4 months of offensive: situation at front, analysis, conclusions
What advantages did the Armed Forces have and why did not all of them "work". Why the Balakliya Offensive was successful. On the shortcomings of planning, the quality of the use of drones and the situation at the front.
- On 4 June, the Ukrainian offensive in the South began, and four months have passed. Now it is autumn. Of course, the pace and intensity of the fighting in the area will remain high, and there will be pauses due to the weather. We can expect this in the near future. So, now, in order for us to talk substantively, let's look at the maps of the situation. What has changed? What is the situation on the frontline now?
This is the direction of the Ukrainian offensive. Day 589 of the full-scale aggression of Russian troops and instead of Kyiv, in 3 days we are discussing the Ukrainian offensive in Zaporizhzhia region and Russian attempts to contain the Ukrainian breakthrough.
So we can see what happened. 4 months ago, Ukrainian troops moved forward from approximately these lines, which are shown here. They were trying to make their way from the villages of Malaya Tokmachka and Novodanilovka near Orikhov to the village of Robotino, then to Novoprokopovka and the town of Tokmak below. But we can see how dense the defenses of the Russian troops were in this area. We have a large amount of data on the structure of the Russian battle lines. We know what forces Russia has concentrated and we see the results. Well, to be honest, the results here show that the fighting was tough, but in four months our troops broke through by 9 km. And this gap is very, very narrow. This was one of the main areas of our efforts. We can judge this because in this area, right here, near Robotyn, there were the latest models of Western military equipment that Ukraine received. There were 2a6 Leopards here, there were Bradleys. Marder armored personnel carriers, Stryker armored personnel carriers, and Challenger 2 tanks are now being used here. It is obvious that the concentration of this equipment, which is being recorded here, is one of the main areas of the Ukrainian troops' efforts. The fighting here is heavy. The Russians are throwing all their forces here. From what we can see at the moment, there are units of the Russian 42nd Motorised Rifle Division, units of the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Russian Armed Forces, the 42nd Division, the reinforced Marine Brigade 810, various special forces brigades in the area. So Russia has concentrated very, very large forces here. And we see that the results are quite... quite modest. The losses of the enemy troops are large. Ours are not small either. We will talk about this a little later.
This is another area. The Pyatikhatka area. This is the direction to Vasylivka, to Enerhodar. Obviously, our troops are trying to move along the Dnipro riverbed to Vasylivka and then to Enerhodar. We can see that they have also advanced about 3 kilometers in four months. We understand that this is also a rather limited pace. The enemy's defenses are also very dense. In this area, Russia has concentrated on the 49th Combined Arms Army, which has built a multi-echelon defense. There are units of the 4th military base of the Russian Armed Forces, the 19th Russian motorized infantry division, and various reinforcement units. The 58th Army and 49th Army are also reinforced in these areas by Russian airborne troops, including the 76th Air Assault Division. They are fighting here. The enemy is also deploying, or was forced to deploy, its strategic reserves here. The next map.
This area is the largest in scale. This is the so-called Vremiyivka salient. And in this area, our troops managed to advance the most. It should be noted that the situation was favorable, of course. The enemy made this advance in order to take control and get as close to Velyka Novosilka as possible. The Russians were trying to capture this town. It has a very important strategic importance in the south of Donbas, and they were actually as close as the outskirts of Velyka Novosilka. But they had open flanks and managed to make the most progress here. On the 32-kilometer front, the advance was about 10 km. A significant number of settlements have been liberated. But this direction is not as sensitive for the enemy as the Tokmak direction, because here we are actually cutting off this ledge. We are cutting it off, but the cutting of this ledge is slow. And while the direction of Tokmak is a strategically very vulnerable city for the enemy, here the enemy has such reserves of positional defense. Staromlynivka is a defense hub in the Russian positions. So far, the enemy, unfortunately, has the strength to hold it.
This map shows the Bakhmut direction. What changes have been made over the summer? As of the end of September, Ukrainian troops managed to recapture a large area near the villages of Andriyivka and Klishchiyivka. We have liberated Klishchiyivka and Andriyivka. Our troops are approaching Kurdyumivka and Ozaryanivka, and for the enemy, this movement is a serious threat to Bakhmut. As we can see on the map, the Opytne-Odradivka line is an access to the railway line in the area. It makes it possible to create a big threat to the coverage of Bakhmut from the south. This is a serious threat to the enemy.
This is a general view of the Donbas - Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Maryinka, and Siversk directions. We see that there are some advances in the area of Pervomaiske, in the area of Vodiane, Opytne. There are small advances of our troops. Significant advances in the area of Klishchiyivka, Andriivka. There is fighting everywhere. The rest of the frontline is actually static. This does not mean that nothing is happening there, there are heavy positional battles everywhere.
This is the northern section of the Kupyansk-Lyman frontline. We can see that the enemy is trying to advance in the direction of Makiivka, and there are ongoing battles in the direction of Kuzemivka and Novoselivske. But in fact, these are all positional battles. There were reports of a Russian offensive, a hundred thousand-strong army. In fact, our forces are not inferior to the enemy and there is no continuation of offensive actions here, Russia is conducting rather localized combat operations. We are able to control the situation in this area of the frontline to the greatest extent, although there are also very heavy battles going on everywhere.
And this is the entire southern direction we are now showing. There are wedges, certain positions where we have managed to penetrate the Russian defense during this time. But, unfortunately, we are still quite far from Tokmak, 16 km away. It is quite far. Staromlynivka is about 2 km away, and it is a key Russian defense node. If we were to reach Tokmak, it would really be a pretty big operational success in this area. The Russian defenses are very strong.
Next, the village of Vasylivka. About 11 km to go. The Russian defence is still quite stable and it has not yet been destroyed. The enemy is holding the line in general, there are some narrow wedges, there are advances, but the Russian front has not collapsed.
This is the direction of Kherson, Beryslav. The Russians claim to be active there, and Russian telegram channels report that Ukrainians are planning some kind of bridgeheads and offensives. In fact, there is no such great activity there at the moment. There are positional battles, very fierce, for the islands, for control of the strip along the Dnipro. But so far, there have been no significant deep advances across the Dnipro.
Regarding the offensive in the South. Zaporizhzhya direction. And the Donetsk direction. The South-Donetsk direction.
The offensive lasted for 4 months. Significant armoured forces were brought in, our armoured reserves were brought in, and artillery, and a significant amount of ammunition was concentrated in this area. What were our advantages? We were attacking a deeply entrenched defence. There was a lot of ground to cover. All this territory, I mean, the enemy captured it in about the first week, the first two weeks - this southern direction. These are the first two weeks of the war. Russian troops entered Enerhodar on the fifth day of the war. Melitopol - on the second day. Berdiansk - on the third. Mariupol was completely surrounded on the fifth. The enemy came to Mangush. In fact, the city was surrounded. And now we have been fighting for it for 4 months.
Let's talk about the results of the offensive.
First. We see on the map that the advance is really shallow. We have not managed to destroy the Russian defences. We have to admit this objectively. But let's compare the strengths of the parties.
First of all, Russian troops were not inferior in terms of personnel in this area. Secondly, a deeply entrenched defence was built, consisting of dense, very deep minefields, up to 7-8 km deep, which the enemy constantly updates with remote mining systems. It should also be noted that the enemy had engineering support. The Russians knew where we were going to go. They understood that we had to break through in the South at any cost. They concentrated on engineering assets. They concentrated people. They had enough infantry to fight in defense and to conduct counterattacks. The Russians concentrated a large number of armoured vehicles, and tanks, including the latest T-90 Breakthrough tanks, were also used in significant numbers.
Artillery. A large number of artillery. Self-propelled artillery, multiple launch rocket systems. The main forces of Russian aviation worked here. Adjustable aerial bombs, KABs. The enemy is constantly striking in this direction. Russian helicopters have become very active. Now the enemy is using them with adjustments from drones. They know the distance to the target. They can clearly see the object of attack, and of course, this complicates the fighting. So we had no surprise. We did not have a numerical advantage in the infantry. We did not have an advantage in the number of guns, in armored vehicles, and the enemy had a great advantage in the air. In fact, I must say that Russia dominated the air in aviation, in helicopters. It had a large number of anti-aircraft missile systems and still has them in the area. But this time, there was a key factor that, perhaps for the first time, made these Russian forces really stronger, in this area, I should note in the south, Zaporizhzhia and South Donetsk direction, the Russians concentrated a large group of drones. It should be noted that the enemy is not only not inferior in drones, but in many types of drones they outnumber us. In other words, the enemy's air dominance is a sustainable quantitative advantage not only in aviation and helicopters but also in drones. Drones that provide surveillance and reconnaissance.
Also, the main forces of Lancet drones, long-range kamikaze strike drones, and significant forces of FPV kamikaze strike drones (unspecified) have been concentrated here. All of this has led to the fact that it is usually impossible to break through such defences with a single swift strike due to motivation.
What were the advantages of the Ukrainian forces? First. The number of fresh brigades was concentrated. A large number of new reserve military units. Our troops received a significant amount of Western and NATO military equipment. Unfortunately, we did not have a numerical advantage. But for the first time, our army has a significant amount of armored vehicles that have high-quality thermal imaging sights, which are optimized for night combat, which are reliable enough to ensure, very seriously, the life of the crew, and allow them to work effectively for a long time. Bradley, Leopard 2a6, Challenger2, Stryker, and Marder - all of these are very high-quality combat vehicles.
Next. We had an advantage - a significant amount of ammunition. For the first time during the war, the Ukrainian military command concentrated and supplied a large amount of ammunition, shells, missiles to destroy targets for a long time, and it should be noted that our artillery was operating with unprecedented density. The enemy also suffered heavy casualties because they failed to cover our artillery. Our artillery was firing for literally hours. This was the case. Corrected fire of this magnitude is a very important factor. The enemy suffered heavy losses as a result.
Tactical targets such as a "stronghold", where firepower was concentrated on the front line, were struck with HIMARS missiles. That is, at such a tactical level, in such numbers, the HIMARS had never been used before. Therefore, there were certain advantages. But. Why did this battle turn into such a battle of attrition and such a slow advance? The fact is that the enemy had been preparing since about October. He was building a powerful defence line. At that time, they did not have so much ammunition and munitions. The Russians were doing this, frankly, in fairly comfortable conditions. They were tied to the heights. Firepower and munitions were concentrated on the dominant heights, and in front of them were foothills, infantry and minefields. All of this actually led to very high requirements for the organization of the offensive. But. In this situation, unfortunately, it is impossible to rely solely on the motivation of our infantry - and this is our main advantage in war, that is, the advantage in motivating our troops, that is, let's count again: motivation - yes. Motivation, ammunition, and new armoured vehicles in a certain amount. But all this did not work, why? Let's think about it.
It didn't work, it didn't allow us to break through because, first of all, there was no offensive, unlike the events of 22nd of March, when we had a successful offensive. First, we did not have the suddenness. Strategically, there was no surprise in the actions of our troops this time, because the enemy understands three main things.
First. In order for Ukraine to continue to develop and wage war, we need to cut the corridor to Crimea. That is, the presence of a land corridor to Crimea is one of the strategic goals of the Russian Federation in this war. If the Russians stabilise the front in the South, of course, they will want to cut off this land forever by force of arms, and build concrete fortifications in several rows, which will be physically very difficult to knock out. So the Russians understood where we were going to go.
At that time, the Ukrainian command was under pressure from the time factor. Strategically, I understand the plan now - what we are seeing now is clear to me what the Ukrainian command was trying to do. They were trying to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold, build a very dense line of defence, prevent the Russians from stabilizing the front line in the southern direction and push the enemy as far as possible from the lines they currently occupy in order to impose a battle of attrition in a specific direction that is favorable to Ukraine and thus deprive the Russians of the strategic initiative. To chain all major forces to this area. To concentrate all the main forces there - not only the Ukrainian army, but also the Russians, who were forced to throw all their forces into this battle. That is, it was a struggle for strategic initiative along the entire front. That's why we understand that we have a lot of, you know, people saying that someone is ordering us, the West, to advance quickly. In fact, it is not. There was no political dependence on this offensive.
The offensive in the South is dictated by military necessity, military necessity. If we allow the frontline to stabilise in these areas, the Russians will strengthen their defences - even more so. They will save their forces. They will reduce the strain on their troops. They will rely on powerful lines, from which, if they are to be driven out, it will be like a war between North and South Korea. It will be very difficult to drive them out and it is unclear how long it will take. Therefore, as soon as the situation was ripe, suitable, warm, and the weather was normal for adjusting fire so that they could use the advantage in artillery, and use new armoured vehicles, the Ukrainian command was forced to go on the offensive. Was it thoroughly prepared? Of course, what can I say? Newly formed units were advancing. There is an opinion in our military command, voiced by many senior commanders, that cohesion is developed not in training, but in combat. Exclusively in combat. And that in a defensive battle, there will be problems and losses, and that in an offensive battle, there will be problems and losses. Thus, the term, expression "You will work out coherence in the offensive" is not just a word. This is an opinion that a significant number of our military commanders have. Thus, the high motivation of the Ukrainian infantry was used to create a surprise factor and try to break through the Russian defence with a multi-directional attack.
First, on 4 June, there was an offensive in the auxiliary direction. This is the direction from Velyka Novosilka. Our troops suddenly began to cut off the Vremiyivsky ledge for the enemy. We partially succeeded in some places, but unfortunately, we failed. The enemy was preparing, I emphasize. On 8 June, our troops launched an attack towards Tokmak. Judging by the grouping and what we see, this direction was planned for the main efforts. Judging by the equipment that is concentrated there, which we have seen over these four months. Therefore, the Ukrainian troops were primarily under pressure from strategic factors. And strategic factors led to the fact that we did not have there, unlike, let's look at the Balakliya breakthrough of 22 years ago, which changed the strategic situation.
At 22, why was the offensive successful? First of all. The main forces of the Russian army, strategic reserves, and airborne troops were completely shackled by the fighting on the Kherson bridgehead, and the fighting around Kherson. The main Russian forces and means of destruction were concentrated there. The Russians threw everything there: the main forces of aviation, artillery, air defence. All the reserves were there. This led to the fact that on the northern section of the front, in the Kharkiv region, the Russians withdrew their reserve units, and airborne units, and moved them to other areas. That is, the enemy's defences were seriously weakened. And the enemy did not expect our offensive in this area. They repelled the attacks of Ukrainian troops at the Kherson bridgehead.
On 29 August 22, an offensive operation began in the Kherson sector, and our troops tried to break through the deeply entrenched defences. Yes, they failed. But all the strategic reserves of the Russians were pinned down in the area. And at that moment, using this situation, on the other flank, where there were not enough reserves, the grouping of our troops broke through in one swift attack, simply drove through the Russian defences and reached the rear of the Izyum group. This led to a panicked flight of Russian troops. What is important? The fact that Balakliysk offensive was carried out at that time by our military brigades, which were still well-equipped and well-trained - the 92nd Mechanised Brigade, the 80th Air Assault Brigade and the 25th Airborne Brigade. They were also reinforced by various other special operations units and so on. That is, we managed to create in that northern direction not only a quantitative advantage in certain areas, but also a qualitative advantage of educated troops who could be given tasks and who would go forward and be able to demolish any resistance.
The Balakliya defence area was not covered by stationary defence lines. There was no echeloned enemy defence there. Even the tactical reserves were very weak there, concentrated in the area of Izium. The enemy did not even have time to bring them to the defence lines. They were defeated very quickly. I should also mention the terrain and the area. There were no minefields. The terrain was not so open. There were a lot of forests that allowed us to accumulate secretly, to move covertly. There were no distances for long-range weapons to hit. And one more factor. There were not so many drones. The Russians had no attack drones in that area. There were no FPVs, no lancets, and even very little aerial reconnaissance.
So aerial reconnaissance is now in modern warfare, drones. Drones are a factor that enhances combat capability and multiplies the effect of any weapon many times over. What has happened in the South over the past four months? Unfortunately, all the factors that worked in the Balakliya breakthrough could not be applied here. None of this took place. The freshly formed units were very well motivated, consisting of patriots, of motivated people. They were ready to move forward. But the situation was different. The enemy was waiting for an offensive, concentrated large force, and the breakthrough simply turned into a battle of attrition. That's how it happened.
But now let's say that this is a success or a failure. I've mentioned all the factors that made Ukraine advance. Frankly speaking, some senior leaders were very optimistic about this offensive, very hopeful. But in fact, we had no choice. Unlike the Balakliya breakthrough, the offensive in the south, in the Zaporizhzhia region, and in the Southern Donbas in 2023 was not a chess game. It was not a chess game. It was a full-force blow with a crowbar on a tightly closed armored door. We didn't break through the door from the first blow. We have been pounding on it for 4 months, and we are still pounding on it. And based on the current situation, we will continue to hit them. I want to say that we had no other options at the strategic level.
Now let's think about what could have been done better and whether it could have been done better. What were the mistakes? It has become apparent in full force that the development of cohesion in combat, in the offensive, is still, I hope, a mistake that the military command will recognise. Fighting in an offensive makes much greater demands on the management of the organization of troops and on training. An offensive is the concentration of all forces, and all resources to perform a task at a specific point in a specific area in a specific place. During an offensive, you cannot train someone. During an offensive, everyone must go forward and work as a well-oiled machine.
Defensive combat offers other opportunities. Under attack, a newly formed unit, if it occupies a defensive line, can even buy time for territory. It can be withdrawn. It can leave some positions. But it gains time. During this time, it can improve its command and control system. Defense gives you an opportunity to understand where the enemy will be coming from. To improve the command and control system, and intelligence, and to conduct additional training of personnel. If, of course, there is an initiative of the commanders.
An offensive does not provide such opportunities. In an offensive, you need every soldier to go forward. Every shell must hit the target. These are different conditions. Yes, over the nine years of war, all our leaders have become accustomed to the troops being trained like in the ATO - a brigade comes in for a year, sits in the trenches and starts training there, conducting actual combat training. Yes, it was like that. But in a full-scale war, this does not work. And the significant losses of military equipment and people were due to the fact that there were shortcomings, especially at the initial stage, in training and organisation. And the main shortcomings were in management. Because a command's management must take into account the characteristics of its troops, based on their actual level of training. And when we have a single corps commander there who constantly shouts "forward, forward!" and sets tactical tasks, when the corps commander sets tasks for platoons and companies separately, without actually improving management, but only fragmenting it, this, unfortunately, cannot be effective in modern combat operations. Modern warfare is not about following a map. Not points, directions, or arrows. It is a drone vision. This is the decentralization of control. This is a manifestation of initiative on the ground, so that the main people now, during modern offensive operations, are company commanders. At most, these are battalion commanders. They should not be interfered with during assault operations. The brigade, and the corps should support their actions, not try to impose their vision on them. I think this is a very important lesson that needs to be taught. Modern warfare also requires a completely different approach to the organization of intelligence management.
Reconnaissance and fire control require multi-echelon concentration and the use of all intelligence assets, so that there is order so that someone plans clearly, and preferably on an electronic map. On an electronic map, not a paper map. Some intelligence assets are concentrated. Which unit is responsible for which sector? How deep the intelligence is organized. What means are available? What is the consumption of these means? All this needs to be planned. Because the modern battlefield is not something that was even studied in our military academies three years ago. I'm not talking about the earlier stages. Nowadays, the modern battlefield is full of sensors, full of drones that are watching every step. Now, when an infantryman moves forward alone, it is no longer a question of whether he may or may not be noticed. Maybe he will be able to slip through, maybe not. Even one person, especially in such an open area, will definitely be noticed. Even one person. I'm not talking about a group. Even one person will be noticed. And even this one person will be hit by fire. So when the infantry moves, it has to be a complex of actions. It has to be controlled from a drone, so that, God forbid, there are no prisoners, and no missing persons, which can happen in a modern offensive if you have drones, you have interaction, you have firepower. This should always raise questions. Unfortunately, this management, which should go first of all, management in modern warfare should use this huge amount of situational awareness. New means. Thousands of drones, hundreds of drones operating on the battlefield. Data from hundreds of thermal imaging sights of modern military equipment. All this needs to be integrated into a single picture of situational awareness. Has this been created? Unfortunately, no. There was no planning for these actions, no planning for the use of reconnaissance assets, and no planning for the use of drones during the offensive. This is a serious drawback in modern warfare.
We can see for ourselves what the Russian offensive that took place in January, February, and March on Vuhledar was like. When the Russian command of armored columns tried to break through our defenses. What stopped them? The drone front. Drones that observe and detect targets in advance, that are hit, put the troops on alert. It is the same here. In the south, the main factor is not minefields. It's not even the large number of infantry that the Russians have concentrated on and are counterattacking and taking up positions.
The drone front. The drone front is a key factor in modern warfare. We are no longer the only ones with drones. The Russians have them in no lesser, and sometimes even greater numbers. They can see our near rear. They can see the positions of firepower, and command posts - we need to manoeuvre with this. We need to respond to this. The same is true on our side. Intelligence must be comprehensive and integrated. To counter the Russian drone front, we have to have a drone front that has to create an advantage in situational awareness through organization and management.
Quality. That is, quantity, new equipment - it doesn't work. Only quality. And I would also like to mention something else. Tactics. The advantage in tactics, the advantage in interaction, the coherence of troops - these are things that are not practised in modern warfare in the offensive. They have to be practised on the training ground. Troops that have not practised the interaction of drones and assault groups, drones and artillery, drones, artillery and assault groups, drones, artillery, assault groups, and armoured vehicles, the interaction of armoured vehicles and drone targeting, the interaction of the company headquarters, the company commander, his drones, his equipment with the battalion commander, the brigade commander, with the allied forces on the flanks. This needs to be worked out. At least there should be a short training cycle. At least at the level of command. This cannot be improvised. So I hope that this is the overall situation. We couldn't help but attack in the south. We had to act there. And the strategic plan, what was drawn on the map, is justified. We understand and see its logic now, 4 months later. The plan was drawn on the big maps, it made sense, and this battle is ongoing. We cannot dodge this battle.
But what was the problem? The main problem? The gap between the strategy, the plan, and the tactics, the execution. In other words, everything is planned and calculated at the highest level, but the execution is not finalized. And how to do it? The idea is good. But how to do it in practice? Go ahead and set a deadline? Well, we have drawn it. We have one corps commander who is so far along that... I think the time will come when we will tell about him. We have a lot of people who hang themselves with high awards and think that management is when you sit in the headquarters and constantly shout at your subordinates nervously: why haven't you reached that milestone yet? Very often, during these events, I would like to invite some high commanders to land for one day so that they can see what war is like from the infantry point of view when you have to advance, but you are not given armoured vehicles because they will be quickly knocked out by a drone. You have enemy drones above you, and you are bound to be hit. Nevertheless, you have to move forward. It's not just a matter of fear. I want to say that these kilometers that we have traveled - 9 km to Robotyn and Novoprokopivka. These kilometres to Makarivka and Novomayorsk. Believe me, these are very expensive kilometres for Ukraine. Forever expensive. And there will be monuments to many, many of our heroes. To many people who shed their blood. These will be holy places for us. What was done there is a feat. No army in the world, I am convinced, could have done what the Ukrainian infantry did in those areas. In fact, it was just massive heroism and self-sacrifice. The Russian army could not move a single step at all in such positions with such resistance. The Ukrainian army did. Great losses were inflicted and are still being inflicted on the Russians thanks to shells, rockets, and the heroism of our soldiers who are going all the way. But such an exchange, I think everyone understands, is unprofitable for us. We need to create a qualitative advantage not only at the strategic level but also at the tactical level. A miracle will not happen. The enemy has drawn conclusions from the events of 22 years ago, from the battles for the Kherson bridgehead, from the Balakliya pogrom of Russian troops. That is, they have drawn great conclusions from our September offensive, and it is impossible to repeat this a second time. The enemy does not want to lose, concentrates all its forces, dominates the air, and equips powerful engineering lines that for some reason, unfortunately, the Ukrainian army does not equip and the Ukrainian government does not build with construction organisations. But they are doing it, and we should draw conclusions from this. This is very important.
We have to win not only at the strategic level. We have to build victory in tactics, so that planning is top-down, so that the squad leader down there also understands that he has information, understands where he is going, what means are supporting him, what realistic borders he has to reach, thanks to what means. And that he was not going to be repeated, but that he had to get there and come back. And that the command has done everything for this. And to fight by ordering people to perform a feat, go ahead, go for a feat - well, you know, this is not how you fight in the twenty-first century. And I want to say that in 1923, in my opinion, it was the last year when both the Russian army and the Ukrainian army tried to break through the front by concentrating masses of infantry, artillery and armored vehicles. If we want to outplay the enemy at all levels, the first thing to start with is planning the use of drones. The advantage must be in drones. Not just in numbers. For drones, it's not the quantity that matters, but the quality. The organization of drones. Quality of use. Both reconnaissance and attack drones of various types. This is the main thing. A commander who starts at the age of 23, now, will start the next offensive not by planning the use of drones, not by using and planning the work of electronic warfare, not by using air defence, not by using electronic intelligence - this person is not modern. This person is not capable of achieving results. This person simply does not understand the nature of modern warfare. The offensive with infantry, artillery and tanks will not be repeated, unless, of course, the commander of these troops is interested in the result. And we need to prepare for changes in warfare - the war of drones. This is the main lesson for me from this offensive in the south. Drone warfare requires new technological solutions.
We have to use the advantage of our troops' intelligence and motivation, not just heroism and readiness to go forward with a machine gun at any cost. Who should we trade with? With the Russian mobiles or the mercenaries, they are recruiting now? Why? So I want to say that the offensive in the South in 1923 - I understand its logic, I understand the time, the timing, I understand why there was no time to correct many mistakes. There are flaws in all of this. There is an explanation for all this, there is a logic. But the mistakes that must be corrected are the mistakes that create this gap between strategy and tactics.
Tactics also need to be planned. Troop management also needs to be practiced. Cohesion in the offensive, some of our dear high commanders say, is not practiced in modern warfare. Where did you get this idea from? We don't even have such examples. Therefore, cohesion must be developed in defence and only in this way. Or through long training with experienced personnel somewhere on the training grounds. But all this needs to be planned. There is a real war going on, and real combat training and running-in of troops is running-in in defence. This is also the experience of world wars. All this must be done. Let's recall - there are many examples. Both the First and Second World Wars involved the use of newly formed troops. The main problems are always organisational problems, and problems of cohesion, which greatly reduce the offensive capabilities of the troops.
I think that we should not repeat such a run on the historical rake, but rather learn from our mistakes. I would like to say one more thing, the last thing. That the army needs... we have a tradition where many positions are filled with commanders who always want to give good news to their superiors for some reason. They don't want to bring critical news. Everything is always good for them. The situation is always tense but controlled. A stereotypical report - everything is always good, no problems. In principle, such reports can be made by... a cadet. In my opinion, during a major war, people with independent thinking should be appointed to command positions, whose main task is not to create problems to worry their superiors but to solve problems. People who have critical thinking, who are independent, who propose action plans, and who are not just administrators: nothing happened, nothing happened, boom-boom-boom-boom, tense, controlled, thank you, no questions, we are solving everything. Such commanders are not needed in modern warfare. We need people who produce results in war. The result comes from outplaying the enemy tactically.
Now the positional defence is in place. In fact, the front line we have been looking at is unchanged. It's almost exactly the same as it was on November 22. That is, the frontline is actually stabilised. Unfortunately, neither the Russians nor we managed to break through it, tear it up, or bring down the defences in 23. This positional war is moving into year 24. We need to be effective in a positional war. First of all, you have to save human resources. This is the talent of a commander. Not just to send everyone forward, but to save the main thing for which the war is fought - human resources. Because a war of attrition depletes what? Not the number of shells. Not the number of tanks and guns, but the number of people. And especially qualified personnel. And especially in the infantry. First and foremost. This is the main task of a general. The main task of the commander. To save available resources. To use them wisely. And not to sit around: okay, we've gone ahead, give me more - we're out of people. This is not how you fight. You can only spend what you will be repaired later. They will give you equipment, drones, and shells. Tanks will be given. People will not be given. The people who are spent in frontal attacks will not be given. They will not be there. Long-term positional warfare requires, first of all, careful planning to preserve human resources, to preserve qualified personnel. This is the main challenge of the war.
I was provided with information from many of our combat brigades and commands. I understand quite well some aspects of the situation. I will not say that I understand everything. I may be wrong about some details, some nuances. I am responsible for what I have just said and I can deliver it. I have many arguments. I am very grateful to you for this broadcast. Thank you for your understanding. I consider it necessary to express my position on the offensive, its problems and achievements, and its necessity so clearly. I need to form a general framework for myself. I will continue to write about this. Most likely, it will not be such an open detailed report. Part of it will be public, and part of it will be non-public. I'll see you on air. I am very glad to see everyone. Thank you for being with us. The great battle for the South continues. A great battle on the entire front. Ukrainian soldiers are moving forward. The Russian occupiers are still trying to hold back our advance. We will believe, we believe in victory. We believe that the Ukrainian will and intelligence will prove to be stronger than the invaders. Today, more than ever, I am confident in our victory. Glory to Ukraine.
Yurii Butusov, Censor.NET
