WHY ARE WE LOSING AVDIIVKA AND HOW TO SAVE IT?
We are going to focus our next stream on the hottest spot of our frontline in Donbas. This is the city of Avdiivka.
AVDIIVKA IS NOW THE MAIN TARGET
The situation in Avdiivka is very difficult. I would like to remind you that since October 10, Russian troops have been continuing continuous massive assaults on the defenses of Avdiivka, the city itself, south of the city, north of the city. For the Russian command of the First Army Corps of the Russian Army, the capture of Avdiivka is now the main goal, as evidenced by the fact that all major reserves of infantry and assault groups are now being sent to Avdiivka. It is here that the enemy is deploying its forces to continue attacks. The situation is becoming very threatening. It is complicated at the same time. There are our advantages, which, unfortunately, we cannot fully use yet. And there are the enemy's advantages.
The loss of Avdiivka is not since the enemy has some great advantage, some forces that outnumber us many, many times over. The enemy is superior to us in certain components, certain aspects. We also have our advantages. Avdiivka is a strategic point. By controlling Avdiivka, we control the Donetsk agglomeration. And for the Russian command, to recapture Avdiivka means to take full control of the entire Donetsk agglomeration, which would make the prospect of liberating Donbas incredibly difficult. This allows the enemy to build a large fortified area that can rely on large cities.
THE IMPORTANCE OF AVDIIVKA
Large cities are very convenient for organizing defense. Therefore, the loss of Avdiivka is a huge strategic defeat for us. It is the same defeat as the loss of Sieverodonetsk, Lysychansk, and the agglomeration of these two cities. Just like the loss of Bakhmut and Soledar. This will be a strategic defeat in Donbas that we must avoid. I want to note that the significance of Avdiivka is much more important than the significance of Bakhmut, which has been discussed so much and fought over so fiercely. Avdiivka is the most painful place for the enemy. That is why they are concentrating their forces here. What is the crisis?
The situation has changed. These changes in the situation have occurred over the two months of Russian assaults. At first glance, it seems that the enemy's advance is really big. What has happened here? The enemy has actually advanced in a rather small area. Just a few kilometers of advance. A few square kilometres of advance in 2 months of fighting. Russia has sent large forces here, I want to remind you. 4 brigades are attacking the city from the north, 2 brigades are attacking from the south. But Russia is constantly sending reinforcements here.
The enemy advances step by step. In 2 months, he has advanced... I don't know, maybe 100 meters a day, maybe even 50 meters a day, if we compare on average. But this progress is very painful for us. Because the only main supply line is actually being shelled with all kinds of weapons. The enemy has significantly reduced the corridor. The corridor that allows us to hold Avdiivka has actually narrowed down to less than 7 kilometres. Logistics has become incredibly complicated. It is a very difficult maneuver. The organization of fire support has become very difficult. What the enemy has done is a serious threat of losing the city. And we have every opportunity to avoid it.
I am broadcasting to clarify this problem, to make it more understandable to the public and to the military and political command, which, in my opinion, does not understand the situation and the ways to solve it. This realization came to me after I saw the gap between the plans and statements of our leadership in Lysychansk and Sieverodonetsk and then the implementation of these words and statements on the ground. The difference was striking, unfortunately. There were also cheerful statements about Soledar and Bakhmut that completely contradicted the situation. And this lie in the reports, which, unfortunately, is systemic in those places where there are heavy battles, where many leaders want to absolve themselves of responsibility instead of taking responsibility. So all of this makes me think of Bakhmut and Soledar, which were held cheerfully until they lost. And then they were shamefully silent, saying that we cannot say that we lost the city. We have lost Bakhmut, Soledar, Sieverodonetsk, Lysychansk, and all this under optimistic statements that we have everything under control. The lies of senior leaders in the President's Office, the Supreme Command, the Ministry of Defense, and the General Staff prevent us from objectively assessing the situation. Every centre of influence in our country wants to say something pleasant for itself. To say that there are no problems. But there are problems. I want to say that this map shows that the enemy is literally a few steps away from really capturing Avdiivka and making it a fortress, making this defence practically very short-lived. Because this is a significant advance, flanking is a difficult problem for us.
WHY DOES THE ENEMY SUCCEED IN CITIES THAT ARE CONVENIENT FOR DEFENSE?
This is the same scenario that I saw in Sieverodonetsk, Lysychansk, Bakhmut, Soledar. When initially... this is what, in my opinion, was the defense crisis, why were these cities surrendered? I want to tell you that Lysychansk is a super-favourable city for defence. It is on high ground. There are a lot of buildings and basements there. It was possible to organize defense there. Bakhmut is an incredibly favourable defence line. It's all on the heights. At the heights of the dominant forces. A huge pile of houses that even enemy aircraft cannot simply demolish. A large number of comfortable basements. Soledar is also on heights. All seemingly very favourable conditions for defence. Then there were the people. There were troops, a significant number of troops. There were all kinds of people in Bakhmut. A huge pile of troops. Bakhmut, Lysychansk. The withdrawal from Lysychansk lasted three days before my eyes - there were so many people, vehicles, weapons, property that people could not leave in one day. There was an order, but the vehicles kept leaving, leaving and leaving in columns. In Bakhmut, I think you know what the number of troops was, it was just very large. Nevertheless, these cities, which are very convenient for defence, were lost, even though the enemy did not have multiple numerical advantages in these areas of the front. What is going on? How is it happening? To begin with, let's look at the example of Bakhmut, a recent example, and Avdiivka. These are two very similar examples. What is happening there? What is allowing the enemy to advance?
The enemy identifies areas of breakthrough. They look at where they can get through. They concentrate their forces and means. As a rule, it is on the flanks of our fortified areas. The main fortified area is the city itself. It is incredibly difficult to knock the troops out of the city, because all the rear, command posts, aerial reconnaissance points, evacuation points, warehouses, places for personnel to rest - all this is very conveniently located in the basements in the city. It is incredibly difficult to destroy all the basements. Even the Russian army does not have enough ammunition to destroy all the houses with basements in Bakhmut, for example. They could not do it. Similarly, they cannot destroy all the houses with basements in Avdiivka. Because there are just too many of them. Although they are trying to do so. That's why cities are very convenient defense lines. Especially because our cities are located on heights. They are fighting for convenient firing points, convenient points for aerial reconnaissance and drones, for anti-tank missile systems. What is going on? The enemy is creating such attack areas on the flanks of these cities. They are created in the city itself. The enemy is trying to move into residential areas, to get a foothold there. And to pass from the flanks. They create such attack areas. And they start attacking. A large amount of ammunition is being concentrated to destroy our certain fortified positions. They cannot destroy everything. So they concentrate their ammunition on destroying certain positions in certain areas. Then they launch massive attacks on these areas. What is happening? As a rule, our troops, who have been defending certain areas for a long time, can normally gain a foothold, dig in, at least the infantry, in the first line. They dug in. Then they are shelled by artillery. Then the assault attacks begin. Then - again artillery, again assault attacks. And our field fortifications cannot withstand this attack. Neither around Bakhmut, nor around Soledar, nor around Lysychansk, nor around Sieverodonetsk, nor around Avdiivka have strategic defence lines been built that could be compared to the Russian fortifications in Zaporizhzhia. There is no concrete, no capital structures that would ensure the survival of infantry under massive artillery and mortar fire. None of this is there. There are just field fortifications that the soldiers themselves dug with a shovel and a pickaxe. They laid two, maybe even three layers of logs. They covered it with soil. But in reality, most of these shelters are very quickly destroyed by artillery. And the enemy starts storming with infantry. One attack, another attack, another attack. Artillery preparation. Gradually, the unit that knows the area where these fortifications were built begins to disappear. People are being lost. Even small losses, even day after day, but still there are losses. People are not iron.
I talked to the soldiers of the second mechanized battalion of the separate presidential brigade in Avdiivka, north of Avdiivka. They were holding out with great dignity and heroism. I filmed several interviews with the soldiers of this battalion. They resisted Russian attacks for 4 days. That was the maximum. For 4 days, the fighters who spent in the trenches lived up to two weeks, some of them after 4 days of continuous fighting, when a person does not sleep all this time - he is constantly under fire, constantly ready to repel attacks, or is directly engaged in combat. It simply physically loses its combat capability. Plus, losses are added. We have to withdraw from this advanced position. The enemy suffers many times more losses. But the Russian command is preparing, planning the use of artillery, and every day they shoot out a certain amount of ammunition, it is planned, it has already been delivered. And they also plan the amount of people they spend. They plan: today we will send so many assault groups to the end and so many assault groups will die there tomorrow - so many assault groups. They echelon their forces deeply and concentrate their reserves in advance. They gradually, step by step, break through this path and move forward. Why doesn't the same happen to us?
And because our troops, our infantry, all of them, both in Bakhmut and in Soledar, this is the story of our entire war, all of our infantry in defence is stretched into one echelon. Some troops are rotated to the rear. Some keep strategic reserves there. Some are engaged in various tasks. Some are preparing for an offensive. And the infantry in defence is stretched into one echelon. An infantry battalion commander, a brigade commander, an infantry battalion commander has no reserves, no fresh reserve company. He cannot replace exhausted, tired fighters or conduct a counterattack with his own forces quickly, when the enemy has just entered the position, to instantly knock him out. The brigade commander does not have a fresh battalion in reserve, again, to replace tired men, replenish them, or immediately launch a quick counterattack to restore the situation. We don't have any of this. We don't have echeloned defence - our entire defence is in one line. And when we broke through this line, people could not stand it physically, they fought heroically. They fought north of Avdiivka, but during the 4 days of the assault - 4 days - because there were no tactical reserves who knew the defense area and could gain a foothold because there were no concrete defence lines that were effectively protected and it was difficult to withstand artillery fire, the enemy made their way through.
And then what happened? And it turned out that in the rear - let's look at the map again - north of Avdiivka, the situation on October 10, we see how it has changed. They didn't go far - up to 3 kilometers, which is the maximum. These are 2-3 landings, no more. They advanced to the railroad line. So, on this railroad line, which seems to have tracks, ties, subgrades, all of which seem to make it possible to dig in, to build defense lines... But 2 km from the front line, there were no rear defense lines built. Yes, there were field trenches, several trenches dug, which we call a stronghold. But these are still field fortifications dug by soldiers. They cannot withstand prolonged artillery fire. They need to be constantly restored to defense. Or, most sensibly, at least a rear line of defense should have been built there over the years. But no one has built it. It doesn't exist. There is only what the soldiers themselves dug and what the artillery, unfortunately, quickly destroys. The dugouts are 1-2 meters high, and they are being destroyed quickly. A mortar works quickly and demolishes them in a spot under adjustment. And then heroism begins. That's why, after the enemy passes the first line of defense, we have a story of heroism. If our defense had been built in at least 2 echelons, the second echelon would have supported the first, and brigade commanders and battalion commanders would have had tactical reserves. And they would have lasted much longer than 3-4 days. Even under massive enemy attacks. But there are no such reserves. It takes a long time for information to reach the top management. And it takes a long time to make decisions. We have the following situation. First, the enemy puts a lot of pressure. Reports from the command are as follows: the situation is tense, but under control, we are holding them. Unfortunately, no one thinks about the fact that our infantry is suffering losses and losing their combat capability. Or maybe they do, but there are no conclusions to be drawn from this.
And what happens next? The enemy breaks through. And after he has already broken through, then, some time later, with a delay, then the understanding begins: how to stop it? And then, suddenly, heroism begins on the alert. Some reserves are transferred by alarm. This is no longer building a defense. This is actually rushing into a counterattack against the enemy who is advancing in this direction.
That is, if our infantry had been organized in two echelons, we would have had tactical reserves. If the second line of defense had been built, it would have been dug properly at least 3-4 kilometers away, and there would have been normal dugouts at least 4-5 rough floorings, just like they dug in the First World War. Read the memoirs of soldiers of the First World War. I mean, in the First World War, dugouts of 5-6 pitches were a common practice on the front lines. It was usually built simply for the soldiers to survive. Do we have fewer logs now? Or do we have less equipment to chop these logs, to bring them in? Is it difficult? If it is a position 3-4 km from the front line, it is possible to build reliable field fortifications there, even with concrete. If you do it at night. It can be done. Unfortunately, this is not done. Then the heroism begins.
"THE SITUATION IS CRITICAL BUT NOT A CATASTROPHE"
If we had the forces that are now being thrown there, for example, the 47th Mechanized Brigade, deployed in the rear along that railroad in advance, if that brigade had prepared for defense, deployed, built a system of at least field fortifications, the situation would have been different. Now this brigade was abandoned at the last moment, after the breakthrough. They had their first battle about 9 days after the enemy launched the offensive. If they had been there on time, not nine days later, the situation would have been different. And now this brigade was abandoned at the last moment, after the breakthrough. They had their first battle about 9 days after the enemy started the offensive. And if they had been deployed to that line in time, not in 9 days, but in 3 days, this brigade would have dug in properly, organized a defense system, and there would have been another battle, no need to go in from the east. And so we get involved later... reserves are not transferred in time, they are transferred at the last moment. They are actually engaged in a counterattack with the advancing enemy. And we suffer heavy losses. Instead of standing on the defense, holding and shooting the enemy from the dominant heights, we have to constantly do heroics. Constantly knocking someone out of there, attacking, even though we could build a line of defense and just shoot everyone who the Russians send there.
In fact, Avdiivka, the situation does not seem catastrophic now. It is critical, but it is not a catastrophe. The enemy is advancing very slowly. The area of advance is very small. It is all shelled. It is very small... We take stand in the city. We are looking at all areas of the breakthrough. We are inflicting effective damage on the enemy. Russian losses in these areas are many times, many times greater than our losses. But we cannot stop this creeping offensive. Why? Because the enemy has a plan for these actions. They are deeply echeloning their forces and conducting echeloned attacks in certain areas. They have accumulated reserves and one wave, the second wave, the third, the fourth. And then they just "nibble" the next landing.
How to deal with this? Again, the first thing. Pay normal attention to improving field fortifications. This is a normal construction of structures that are not on the front line, but 2-3 km away from the front line. A normal amount of wood to cover all this. Camouflage materials. A large number of hands, shovels, small mechanization, small mechanized means to dig these trenches faster. Explosive charges to build these trenches and trenches faster. All this needs to be done quickly. Mines, mines should be placed densely so that the infantry cannot pass through easily. All this must be done quickly. And on time. And the second thing. If we even engage in a counterattack, we also need to plan the use of people. It shouldn't be that we have a heroic attack going on from evening to morning all the time. People should be deployed promptly to a narrow front that they can hold, carrying out rotations. Not one day, not two. But 4, 5, 6 days. To do this, a person needs to be in such cold weather, he or she cannot perform tasks for more than 2 days. Then you need to rest. These are the physical abilities of the body.
MEETING OF THE HEADQUARTERS IN THE LANDING FOR THREE DAYS
I believe that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office and the General Staff should conduct some research on the endurance of the human body. Try, for example, to work, to hold a meeting of the headquarters somewhere in the forest for 3 days. In the field. Just like soldiers at the front. Without electricity, water supply, etc. Just once. I believe that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief will sit with his generals, advisors, ministers, and the head of the Presidential Office once in the forest in dugouts and dugouts dug by his environment and just understand what 3 days in the cold is like. It is very hard to live there, to fight there. It is physically hard. A person's efficiency, combat capability, attention - everything decreases. And you need to replace people. What is happening near Avdiivka? I made a video, you can watch it on the channel. Soldiers from the 26th Infantry Battalion say they have been in continuous combat for 5 days. And they are losing ground. Of course, how can a person live in the open air for 5 days at zero temperature under constant shelling? A person does not sleep. He hits at night. A person does not sleep for a day, the second day, the third day. Then he is done. He doesn't care anymore. This is not the way to set tasks. This is not the right way to manage people.
At first, it seems that there are no people. And then. This is what I saw in Sieverodonetsk. In Sieverodonetsk, the situation started with the fact that the perimeter of the city's defense was not secured by a sufficient number of troops. And everyone knew about it, talked about it. The 115th Mechanized Brigade had just been created there. It was a unit that was simply made from scratch. In a few days. These people were good, but they were not coordinated, trained, or organized. They were immediately thrown into such a direction and there was no artillery support, no fortifications, and the command was not effective in this brigade. The brigade was weak. It was stretched over a large area. It could not hold it. I also talked to many people up there and heard: are there no reserves, who should we send? I think: well, maybe the situation is really so critical that there are no people at all. And, of course, as soon as the first enemy hit, a light one, in fact, the enemy just launched a powerful artillery attack and then infantry groups attacked... The brigade could not hold it. And the enemy quickly entered, occupied half the city. And then suddenly, when half the city was already occupied and the enemy had raised the flag in the city center, the reserves suddenly went to Sieverodonetsk. Special forces, the National Guard, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, the Special Forces, the third and eighth regiments - everything went there. The 10th Mountain Assault Battalion, the reserves, the Territorial Defence Forces from Kyiv. Whoever was not thrown there. If you count, it's a lot of troops. I want to tell you that if 50% of what was thrown into the counter-attack in Sieverodonetsk just two weeks before had been placed on the perimeter of the city's defense, the enemy would not have entered. Because it would have been a timely decision. And there would have been no heroism, no heroic battles for Sieverodonetsk. There would have been a systematic defense, a very long one. Much longer than it actually was. It is the same in Avdiivka. We are strategically late in assessing the situation, because we have optimistic reports. And we do not take into account the enemy's tactics. The enemy has been systematically nibbling our positions for two months. And he managed to succeed. We have not stopped him. And the situation near Avdiivka is critical. And if there are reports at the headquarters - and I know what they are talking about, I can tell you for sure - if all these stories continue that everything is tense but under control, we will lose the city. It is a strategic city in Donbas that absolutely cannot be given away and that we have every opportunity to keep. But for this, there must be recognition of the situation and adequate planning - not like in Bakhmut, not like in Lysychansk, not like in Soledar. But adequate planning. To do this, we need to recognize that the situation is critical. We cannot stop the enemy. We cannot because of the first, second and third reasons. And the responsibility for this, I want to tell you that we have a tradition of making soldiers responsible.
WHY DID WE LOSE SOLEDAR?
After the loss of Soledar, I read an analysis made by one of our operational-strategic groups with the letter Kh. Operational-strategic group on letter Kh analyzed why we lost Soledar. There is the first, second, third, fifth. And the conclusion is that the loss was since the commanders of some brigades did not prepare their troops well and did not manage them well. Unfortunately, this is a complete lie. It is a lie.
The loss of Soledar, the loss of Bakhmut is the result of decisions, that is, delayed decisions at the strategic level. This is the command of the OSG, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's headquarters, which hears the reports of the OSG and draws conclusions. They are critically late, literally weeks late with the analysis of the situation and what is happening there. And then we have to do heroics. Why do we need heroism in modern warfare? Don't we know where they are going? Don't we understand how to stop them? You can ask many brigade leaders, they will tell you everything, I can even tell you what they said. But I will not go into such details now. At the end, we will say general things, important general topics, how Avdiivka can be saved now. But I want to say that the surrender of our cities, the loss of our cities under enemy attacks, is not due to some kind of superiority in numbers, or some kind of military art of the Russian command. It is very limited, to put it mildly. This is all very much the result of miscalculations at the strategic level. And then, when there are strategic failures, we see how our generals and OSG with the letter Kh, and OSG with the letter T, constantly explain the reasons for the defeats by saying that the soldiers ran away somewhere. Soldiers are not like that. Give us all the Rambos, the samurai who are just "banzai" and will go on the attack and we will be fine. Such absurd conclusions can be drawn.
I want to tell you that the reason for the loss of Soledar is not that the soldiers ran away and failed to hold some positions. It was the fact that our reserves, which were used, were stretched into a single line. They were deployed when the enemy had actually broken through the first line of defense. The reserves were not deployed in time, and then many units that were supposed to close the breakthrough were thrown into completely bare landings, without any trenches or trenches at a temperature of -15-18. Of course, soldiers cannot hold the line in such conditions for any length of time under the influence of an enemy who has prepared, who has reserves, who systematically uses them, one by one.
The situation here is the same. The situation in Avdiivka is beneficial for us. The enemy is advancing through narrow corridors. We can see it. We control the flanks. We shoot through the enemy's passage areas. We effectively control their logistics and can destroy them in much greater numbers. But we lack concentration of forces. This is where we lose. We are losing because the enemy is systematically using it. He outnumbers us in terms of marching replenishment. That is, the replenishment of combat units. The Russians have many times more combat troops than we do. The total number is about the same. But our soldiers in the defense of Avdiivka are subjected to a much greater physical load. Because the Russians can't stand it. They are in active combat for 2 weeks, a month. Then they are taken to the second line of defense. Yes, they are not sent to Russia to rest. But to the second line. They can wash there, have a rest in an area where they rarely fly in. We do not have this opportunity. Our battalions live in their positions until they run out of supplies.
How can this be avoided? We need to arrange it - we can see now that the front is large. What is the most vulnerable area on this front, the most important for the enemy at the moment? Which one? Is it Bakhmut? No. Maybe some other area? No. The most important part of the frontline now, the point they want to capture, is Avdiivka. That's why they send the biggest number of new recruits there, to assemble assault groups and send someone there again. And we still wonder why they are so stupid, these Muscovites, that they go like this, wave after wave. But in fact, this is the result of planning. They are using fresh reserves. And they do not let them come in waves. They send them in small assault groups to identify weaknesses in our defense, to systematically, day after day, follow the same routes in small groups. And they clearly know that if you follow the same route for 3-4 days. 3-4 weeks, then sooner or later our units that are in front of them, which are not shelled, will wear out and you can move on. This is exactly what is happening near Avdiivka. And they are coming fresh. Because they come wave after wave, because they don't sit there for months. That's why they are moving forward. They sit in the near rear or even in the far rear and wait to be brought into the battle. Therefore, they are fresh and they can basically perform some actions. The enemy has no supernatural powers. There is just planning. Planning the usage of shells, planning the usage of people. This is not military art. Russia does not have it. Russia is superficially familiar with the art of war, the Russian army. But they have organized the planning of costs and resources. This is something that the Russian regular army took from Wagner. Wagner also suffered great losses. Very big ones. But they were advancing. And their advances allowed them to advance in some areas - yes, they initially had heavy losses during the breakthrough, but then their losses decreased, while ours increased after the breakthrough of the first line of defense. Because then we have clean landings with some hastily dug trenches, and the enemy dictates the initiative, advances wherever they want. And then the ratio of losses is equalized. Unfortunately. Because we are in equal conditions. But we need to actually engage in a counterattack. Avdiivka is facing the same problem now.
WHAT SHOULD WE DO?
If we don't have a planned replenishment of our troops of the 110th Mechanized Brigade, 47th Mechanized Brigade, attached units and others in this defense area, 53rd Mechanized Brigade, if we don't have weekly replenishment, if we don't have additional forces that can allow us to tighten the defense front of these brigades so that they can rotate, allocate tactical reserves in their composition, we will lose Avdiivka. And I want to tell you that if we break through the first line of defense, we will have the same story about the Bakhmut fortress. I want to tell you right away. The President will start recording videos every night and say that he is with the heroes of the defense of Avdiivka in his mind, that they are great, that fierce battles are going on. This is an example for the whole world. Give us more help from the military. They will sing songs about Avdiivka. They will award a large number of orders to those who were in Avdiivka, in its area, or not, but close to their superiors, they will pull up special forces, reserves, from other parts of the frontline, and heroically throw them, for example, into the city center, so as not to surrender, for example, the city administration, so that the enemy does not raise the flag there, and we can report that the flag is still there, we are still in the city. All this will be done. Just as it was in Sieverodonetsk, just as it was in Bakhmut, just as they tried to keep it up to the end, tried to save Soledar. But why, explain to me, why are we constantly stepping on a rake? How many times can we step on a rake in this war? Doesn't the president's forehead already hurt because he is constantly stepping on rakes with his reports? Volodymyr Oleksandrovych, you keep saying: I'm making a headquarters on Avdiivka. You are not making these headquarters well, you do not understand the situation. You don't know the true situation. You have poor planning. You have poor-quality reports. You are not allocating resources properly for the defense of this strategic city, and this must be done. We need to look at it differently. The offensive has been going on for 2 months and we have not yet defeated the Russians. We have not stopped them. They are advancing. And they have significantly worsened the situation in the city. And the enemy is already advancing from the industrial zone.
Let's take a look at the eastern outskirts. The enemy has already entered the industrial zone. They are approaching. Now very little separates them from the Memorial to the Defenders. The Memorial to Ukrainian soldiers. There is a famous memorial on the outskirts of Avdiivka, where everyone was there, taking pictures, the president, all the ministers, generals. The enemy is already close. If the enemy touches the city buildings, the houses, then the enemy will have another arrow in their quiver, as they will have their own evacuation points, command posts, aerial reconnaissance points, warehouses, places of rest for the personnel. They will be the ones entrenched in the basements, and then with such an organization, there will be no reserves to knock them out. There will be heroism again. The fortress of Avdiivka, everyone will sing. And why will this be done? Because the reserves are not being transferred here on time.
The reserves that are not transferred in time, the degree of threat is underestimated. And the people who live there in the 110th Brigade have been living there since March. Since March 22, in Avdiivka. They are just physically exhausted. They are getting sick. They have health problems, they have contusions, injuries. Someone has to replace them. To do this, they need replenishment. And they need timely replenishment. They need to have tactical reserves to restore their position, to consolidate on some strongholds that the enemy is attacking. They cannot hold the entire defense line as if there is no offensive. 2 months of continuous fighting. Uninterrupted! How long can you go on? This is a kind of mockery of people. I mean, it seems that the leadership is simply ignoring the real situation. What else can I say? You are going to lose Avdiivka. And this loss will be in the name of Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is simply irresponsible, incompetent, and unable to conclude even after the loss of several cities, the defense of which he reported on. How many statements were there about Sieverodonetsk? The president personally came to Lysychansk to strengthen the defense. Bakhmut - all the media were talking about it, about the heroism in Bakhmut. Soledar. And now it's the same picture again. We control the dominant heights. It's comfortable, but where are the forces? Where are the drones? Why can't the Ministry of Defense send at least 500 fpvs to our soldiers in that area at least once? Where are the Mavic-3s? Where are the Mavic-3Ts? I will tell you now that the majority of drones in the defense of Avdiivka, 90%, 95%, are drones bought by soldiers themselves, donated by volunteers. These are not state drones. The state can buy up to 10%, let's compliment the Ministry of Digitalization. Up to 10%. Everything else is volunteer drones. And Russia uses drones that it buys at public expense. And it has an advantage in these drones. They have much more of them. And where is our state? I see that we are doing well with the telethon. It cost UAH 1.5 billion of taxpayers' money. Why can't the president spend UAH 1.5 billion to buy drones for the defenders of Avdiivka? And at least a couple hundred million more to build the second line of defense, which still does not exist. At least construction materials to bring there. And some engineering equipment. What's so difficult about it? I do not understand. Cut costs, wealthy people - cut costs for the Office of the President, for the State Administration of Presidential Affairs. It will be a nice gesture. Why are we losing the city because the state does not take basic steps to strengthen the city's defense? Why are we losing an entire Ukrainian city? It's just absurd. And this is not the first time. It happens again and again and again. Who will be responsible for this?
ABOUT MINISTER UMIEROV
The responsibility is shared by the country's leadership. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy is, first and foremost, his responsibility. Voters elected the President and Commander-in-Chief for this purpose. This is a political responsibility under the Constitution of Ukraine. He is the one who appoints all security officials. He is the one who receives reports from intelligence agencies and military structures and must provide an objective analysis of the situation and decisions. As we can see, Zelenskyy is not able to do all of this and is not even going to do it.
Second. We see that the responsibility lies with other executives and leaders on whom it depends. Defense Minister Umierov. It's good that Umierov decided to take a picture with the commander of the Land Forces, Syrskyi, and the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces, Zaluzhnyi, on his 100th day here. But I want to tell you... there is a war going on now. Instead of PR, Minister Umierov needs to go somewhere near Avdiivka, get acquainted with the situation and at least organize some drones, buy them. If he can't do it through his ministry, he should write on Facebook: 'Friends, I am the Minister of Defense who is unable to buy drones for the army. Here's my monobank jar or my bank account, please send as much money as you can, and I'll buy fpv drones and send them to Avdiivka on my own behalf. Do you think they won't respond to the minister's call? But he won't. Because we have everything under control. Everything is fine. The minister is doing well. So, I want to say, Mr. Umierov. What if you behave like your predecessor, Mr. Reznikov... You know, he reminded me a little bit of the main character in the movie Rain Man. He walks around, doesn't understand where he is, and always asks: what do you want from me here, I'm a new person here, I'm just a civilian, I don't know. So, the same thing is happening now with Mr. Umierov. Your political responsibility, together with Zelenskyy, is to protect the Ukrainian city of Avdiivka, you have to do something, and not respond with blah, blah, blah press releases. And the military command. With all due respect to Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi, he was in Avdiivka personally, I give him his due. But this is absolutely not enough, the measures that are being taken now. And this is Mr. Zaluzhnyi's responsibility, yes, of course. It is also the responsibility of Mr. Tarnavskyi. Mr. Moskalev's responsibility. Some other leaders. You cannot stop the enemy's offensive and you cannot strengthen our troops in such a convenient situation. This is a very threatening situation. We will lose the city. So let's do this. In order not to have to analyze very quickly what is going on with the Avdiivka fortress and who is responsible, I would ask all these people I have just mentioned to take off these rose-colored glasses and the talks they are telling on the telethon. And yet, it is fair to admit that the situation in Avdiivka is critical, the enemy has the tactical initiative, the enemy is constantly advancing and capturing our positions one by one. And we have the capabilities to change the situation in our favor, to recapture Avdiivka. The defense of Avdiivka will be a strategic defeat for Russia and a strategic success for Ukraine in the winter campaign. This will be Russia's main goal now. Don't surrender the city like Bakhmut. There are no prerequisites for this. We have a favorable position in Avdiivka, we can stop the enemy. But for this, we need people, reserves, ammunition, and munitions. We need drones. Well, if you don't know where to get them yourself, then at least don't keep quiet. Lend a hand, address the public. You can donate something yourself. Mr. Yermak can, I don't know, provide drones for one, I don't know, five brigades near Avdiivka. From his own pocket money. Why not? So show that you are the leaders involved in this situation. The country needs to see this. The army, they are not there to bring medals and then hand them out. Give out drones instead of medals. The president came, Volodymyr Zelenskyy came to Avdiivka and distributed 500 drones to certain brigades from his personal funds. This is how everyone will applaud. I honestly promise to say on the air: the president listened to public opinion and did the right thing. An example for others. Umierov can do it if the president is ashamed. Well, holy gamoly, authorize Mariana Bezuhla, a servant of the people, give her an order. She will address it, and she will also convene a defense committee. If you can't get drones, let someone else ask for them. This is just absurd, in general. All the drones are from volunteers, and people don't even expect to get something from the state, because it seems to be absolutely unaffordable for the state. The state cannot provide 500 fpv drones for Avdiivka... only volunteers... go to foundations. This is absurd! You have to look for mavics in foundations. All soldiers have to look for reconnaissance and destruction equipment themselves. The astronauts are in charge, for real, I want to tell you. This is just space. I would really like you to come to Avdiivka.
AN APPEAL TO THE MAYORS OF CITIES
I would like to address the mayors of Ukrainian cities. I would like to appeal to Kyiv Mayor Klytschko and all other mayors that, dear friends, there is money for paving. But there is no money for drones in Avdiivka. So, I want to tell you that if all the mayors of big cities, at least Kyiv, Dnipro, Lviv - big cities - do not immediately allocate additional funds... Dnipro has sent 10 drones to the 110th Brigade, as I see it. And if everyone does not allocate at least a few hundred drones that will not be sent to Avdiivka to the 110th Mechanized Brigade, 47th Mechanized Brigade, 53rd Mechanized Brigade, Avdiivka may begin on your streets. How will you manage there? In which cities? We need drones in Avdiivka now, so that later we don't have to buy them urgently in Kyiv and ask someone. Therefore, instead of all the paving, procurement of all city works, we need to quickly transfer them. Yes, Zelenskyy can't cope, he doesn't know where the money is. He will not give it. Let's be objective. He is in space. He is with Yermak. They will not give the money. Come on, you are also state leaders, you have to find... Everyone has to contribute something. The state has resources. They are needed in Avdiivka now. So let's not invest in paving, but in drones. In drones for Avdiivka. It's just a matter of time now.
Now I will answer the questions that were sent to me.
RUSSIAN LOSSES NEAR AVDIIVKA
TA NG: What are the Russian losses near Avdiivka?
The enemy has lost more than 250 armored vehicles near Avdiivka over the past two months, and we have already identified about 150 of them, they are on the map and can be viewed. A hundred or so units are video and photos, not all of them are confirmed by public sources, but they are also in video reports, which are partially still closed. But losses of up to 250 units are objective losses. This is the data I personally trust based on reports from the commanders of aerial reconnaissance units, and I talk to many people there. Losses in personnel. Well, I can't tell you for sure, but it's thousands of casualties. That is, the enemy has lost... 4 brigades attacked north of Avdiivka simultaneously, the entire composition of the assault groups was knocked out several times. The enemy is actively sending reinforcements from the entire frontline. Assault troops, mobilized soldiers, contract soldiers - they are sending everyone. That's why I think that this is at least what is north of Avdiivka, several thousand dead, seriously wounded and prisoners. In general, I must say that at the moment the enemy has losses near Avdiivka, at least 1 to 5. This is because we control the dominant heights. We have good opportunities to shoot. We rely on urban development. And of course, we have favorable conditions for defense there. And the offensive front is very narrow. Therefore, this situation is favorable for us. But it is favorable when we continue to grind them down, not withdraw.
Irshava: People's Deputy Bezuhla released figures showing that 300 thousand soldiers are at the front and 700 thousand are in the rear. She has questions about this ratio. Do you have any?
I want to say that the issue is actually known. In fact, it has been known for a long time. There is a certain organizational logic in our Armed Forces. This logic raises a lot of questions, I will say. But this logic exists. There are a large number of units that are trained and staffed according to the state. We have a large number of them, training units. We have a large number of border protection units. We have a large number of rear units or combat units that perform combat missions in the rear. I want to say that the issue of replenishment and proper organization of the army is a strategic issue. Of course, it needs to be addressed. And we have to do it now. But I want to say that it will not be possible to replenish the active army exclusively at the expense of the rear. Because in principle, we need a military structure along the entire perimeter of the state border. This is all a large number of people. In fact, we just need to stop looking for some 50,000 people to be transferred forward from positions in the third lines or in the rear areas. We need to look for the right mobilization of people, the right equipment of troops. This is what we lack. Why do we constantly lack people? Is it because we have too many in the rear? No, no. It's because our front line is quickly burning out. And why do they become burned out? Because there is no centralized supply of munitions, especially drones. The state does not supply them centrally. The state does not provide even 5% of the troops with drones. We have no defense structures, no strategic defense line. Today, for the first time, I saw a report about a trencher digging some trenches on the northern border. It's just strange that this has started. In winter, though, in December. In fact, we don't have such a thing. We do not save people. We have this paradox. Our propaganda is very popular here, and we, you and I, too, love to laugh at the clumsy Russians, how they don't spare people and throw them like cannon fodder. But let's face the truth. We also often use people as cannon fodder. Without normal support and management. That's why we have big losses. We constantly lack them. Mobilization is carried out and people just disappear like water through the fingers. That's why we can't find people. So what? Who are we going to find there? We will pick up in the rear areas, yes, there are reserves there. We have a huge number of training centers, for example, which, in principle, we do not need in such numbers. In general, the best training units, as the experience of both the First and Second World Wars shows, are those created for infantrymen in combat formations. They should be attached to brigades. A training battalion means that the brigade trains and prepares people for itself. And the brigade can use this training battalion for rotation, for second-line defense. So that people can be treated and prepared there. All this was already invented before us. And we have a completely inefficient, corrupt system of training centers, of which we have many more than we have mobilization resources. There are a bunch of instructors sitting there, who basically protect and provide for themselves. But I want to tell you that this is not a great resource. And this resource can be lost so quickly. We have conscripts, several tens of thousands of them, who can also be lost quickly without preparation. And then what? The main problem with mobilization is not that we don't have enough people detained in nightclubs and recreation centers, that not all of them went to become assault troops, but that we don't need that many assault troops in a modern war. We need a balanced army, where military engineers and construction workers should fight first and foremost. Operators of aerial reconnaissance, operators of precision weapons, operators of artillery, grenade launchers, mortars must fight. They are the ones who must fight first and foremost. But our army is like a collective farm, and we all need attack aircraft. Why do we need attack aircraft? Because our frontline is held by infantrymen with assault rifles and shovels. And the front should be held by organized defense lines, fortifications, drones, reconnaissance, artillery, munitions, firing points, adjustments, covering infantry positions with machine gun fire from the second line, machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars. All this was invented before us. The First World War still showed us. This is how the frontline is held. With organized artillery and machine gun fire. But we have no organization and need attack aircraft to control everything. Instead of supplying drones, our leadership is not thinking about supplying the number of drones in the troops and creating the proper number of positions, but only about supplying attack aircraft. If we fight like this, we will soon run out of attack aircraft, aerial reconnaissance aircraft, everything. This is no way to fight a modern war. That's why there are not enough people. Not because there are too many people in the rear.
BILD ARTICLE
Please comment on Bild's article about Russia's plans to seize Donetsk and Luhansk regions by 2024 and Kharkiv, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia by 2026.
This is just ridiculous to say. Russia has many plans. All of these plans have been thwarted by Ukrainian soldiers and the resistance of the Ukrainian people. Now these plans also depend on us. Only on us. First of all, we are implementing the weapons that our Western allies give us, which we have, our people, our defense potential. It depends on us. Not on anyone else. Not on F-16s, not on missiles, not on HIMARS. It depends on our organization. Our main problem is that the enemy is advancing, and we are hemmed in because we have no systematic organizational solutions. And Avdiivka shows this. As well as Bakhmut, Soledar, Sieverodonetsk, Lysychansk.
FPV DRONES WITH THERMAL IMAGER
Yurii, have you heard about the enemy's massive use of fpv kamikaze drones with thermal imagers? How true is this information? Will such fpv drones with thermal imagers be used against us?
Of course, this is an obvious fact. Thanks to the donations of Censor.NET readers, we sent a batch of thermal imagers to the 59th Brigade and bought them to be used on fpv drones. But we only do this for donations, for donations, for the small amount of money we receive from advertising. The enemy does it from the state budget. I want to tell you that a normal quality fpv thermal imager retail price in Ukraine is even up to... let's say 200-250 dollars. Imagine what 200-250 dollars means on a national scale. Russia buys them by the thousands. Of course, they have an advantage. We also use them. But since we only have volunteer funds for this, for the defense of the homeland, for the main means of destruction of drones, then of course, all this is small so far. If the state does not intervene, then the volumes will remain small, and the enemy will have a great advantage.
And the case, I mean, that everyone is discussing, is indeed that near Bakhmut the enemy managed to destroy our position and inflict serious losses on us with fpv drones with thermal imagers, it happened near Bakhmut on the site of one of our... 42nd Mechanized Brigade. This is a very tragic case. It shows that the enemy is increasing its advantage in technological weapons. Because he is implementing the state strategy, and we are still doing the same as we did in February 22, as a volunteer initiative. The President's Office has its own life, the General Staff has its own life, and the Defense Ministry has its own life. Everyone is fighting for ratings, popularity, and the supply of destruction - soldiers call volunteers: bring us a Mavic, bring us an FPV. And there is no one else to ask. And those people are sitting there and telling us in press releases how well they provide and do everything. Everything is fine with them. The war is going on. And they don't talk about drones. They are not interested in it. They talk about the telethon. For a telethon, I want to tell you that one telethon costs the state at least 80 thousand fpv drones. I want to tell you that 80 thousand fpv drones is about ten times more than the state has bought in 23 years. And that's what we see in the troops. These are the priorities. For Mr. Zelenskyy, propaganda is more important than defending the homeland. This is how it works. If you look at the ratio of what goes to drones and what goes to propaganda of the servants of the people themselves.
We are going to end on this sad note. I am in constant contact with the soldiers who are defending Avdiivka. They are confident, proud people. They are truly the Ukrainian elite. They are the ones of unique courage and unique physical, moral and psychological capabilities. The defense of Avdiivka has lasted so long solely because Ukrainian soldiers, the 110th Mechanized Brigade, first of all, its attached units, the second battalion of the presidential brigade - these people demonstrate incredible endurance and combat capability that far exceeds anything the Russian army has shown at the front. There has been no catastrophe, tragedy or heroic battles in the center of Avdiivka so far only because the soldiers of the 110th Brigade are doing the impossible day in and day out. And I ask all the people who watched this broadcast, I have no hope that our leaders will watch and understand this - I am just explaining to you the seriousness of the situation and the threat, only because I understand that the strength of support of the Ukrainian people is very great. And only publicity can force our leadership to make adequate decisions on the situation - to allocate funds, to allocate drones, to allocate reserves to strengthen defense. Only if there is our publicity. And these drones will be there quickly only if we, civil society, help. So I urge everyone to provide maximum assistance to the 110th Mechanized Brigade. It helps our neighbors. It is holding. It helps the entire defense area. Help the 110th Brigade with all your might. My foundation, the Censor.NET community and many other volunteer organizations and foundations are doing this. But we need even more. We need more efforts. And friends, I believe in the people who are there. They are full of courage not to surrender Avdiivka and are doing everything to hold this Ukrainian city to the end. That's why I made this broadcast, and I saw these people living in the snow-covered landings before my eyes. Under enemy fire, on the front lines, who do not see our broadcast and will see it in a few days, perhaps when they come out of rotation and have access to the Internet. I believe in these people, I believe they are doing everything they can to do their best. And we have to do the same. So today, more than ever, I am confident in our victory, I am confident that the Ukrainian people and the Ukrainian army will win. Glory to Ukraine!
