On new Commander-in-Chief Drapatyi’s report on results of counteroffensive near Zaporizhzhia
There is a risk that no real changes will be achieved in the Defense Forces if semantic manipulation, exaggeration of actual results, and concealment of problems become widespread.
It has been announced that the counteroffensive was successful, with 26 settlements liberated and 745 square kilometres either liberated or brought back under control, including 15 square kilometres liberated over the past week by an Air Assault Forces grouping comprising four Air Assault Forces brigades and two assault regiments.
If you speak to those fighting in that sector, however, the actual situation differs in several significant respects and calls for an entirely different emphasis.
In late 2025, due to our failure to commit reserves in time, the occupiers captured Huliaipole, a key transport hub on the approaches to Zaporizhzhia.
The Air Assault Forces grouping, together with Ground Forces groupings and assault regiments from the Commander-in-Chief’s reserve, was deployed to halt the Russian advance and retake the lost positions. The counterattacks involved not only four Air Assault Forces brigades and the two assault regiments subordinate to the grouping: two army corps and numerous Ground Forces brigades, including the 5th and 92nd Assault Brigades, as well as two assault regiments from the Commander-in-Chief’s reserve, were also carrying out, and continue to carry out, their missions along the axis across a frontage significantly wider than that assigned to the Air Assault Forces.
As a result of the effective actions of our forces, the Russian advance was halted in fierce meeting engagements, the enemy suffered heavy losses, and the front was stabilised. But Huliaipole, which was evidently one of the objectives of the operation, could not be retaken. Unfortunately.
Ukraine lost several hundred square kilometres. Some of the lost territory was retaken, however. If the term "liberated" is to be used, then, according to some well-informed Ukrainian military personnel, it applies to up to 150 square kilometres. Everything else should be described as "control restored" or, in some areas, more accurately, as "partial control restored". These different concepts should be kept distinct.
Also noteworthy is the fact that all 26 of these settlements were retaken in February–June this year, during O. Syrskyi’s tenure as Commander-in-Chief. But Syrskyi, for some reason, made no statements about these gains. Why? Because the Russian command at the operational and strategic levels does not have complete information about the actual situation. The battle continues, the enemy is advancing, the operation is far from over, and Syrskyi did not consider it appropriate to announce the results of operations that were still ongoing.
The situation on the front is now extremely difficult: the enemy is on the outskirts of Sloviansk, Druzhkivka and Dobropillia, has captured a large part of Kostiantynivka, and the situation near Zaporizhzhia and Sumy remains extremely tense. None of us needs complacency; on the contrary, we need a clear assessment of the threats and challenges. Only an objective acknowledgement of reality will enable us to determine how to defeat the enemy.
