Battle for Bakhmut: Are conclusions drawn after Debaltseve?
I read that today the Supreme Commander’s Council decided to continue the defense of Bakhmut. Among the participants of the Council were generals who commanded the defense of Debaltseve, that is, as we are sure, they drew conclusions from that experience, and their decisions regarding the defense of Bakhmut will fully correspond to the real situation, because it is necessary to learn from one’s own mistakes, isn’t it?
Therefore, based on the Stavka's decision, I expect:
1. Someone from the generals or colonels will come to Bakhmut to deploy a command post, in order to have unified control over all the troops in the city based on the real situation, not a paper map somewhere in the remote headquarters because the speed of decision-making and interaction in such a situation is key. The troops must hold positions that actually allow inflicting losses on the enemy, which no one will see on the map. Managing by the map outside the city in such conditions and without taking into account the real combat strength is irresponsible.
2. The command in the city must ensure a unified situational awareness for all the units, to understand in such a complex situation where the positions of their own and enemy troops are, which areas in the city are under fire from the heights and streets, which are controlled by the enemy. There must be communication between all the units, interaction is the key to avoiding firing at their own in such conditions. If this is not done - there will be unjustified losses.
3. The advance from midnight to capture the city should be stopped, this can be done exclusively at the expense of the application of combat reserves. That is, not to send someone somewhere to a point on the map, as it was in Debaltsevo, but to personally control the deployment, help to dig in, and organize round-the-clock reconnaissance.
4. Provide ammunition for hitting at least group targets.
5. Engineering equipment should provide access to several communication paths, to which the enemy has not yet reached, since the main track is being fired. And the wheeled equipment itself will not pass through the fields.
6. All military equipment in the city must be provided with spare parts, and mobile repair units must be created to help check the combat readiness of the equipment, since in conditions of enemy coverage no one will deal with the technique, and there will be no time to wait for the delivery of spare parts. Let's not repeat the mistakes of Debaltsevo, when due to the irresponsibility of the command, due to insignificant malfunctions and technical unpreparedness, a significant amount of equipment had to be thrown away.
7. In a complex combat situation, soldiers do not need soothing good news, the motivation of our soldiers is sufficient. The truth about the situation, realistic tasks, the personal presence of commanders, and responsibility for the lives of people, must be determined in constant information, and constant clear orders are needed.
Yuri Butusov, Censor.NET
