How will war develop in 2024?
The stream is dedicated to the current situation at the frontline and the immediate prospects of the war that await us in 2024. Very heavy fighting continues along the entire frontline. The area of active hostilities has now expanded. There are also battles on the border between Russia and Ukraine in Kharkiv and Belgorod regions.
We will look at the maps, briefly provide an assessment of those areas where the intensity of hostilities is the highest, and then I will answer questions and give my brief summary, because now, in my opinion, we need a discussion that is not there, unfortunately. An intellectual discussion about the future of the war among our military and political leadership.
The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is basically a structure that does not know what algorithm it is working on and does not take responsibility for most of the processes that take place in the war. Our military command is fragmented. Now, the new team of Oleksandr Syrskyi in the Armed Forces is trying to somehow build its own logic of work. This process is ongoing. And we have big problems with management and organization. Those advances on the front that the enemy has, those, unfortunately, our defeats that we have suffered recently - we are talking about the defeat of the Patriot system, the defeat of the HIMARS system, the defeat of two helicopters that took place - all these are consequences of systemic problems in the management of the war. Unfortunately, the top leadership does not have a clear understanding of how to change, what the strategy of war is, how organizational management decisions should be made, in what sequence to change the situation going forward, and how strategic decisions should work. That is, we are doing very well at the level of self-organization. We can quickly find and apply innovations on the frontline, but when it comes to scaling, to organized development, to the procedure of actions on a large scale on the frontline, unfortunately, we have big problems with this. To put it mildly. We have complete failures and this has a very serious impact on the course of hostilities. What is happening at the front? Let's look at the maps.
So, the situation is in the Berdychi-Tonenke-Orlivka area. These areas, these three villages, are the most important part of the frontline right now. This is where the enemy is trying to push our front away from Avdiivka. Now the enemy is relying on the heights of Avdiivka, on the built-up areas of Avdiivka, to knock out our troops and strengthen the defence of its positions around Avdiivka and make Avdiivka a convenient base for the further offensive against the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk area. We see that Selydove, Myrnohrad, Pokrovsk, if the enemy establishes a strong foothold in Avdiivka, which they are doing, and throws our front back, they will succeed. Avdiivka, of course, has a unique, simply dominant position on this front. We have talked about this many times. It is very convenient for the enemy to conduct combat operations there. And now all these areas - Berdychi, Orlivka, where fierce fighting is going on - are lowlands. The enemy is attacking us from above, controlling us with fire from the heights. At these heights, the Russians have deployed and raised the antennas of their drones. It is very convenient for them to use drones now from Avdiivka, from the industrial zone, from Avdiivka Coke, the coke plant. They have installed their long-range anti-tank missile systems like Kornet with new long-range missiles up to 10 km at the plant, which, unfortunately, are working. And using this fire control and air control, the enemy is trying to break through and capture Tonenke, Orlivka, Berdychi with the help of air strikes, artillery, and assault groups. These areas are being defended by our troops. The 47th Mechanized Brigade is a very prominent combatant here, brilliantly fighting in defense. The 3rd Assault Brigade is also fighting, as well as some units that are also operating there to reinforce. And the enemy has very heavy losses here. There are no large numbers, no information about what is actually happening on our side. I think this is very right, I support it. In such complicated places where tactics, where terrain play a significant role, there is no need to rush and post videos about what is happening there. The enemy still does not have a full understanding of what is really going on there. And for us, this is possible, one of the few advantages in this situation. Because in fact, the situation on the map looks hopeless. In fact, our soldiers are skillfully using the terrain and doing everything possible, and in my opinion, simply impossible, to stop the Russian offensive.
For me, this situation on the Berdychi-Tonenke-Orlivka sector is very revealing. We controlled a dominant, strategically important position - the city of Avdiivka. And we were unable to hold it because of certain problems. Problems at the highest level of command. Not at the level of fighters. Problems with the organization, command and control of troops, timely rotations, and troops replenishment. There were big problems with this. Now we have been knocked out of this dominant, very favorable position, and we, our two brigades, are standing in the lowlands in the direction of the enemy's main attacks, and suddenly it's a miracle. The position is tactically untenable, if you look at the map, and the enemy is securely held back. I want to say that since we retreated from Avdiivka, there have been very fierce battles for Berdychi and Orlivka. Daily battles. The enemy managed to capture the village of Lastochkyne, which is right next to Avdiivka. Of course, they failed to hold it. But the next one is right next to it - Orlivka and Berdychi - the enemy fails to take. And the losses of Russians there are very high.
I would say that we should pay attention to such things as the right tactical decisions, as a normal opportunity to use our troops on a front where we can use our advantages in management, training, and motivation of soldiers. Technical support, the use of modern equipment, the competent use of electronic warfare, and a significant number of our drones allow us not only to stop but to defeat, destroy the enemy with huge losses. At the moment, Russian losses in this area are many times higher than Ukrainian losses. That is, our soldiers are at disadvantageous conditions. They are sitting in a lowland without any fortified positions. Nothing has been dug outside Avdiivka, where the fighting is going on. There were no positions at all in Lastochkyne, no trenches in Orlivka or Berdychi. Nevertheless, our soldiers are adapting to these conditions and are putting up an epic fight against the Russians.
The fighting for these villages has been going on for almost a month. More than three weeks. And this is truly a model of skillful and effective action. It should be noted that the Ukrainian Armed Forces command is also paying attention to this area. Let's look at the results now. There are problems, of course, as it happens in war. But I want to say that what the soldiers of the 47th Brigade under the command of Brigadier Riushyn and the soldiers of the 3rd Assault Brigade under the command of Brigadier Biletskyi are showing is really high level, tactical level and skill of our soldiers. This deserves respect and support. A lot of support.
This area is Avdiivka, why is it important? The enemy is sending significant marching reinforcements there. That is, reserves are being sent there. The Russians are not throwing large new formations into the battle now, but they are replenishing the formations that are there as a matter of priority in the Avdiivka district with fresh cannon fodder, and thus our soldiers are grinding down a significant number of Russian reserves near Avdiivka.
We will talk about all the main attack areas of the Russian troops on the front, where they are trying to constantly advance, create a tactical initiative, capture, but where we do not have attack areas, the situation is now stabilized. That is why I would like to note that what the 47th and 3rd assault brigades are doing now is working for the entire front. This is a great help to the entire front. Because the enemy is sending very large forces there.
Pervomaiske. It is south of Avdiivka. The Russian offensive. The village of Pervomaiske is in the line of the 59th Infantry Brigade, which has been fighting heroically here for over a year, holding a large front. And the enemy is now trying its best to capture Pervomaiske. I just posted on Facebook, the soldiers asked to raise money to help this battalion, which is fighting there, with drones. This is the focus of the main efforts. The Russians have concentrated an attack area there and are trying to capture Pervomaiske. This is a very important village that will allow the enemy to move our entire front about 15-20 kilometres away, basically the entire front near Avdiivka, from Vodiane to Tonenke, will simply collapse if the enemy moves forward from Pervomaiske. This is of great tactical operational importance. That's why there are constant attacks here, as well as the active use of drones and enemy weapons. This is the second area.
Let's look at the third impact area. The Krasnohorivka-Marinka area. This is also a very important area. The enemy is trying to advance from Marinka, knock our troops back and break through. Marinka is now a base in general. The enemy is trying to go north to Novomykhailivka, trying to go to Kurakhove, and the main direction of their attack is the battle for the town of Krasnohorivka. Russians are trying to capture this town. In fact, it is also of great operational importance. If the battles for Tonenke, the area around Vodiane, the area around Pivnichne, the area around Pervomaiske are all enemy attempts to knock out our front between Marinka and Avdiivka, to push our front back. To push us as far away from Donetsk as possible. There are very fierce battles for Krasnohorivka. We know there was a successful counterattack there the other day, the 2nd assault battalion of the 3rd assault brigade completely knocked the enemy out of the construction zone, but the enemy continues its attacks and also brings reserves into the fight. That is, Avdiivka, fighting near Avdiivka, fighting in the Pervomaiske direction is the second. That is, the first main area where Russian reserves are replenishing is near Avdiivka. Then the area of Pervomaiske. The area of Marinka, i.e. Krasnohorivka, Novomykhailivka to the north, Krasnohorivka to the south, the direction to Kurakhove is straight ahead. There is fighting there.
Robotyne. We have repeatedly said that this is the bridgehead of the salient of our offensive towards Tokmak, which Ukrainian soldiers managed to capture and break this salient in the Russian defense during the battles in the summer of 23rd. Now the situation here has become very complicated. The enemy is advancing, the enemy is pressing. In fact, from a tactical point of view, holding this foothold at the moment, in the configuration that we have, is disadvantageous for us. Unfortunately, we are holding the position now because I understand this logic, we were 10 kilometers closer to Tokmak. I understand how important this is from a political point of view. But, dear friends, do we have the forces to fulfill this military and political task? I think that we, if we compare from a tactical point of view, who is more exhausted and inflicting losses here, we or the enemy, unfortunately, the ratio of losses is hardly in our favor. Because here we have a disadvantageous configuration from the front. The enemy controls the flanks, shoots this small corridor for several kilometers, there are literally 1-2 field paths. They shoot it from the flanks. To be honest, we need to plan retreating rear defensive positions. Because there is nothing left to hold. Novoprokopivka, where we entered, we have already lost it - there is nothing left. There are absolutely no plantations, everything is cut off by fire. There is no possibility for camouflage. Everything is being shot at from all sides with all kinds of weapons... counter-battery fighting is just very difficult. We cannot hold the bridgehead if we do not have the strength to conduct an offensive... this bridgehead, which is being attacked from the flanks, is important if we are going forward. But we don't have the strength to go forward. We were preparing reserves and, unfortunately, the reserves were not enough. We wanted to attack and defend - we wanted to do everything at once. But this is not how it works in war. War requires, and the war strategy requires, concentration of efforts on the areas defined by the strategy that are really important. If our frontline in Donbas is collapsing and we have lost Avdiivka, a key, strategic city, much more important, as I have said many times, than even Bakhmut, what kind of offensive can we talk about? We need to hold the positions we have. We need to kill the Russian manpower that is attacking, as we are doing now in most parts of the frontline. As they are doing now near Avdiivka. To do this, we need to have a logic of command and control of the troops, an organization.
The situation near Robotyne is now unfavorable for us. We can only hold this salient with significant losses, and this exchange is not in our favor. The enemy is shooting from all sides, using drones, artillery, tanks and assault groups. Of course, in such circumstances, the enemy is operating in a fairly comfortable environment. Therefore, I hope that the military and political leadership will begin to think, to assess the situation objectively, in terms of tactics and strategy. Where we do not have the resources to hold, we cannot hold everything. We need to think about where we really need to do it. Avdiivka is one of them. This is a completely different frontier. Our battles near Avdiivka are of strategic importance. We are preventing the enemy from reaching the Myrnohrad-Novopokrovska conglomeration, giving them the opportunity to prepare at least some defensive positions in the rear on the heights, which, unfortunately, were not done with Avdiivka. Now they are trying to do something there. God willing. But we need to proceed from logic. Unfortunately, logic is not yet everywhere visible in our actions. As before, unfortunately. But I urge us to create this logic. We need to look at the situation objectively. The headquarters of the Supreme Command, the command of the Armed Forces must finally draw objective conclusions.
Krynky district. There is a well-known foothold here, which has been fought over for a long time in the Krynky area. I think the time has also come when we need to think about whether we should fight in this area of the frontline with such efforts. In what conditions are we fighting? Unfortunately, we cannot concentrate military equipment on this bridgehead. We cannot use many types of weapons there. The enemy, unfortunately, has an advantage in firepower and munitions. This is an objective situation. Therefore, we need to think whether this foothold is tactically justified for us. Is it worth it? The leaders must calculate the losses in Robotyne, the losses in Krynky, and finally draw conclusions - such an exchange is in our favor in unfavorable conditions, when you just have to hide from everything, sit in holes, and have drones and enemy aircraft and artillery constantly overhead...
To hold everything in a war means to hold nothing. Trying to hold on to everything means that you will be weak everywhere. It does not work like that. We have to draw honest conclusions without looking at any prestige, PR, or slogans. This is a war. And every step we take, when we hold a disadvantageous position, has a price, and we need to understand why we are holding it. Because every day that we take a disadvantageous position and allow the enemy to shoot us, we lose. Someone dies. Someone gets wounded. We are losing people. What for? What is our strategic goal? In my opinion, the strategic goal is to hold on to the places where we should not retreat. We absolutely needed Avdiivka. Vuhledar is also of strategic importance for us now. The Selydove-Pokrovsk-Kurakhove-Myrnohrad agglomeration is of strategic importance to us. We must do everything we can to protect these cities. The logic is clear here. These are communication hubs. It is clear why. But why there? I understand the existence of a bridgehead in Krynky and Robotyne when we used our reserves and tried to bring down the front in the south. One can argue in principle whether it was worthwhile to attack if there were not enough reserves, but okay. The military-political leadership of Ukraine, the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, decided to attack. Okay. Now these salients, bridgeheads, had their own logic, including as an element of tactics. That is, you put pressure on the enemy, you also create pressure from the flanks. And now? The wedges were needed to support the fighting in the Zaporizhzhia direction. The tactical logic was, of course, a difficult and risky operation. But now there is no offensive. So why? I don't have such answers. I would like the military and political leadership to have these answers.
Next map. Ivanivske. A small village that is now on everyone's lips, near Bakhmut. It covers the approaches to the town of Chasiv Yar. The enemy is trying to capture Chasiv Yar, and now there are heavy, very fierce battles for Ivanivske. The situation here is also very difficult. Using Bakhmut, the heights controlled by the enemy, the residential area of Bakhmut, which allows the enemy to maneuver and hide, the enemy is constantly striking at our positions in Ivanivske. And the sky here is dominated by Russian drones. There are constant attacks on our positions. Just continuous. And we also need to think about why we are doing this. To build reliable defense lines in the rear and keep the enemy at some other positions? What is the purpose of this? We also need to understand that if we need to hold Ivanivske at any cost, even though it is a disadvantageous position for us from a tactical point of view, then we need to strengthen this area. But not with the number of people, but with electronic warfare equipment, which the state still does not supply to the front. Drones, which, unfortunately, the state still supplies less than volunteers buy. That's it. And just exchanging for exchanging - for what? This is the third year of the war. We have to think about it. I really hope that the military-political leadership, the Supreme Command, and the new Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi, will start to build some kind of logic in their actions, in the expenditure of people and resources for the war - ammunition and military equipment.
War is about logistics. War is the distribution of resources. War is primarily about the distribution of people. For what purpose? We need to understand what the victims are making sacrifices for. There must be a logic to everything, which must be understood first and foremost by those who risk themselves. Sometimes, yes, orders are given to stay in a disadvantageous situation. This happens in war. And it often happens. But you need to understand what the goal is. When in February and March of '22 people were going under the tanks, throwing themselves with machine guns or even Molotov cocktails, it was clear that we are absolutely not ready for war. To kill at least one occupier, to hold back the advance of any Russian column, means to gain time. Time for what? Western aid came to deploy the army, to provide people with weapons, to prepare for war at least a little bit. It was clear why. And now? We have a stable front, a small number of offensive areas where fierce fighting is taking place, and the enemy is throwing reserves and supplies. That is, these areas that we have listed are active now, in total, if you put the front together like this, well, maybe 60 kilometers. In general, these are the active sections of the front. And these 60-70 kilometers are where the biggest battles are taking place. The fiercest ones. We need to understand why we are holding it. Unfortunately, these answers are not always clear.
I want to say one very important thing. I would really like to see training for our top management because when we evaluate these maps and look at them, I realize that the top management does not have time to simply realize the experience that the war gives and does not have time to draw the right conclusions from the situation. Because these arrows on the map and the front lines, unfortunately, do not correspond at all to what is actually happening in those positions. I would really like to see the leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Headquarters of the Supreme Command summon some practitioners who, for example, are engaged in electronic warfare and drone warfare in several brigades. The 59th Brigade of the Armed Forces, the 1st Brigade of the National Guard, the 92nd Brigade of the Armed Forces, and the 3rd Assault Brigade of the Armed Forces. From there, we need to gather specialists and people from the front, practitioners who manage electronic warfare, fight against drones, who control drones, so that they can tell the state leadership what is happening at the front. In fact, what the problems are. Because I understand, what I see, unfortunately, there is no awareness at all of what the role of drones is, how they affect the conduct of hostilities in general. Now these battles are taking place on the border with Russia. Of course, first of all, Russian volunteers are fighting there on Russian territory. Our troops are supporting them, and they are striking at the Russian occupiers in the Belgorod region from our territory. But will anyone draw any conclusions at all? When I see significant forces trying to conduct maneuver battles under the control of Russian drones, when the enemy with drones controls our positions from a considerable distance, strikes, does anyone draw any conclusions from this? Is it not clear that if you cannot close the sky or at least shoot down a significant number of these drones, prevent them from making adjustments, then no maneuvering operations, offensives, defenses are possible at all. And it is extremely difficult to conduct defense in such conditions, and you need to work very seriously on engineering support, on rotations, on replenishing infantry, on the use of your firepower, on counter-battery warfare, on providing your drones of various types.
As I understand it now, unfortunately, there is no such understanding. I urge the Headquarters of the Supreme Command and the leadership of the Armed Forces, all our respected generals, to start studying regularly, once a month: to hold master classes for themselves, to organize master classes for people who know how to use drones professionally, how to use electronic warfare, guided weapons, infantry, to learn a little bit, to understand for themselves how war is changing. It changes every month. And our leadership, unfortunately, simply does not have time to objectively follow these changes. After all, we need to analyze a large amount of information and communicate. These are objective reasons. There is nothing wrong with learning. It's bad when managers refuse to learn. Because sitting in their offices, in their headquarters, making decisions, they think that the nature of war is unchanged and everything is as it is here. Well, there is no such thing. The nature of war is constantly changing. It is alive. And this must be felt and understood. Giving the order to stand to the death if you are under the control of drones, the enemy has the dominant heights and you have open communication routes, not covered by anything, is simply suicide. It's just stupid. It has no logic from a military point of view. It is not justified by anything. And unfortunately, because we do not train our decision-makers, they do not have time to objectively realize what is happening at the front. And the decision comes too late when we have already lost something. We have lost Avdiivka, and now there are videos showing that the Ministry of Defense is building something. Yes, they have started to build something. But far beyond Avdiivka, of course. I don't know how long we had to - I don't know how long we were on the programs, a year, two years - say there are no fortifications. Since the beginning of October, when the assaults on Avdiivka began, there have been no fortifications. There are no rotations. No replenishment. Zero reaction. And then we see that the reserves eventually appear in some parts of the frontline. That is, for some reason, the top leadership decided that it was necessary to allocate forces to some other city instead of Avdiivka. Why? It's completely absurd. This is just a lack of understanding of what is happening at the front. There is absolutely no understanding of what are drones, what are high-precision weapons, what are electronic warfare devices. That is why I call on the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, his entire headquarters, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Other military leaders: start studying! If you don't learn, you will fall behind, as we are now, unfortunately, falling behind the enemy in many things. We are falling behind. And we have a gap, for example, in the use of drones, in the organization of long-range reconnaissance by drones, in the use of electronic warfare production, unfortunately, not decreasing, but increasing. This has a very bad effect on the course of hostilities.
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
Russia has increased the number of UAVs flying continuously in deep operational rear areas. This is a big threat. How do we deal with it?
This is a systemic, deep issue. We have seen the enemy hit the Patriot system, the Himars system, two helicopters recently. These were strikes at a distance of up to 50 kilometers from the front line, from the firing line. That's quite a distance. Of course, what this means is that the enemy is concentrating UAVs in certain areas. The enemy has established systematic production of drones that conduct reconnaissance at a considerable distance. The enemy is trying to use electronic intelligence, to understand where our radars and communication systems are emitting, where they are leading, and then conducts a targeted search for our particularly valuable military equipment, control points, places of concentration. Of course, what to do with this? First of all, before all these defeats, this is precisely the issue of the organization of electronic intelligence in the Armed Forces. All these hits at such a long distance, which are made by a drone that adjusts fire and transmits a video signal, are the result of poor organization and, unfortunately, lack of understanding by the military leadership of what it means to organize counteraction to long-range enemy drones. Because when we see a video signal, it means that all our electronic intelligence means are detecting the drone in a certain area. Our air defense system, which has radars, can also detect drones at a considerable distance. If a drone is not detected, if there are no measures taken, if we see a convoy with Patriot launchers standing still under the supervision of a drone, it means that either there was no timely notification or there was no response from the unit that had to immediately leave the area and maneuver, not stand there waiting for the missile. That is, these are organizational decisions by the leadership of the Armed Forces, operational and tactical departments, which must establish interaction between intelligence assets and units in the area. Especially when these units are particularly important and valuable types of weapons. In all of these cases, we see that this notification is missing. For many reasons.
What can be done if there are a large number of drones? First of all. Of course, this is information. The operation of drones that transmit a video signal must be immediately notified to all units - all units, especially those units that perform important combat missions, such as anti-aircraft missile systems, missile and artillery systems. All of this should be immediately informed. But we have no responsibility. Who was doing it? This is the responsibility of senior leaders, this is the responsibility of generals. Do you think any general will be punished for this? I think that, as always, no. As usual, the responsibility will be shifted to some executives - battery commanders at most, the gun crew themselves, who misunderstood something. This is the main problem. When I said that leaders need to learn. They do not understand the tactics of using enemy drones, the interaction between drones and electronic intelligence tools that the enemy creates, and they do not pay attention to defense or at least maneuvering, organizing the maneuver of our forces. What is the first thing? Informing.
Second. The maneuver allows us to move away from ballistic missile attacks.
Third. If you receive a warning, you have to leave the area immediately, you have to maneuver, you have to prepare it in advance. The third element. This is engineering support. What do we see? The HIMARS and Patriot systems are moving around completely unmasked. They have no camouflage. That is, they can be seen and identified by anyone as an anti-aircraft missile system. And this is, for example, a rocket and artillery system. I was struck by the fact that there is not even a camouflage net on the Haimars. Nothing is provided. People are standing in position, waiting for something. And there are no means of camouflage. They are in an open field. The same is true for Patriot. They have moved out and are standing there. There is no maneuver. There is no camouflage. That's it. A hit. Obvious.
Fourth, we need deception devices. The enemy must be constantly looking for targets and constantly hesitate whether it is a real target or deception devices. To do this, these models must be used in combat areas, in the positional areas of our heavy weapons systems. Are such deception devices being made? Unfortunately, no. They are not. There are no such deception devices in these areas. And the enemy sees the target and strikes without hesitation. What is the obstacle in general? We have lost the HIMARS system, 17 million dollars. Is it difficult to make a metal model for 20-30 thousand dollars? Are these things even comparable? Or the Patriot system. One Patriot launcher costs $10 million, one missile costs $4 million. So maybe it's cheaper to spend a little money, order our companies, Metinvest does it, and we have another organization that makes very high-quality models. What's the problem with ordering models of all these systems for a little money? It is possible. Even self-propelled deception devices can and should be installed. What's preventing us? It is the unwillingness to learn, indifference. Oh, we need deception devices, but someone has to use the deception devices, some people, adopt it, take responsibility for its use - why hesitate? It's better to tell the battery commander: go, shoot, and if something goes wrong, get out. I wonder what the role of our higher command is. I know that an internal investigation is conducted in each case. You know, we have internal investigations for everything. That's how it is in the SBI, and I sympathize with future historians of the war. When they see the SBI archives and tens of thousands of internal investigations into all the messes in the Armed Forces, they will simply go crazy. Because there are papers, these stacks of papers, everywhere. We have a paper war. A war of internal investigations. Instead of analyzing the causes and making a decision, internal investigations are being written to show that the high command is not involved, the generals are not involved, the unit commanders are not involved. The blame lies with some ordinary performers who simply do not have the opportunity to call the SBI and resolve the matter with someone. That is why we have such results.
The army needs to learn, there is nothing wrong with that. My God, how is this not clear? What kind of complexes do people in the office of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff have? Learn. It's a good thing. This is your job. It would only inspire respect. But, unfortunately, we see that the lessons of war are not being learned.
In the near future, I will write about some of our operations, about the unsuccessful failed assault on Zmiinyi Island in May 22, I must finally tell you about it. Of course, I will write about the report that there was no reaction, partially made public about the raid on the Tendra lighthouse. Of course, I will write about the strike on the Patriot. I will write about the problems there. Something has to be done about it. As I understand it, we have no influence on the top military leadership except for public opinion. It does not react. I don't know why. There is no desire to change something, to do something, to learn. Then we will somehow disperse and create it with you, this desire. So, of course, there is a simple way to deal with UAVs: shoot down UAVs. But we don't have that many anti-aircraft missile systems, and of course we would like to shoot down all UAVs. This is the best way. But if you can't shoot down a UAV, you can at least organize maneuvering, camouflage, and at least disorient, misinform the enemy about where exactly we have our assets. Why are these elementary things not being done? And we are losing two Patriot launchers, we are losing several missiles. And most importantly, friends, we lost 9 wonderful people. Unfortunately. From among the calculations. Motivated, trained, who were trained in European countries. They understood what they were doing. They were real experts. And they lost valuable equipment. The Patriot system is of strategic importance, and fortunately the enemy did not manage to destroy the Patriot radar and fire control system. But we have suffered heavy losses. Yes, the Patriot battery will remain operational. But if no conclusions are drawn, the radar will be lost in the same way. This cannot be allowed to happen.
Don't you think that PR has a great impact on the nature of warfare and provokes us to act not rationally, but in a way that pleases people?
This is true, absolutely. The current Russian-Ukrainian war, the war for Ukraine's independence, is a war where the decisions of the leaders are dictated primarily by the media effect. On both sides, unfortunately. They want to point out that orders are given primarily to those who are heroes of social media and the information field. Operations are only done so that they are talked about all over the world. That's what they pay attention to. Only those organizational things are done that the whole society is talking about. For 2 years, they said that no fortifications or defences were being built. 2 years! And it was finally the day before yesterday that Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy said, after 2 years of full-scale war, that we need to build defenses for 2,000 kilometers. That's a long time! This is such a narrow-mindedness of the top leadership. Of course, the president spent two years visiting the frontline, handing out orders and medals, and I was on the broadcasts and kept asking why the president wouldn't see how the defense structures were being built. He has never visited. He stopped by to see the roads in his time, the Great Construction, but here for some reason, he didn't. There were people in my comments who kept saying, "It's not Zelenskyy's responsibility why you're sticking up for him? It's the military's responsibility. I explained that the military cannot find the resources for construction. Someone has to give them. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office, the authorities have to give it. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief has to set a strategic task. And suddenly it turned out that everything was as I said, and it happened. That the president has now given the order. And you see, there are still some people who justify this stupidity. It just shocks me. As a rule, the people who always justify the authorities are those who have never been in the trenches themselves. Perhaps they were there once... there are people from the ATO era. But not now. They do not sit under drones. They do not sit in cold holes. They like to defend the government somewhere close to the offices in Kyiv. That's all. And here, unfortunately, there is no such support. That's why PR, friends, is very important, and this is a very big problem. The war strategy, tactics, and focus of efforts should be free from PR. Where the enemy does not receive information from our side, does not receive videos, then on many issues of the war, I will not even say which ones, they do not even realise what is happening and cannot react. This is very good for us. They are not aware at the highest level of many of our vulnerabilities. Because they do not have an analytical apparatus. But the problem is, friends, that we can talk about it, but we also have neither awareness nor analysis of losses. No objective analysis. We have these false internal investigations, which generals use to protect each other. Law enforcers are covering up for someone. We always have a soldier at the end of the line. And the people who make decisions are always irresponsible. Sometimes they are simply shifted, moved somewhere. But many of them still continue to hold some kind of leadership positions. This is a big problem. The incompetence of commanders, the incompetent principle of leadership in the army, in the Defence Forces as a whole, when not those who have shown leadership on the battlefield, who show videos of the enemy's greatest defeats, are promoted, but those who are the calmest, who never raise questions, who always say: yes, I am. They do not create problems for the generals, they do not argue with him about anything. Unfortunately, such amoebic commanders are promoted to most positions at various levels. There are heroes at the bottom. They are needed at low level there, of course, because only a person of character can take up a position. But we have problems where we need to manage not soldiers in a trench, but where we need to manage organizational structures. At the highest level. It is there that we have management problems. Not at the bottom. Our soldiers are heroic. They have been fighting the entire war against an enemy that is superior in every way. That's why when I hear official investigations into Avdiivka, Soledar, Bakhmut, our General Staff has prepared reports on why they were lost. These are absolutely false documents that provide zero insight into the situation.
What do you think the special operation of troops entering the border territory of the Russian Federation brings about?
I think it has a purely media effect. Those who planned it wanted it. Because, in fact, from a tactical point of view, from a military point of view, even from an operational point of view, there was a great logic in the fact that our troops were operating on the territory of the Russian Federation in 2022. There was a great... Here's the situation, we can see from the news reports where the fighting is going on. Graivoron, Tiotkino. All the battles are on the border. There was a certain logic to this in 2023, when our offensive was going on and there were simultaneous attacks here. What has changed now? The situation. The enemy did not wait 2 years, as our Supreme Commander-in-Chief did, to build fortifications. They started building them at the end of the 22nd year. Now they have been fortifying their border for 1.5 years. It is already quite well prepared for defence. There are a large number of engineering structures. They have deployed various types of surveillance and reconnaissance systems. A large number of drones are now operating there. So it's no longer a surprise raid where you can go in quickly and perform sabotage, but it's a frontline that has to be broken through with a fight. I think everyone understands that this is no longer a sabotage action. These are no longer raids. This is a general military operation that needs to be prepared. It requires large resources of people, ammunition and military equipment. And where is it better to use them? I believe that it is better to concentrate such reserves as we have, where the enemy is advancing. We could have held Avdiivka if we had deployed them there in time. Or now we could strengthen our frontline, where the enemy is putting pressure, and not shoot cool videos of our troops smashing the enemy and leaving hundreds of corpses. In my opinion, this media effect for Putin before the presidential election in Russia was much more deadly. And we have a template. We went in at 22, it was cool, it had an effect. But then there were very small losses. Relatively small losses. In 23, there were relatively small losses. But in '24, it's hard to break in when there are already troops and drones at the front. The enemy, by the way, has an advantage in the number of drones in the air in these areas. I don't see any logic in this. Perhaps the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Headquarters, the Main Intelligence Directorate, Kyryllo Budanov, sees it. Maybe they do. But I don't. And most soldiers at the front do not talk about logic either. So we need to understand that the nature of war is changing. You cannot act according to a template and repeat the same manoeuvres all the time, expecting a new effect. Repetition does not produce a new effect. Unfortunately, it leads to the fact that the enemy learns, adapts and is waiting for the next time. And then he strikes. Unfortunately, there is a lot of video of this defeat on the Russian side, during the fighting on the border. Much more than we show on our side. And I calculate the ratio of losses primarily on the basis of what is documented, what can be seen on video and in photos. This is an objective picture. Not just stories about who struck, where, from the point of view of those who struck. Without looking, without adjusting the fire. Now, in modern warfare, the use of precision weapons, the task of precision striking without video confirmation is actually a low probability. So I would like to warn that it is an unreasonable risk to plan a long war of attrition on such a very large front with the help of PR. The factor of surprise for sabotage and raids is paramount. If there is no surprise factor, it is called something else. It's not a sabotage or a raid. It is a general offensive operation. Are you ready for it? And who should lead it? The one who gives more interviews all the time? Or someone who is responsible for people's lives? This is what our government has not yet decided on
Tell us what's going on with Tymoshenko in the Defense Ministry? Have they completely f*cked up? Will they openly divvy up such funds?
Like all of you, I am shocked that a person who was removed from the post of deputy head of the Presidential Office after a series of corruption scandals and scandals related to conflicts of interest, with suspicions of abuse, creation of advantages through the use of his official position, this person will be given the position of a full-time adviser to the Minister of Defense with his own staff - a full-time adviser. This is a responsible position in the leadership of the Defense Ministry. That is, he is not suitable for the Presidential Office because of his bad image. And now he has become the chief communicator for Minister Umierov. This is absurd. I realized that Minister Umierov was just equivocating and equivocating in our political scenarios and decided to become a non-independent figure. Because this is absolutely absurd. This will certainly not lead to any image or quality communications. On the contrary, this is a signal that, just like with the Big Construction, which was supervised by Kyrylo Tymoshenko, the construction of defense facilities will be in his hands. I think everyone understands why such personnel are needed and what they actually do with public funds. I think that the situation with the way companies associated with Kyrylo Tymoshenko use funds for various media projects for which the government allocates taxpayer funds during the war is similar. I think the effect here will be similar. And this is very bad for us.
What are the autobahns for Russian reconnaissance UAVs in Russian airspace? Nassams, Himars, Patriots, S-300s and more
Unfortunately, this is a matter of underestimating the importance and capabilities of drones, drone reconnaissance, enemy electronic intelligence and lack of willingness to learn. The reasons for the loss of the S-300, whether it was initially a Patriot, a Himars, two helicopters, are absolutely the same. Nobody draws conclusions. There are no conclusions. It's as if every agency, every unit has to have its own bloody experience. Until we have half of our equipment smashed up and people killed, we will not learn. Who is responsible for this? The military leadership, of course. Unfortunately, we have not had such responsibility before. We didn't know who the Commander-in-Chief Zaluzhnyi was either. And now the commander-in-chief, Syrskyi, is also not visible, there is no such responsibility. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief Zelenskyy is not clear at all. The Headquarters is an analytical body, is supposed to give assessments and analytical reports. But there is nothing there at all. They don't even talk about it and have no influence. Moreover, Zelenskyy personally told the West: give us 10 Patriots, 10 Patriots will change the course of the war. That is what the president is demanding from the West. And unfortunately, brain is not used to making sure that the Patriots that the West has already given us are preserved. Why? Because this is irresponsibility, it comes from the top. It comes from the first person. And this is a fact. The first person does not require objective analysis. They do not require lessons, they do not learn and do not require others to learn. That's why we have such problems with the organization, with the responsibility of military leaders, and then this irresponsibility goes down. And at the end of it is the life of the personnel. This is what irresponsibility leads to
Say something about the Kinburn Spit
I won't talk about Kinburn. There was a story about Tendra, which should be written about separately. I gave a brief report. There was also a high-profile, beautiful operation on the Tendra Spit with a name. People were told that it was important. Okay. I won't even talk about the goal. The organization is just completely inept. I mean, people who have never been in an assault themselves are planning. Not a single one. And they plan such complicated things as an assault. And it turns out that they did not prepare communications, did not organize an action plan - a frontal attack on unarmoured boats directly on the stronghold. I have already written about this. It's like storming a landing zone in pick-up trucks. A complete underestimation of the enemy. It was as if they thought the enemy would see them and run away. And two years of war have passed. The enemy started shooting. Where were the people who planned it? Certainly not on the boats. They were sitting far away in the headquarters, watching the stream and thinking that they were just very cool commanders. But in fact, at the very least, we need to analyze this and ask the commander who led this operation, the commander of the 73rd Centre, what was the basis for this action plan at all? Who did he consult with at all? Who told him this? Why didn't he sail on a fire support boat himself to lead the battle in combat? Or at least he would have sent one officer. All this is missing. Friends, then the search begins to find out why I am not guilty, not involved, and there are a lot of internal investigations. And there are no people while they are playing internal investigations.
Don't you think the front is collapsing after Zaluzhnyi`s dismissal?
There have been crises before. Our management of the war does not depend solely on the figure of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, because in our organization of power, the key center that approves management at the strategic level is the office of theHeadquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This is how the law defines it. And that's the way it is in reality. And this is the logic. Because the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief affects not just military decisions, but also the allocation of resources. The supply of weapons, the supply of materials, the allocation of funds, the mobilization of people, which has not been properly organized so far. All this is done by the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Generals cannot manage resources that have not been transferred to them. That is why we have problems with planning at the highest level. We don't have, we have a problem at the highest level, why is our strategy, our management organization at the highest level weak and lagging behind the enemy? Because in fact, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief does not take responsibility for any problems in the war. Only for PR. PR, yes. Zelenskyy arrives, takes a picture in Robotyne, and quickly, once, takes a picture, and leaves. And why go there? For a photo? Now you can go to Robotyne. Well, no one goes now, because there are active operations. Is the defense line there? Is the communication there? Unfortunately, no one controls all this. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is responsible for photo shoots, not for the results at the front.
Regarding Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Ryumshyn from the command of the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade.
I spoke about the actions I saw. This happened recently. And Dmytro Riumshyn showed, look, I have not personally met Dmytro Riumshyn at all, I can just say that I assess the results of the brigade by the video of the enemy's defeat. The fact that the brigade held all the lines. Yes, with losses, unfortunately. But the enemy's losses are huge. We have the results of the video of the defeat. I'm talking about the period when Riumshyn was in charge of the fighting near Avdiivka. And he was in charge of this entire stage when Avdiivka was lost. The 47th Brigade held the flank, held it completely. And now they are fighting in Berdychi, in fact, they have not left their positions. That is why I have great respect for this officer. This is an example of a person being dismissed from a leadership position without any logic. They didn't say anything about why they dismissed the person. The enemy suffered heavy losses there. Heavy losses. The interaction of heterogeneous forces and means of artillery, armored vehicles, infantry drones is organized. Bam! And they dismissed him. It's just a completely voluntaristic command. This is the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and I just don't understand why. And no one in the brigade understands why. She did not explain anything. Some kind of general's logic... I want to say that, to be fair, there are correct personnel decisions in that area. Now the army is replacing several brigade commanders in that area, and some decisions are reasonable, logical, and the right people have been appointed. Unfortunately, the decision on Riumshyn is an unmotivated decision.
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In the near future, we will hold a closed broadcast for subscribers. We will be discussing some sensitive political topics that I did not want to discuss in a wide range. I will need advice and communication from those who support the channel. I am grateful to our sponsors, those who help us to do our work. The 2050 sponsors on our channel allow our team to work for you as efficiently as possible. And thank you to our 1 million 57 thousand subscribers. We will be working even harder for you, giving you new reports, interviews and even more streams. Thank you very much, friends.
Today, despite the problems we are discussing, the enemy manages to inflict heavy losses on us and the situation in the war is not hopeless. Far from it. We have great opportunities, a reserve of resilience that we can still use and turn the tide of the war. Therefore, today, as never before, I am confident in our victory. Glory to Ukraine!
