total encirclement for our positions. This situation did not develop yesterday or the day before, but several months ago. The Russians control all the high-rises in Pokrovsk, where they have placed antennas for their drone operators and UAV positions. They have a significant number of convenient multi-story buildings and shelters, allowing them to operate effectively from within Pokrovsk. Our troops do strike their lines of communication, of course, but that is far from possible every day, including because of the weather. Consequently, the enemy maintains fire and continuous drone control over the single supply route that has not yet been physically cut off on the ground. Under these conditions, units have been fighting in Pokrovsk for about six months, with the 425th Assault Regiment "Skelia" representing the bulk of the forces there. They remain on that northern periphery despite only one road remaining, which is constantly monitored by dozens of Russian drones, "sleeper drones" that control the area. It is very convenient for them to fly from Pokrovsk, even using Mavics to maintain absolute control over the situation. Is it worth doing this? Can these actions be conducted with minimal losses at all? In reality, the tactical situation is unfavorable for us. This is visible on the Deep State map. One does not need to be a highly prominent or advanced military expert to see this; everything I have just said is evident from the map without any exaggeration. Looking at the Deep State map, we are effectively in operational encirclement because the enemy, from the high grounds and multi-story buildings of Pokrovsk, controls the supply corridor with all types of drones and holds the advantage in this sector. Most other units simply cannot hold out in such a front-line configuration. Units of the 155th Mechanized Brigade are also operating there, but that is all, because holding on under conditions where rotations and supplies must be fought for is nearly impossible. These assault operations we witnessed, the columns, were an attempt to cover the flank in Pokrovsk, as defense is otherwise impossible without that flank.
Why is this happening? Why is it necessary to rely solely on heroism, condemning our troops to engage in such battles, and creating conditions for enemy drones that allow the adversary to dismantle our equipment in this manner? For me, this is the primary question in this situation. I believe that the personnel in this assault regiment, carrying out these tasks, are doing exactly what is required of them by orders. This is nothing short of pure heroism. It is a heroic operation. I do not know which other units in Ukraine could accomplish this. Perhaps there are others; certainly, we have many worthy military units, but to perform such tasks under these conditions? And who issues the orders to hold out in such circumstances? I can say that, definitively, a regiment cannot find itself in such unfavorable conditions on its own. Obviously, both the higher military command and the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief are aware of this situation. I am certain they do not just read bloggers. They see the losses on this sector of the front resulting from orders to stand to the death and from such maneuvers involving equipment, positions, and breakthroughs toward our own lines. I believe it is evident that the loss ratio is also being analyzed. How much is the enemy losing in this frontline configuration? Are we losing more, or is the enemy? All of this must be calculated, and the people issuing the orders to hold ground and setting the tasks for the assault regiments should see this clearly. And they do see it clearly. Therefore, if troops are condemned to perform feats of bravery, breaking through to positions under fire while the enemy holds total tactical advantage, it is simply impossible to do so without losses, and the kind of footage showing such strikes. This pertains specifically to this situation. In my view, the situation at the front does not require our troops to be condemned to full or partial encirclement and forced to fight their way into positions. I believe planning operations in this way is negligent and irresponsible, both toward the troops and toward the loss of our people. Instead of planning and organizing defensive battles, we are condemning ourselves to heroic losses and acts of valor that are not required by the strategic situation. The enemy is advancing in waves, being destroyed by drones, and suffering heavy losses. Why should we operate according to Russian logic? Why condemn ourselves instead of eliminating the advancing enemy from a defensive posture, conducting effective counterattacks under the cover of our drones, and fully utilizing our technological and intellectual superiority over the Russian army? Instead, for some reason, we are mimicking the actions of the Russian military. What is the point?
I understand why the order was given to deploy "Skelia" to Pokrovsk in November 2025, to hold the remnants of the residential sector on the northern outskirts and some industrial zones. The front was collapsing, and it had to be stabilized somehow. That was six months ago, and stabilization has occurred. Why hold it now? Is it for a report stating that we still maintain positions within the Pokrovsk city limits? Is that why this is being done? Just for the sake of it? The people making these reports, as well as our esteemed Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, must draw their own conclusions from this video. But here, as always, I am waiting, perhaps there simply was no Supreme Commander-in-Chief Staff meeting, or there is something we do not know. I see that Sternenko has written about it, an advisor to the Minister of Defense has spoken out, and the Deputy Military Ombudsman of Ukraine has made statements regarding the assault regiments. Major Shyrshyn made a statement, yet there is not a single word from any of the leaders. I do not know, I haven't seen any statements from those who actually lead our military-political vertical. I have not seen a single comment or assessment of this situation from the command of the 7th Air Assault Corps, in whose sector the 425th Regiment "Skelia" is operating. As I understand it, the regiment does not act alone; the corps commander directs and commands these actions, approves combat orders, and ensures their execution. Or was this some kind of freelance operation? The 7th Corps says, "we are conducting an internal investigation", but how long do you need for an investigation when you are the ones who must sign these orders with your own hands? Then the Ground Forces remain silent, all the higher-ranking leaders remain silent. Where is our official position? It is not as if the regiment is conducting combat operations somewhere on its own initiative. The regiment does not recruit people off the streets; they are assigned via combat orders, and their salaries are paid by the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces. Is someone responsible for this?
So far, we see the usual: a discussion on the internet and in the mass media, accompanied by total silence regarding what happened and why. As always.
You know, I have said many times on air that the primary problem in our war is a lack of accountability and honesty. I always maintain that these are not moral virtues, but rather organizational bugs, organizational errors within our command system, troop organization, and command and control. Because accountability and honesty are built into the planning of combat operations, the accountability of specific commanders for mission accomplishment, for the lives of their personnel, and for the destruction of the enemy. And honesty means an honest report: who is responsible, what are the actual results, and where is the after-action review? There is none. Only silence. Therefore, I hope this multi-day silence serves as a major lesson for all commanders in our army. Troops must not be sent on hopeless missions that cannot be executed without significant casualties. Because in the end, you will be the ones held responsible, while those who issued the orders will remain modestly silent. Perhaps they will send their regards through lawyers, I don't know, maybe they will find the courage to do so quietly. This is the situation currently unfolding, specifically regarding this video.
Next, regarding assault regiments in general. How did this phenomenon even emerge? At the beginning of the war, in 2022 and 2023, individual assault battalions did not hold such significance. Only a few assault battalions were created in 2023. This was not a mass phenomenon; they were an outlier on the front, as assault operations in Ukraine were effectively carried out by our regular, highly motivated infantry. That powerful, unbreakable volunteer core of our infantry, which effectively collapsed and changed the course of the war, ruined all of Putin's plans and destroyed the Russian army in 2022, was formed from volunteers. This applied to the Air Assault Forces, our Ground Forces, and the Marine Corps. The presence of individuals motivated to enter combat, destroy the enemy in close-quarters fighting with small arms, and assault their positions gave us a colossal advantage. Any Ukrainian unit—border guards, the National Guard, or anyone else, even the police, had assault units. Everyone, including the SBU, to ensure no one is left out, every component of the forces deployed in ground combat had assault units. This included the SOF and HUR. Tasks were accomplished. Units would be rotated; one would be worn down, and another would be brought in. However, in 2024, after two years of intense combat, the number of self-motivated volunteers with combat experience, those willing to fight for every tree line in that "forward-forward" manner, was no longer there. This is where the story of these dedicated assault battalions began, which later transformed into assault regiments subordinated directly to the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU. What were they? Initially, they were separate battalions manned by various contingents of personnel. These battalions had commanders appointed by, and working personally with, the Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, Oleksandr Syrskyi. At that time, Syrskyi already had several successful offensive operations to his credit, along with some unsuccessful ones. But he possessed a background that Russian generals lacked—they had nothing comparable to our Balakliia breakthrough. Syrskyi fights for strategic and operational initiative on the front. This is his constant idea, which he continuously attempts to implement. The strategic concept of the AFU is that while the enemy applies pressure and makes breakthroughs, we also seize the initiative, create an advantage elsewhere, and conduct counter-actions.
Throughout 2022, this logic worked, but in 2023, it actually proved to be weak. Let us recall that we had two unsuccessful counter-offensive operations that failed to achieve their designated objectives: the 2023 Zaporizhzhia counter-offensive and the unsuccessful 2023 Bakhmut counter-offensive, which aimed to encircle Bakhmut and liberate the city.
Consequently, in 2024, Oleksandr Syrskyi planned an offensive into the territory of the Russian Federation. To achieve rapid results, three separate assault battalions were committed to the flanks of this bridgehead. On the left flank was the 225th Assault Battalion, on the right flank the 33rd Assault Battalion, and in the center, the 253rd Assault Battalion. These battalions proved themselves effective. That is true. With minimal losses, these units were able to fulfill their tasks and significantly contributed to the deployment and insertion of other forces into the breakthrough. For instance, on the left flank, for a considerable period, an entire week, in fact, the primary border crossing point near Mykolaievo-Darino was secured by the 225th Battalion. It was through this route that our other units were funneled in. While the air assault brigades served as the main striking force, these three assault battalions helped breach the Russian defensive line. Subsequently, these battalions also played a role in supporting the framework of the bridgehead in the Kursk region.
A specific situation involved the 425th Battalion in the Pokrovsk sector. It occurred in late 2024 and early 2025. The enemy managed a very rapid breakthrough from Selydove. By December, the enemy had reached the outskirts of Pokrovsk and was positioned to cut off the city from the west. At that moment, Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi deployed the 425th Assault Battalion into this sector across a wide yet concentrated front. The battalion took up defensive positions ranging from the village of Kotlyne to the village of Shevchenko, effectively blocking the southern approaches and the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk. Several brigades, the 152nd, 155th, 32nd, and 68th, were already stationed in this sector, holding their positions. Units of the 425th were deployed as the framework of the defense in the most heavily contested sectors, where they carried out counterattacks. One such operation took place at Kotlyne, together with the 3rd Battalion of the 25th Air Assault Brigade. The concentrated deployment of a single battalion, used as a framework for several of our brigades, allowed for the synchronization of UAVs, artillery, and infantry, which ultimately stopped the enemy. In 2025, the enemy was repelled, and the situation south of Pokrovsk was stabilized. This success served as the impetus for expanding these separate assault battalions into regiments. This experience led to these assault battalions transitioning from solving isolated tactical tasks to receiving thousands of personnel and the authority to recruit on a massive scale. Their missions gradually expanded, completely altering the logic of their deployment. Previously, assault battalions were a tactical tool for specific, narrow scenarios. However, once they were reinforced with large numbers of personnel, via combat orders, as you can imagine, their scale increased sharply, with numerous battalions being formed. These assault regiments were then utilized to plug every conceivable gap along the front. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that while we have our elite Air Assault Forces fighting as brigades, these separate assault regiments operate without their own assigned sectors. Instead, they are meant to act as detached units, swiftly and mobile, to effectively seal all minor breakthroughs and infiltrations.
What exactly happened? Instead of changing and reforming the overall command structure of the armed forces, and instead of increasing the combat effectiveness of the troops responsible for their respective sectors of the front, the greatest development and resources, in proportional terms, were allocated to those forces tasked with resolving problems within the sectors of all our stationary troops. That is, instead of creating the army corps system in 2025, which, unfortunately, does not exist as announced. It does not function. It is deployed, meaning there are army corps, with headquarters established somewhere, some less qualitatively than others, but the main problem is that only the 3rd Army Corps received its assigned complement of troops as defined by the order. All other forces, all brigades, are torn apart and scattered across different sectors of the front. And instead of taking even this sector of the front, declaring "these are your troops," integrating them into a corps, and subordinating them, nothing is being done. Responsibility remains as fragmented as ever. Essentially, we’ve just made a substitution: where we previously had 6–7 OTGs (Operational-Tactical Groupings), we have now introduced 15 army headquarters. Without changing the underlying essence, a corps commander is an individual who has no right to receive, has no planned monthly influx of personnel, no planned influx of drones, and no independent funding to spend on priority issues. Therefore, he cannot be held responsible for planning combat training, reinforcements, force concentration, or combating these breakthroughs, infiltrations, and everything else. Instead, for some reason, it was decided that the problems of a 1,200-kilometer front could be fixed by expanding separate assault regiments. I actually want to state that I believe assault regiments are necessary in modern warfare, given their infantry-drone nature. And the experience of these assault battalions and regiments includes not only bloody, lethal operations, but also successful experiences with relatively low casualties, major achievements, and heavy losses for the enemy. But what constitutes an assault regiment? Primarily, an assault regiment must not be about the number of personnel or even their discipline, but about high-quality, accountable command. A combat commander who understands the essence and nature of assault operations, having been an assault trooper himself. Why is it important to pay attention to the criticism of Major Shyrshyn, for instance? Because Major Shyrshyn was himself a commander of an assault company in the 47th Brigade. He personally assaulted positions, incidentally, alongside the assault battalion "Skelia" at the time, in the Zaporizhzhia region, near Robotyne. Shyrshyn personally assaulted Russian strongholds and defensive areas, which we called "Real" and "Barcelona." Understanding what assaults are and the nature of assault combat requires commanders who have participated in these operations themselves. And these commanders must have corresponding headquarters, because the success of assault combat primarily demands command quality, command speed, and precision in decision-making. Because it is upon this command that coordination relies during an offensive engagement between personnel entering unfamiliar territory, under the influence of numerous unknown factors. Navigating this chaos of war requires a very high-quality, exceptionally well-organized, and structured headquarters. Yet, how can the effectiveness of assault operations be ensured for an assault regiment when some of them are currently deployed, there are periods when a single regiment covers 10 or 12 directions, and are assigned massive sectors? How can effective combat operations be organized if you lack a command center, and units of personnel are simply parceled out to places where there is an absolute shortage of even a command apparatus? I believe that assault regiments are necessary.
Recently, within the 2nd Corps "Khartiia," the 23rd Assault Regiment RUG was created on the initiative of Minister of Internal Affairs Klymenko and with the support of Minister of Defense Fedorov. Infantry is being recruited for this regiment, and foreign volunteers are being enlisted as assault troopers. But why was it created within a corps? Because conducting assault operations requires intensity. An assault is intensity—intensity of decision-making, and intensity in the deployment of personnel who must be specially trained for these tasks. For them, special command and control, reconnaissance, and coordination with drones during an assault must be organized. This requires separate practice, and a distinct tactic of coordination must be developed. And this is difficult. To accomplish this, a separate command element, a distinct combat unit with its own complement of troops, is required. Because otherwise, quality cannot be ensured.
Back in 2022 and 2023, it was still possible to carry out assaults because there were people — volunteer fighters, professionals, people motivated to learn the military craft. They tried to solve combat tasks on their own, and very often did so effectively. But the war has become more complex now. The battlefield is fully monitored by drones and sensors, and every inch is already zeroed in. The accuracy and speed of fire are instantaneous, and precision weapons are everywhere. Today, no matter how well-trained or motivated an infantryman may be, he will simply be killed by a drone. Therefore, effective and successful actions are only possible with high-quality planning, the suppression of enemy UAV positions, solid reconnaissance, and a clear understanding of the enemy's actions and inactions. One must know exactly when and how personnel should move, where to take cover, how logistics are handled, how supplies are airdropped, and what methods of camouflage and deception are employed. Hundreds of factors influence the course of a battle. This is precisely why a concentration of command is required. It is not just about pumping personnel into a given regiment simply because it has good discipline, or arbitrarily expanding a single battalion into a division of fifteen. The point lies elsewhere: to achieve quality, preserve personnel lives, and kill the enemy, these regiments cannot be fragmented across multiple sectors. One sector, or two at most. Anything beyond that is impossible and leads to severe overextension. An assault regiment must be assigned a task in a single sector of the front; only then can it perform adequately and conduct effective attacks or counterattacks. Why regiments, then? Because while one battalion assaults, another trains for the current or upcoming mission, a third rests, and perhaps a fourth training battalion focuses exclusively on preparing reinforcements. The remainder consists of support units. For such regiments, as Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated in his speech, and subsequently implemented, by the way, we need four regiments. The 1st Assault Regiment named after Dmytro Kotsiubailo, the 475th "Code 9.2", the 425th Skelia, and the 225th Regiment should be converted into drone-assault regiments. To its credit, the Ministry of Defense immediately allocated one billion hryvnias to each for the procurement of drones and equipment. This was a correct and logical step in the development of these assault troops. However, effectiveness cannot be guaranteed by the sheer quantity of drones alone. Drone command and control, alongside proper coordination, are essential. This is a complex organizational and managerial process. In other words, without altering the methodology of troop deployment, it is impossible to reduce casualties and execute missions effectively. Therefore, in my opinion, assault regiments must be integrated into the structure of the army corps. They could be attached to one corps, or perhaps two, but no more than that. The optimal structure is established at the army corps level. The number of these corps at the front can be reduced; such a multitude of corps is simply unnecessary. Currently, the 3rd Army Corps comprises 9 brigades. Although they are relatively small in size, the 3rd Corps effectively commands these 9 brigades. Without any issues. The front line is stable, the enemy has been beaten back everywhere, and the situation has been stabilized. That is because command and control are working, and all nine brigades are concentrated in a single sector. Not two, not three, not five. If, within that sector, the 3rd Corps were to employ a separate assault unit, whether a battalion or a regiment, it would be operating on a stable defensive line. It would be effective, carrying out targeted actions successfully. First in one place, then another, then a third. In other words, it would fight in one area while planning operations in a second and a third, gradually concentrating forces where needed. That would be effective. The 3rd Corps, in principle, does exactly this: it allocates specialized assault units for specific tasks and trains them. "Khartiia" operates in the same manner. Also in the Kupiansk sector, a specific battalion was deployed, received a task, planned its operations, and executed these tasks effectively. Because the key aspect of assault operations is not the number of personnel, but the quality of their deployment and the quality of their training. And coordination, as well as the availability of technical assets. Therefore, are assault regiments necessary? In my view, assault regiments are necessary. However, the logic of their deployment must change. It is currently not 2022, not 2023, not even 2024. We cannot continue using this carbon copy, this template. The war has changed. The sheer number of drones is such that there are no "windows" on the front for infantry to slip through and sustain independent operations for any prolonged period. Infantry must operate exclusively in coordination with drones. Drones advance ahead of the infantry, alongside the infantry, and behind the infantry; they supply the infantry and support the infantry. They do everything, only then is the infantry effective and capable of surviving. But this requires specific conditions. Furthermore, this means troops must not be sent into encirclement, because if troops find themselves encircled, their own drones cannot support them. Personnel can hold out there for a certain time, surviving in basements, but if drone operators cannot establish an umbrella of Mavics, FPVs, and bomber drones over them, no miracle will occur. The personnel will not be able to hold out on their own for long. Yes, assault regiments are needed. However, in reality, our assault regiments have been transformed into meeting engagement troops. And the meeting engagement has become our primary type of combat operation. This is because we lack the organization to employ army corps according to the logic by which they exist worldwide, since the time of Napoleon. An army corps is supposed to improve command and control and the organization of forces. Assault regiments should be introduced into its area of responsibility. In a properly organized sector, assault regiments will be effective. This is all part of military history. It is laid out in every field manual, including those of the U.S. Army. Army, corps, division, it is all described there. So what I want to say is that assault regiments are absolutely necessary, but this kind of irresponsible attitude toward personnel is both unacceptable and counterproductive, not only in assault regiments but in any regiment. Sending people into combat in encirclement without drone support is simply military incompetence, in my view. And someone should be held accountable for such incompetence; someone should be looking into it. I hope that, now that Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov and his adviser have raised this issue, and Fedorov has said he will reform the assault regiments and has allocated funding for four regiments, including the Skelia Regiment, the number of UAVs is now increasing sharply thanks to that decision. So I hope that what Fedorov called the mathematics of war will start to work. Loss accounting will begin to function, someone will start keeping track of how many sectors these assault regiments are operating in. And I have already said that operating in one sector is effective, two at most. Beyond that, a headquarters can no longer organize operations across multiple directions. Two sectors for assault operations is already an extraordinary situation, an overload on the command structure.
What is the problem with assault operations? Instead of improving command within the sectors, we know where the enemy is advancing, after all. Provide a planned supply of personnel, drones, and funding to the army corps commanders. Provide them with the full complement of brigades currently stationed in their sectors, and subordinate these brigades to them. Then there will be some logic to their deployment, and the defense will become stable. The corps commander would prevent the breakthroughs and gaps that subsequently require assault regiments to be heroically thrown into. If a single battalion of Skelia, not an entire regiment, had been deployed to defend the southern outskirts of Pokrovsk, exactly as was done in early 2025. If this exact approach had been taken in August 2025, the enemy would never have entered Pokrovsk at all. Because at that time, there was an outer perimeter held by our army brigades, and the presence of a dedicated assault unit clearing enemy infantry infiltrations would simply have prevented the adversary from accumulating in the residential areas of Pokrovsk. And there would be no need for this heroism. I can say with 100% certainty, you can speak with many of the individuals who participated in the battles there, if such a decision had been made, similar to early 2025, supporting the frontline brigades with a single assault regiment or battalion equipped with all necessary forces and assets, and if such coordination existed, the enemy still would not have entered Pokrovsk. It would be a Ukrainian city. Even now.
Assault regiments are necessary, but there must be a doctrine for their deployment, as well as a logical command system. We simply do not need a situation where all the problems of the army, all the problems across a 1,200-kilometer front, are solved through meeting engagements. Why do this? What is the purpose of this heroism? Why? The war has changed. Infantry remains the key branch of the military. However, the significance of the infantry has grown considerably. Manpower is scarce. Furthermore, fighting in a kill zone, even merely surviving in one, now requires special training; otherwise, one will be killed. Killed quickly. Therefore, preparation is required. Defensive combat planning is essential. If defensive combat is well-planned, then assault operations are effective, the enemy is destroyed, and casualties during those assaults will be minimal. Judging from numerous sectors of the front and dozens of operations, during high-quality assault operations, if there is a foundation in defense, effective organization of combat formations, and coordination with drones, casualties in assault operations are significantly lower than casualties in defense. Yet for us, the opposite is true, because our assault troops, our assault regiments, do not support an organized defense; rather, they are thrown into battle, into a meeting engagement, when that defense has long since collapsed. This is exactly what we see here in the Zaporizhzhia sector. Or in the Dobropillia sector. Where the enemy first captures several hundred square kilometers, and only then do we launch a heroic counteroffensive. But why? What is the point of this counteroffensive? The enemy could have been completely prevented from advancing there in the first place, with no need for any heroics. Why do this? I believe this is a conceptual, doctrinal problem that needs to be resolved. To achieve this, we simply need to reconsider the nature of the war, its current phase, and the power and effectiveness of modern technological weaponry. Only then will there be no more column deployments like this just to rescue personnel.
Assault troops should kill the enemy, not heroically rescue surrounded units at the cost of significant casualties. Only then will there be effectiveness on the front. Therefore, in my opinion, assault regiments should be retained, perhaps one, two, three, or four, but no more. There could be drone-assault regiments under central command, or perhaps even fewer of them. Alternatively, in principle, all these assault regiments could be transferred to the corps. To achieve this, the number of corps must be reduced, and the size of their designated sectors expanded. This would be an adequate solution. Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that we need assault regiments essentially to counter enemy breakthroughs. But this is exactly what can be done effectively within a corps sector. A corps is deployed in its sector, conducting counterattacks. Excellent. Then the corps' defense will be stable, because there will be a specialized unit tailored for these tasks. Casualties will be lower, both in defense and for the entire assault regiment. So why not do exactly that? And if large-scale counteroffensives need to be conducted, we do indeed have two corps of Air Assault Forces equipped with air assault brigades. Where ready-made command echelons exist, we also have a large number of these brigades. They, too, require planned troop replenishments and planned mission preparation. Therefore, I believe that now, this year of 2026, demands changes. And all this heroic struggle against breakthroughs—it is time to forget it. It is an ineffective strategy and tactic. The enemy does not advance at such a high speed. The Russian offensive is quite slow. They advance in two-man teams. A slow creeping from tree line to tree line, crawling forward, destroying targets with drones and all types of weaponry. They creep into the gaps in our combat formations. We can organize UAV and infantry combat formations that the enemy simply will not pass. And this will allow us to reduce casualties and strain, increase training cycles, and improve the overall quality of troop deployment.
I believe that the people who plan combat operations should be the ones held responsible for them.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
I read two highly critical interviews about Syrskyi on Censor. Have you read them, and do you agree with the assessments?
I am not the editor-in-chief of Censor, and I certainly do not have the time to read everything, but I believe that when people like Oleksandr Shyrshyn and Dmytro Kashchenko, a Hero of Ukraine, offer critical assessments, it is necessary to respond to such remarks from individuals with proven merit and a combat record, rather than remaining silent. The fact that everything here happens in silence, with no discussion, is exactly why our changes are so slow and our actions so formulaic.
Why is there an unfair unlimited supply for the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and assault units? Some have drones of all types, while others, unfortunately, only have manpower. Meanwhile, line units are standing with an outstretched hand to volunteers while holding the front?
Herein lies our problem with planning, which I constantly emphasize. Why must we operate within a corps sector? Because the corps must become the primary hub for overall planning and resource allocation. First, the corps knows the situation much better than the center. The corps commander has the opportunity to meet constantly with everyone, brigade and battalion commanders, and to truly understand the situation on the front. And if the corps receives a planned influx of personnel, drones, and funding, it will be able to supply the units operating within its sector. But our logic is fractured. Every unit has its own vertical, the USF has one, others have a different chain of command, some are National Guard, others are the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Everyone has their own distinct channels for receiving personnel and money. There is no unified planning. Our army is fragmented, which is exactly why these problems exist. The problem is not that the enemy is somehow invincible or possesses a massive superiority in forces. The problem is not the enemy's numerical advantage. We in Ukraine currently have significantly more drones than there are Russians in Russia altogether. We can wipe out any mass of personnel. But the issue is that to achieve this destruction, to effectively destroy the enemy, we must ensure the proper planning, organization, and command of these operations. To do this, the corps commander must transform from a mere administrator into an individual who is responsible for the sector and actually possesses the tools of influence. He has a UAV regiment, he has an assault regiment to reinforce specific axes, he has a planned allotment of drones and funds, and he directs these assets to replenish the units, brigades, and battalions that are, for example, in zones of intense fighting, facing an enemy offensive, or engaged in our own counteroffensive operations. In other words, the corps commander influences the situation; he must be given the tools to do so. Artillery, assault troops, drones—he must be granted the ability to replenish his forces so he knows: I have new personnel arriving; some leave due to illness, as not everyone is killed or wounded. A significant number of personnel become non-combatants due to illness and are discharged on legal grounds. There is also a significant number of AWOL cases. The commander must understand: Can I conduct combat operations here at all? What can I actually rely on? Then everything depends on what resources he has for the upcoming month. But what happens when he doesn't know what he will receive next month? That is pure chaos. This chaos in planning subsequently breeds the supposedly "sudden" loss of Huliaipole. Everyone fighting in the southern sector knew about it. The supposedly sudden loss of Pokrovsk, which was not sudden at all. The enemy had been accumulating forces in Pokrovsk for four or five months before capturing the Shakhtarskyi neighborhood. There was even a multitude of videos showing this online. What prevented action? Nothing prevented it. And we have many such "accidents," which later have to be heroically held with heavy losses, producing the kind of footage the enemy films, gloating over their ability to strike us. All of this can be avoided if defensive actions are actually planned, rather than neglected. Because sometimes one gets the impression that certain high-ranking leaders of ours are deeply interested in conducting counteroffensives and counterattacks simply because it is highly mediagenic, looks impressive, and people love to talk about it. Yet not once have I heard about any planned, competent actions being recognized in defense. Who is actually defending out there? For some reason, our defensive operations are considered un-newsworthy because the front does not move, nothing has collapsed, the enemy is being killed, and there is no breakthrough. What is there to discuss? It is treated as if that is simply how it should be.
In October 2025, our "Khartiia" battalion pushed forward, deployed an infantry battalion, conducted assault operations, completely sealed off the enemy's passage into Kupiansk, and has been holding it for a considerable time; the enemy cannot break through. Nothing goes wrong, there is nothing epic, no one is screaming, no one is suffering, and there are no posts crying out to be saved. People simply stand and hold the front. There is zero media presence in this. They are simply killing the enemy, and that is it; the enemy cannot breach their combat formations. And that is all. Indeed, it turns out that these actions are uninteresting to us. Where the defense is effective, it receives no support. Our support is directed to where everything has collapsed and everyone needs to be thrown in. Assault regiments, all UAVs—everything goes there. If the front is built correctly, all this heroism will be unnecessary. Then there will be no need to pump assault regiments with such a large number of personnel, and no need to tear these assault regiments apart by splitting a single regiment across 10 sectors. It is obvious.
Did you yourself make a complimentary video about Skelia?
I made an objective video about combat training in Skelia. It was a report from my time as a journalist, featuring real people undergoing combat training, real commanders, and with those same commanders back in 2023, when they were ordinary assault troopers, I filmed them during assaults. Everything stated there, all those people, they are absolutely real, and you can ask any of them if I fabricated anything or prevented them from speaking. Therefore, I had a report on training, and I am ready to state even now that everything said and shown there is the truth from beginning to end. There are witnesses to this who appear in the report, and you can see them and ask them yourself.
How do you assess Oleh Shyriaiev as the commander of the 225th Regiment? His ties with Kyva and OPZZh?
That is undoubtedly a biographical fact. Oleh Shyriaiev was connected with Kyva and OPZZh, and even served time in prison. He received the title of Hero of Ukraine and several other orders. And when I observed the combat operations, how Shyriaiev breached the defense on the left flank at the Kursk bridgehead, those were effective actions. I did not cross paths with him as a political figure; I had a negative view of him when I saw that he worked for Kyva, participated in gang conflicts, and was affiliated with OPZZh. But later, during the war, I saw a video of him while he was the commander of the 225th Territorial Defense Battalion, specifically conducting reconnaissance near Bakhmut and personally capturing three Russians. I was impressed; the video gained massive traction. Afterwards, I was near Bakhmut many times in various units, and everyone said the 225th Battalion fought reliably. Therefore, I naturally have no respect for any of Shyriaiev's past activities with OPZZh, which landed him behind bars. However, I believe that as a commander, as someone who has personally risked his life and participated in close-quarters combat, his wartime actions as a battalion commander deserve respect.
But I repeat once again, this deployment, formation, and transformation of these assault regiments into entire divisions does not allow for effective command. And a good battalion commander, even a highly capable one, cannot simply become a good division commander with the wave of a hand. It is a process that must be organized. I believe that this gigantomania and the transformation of battalions into divisions have worsened the command of these assault units. In my opinion. Especially since they are deployed across multiple axes. This is the key problem that prevents them from even training their own personnel and expanding. It is a problem. I believe this problem must be solved. Because it leads to major, resonant criticism and significant losses. Ukraine cannot afford these losses. We do not have the manpower to constantly conduct such heroic attacks and offensives against a prepared enemy. Because the enemy, who is currently advancing themselves in the Zaporizhzhia region, we have a meeting engagement there, is advancing, and in some areas, they also manage to push forward and press through. This must be countered. Planned defense is required. This will genuinely solve the problem, elevate their significance, and allow for improved command and deployment of assault regiments. And it will tangibly reduce casualties. Therefore, I hope there will be reforms now, and these reforms will be aimed primarily at what I consider the challenge of 2026: planning and accounting, the mathematics of war mentioned by Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. I hope this will start working. Because right now, the accounting exists, but the conclusions do not. That is, statistics are gathered, but decisions based on these statistics are not made. I believe in the mathematics of war Fedorov spoke of, and the conversion of assault regiments into drone-assault regiments, yes, I am not afraid of this term, even if someone dislikes this drone component. I believe it must be reflected at least in the name, to make it clear that drones conduct the assault here, and then the infantry advances alongside the drones. Instead of just rushing "forward, forward." And the fundamental reform: first, there must be accounting of resources, and the second part is the proper organization of the deployment of these resources. Reducing casualties directly depends on the quality of command. Incidentally, the statistics compiled by the Ministry of Defense in evaluating the performance of army corps demonstrate this quite clearly. And we have statistics on casualties across the entire front, which are held by the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I hope the correct conclusions will be drawn: our main casualties do not occur where the enemy is confidently controlled, beaten, and killed, but rather where there is a breakdown in the organization of command. That is where it happens, not because of the enemy's superiority. They do not possess superiority on the front; currently, there is no such overwhelming advantage where 100 Russians simultaneously attack a single Ukrainian in one location. The enemy attacks in two-man teams; the advance is conducted by two-man teams. Russian assault groups occasionally consist of 4 or 6 personnel, but this is already a rarity. The primary combat formation in the enemy's offensive is a pair, or even individual soldiers. Is it really impossible, what do you think, to kill the enemy advancing in such small groups of 1, 2, or 3? Of course, it is possible, in any number. Any amount. Russian infantry has ceased to be a tool for breaching defenses. Russian infantry can solely perform the function of infiltration. And this must be capitalized upon. Infiltration works only against poorly organized troops. This is not merely my opinion. This is the consensus and the result of analysis found in numerous military memoirs, textbooks, and monographs on military strategy from the First and Second World Wars. One can read a brilliant book on infiltration, for instance, Rommel's "Infantry Attacks". This is described in many books. However, the infiltration of the Russians, Russian infantry, the infiltration of Russian infantry, compared to the infiltration during the First and Second World Wars, differs radically. Because Russian infantry is merely an individual, one or two people with assault rifles. With the high-quality organization of reconnaissance, with personnel in positions who are supplied, possess communication and support, and are trained for independent action, these two-man teams cannot infiltrate. They can only infiltrate when there is a lack of accountability, a lack of organization, and a lack of combat planning. We already have the drones right now to kill all these Russians that Putin is sending into Ukraine. And following Fedorov's recent actions, as he is currently increasing procurement, I hope the funds will arrive, making it possible to provide drones in significantly larger volumes, exactly as the minister stated in his speech. Well, in that case, I see absolutely no chance for the adversary. But if there is no organization, the sheer number of drones will not help either. Because the crucial link in the army during a war is the personnel in the trench. If they are not worked with, if they are not supported, and if their survivability is not prioritized, then these personnel in the trench—and the personnel going into the assault, will run out very quickly. And that is when the enemy will advance without resistance. As we see, for example, in the Zaporizhzhia region, where the Russians entered our strongholds without a fight. Now we have a problem: Russian troops are defending from our own strongholds, which were simply devoid of our troops and which the adversary occupied without a fight. Now we are assaulting them. It is an absolute absurdity.
Can you say something about the 475th Separate Assault Regiment?
I believe that the 475th Assault Regiment is an exemplar, at this moment, it is the standard of what a modern drone-assault unit should be. Significant attention is given there to infantry training, specifically with an emphasis on coordination with drones. The drone component there is very strong. If this regiment were deployed according to the scheme I mentioned, assigning it to an army corps sector, where it would have one battalion in combat, one in training, and one resting, this regiment would be able to clear the corps' sector without any problems, highly effectively, and with minimal casualties. The experience of the 475th Regiment is currently being studied by others; I know that the 425th Regiment "Skelia" and the 1st Regiment named after Dmytro Kotsiubailo are sending their UAV operators and commanders to train precisely at the 475th Regiment. This is an effective tactic.
They are trying to learn how to fight using drones. This commands respect, which is exactly why we have successful examples demonstrating that an assault regiment is not a one-way ticket, but rather a highly effective combat operation.
Similarly, casualties are minimized in the operations of the 1st Separate Assault Regiment named after Dmytro Kotsiubailo. This is also an effective assault regiment. So I want to ask: why are casualties significantly lower in volume, while effectiveness remains high, in the 1st Assault Regiment and the 475th? Why do personnel there execute tasks effectively, and why is there none of that negativity? Why is that? There is no such negativity as we hear regarding the 425th and the 225th. But why? A very obvious reason emerges: the 1st Regiment and the 475th operate within a single sector. And they do not have such a massive number of battalions. They are able to operate compactly, and their command is not fractured. They receive a sector, and they execute tasks within that single sector. They are able to be effective. They reinforce UAVs, reinforce command, and it works. Why can't other assault regiments be deployed according to this model? What is preventing it? In my opinion, it is simply formulaic thinking and a lack of understanding of what defensive combat planning entails. An obsession with these endless counteroffensives, which we do not need. The enemy is being killed in futile attacks on our positions, suffering massive losses. So let them all kill themselves off. Why these constant offensives? We can build a defensive line and simply eliminate them month after month, stabilizing the front line.
Now, assault regiments have been deployed to the Zaporizhzhia sector to support our corps. Had they been deployed a little earlier, these assault regiments not only would have prevented the collapse of the front, but they would have effectively supported our troops stationed there. The front would not have fallen, there would be more troops, greater combat capability, and the problems with the 102nd and 108th Brigades would not have occurred. They would still be holding their positions. Huliaipole would be Ukrainian. And our UAV operators would be sitting in the basements there, not the Russian ones, as is the case now. This would have provided significant tactical advantages. Fighting with technology instead of heroism, this simply must become the new doctrine, applicable not just to assault regiments, but to the army as a whole. We need a reorganization of the army. And the core element should not be those who are assaulting something somewhere, but those who plan, organize, and bear responsibility. Only then will there be success.
I want to state that assault regiments, assault units—they have always existed, they exist now, and they always will. We cannot do without them. The problems, the grievances, are directed at assault regiments that are suddenly inflated to the size of divisions, reaching 13,000 to 15,000 personnel. The issue is that when expansion happens so rapidly, the command structure cannot keep pace; people simply lack the time to organize proper command and control. When 15 battalions are formed and scattered across 10 to 12 axes, the regiment's headquarters simply can no longer manage it all. Even organizing logistics becomes problematic. Supplies, orders, utter chaos ensues. Therefore, the issue of planning and the deployment of personnel is relevant to the entire army. Right now, there is an ongoing discussion about whether we even need assault troops. And the minister says we need a doctrine. Well, I want to say, friends, the entire army needs a doctrine. And this doctrine must be implemented. It is not just assault troops that require a doctrine. There must be accounting. And how can this be changed quickly? By demonstrating this accounting. I believe that meetings of the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which take place every week, sometimes up to three times, should start with the following questions: What are the casualties for the current period? Where did they occur? Where are they the highest? Why? What is the casualty ratio compared to the enemy? Did our losses result in us eliminating a greater number of enemy forces, or not? Why did this happen? Who bears responsibility for such orders? Who signed the combat directives? Then, suddenly, patterns of the same recurring situations will emerge. And then it will be possible to analyze: why are there such heavy casualties? Why is effectiveness so low? Why is territory being lost? Why does rhetoric about successful counteroffensives actually serve as a cover for the withdrawal of our forces and the rapid, sweeping abandonment of large swaths of our territory and our defensive lines? That would represent true accountability and honesty. If such an after-action review is conducted solely on the basis of existing statistical data at the higher level. I hope that this discussion, which is currently being amplified by the media, will lead to the correct conclusions. Assault regiments and assault operations are necessary; they are an integral component of the war. But irresponsibility, ineptitude, and incompetence must be evaluated and punished. At the very least, on an administrative level, I believe. Therefore, until our army transitions to being commanded by an army corps, as long as everything here is run by a call from a single phone, as long as every company and the battle for every tree line is micromanaged by a single leader, we will continue to have this constant chaos and constant problems, because you cannot fight like this. It is not just that we shouldn't fight like this; no one in the world has ever fought like this. There are no such examples. There have already been world wars, there have been infantry wars, there have been wars of massive mobilization, but such a mess, where a warring army lacks the echelon of army corps and the echelon of divisions, and all fighting is done solely by tactical units under the direct command of the General Staff, well, unfortunately, that is an exclusively Ukrainian "know-how." One that will later be evaluated very negatively in future history textbooks. So, friends, this is the situation; this is my opinion on assault regiments. Regiments must be integrated into the structure of the army and assigned to specific sectors of responsibility. Operational tasks must be executed by brigades, command echelons, corps, brigades within corps, and regiments within corps—and this will constitute systemic action. Rather than media-driven reports about who among us is the single, indispensable leader and warlord. Only then will we see actual results.
Thank you, friends, for the broadcast; thank you for being here and for asking questions on such a pressing topic. Glory to Ukraine!
