Offensive on Kharkiv
The situation in the Kharkiv region. The Russians have launched the very offensive that has been much talked about.
I have spoken about this story many times on air. I said that this offensive, if it happens, will have a limited scale, it will be like armed reconnaissance. Today, we see that this is basically the situation now.
So, at 3:00 a.m., Russian troops, up to 4-5 infantry battalions, launched an attack in the Kharkiv region in two directions. So, let's see what happened.
The general operational map - we see that there are two directions of the enemy's offensive. This is in the Kharkiv area. The enemy managed to capture four villages. We see the settlements of Strilecha, Pylna, Borysivka and Krasne. Strilecha, Pylna, Borysivka are located right on the border. Krasne is located up to 5 km from the border with the Russian Federation. The enemy managed to capture these settlements in this direction. And on the second direction, the enemy managed to capture the border settlements of Hatyshche and Pletenivka, near Vovchansk. That is, there are two directions of the Russian attack. We see that there are other places on the border where the enemy could enter, but they are conducting an operation that is, I emphasise, with limited objectives, so they are focusing their efforts on two areas at the moment. Why are they doing this? We understand that the enemy wants to impose a tactical initiative on us in this area with relatively small forces, to neutralize our troops, to expand the front line... Why are they doing this? Let's take a closer look.
Here is a close-up of this map. We can see the enemy advancing. They are not advancing any further now, that is, there are other villages further away that are quite tactically important from an operational point of view - the village of Lyptsi. The enemy has not reached it. Our troops stopped the Russian advance. We understand that the enemy is not sending additional forces there now, meaning that no armoured columns are approaching Kharkiv. There are no large-scale forces like the ones that attacked Kharkiv in February 2022. The enemy is trying to expand the front with small forces.
Why are the Russians doing this? The enemy has now spent considerable forces and reserves on offensive operations in the Donbas and Kharkiv region. For a long time, they have been advancing very actively with large forces in some areas and continue their attacks. But Russian reserves have been killed. The losses are enormous. Even Russia has problems with mobilising and recruiting new mercenaries, convicts - whoever they can throw at the front. Therefore, the Russian command in these circumstances decided to strike where our combat formations are not so dense, where we do not have a concentration of manpower, equipment, ammunition. And thus, to distract our efforts from the main 800-kilometer front, to create additional fronts, using their existing infantry units, fresh battalions that they can throw into this battle. To use them to stretch our forces, to create a threat to Vovchansk. The threat to Vovchansk is the enemy's direct assistance in the Kupiansk direction, because it is close to Kupiansk. The enemy thus wants to increase pressure on Kupiansk. And at the same time, this move into the Kharkiv region is the enemy's attempt to create, organize, and mark a threat to Kharkiv so that our troops are also forced to concentrate in this area, thus expanding the front. And thus disperse the forces. To keep Ukraine's defense forces in check. To keep them on their toes and try to exhaust the Ukrainians even more. So a limited force operation.
Were Ukrainian troops ready for this? To these actions? The Ukrainian command certainly had full information about the concentration of Russian forces, and there were all the warnings. The Russians did not manage to achieve any surprise at all. Even at the stage of deployment, the enemy was detected on Russian territory. Strikes were launched both on the other side of the border and on this side of the enemy's border. Unfortunately, these strikes were not so massive and concentrated that it was possible to break the offensive, these small groups of infantry moving through the tree covers, camouflaged. The enemy is attacking with platoon-size. The infantry groups enter our territory, because in fact, these bombings, aerial control of any movement by drones, strikes by Russian drones, basically, they turned the border strip into a kind of gray zone. Of course, going there was very risky. It was extremely difficult for our troops to hold positions in such conditions near the border.
What can be said? What is a bit surprising? That the infantry on such a front is advancing and has advanced with minimal obstacles. Of course, we should have used the time to prepare - what can I say as a criticism? That it was possible to prepare and meet the enemy with fire, minefields. To create much more problems for the Russian infantry when they enter. Now they are deploying and consolidating. Could the defense forces have prevented the Russian troops from entering? To be honest, if we are talking about these border villages, which are on the very border, unfortunately, the defense forces could not prevent the entry into the border villages. There are objective reasons. The enemy has an advantage in manpower. There is an advantage in munitions. The Russians have organized a fairly strong line of defense along the border on their side, which Russian troops can rely on. They have organized a very powerful surveillance system, video surveillance, intelligence. And they are actively reconnoitering the border areas with drones. As we know, they have an advantage in aviation. They have a significant amount of ammunition. Therefore, it is extremely difficult for us to conduct combat operations in the border villages. Only fire control is possible there. We can only control this border line in the same way with our drones, our reconnaissance means, our artillery and missile systems. In other words, only fire control. Now we will look at the development of the situation. The enemy's maximum advance is the village of Krasne. They are trying to move further. Now we will see where and how the Russian troops will be stopped and what losses they will suffer, depending on the actions of the Ukrainian command and their level of preparation. We can see that after the Russians reached Krasne, they basically stopped and are advancing very slowly. Perhaps, they will start another meaty assault. We will see. The terrain there is favorable for Russian infantry. There is a lot of tree covers. It is convenient to enter. A lot of forests. It's quite convenient for infantry to hide there and operate in platoons and squads. Therefore, the Russians will definitely try to reach Lyptsi. Lyptsi is a very important point in operational terms. If they reach Lyptsi, we can say that they have managed to gain a foothold that will be a long-lasting foothold for Kharkiv. If they are blocked in the area of Krasne, it will just be a new additional front, but it will be difficult for the Russians to use it as a foothold. In some way, this will not critically affect the tactical situation. It will affect Kharkiv. The threat to Kharkiv is that the Russians have concentrated their forces and are trying to approach. This is a threat. But there is no threat of a breakthrough, of any exits to the bypass road, even further. At the moment, there is no such concentration of Russian troops. The Russians have no advantage over our defense forces in the Kharkiv area. Therefore, this situation must be viewed realistically and objectively. Of course, this foothold should be controlled as much as possible. That is, it must be subjected to constant attacks, and the price of Russians staying on Ukrainian territory must be high.
On the other hand, we understand that this is the situation everywhere. The forces are limited. Ammunition is especially limited. It is the amount of ammunition and the quality of intelligence organisation, the quality of the use of drones that will measure how effectively we can stop this event, the creation of this bridgehead near Kharkiv.
The situation near Vovchansk is also threatening. It poses a threat to Vovchansk. However, the enemy's advance, as we saw on the map, is shallow. There are also our troops there, and there is no threat of capturing Vovchansk at the moment. The enemy is trying to advance and is receiving quite powerful retaliatory strikes. We will see. A new front is being formed. When forming a new front, the biggest risk for us is the deployment of a command and control system, intelligence, interaction between units, proper understanding and awareness of commanders of what the tactics should be in a particular terrain, in a particular section of the front. This is always a painful issue. How to use troops efficiently.
When we talk about this offensive, the main thing I would like to say is that we should not treat it as a catastrophe. There is no need to exaggerate the significance. The main fighting on the frontline has been going on in Donbas and eastern Kharkiv region, and continues to do so. The main Russian forces and reserves were sent to Donbas and eastern Kharkiv region, Kupiansk - to Donbas, Kupiansk, Lyman, and they are still going on. and Zaporizhzhia. That is, everything is there, on the 800-kilometre front.
I would not call this diversionary attack, because the enemy is actually increasing pressure on the defense forces. Therefore, this is not a distraction, but a dispersion of efforts. This is a new front. An attempt to draw away as much of our forces as possible. To create as much tension and exhaustion as possible for Ukrainian units at the front. This is the goal of the enemy's actions, and of course the Russians will try to exchange this bridgehead and their infantry for our forces. Therefore, it is very important in these conditions to use competent tactics: to make the enemy's losses in these operations worthwhile, much more expensive for them than for us. That is, these border battles with limited forces can only be stopped if the enemy meets with well-organized resistance, our well-organized intelligence system and targeted destruction, even though we have less ammunition. Of course, we need to protect our personnel at the same time. It is not about hiding them from the enemy. It is to disguise them, to use people exclusively in fortified areas, on defensive lines, to use them with the maximum number of rotations, with the maximum use of drones, artillery, mortars, ammunition, not people. In other words, the enemy should not be stopped with moving forward approach in these operations, because they will not be able to make any breakthrough on the front and use it for some kind of breakthrough of mechanized forces. We need to understand that we need to make these operations in the border area as expensive and costly as possible for the Russians. Expensive. Now we see that the Russians are trying to return to the strategy they had in 2022. As we remember, after the battle of Kharkiv, our troops in March-May of 2022 drove the Russians back from the city of Kharkiv itself. After that, from May to September of 2022, the Russians took control of the ridge of heights along the border and threatened Kharkiv from there. This ridge of heights was convenient for defense, and they constantly kept troops there to create a bridgehead and again stretch our forces. But after the successful offensive of Ukrainian troops near Balakliya in September 22, the Russians had a crisis. They had a general crisis at the front because they did not have enough infantry. They lost very quickly their ground army. They realized that they were exhausting themselves more than the Ukrainians, and they withdrew their forces, brought them to Russian territory. They surrendered the positions they held with heavy losses and focused all their efforts exclusively on Donbas and the east of Kharkiv region. The same is here. If the enemy is exhausted, if the enemy loses much more than we are losing, then these positions, this operation of the Russians, are meaningless. If they gain a foothold there, if they gradually move forward and then again shift this gray zone of bombing and artillery destruction, of course, such a situation will be disadvantageous for us. So in general, I would like to say for all Kharkiv residents that there is no threat of an immediate breakthrough. But, of course, we hope that a powerful defense line is being built away from the front, which in any case will allow us to concentrate our troops and save the lives of infantry, the main and most valuable resource of the war.
What does this offensive show? It shows that the enemy can try to capture other border villages in Kharkiv and Sumy regions, and, by and large, in Kyiv and Chernihiv regions as well, with limited forces. The Russians have their hands full. They can dictate the initiative to us because they have an advantage in certain components of weapons and manpower. They are actively recruiting, mobilising prisoners as much as they can. And they have an objective advantage both in the total number and in the number of replenishment of reserves. Therefore, this situation may be the same in other areas. We cannot stop the enemy completely now, because the main front is still Donbas. The Russian advance has not been stopped there. We hope that these attacks by Russian troops will lead to the construction of several powerful defence lines along the border with the Russian Federation at a safe distance of 5-10 km, which will allow our troops and units to rely on them in their combat operations, preventing raids by Russian special forces and such local offensive operations. Certainly, the presence of strong defensive lines would allow us to stop such breakthroughs very quickly, act with maximum confidence and save the lives of our infantry.
Friends, this is a brief description of the situation near Kharkiv. We need to understand that we have such a zone, such instability along it is a givenness ... our entire border with Russia is a potential front. And the fact that the Russians did not go to the full width of this front is not a political thing, it is simply the reality of war. The enemy reduced the front in 2022 because of the tactical and operational situation. And now he also has the resources and the need to increase the front. Further actions depend on our command
Now let's answer the question.
Why did the authorities brazen it out, proving that there would be no attack on Kharkiv, that the rumours about it were ruscists psyop, and now we have 4 lost villages in one day
It is difficult for me to comment on the information policy of the Ukrainian authorities, as our leaders are constantly saying things that contradict each other. Let's be clear, our government is waging its war in the offices and there is a war waged by the people of Ukraine and the army at the front. These are different things. Listening to the telethon and the statements of Ukrainian leaders all the time - you have to consider it .. They are constantly changing their words. We should also be quite critical and sceptical. Let's remember what our government said before the war. They said that there would be no war. Our barbecues are in May. This is the second anniversary of our May barbecues. So let's not reproach ourselves for saying something wrong. The main problem, my complaint to the government, is that it is not doing anything. If they had said all these things that are being spread and done there, the situation would not have been so difficult. So of course there are problems. I don't want to spend time on it. People are fighting there now. Ukrainian soldiers are holding back the enemy's advance. Everyone who was at the front understood that this attack could happen and that it was quite likely to take place in the format we see. We have the power to stop such actions of the Russians. These forces are being used. The destruction is being inflicted. Yes, we have our problems there, as we always do - with intelligence, with organization, with engineering structures, with supply. Unfortunately, there are problems everywhere. The authorities are not talking about it. But let's analyze the facts, not what they say on Bankova Street or in their offices. As a rule, this has very little to do with reality.
I don't understand why they didn't use drones to throw mines. Mines would have seriously halted the advance. They would have made the targets immobile or immobile at all.
In fact, it would be possible to mine everything on our territory without drones. I think there are two problems. Unfortunately, the first is that I don't know who did it and how it was organised. Secondly. There is the question of whether our sapper and engineering units were provided with mines. This is also a question. People will not make mines for themselves. A mine is a rather complicated engineering munition. I do not know. We need to understand this. Perhaps our soldiers who are fighting there now will be able to explain to us, give us their vision of why there really was no mining and the infantry passed through. To be honest, I am also surprised. On the one hand, this dense tree covershides the enemy's infantry and their manoeuvres. On the other hand, it also hides engineering barriers and mines. The enemy would not run so fast after the explosion. I'm not even talking about minefields, for example, imagine minefields that are monitored by drones. The points where the mines are installed and where the drone is hovering are adjusted. Strikes are carried out by artillery, mortars, or fpv drones, or drones dropping grenades. Of course, there would be a different picture. And we would now be seeing videos of enemy damage, not just talk about how we are hitting them. Yes, the Russians are being fired upon. But, of course, when I talk about the defense of this border strip, I do not mean that we have to build the Maginot line there. This is impossible under Russian fire. But it is possible to create a defense system there that will allow us to hit the infantry through high-quality intelligence, coordination, minefields. Perhaps other engineering solutions, other types of engineering work. There will be sighted in positions for artillery. There will be positions for our small infantry groups and special forces. So all this must be provided for. We do not yet see how it was done, whether it was foreseen. Let's wait for reports from our command, from our soldiers, from aerial reconnaissance. We will wait for it.
4-5 battalions or an BTG - please specify.
The difference is not that big, and I want to tell you that it does not look like a BTG. Russia used the BTG in 2022 and has long since abandoned it. The enemy uses larger organisational forms, at least a regiment, a brigade, and in some areas a division. In this case, as I understand it, it is one of the Russian divisions that is deployed there, and has sent several infantry battalions. And they are acting as infantry... light infantry, independent actions of small groups. That's the combat order now during the Russian attack.
Why are there no strikes on the rear of these groups?
Strikes are being carried out. Of course, we strike wherever we can, wherever we see the Russian occupiers, our soldiers try to strike. But it is not so easy. Any countermeasures require careful planning, ammunition, and intelligence to see where to go. And the enemy does not want to die. Of course, they don't stick out their necks in many cases. Of course, when they come to our territory, you expect all this to work. Obviously, in some places it works, in some places it doesn't. We'll have to see. We'll wait for the video to assess the effectiveness of the Russian infantry during these actions.
It's interesting, why did they manage to enter so easily? Where are our minefields, where are the dragon's teeth?
First of all, friends, dragon's teeth limit the maneuver of armored vehicles, they will not stop infantry. Of course, we must have minefields. Maybe we don't have that many mines. I do not know. Maybe this work was not organized in that particular area. Perhaps mines are placed in another place. It is difficult for me to judge now. But I'm also surprised, because at least the main routes - you expect that mines will work and will work not just because someone has placed mines and they are there. Mines do work. They must be in the defense system, as I said: minefields, drones controlling them, covering these minefields so that someone does not suddenly remove them with other firepower. Of course, I would like to see this. Is it possible? Is this how the enemy is met? At the moment, we have no information. Perhaps they do. We will see in the coming days, and I hope our soldiers will post videos of the Russian infantry coming in. I have already seen some videos today. We will see the full picture in the near future.
Many confidently say that it is impossible to capture Kharkiv, but what if they decide to use tactical weapons?
It means nuclear tactical weapons. Friends, let's not discuss scenarios where the enemy will destroy everything. It is still a conventional war. At the moment, the forces allocated for the defence of Kharkiv, a large city, exceed what the enemy has used in the border area. The Russians have not yet sent additional reserves to this offensive. There is a threat, of course. But for now, the situation is really that we have every opportunity to organise a reliable defence there.
What is the purpose of this offensive? The same sanitary zone?
I think a buffer zone along the border is the first such goal. It is so simple. But in fact, there are other, more important goals. I mentioned them right away. I can only repeat that the main thing is to find weaknesses in our combat order and distract our troops, our reserves, by fighting in this secondary direction. So far, it is a secondary direction. Because the enemy is still operating there, and I emphasise, with limited forces.
In an article about the prospects for the war a week ago, we wrote for the first time about the possibility of a sustainable truce, but this requires stabilisation of the frontline. Don't you think that with the current dynamics, the situation will only get worse?
I wrote about the possibility of a truce. Friends, I told you that there is a possibility of negotiations for a truce, but any negotiations are possible only when the front is stable, when it is stopped. Why do we need to stabilise and stop the frontline at the line of fortifications? Firstly, to ensure that the enemy is not able to move forward. Then there are two ways: either we prepare, wage a long war on this front line, on this line, destroy the enemy, inflict losses on it, and then either conditions for negotiations arise, or one day, when we have accumulated the necessary amount of resources, we can talk about going on the offensive, if it is provided with resources and conditions are created for this, preparations are made. This is the only way. That is why a strong defence line is a top priority for us.
Is Medusa writing about this, or does it seem real to you? A source close to the Presidential Administration believes that the country's top leadership has set realistic goals of capturing Kharkiv, ending of SMO...
Friends, let's not go there - some foreign media, the media. Let's not waste time on this. I just don't really understand it. Let's analyse the situation on the frontline not on the basis of what someone said or wrote somewhere. Let's analyse the situation on the frontline based on real facts. When I say that there are 4-5 infantry battalions there and the enemy is acting with limited forces, my information is based on intelligence provided by the intelligence agencies, i.e. video, satellite photos, reports of our intelligence agencies, opinion, assessment of commanders who make decisions on the spot. In other words, it is tied to objective facts. And I draw conclusions from these facts. They are obvious if you put all these facts together. And all this stuff that is being said here - of course... why Kharkiv? They wanted to capture the whole of Ukraine. What should we do, scare ourselves? We've been fighting a full-scale war with them for three years now, and we've been fighting a local war for 10 years
What are the prospects for an offensive from Belarus?
Such a threat exists. However, there are currently no signs of the Belarusian army preparing to enter the war. Lukashenka's regime has greatly strengthened cooperation with the Russian Federation in the military sphere. They jointly conduct military exercises. They are integrating the Belarusian army into the Russian army. They are actively modernising and strengthening, and this is a big threat to us. But at the moment, the Belarusian army is not preparing for direct combat.
In your opinion, could these actions be a deceptive maneuver?
I've said it before, I can only repeat it. This is not a deceptive manoeuvre. These are actually quite logical goals of the Russian command from an operational tactical point of view.
How can we help the defenders of Kharkiv? What are the most urgent needs to prevent further breakthroughs?
There is actually a positional offensive by Russian infantry. It is the same as they are conducting in other parts of the frontline. How can we help the defenders of Kharkiv? The same way we help the defenders of Ukraine nearby in the Kharkiv region, in the Kupiansk direction. We are all well aware of this in the third year of the full-scale war. First of all, it is, of course, drones, what is needed to supply the soldiers, vehicle repairs, new vehicles. I think everyone understands this.
Do you think the Ukrainian Armed Forces will launch a counter-offensive, for example, in the Kherson direction?
No offensive actions are possible in the Kherson direction. We are conducting limited operations there in the area of the village of Krynky. Basically, it is impossible to do anything else there. Even in Krynky, to be honest, it is very difficult to hold on. The big question is, why are we staying there? The big question is, should we? Why? Because there are objective reasons: the huge Dnipro River makes it impossible to carry out any actions. Therefore, in order to cross the Dnipro, we must first of all have a significant advantage in strength over the Russians on the frontline. You need to have a powerful air defence system that can repel attacks by Russian aircraft, an advantage in ammunition and infantry. We also need to build powerful pontoon ferries and bridges across the Kherson. You understand, let's be realistic.
Friends, I am very grateful for your support. Many people send me text messages and even photos with expressions of support. I am very grateful to you all. I'm grateful and I want to thank you especially... I want to say that we will certainly monitor the situation in the Kharkiv region closely, as well as in other areas. I would like to thank everyone who supports Butusov+ and allows us to prepare these maps, analyse the situation and broadcast them. This is all thanks to the support of our 2229 sponsors at the moment. Thank you. Thank you to all our subscribers and especially to our sponsors, because without your financial support, our systematic work and our reports would not be possible. But we are trying to work harder and harder and produce more and more quality content. Thank you, friends. We will say goodbye. I know that there are many decent and worthy soldiers near Kharkiv, and I am confident today more than ever that Ukraine will win, that our decisions, intelligent decisions, the will of our people, intelligence, will make everyone and leaders at all levels learn from the war experience, draw the right conclusions from the situation. We have people who know how to create an advantage over the Russians in battle. There are many of them. They are motivated. They need our support and the support of our allies. Thank you, friends, for the broadcast. And glory to Ukraine!
Yurii Butusov
