Our generals live on ATO memories. And they manage through maps - Yurii Butusov
Yurii Butusov, Editor-in-Chief of Censor NET on Radio NV, talks about the situation at the front, the concentration of Russian forces in the Kurakhove and Pokrovsk directions, what is happening around Ocheretyne, the problems of mobilization in Ukraine, the supply of Western weapons to Ukraine and the lack of UAVs at the front.
- Yurii Butusov, Editor-in-Chief of Censor.NET. is live with us. Hello Mr. Butusov.
- Hello.
- The Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, said, firstly, that due to the difficult situation at the front, he had been on the frontline for two days and had identified the direction where the Russians were most actively attacking. Accordingly, Ukrainian resistance forces are holding back this offensive. This is the direction to Kurakhove and Pokrovsk. In your opinion, why did the Russians choose this particular direction to strike?
- In fact, the Russian command does not have limited targets like Kurakhove and Pokrovsk. Russians are conducting operations along the entire front. In each operational direction, they have strike areas where they concentrate their efforts to achieve tactical advantage. There is the direction of Kupiansk. There is the Terny-Torske direction. There is the direction near Bakhmut, the Bakhmut area. There is the direction of Pokrovsk. There is the direction near Avdiivka. There is a direction near Robotyne. There is the direction of Urozhaine. That's why there are so many hot spots... Chasiv Yar, of course, is where the heavy fighting is going on. So there are a lot of areas where the enemy is trying to create a big advantage, to gain tactical initiative and create an advantage over our troops. That is why the Russian offensive is on the entire 800-kilometer active section of the front, the active front. I think it's illogical to single out something separately. The attacks are ongoing and the pressure is on, the enemy is trying to prevent our command from transferring reserves, trying to exhaust our troops, the entire active army, not just some individual components.
- The enemy is putting pressure and attacking along the entire frontline. At the same time, you have seen this information that the Russian occupiers have deployed two parachute divisions from the direction of Robotyne to Kurakhove and Pokrovsk. To what extent does this complicate the situation in this area and pose a threat to Pokrovsk, which is a strategic point for the development of a further offensive, if the Russians succeed?
- I don't think the enemy has two fresh divisions. I think we are talking about some separate units, separate subunits of these divisions. Of course, they are constantly deploying fresh forces. Russia is actively continuing its mobilization and recruitment campaign. Unlike Ukraine. Therefore, the enemy regularly deploys forces, individual divisions, regiments, brigades and entire armies. He rotates and replenishes them to continue the attacks. It reinforces certain areas of the frontline where active hostilities are taking place with these forces. This is happening along the entire front. Not just in some specific areas. Now the enemy has managed to break through, to push through the Ukrainian defense in the Ocheretyne-Keramik area, and the enemy will certainly try to develop its success after capturing Ocheretyne. To advance further, hoping that our defense has already suffered serious losses here. Therefore, they will obviously deploy new reserves here. The infantry assault units that they had, have already been eliminated and suffered heavy losses. And now, for two days now, the intensity of the fighting in the Ocheretyne area has decreased slightly compared to before. Of course, the enemy wants to renew the most intensive fighting and will redeploy infantry reserves to the area to replace the infantry that has already been driven out.
- If the Russians have pushed through the defenses in the Ocheretyne area and will try to form such an "appendix" stretching towards Pokrovsk, do you think this creates favorable opportunities for cutting it in the end?
- Of course, the situation there is very difficult for the enemy. The offensive is being conducted through such a narrow gut, I would say, so of course this format is not favorable for them there. Now they will use their tactics to expand the breakthrough zone, try to expand these areas to protect themselves from attacks from the flanks. So far, there have been no such examples of our troops conducting such successful counterattacks and cutting off the Russian offensive. But, of course, the Russian command is afraid of this and will now do everything to secure its flanks. Of course, such opportunities exist. But in order to use them, we need to have complete troops, fresh troops who have been replenished and trained on rotation. We have big problems with this, because, as we know, in Ukraine, the government does not solve the mobilization system and has left it to sink or swim, leaving it to the TCRs (Territorial Centre for Recruitments) and brigades to find people somewhere, catch them somewhere, recruit them somewhere - you figure it out for yourself. There is no order in our work here and no logic. We are certainly inferior to the enemy in this matter of mobilization.
- You can figure it out for yourself. But the TCR system works.
- The TСR system works, but how? No one pays attention to how the TCR system works. The TCR operates without legal authority. All cases when someone was grabbed off and on the bus are without authority. There is no law for this. The TCR has no right to detain anyone and carry them somewhere. It is the police who have the right to detain someone and carry them if they are evading. But the police do not do this. That's why we have TCRs, which can be given an order and somehow try to fulfill it. We also don't have electronic records. We haven't done it in the TCRs. No one in the government cares about this. The TCR has to send out paper summonses. The effectiveness of these summonses is simply negligible. We spend much more money on paper than on the overall effectiveness of all these measures. Almost no one accepts these summonses, so it is a very loud statement to say that the TCR system is working. Unfortunately, our TCRs are absolutely in complete chaos, not provided with anything and completely overwhelmed with unnecessary bureaucratic work, instead of real legal and resource support.
- It is worth noting that many people here believe that the law on mobilization is supposed to come into effect after May 18, but this law has existed all along. It is about certain changes and certain improvements to the mobilization system. And indeed, after May 18, when these changes come into force and become legal, do you think the situation will change?
- No, it will not be changed, because we have the TCR and the mobilization system in general operating without the necessary legislative support, and the new law did nothing. It did not provide any means of control or coercion to the TCR. Therefore, some of the rules of work are just simplified, but unfortunately, there will be no increase in efficiency. Electronic accounting has not yet come into force. The TCR does not know who to call up and where. Who to send those summonses to. Who is doing what. Mobilization - we still do not have a planned mobilization of persons liable for military service and there is no understanding of how many persons liable for military service we have in the country. Nobody knows this. Even the government itself does not know. Because it has not yet created a single register. There is no register of persons liable for military service that would be integrated with all databases and would make it clear where a person is. All of this is missing. You have to look for them somewhere. On the street. Without authority. The police do not help the work of the TCR in any way. They shirk their duties in order not to spoil their image. We have an absolutely absurd system where it turned out that... in other words, the issue of organizing the mobilization of people is a matter exclusively for TCR officers, who have not been given any legal authority by the state to do their work so that they can mobilize by themselves. This is a paradox.
- That's why I'm asking, how will the situation change after May 18?
- Nothing.
- There are certain punitive measures being introduced - a system of fines.
- What kind of fines?
- As far as I can see, they are not small fines. It is also being introduced for those who evade mobilization.
- We still need to prove that a person has to pay this fine. In fact, apart from the fact that the president has written and lowered the age of conscription from 27 to 25, the new changes to the legislation will not bring any additional resources. These people from 25 to 27 who will appear for mobilization or who can be called up are the only additional resources that can be mobilized... everything else will be absolutely insignificant.
- You have direct contact with the military, with officers, with commanders. In general, how do the troops see the need for mobilization? In what way, how to organize it properly?
- In fact, the troops do not have time to deal with theoretical issues of improving Ukrainian legislation. The troops are engaged in war. It is obvious to me that there can be no order when there is still no working electronic register of persons liable for military service in Ukraine, which would be installed in every smartphone and all persons liable for military service would be obliged to install this application in their smartphones. I don't know how else to do it during the war. The state still does not know this. That's why it leads to corruption. Every structure that has the right - doctors, border guards - anyone, these Shliakh systems ... We have created a bunch of ways to avoid mobilization, to avoid determining your status at all. This is the problem. Yes, we do need people, not only in the army. We need to mobilize people in the industry as well. We also need to mobilize people for government agencies. But there must be a record of who is going where and why. Categories must be clearly defined. All people must be registered, all men of conscription age, and it must be written down what they should do during the war, in which category. This is all missing. Until there is a database, there will be no accounting, and there will be corruption at every step, in every structure, and there will be no order in this matter.
- Do you think this account won't work either?
- Look, it is not working yet. I don't know what the issues are with this account. Why the hesitation? Diia is already working. What is stopping us from adding the office of a person liable for military service there? I just don't understand.
- You remember that at one time we were assured that no summonses would be issued in Diia. Perhaps we have become hostages...
- And why? Why?
- of such promises.
- This is some kind of savagery. Why can't we do this in Diia? I just don't understand what kind of absurd logic this is.
- You remember these statements.
- I remember it. This is yet another demonstration that all our state leaders want PR, and no one wants to organize defense and mobilization. This is another evidence. Diia is an electronic application. It just needs to add the function of the Cabinet of the person liable for military service. It will work in a few days. And that's all.
- Here is a proposal. The Shliakh system has probably become a profitable business, right? At the same time, speaking of the intensification of Russian attacks in various parts of the frontline, many people are definitely worried about when the supply of equipment and ammunition from our partners will really affect the war picture, right? In your opinion, are we talking about weeks or months when we have to literally hold on. To hold on under such conditions. We need to have fully equipped troops, as you said. These troops must have sufficient weapons and ammunition.
- Look, we don't really have any prospects that the military aid that the West is sending now will completely change the situation on the battlefield. It will reduce the imbalance, reduce the advantage of the Russian troops significantly, allow us to work more with equipment, of course. But this will not eliminate the need, the critical need to organize mobilization and reform the Defense Forces, the Armed Forces of the state, where there is complete chaos and disorganization. It will not eliminate it at all. The fact that we are now receiving missiles and armored vehicles and some air defense systems will not eliminate the Russian advantage. It will reduce it significantly. But it will not eliminate it. That is, we still need to carry out internal reforms, our own reforms. And not wait for a miracle that someone will send us something. There will be no miracle.
- I carefully read what Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, said. I will quote it now. "The role and place of an officer has always been decisive in achieving success or defeat on the battlefield. A company or battalion commander can't control the battle several kilometers away from his units and make balanced and adequate decisions from a distance, especially when the intensity of the fighting is through the roof and there is a high risk to the soldiers' lives." Yurii, I think the Commander-in-Chief was quite frank in his words, so are we returning to the paradigm, should a combat unit commander be with his soldiers on the front line under any circumstances?
- No, I don't think so. In modern warfare, there is no need for this, because there are enough means of control and intelligence, such as drones, starlink, modern radio communications, which do not actually require the commander's constant direct presence on the battlefield. Of course, from my point of view, the commander, and not only the commander of a unit, not only of a company or battalion but also the general, should visit the frontline positions on zero line with a certain frequency. To realize and understand the nature of modern combat operations in a particular area. And to learn, because the war is constantly changing. If you sit far away with a map somewhere, even at a command post, it may seem close to the front, but you can't see it, you can't feel it, so you don't understand what certain orders are worth. That is why, of course, every commander should not be on the front line all the time - there is no need for that. The commander has to manage and control the situation. What should a commander do? Periodically, at critical moments, he must appear on the battlefield, he must see when there is an inactive situation, he must see the situation. He has to feel it on his own. And he has to learn. To do this, it is necessary to go to the front line. All of them. Not just company and battalion commanders. I would actually like to advise generals as well. Our generals do not do this at all. Many company and battalion commanders do. The generals sit there and are a little bit immersed, living on the ATO memories that are long outdated and managing through maps and reports, completely detached from reality. So, I would advise that if Oleksandr Syrskyi showed this kind of behavior, it would be even better if his generals like Sodel, the Khortytsia commanders, their staff officers who are involved in planning, went to zero line at least once a month and felt for themselves how they manage there, what orders they give, and checked it out for themselves. It would be very useful.
- Regarding the supply, including ammunition and drones, which you just mentioned, Oleksandr Syrskyi said that during these two days, when he was not on the front line, he made all the necessary decisions to strengthen the defense with reserves, allocate additional missiles, ammunition, electronic warfare equipment and UAVs. I read the rest of the information on your Facebook. You described a funny episode when a Russian soldier, Platon Mamatov, imitated being the 200th in order not to be killed. Ukrainians did not believe him, and five rounds of ammunition flew in from drones at once. Combining this information, can we conclude that these episodes illustrate that the situation with the same drones is actually improving?
-No, it is not improving with drones, unfortunately. There is no massive supply of drones from the state to the frontline yet. Most drones are bought by volunteers. That's why there is an acute shortage of many types of drones, which is being solved again by people themselves. Funds are being raised. Most of the drones on the frontline at the moment are still volunteer drones. Not government drones.
- And why do you think this happened? What is the reason?
- Because when they took money from local communities under the slogan that we will now finance everything, unfortunately, this process was very poorly organized. Neither funding was organized promptly, nor orders were placed on time. Most importantly, it was not taken into account that, for example, the purchase of such high-tech equipment as fpv drones requires flexibility and constant changes, as well as long-term planning. In fact, a decentralized approach is needed in planning and financing these purchases. This was not done. As a result, in the first 3 months, we received a negligible number of drones - just over 20,000 FPV drones were delivered by the state in 3 months of the war. 20 thousand! The President said a million in a year. The fourth part of the year has passed, and this year's total is just a tiny amount - 20 thousand FPVs - which is the need of the frontline for a week. This is the maximum. If not intensively enough. So, unfortunately, this is the reality. It is the same with trench EW. Most of the trench EW equipment is not purchased by the state, but by volunteers, so there are many problems. Although, I want to say that Oleksandr Syrskyi is indeed at the front and is making some efforts to redeploy troops. So I can't say that no decisions are being made or that someone is sitting here and hiding something in their pocket. No. Everything is being done to strengthen the front. But in modern warfare, in addition to high-quality command, we need high-quality administration and organization of work. If there is no organization of work, there is always a problem with command: what to command? What to strengthen? I mean, everything is being given, but what is everything? How many drones are being given? How many of those EWs are being given?
- Yurii, do you think that some kind of, I don't know, audit, sorry for the word, is needed? We are talking about the efficiency of the state. How much money has been allocated for this and how much has actually been supplied. If these figures are classified, let them be classified. We are talking about the efficiency ratio.
- Of course, we need an audit, at the very least, given that there are a large number of drone manufacturers now, and not all of them can receive state funding for interesting projects. Of course, an audit is needed, since most drones have similar components, and components purchased from the same manufacturers abroad are actually assembled in Ukraine. The percentage of localization is somewhere significant, somewhere not so significant.
Radio NV
