Russian offensive in Kharkiv region. Fighting for Vovchansk
The topic of the stream is the Russian offensive in the Kharkiv region.
THE ENEMY IS PULLING UP RESERVES
I have recently returned from Vovchansk. I saw with my own eyes what was happening in that area, what was happening in the city. Indeed, the Russian offensive began on May 10. Now we are already seeing the first results and changes in the operational situation at the strategic level. The enemy, after gaining the first success and advancing along the border, apparently assessed these efforts as their success and gradually, not massively, the Russian command began to pull up reserves. First of all, infantry reserves, which are being redeployed for the offensive from the north.
Of course, we can see that what initially looked like armed reconnaissance, which unfortunately was not stopped as it should have been, was regarded by the enemy as a weakness in our defense and began to gradually increase its efforts, as it concluded that it was more convenient to break through our defense from the northern borders than to fight in a stationary position that had already been built up on the eastern front.
FIGHTING IN VOVCHANSK
On 12 May, Russian troops gained a foothold on the outskirts of Vovchansk. They seized the meat processing plant and the outer streets. And today (13 May - ed.), the Russians actually entered the city. Street fighting started in the city itself. So, the enemy managed to get a hold of the residential areas of Vovchansk. This way they get shelter for their assault groups and the opportunity to advance forward. So now, of course, there is a response from the Ukrainian command.
OUR TROOPS ARE BEING REINFORCED
Of course, our troops on the border are being reinforced and the situation is certainly becoming clearer, I would say so. In some places, manageable. In some places, organized. But it is still a long way from the chaos that occurred on the first day, unfortunately, and the consequences of which still need to be eliminated.
I was in Vovchansk. I understand that the city is 5 km from the border with Russia. This is understandable. It is clear that it is difficult to build there and prepare it for defense. An enemy can see everything. 5 km away, they can strike. But, dear friends, there are no signs of any defensive structures in the city and around the city. The enemy is advancing in all directions without any obstacles. There are anti-tank minefields. A small number, but they exist, and the enemy is afraid of them. He uses armoured vehicles to a limited extent. But, unfortunately, there are no minefields that could stop or obstruct the infantry in that area. The enemy, of course, uses this. They conduct armed reconnaissance, lose a number of assault groups, and test the strength of our defense. Here they saw that they could go further and they went.
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF VOVCHANSK
The enemy entered Vovchansk. I want to say that Vovchansk is a very important city. It is the flank of our Kupiansk grouping. Of course, it is a city that has to be defended. We still have opportunities to defend the city. The city is divided in half by a river. In principle, we could withdraw across the river. But why? There are no major assaults there. The enemy is conducting artillery and air strikes. But this is not Bakhmut. The attack today (May 13 - ed.) was carried out by rather limited forces of individual assault groups. It was not some kind of invasion like the second Bakhmut. No. Everything was much more prosaic. Of course, how to defend? In Vovchansk, our infantry has to take up positions in houses. Because there are no open trenches, slits, dugouts. There are only houses. We understand perfectly well that houses in street warfare, in such a war in a city, especially in a city like Vovchansk, are a one-story town with basically only one block of 9-story buildings in the center. Of course, it is extremely difficult for infantry to take cover in these small houses. Of course, they need shelters. We need camouflaging. We need positions for equipment in the nearby forests. We need some kind of equipped strongholds. Unfortunately, friends, I do not see all this. It's just strange, not only I don't see it, but the military also don't see it. I was in an aerial reconnaissance unit of the 57th Brigade, I was with the soldiers on the front line. To be honest, they all ask the same questions that I have. So now, of course, the direction of Vovchansk is getting more and more important. It is possible to hold back the enemy there, there is a river line there. But only if the command is still responsible for the result. If there is responsiveness to command. Responsiveness to command that is not just about reporting and reports: everything is tense, but controlled. And the result - the elimination of the enemy and the preservation of our positions and our personnel - is what we are lacking.
We see that this is an unpleasant situation, but it is being corrected. The enemy is advancing very, very slowly in other areas, in the Kharkiv sector in that direction, and cannot boast of any significant successes. That is, the main problem of our troops there is command, controllability, situational awareness, which was lost on the first day. Now, after replacing the commander of the Kharkiv military operation centre on the first day of the Russian offensive, the new commander of the Kharkiv Operational-Tactical Group (OTG), General Mykhailo Drapatyi, is trying to restore it. This is not so simple and easy to do in a few days from scratch, right during intense fighting.
DEFENCE LINE UNDER THE HEIGHTS
But, dear friends, the situation on the border looks much more stable in general. This is because, just as the enemy is pulling up reserves, we are pulling up reserves. Our commanders are already consolidating their positions. I have already written and can say it again. Why do our soldiers say that there are no emplaced positions? It turned out that the main line of fortifications shown in the video is, unfortunately, not as dense as the defense line should be. These are separate defensive posts where the video was filmed. Unfortunately, this is not the entire line. But the main problem is that the defense line of these structures, which have been digging around Kharkiv and the border with Russia for a year and a half, does not cover Vovchansk, first of all. It does not cover the village of Starytsia and other villages that are of important tactical operational importance in that area. They pass through a very strange decision of those who planned this construction. There is a ridge of heights along the border. So for some reason, the defensive positions did not cover this range of hills, but they were far down in the lowlands. How can you defend this, all military men ask, when your defensive positions are in hills. What is a hill? It's not just a shot for, for example, anti-tank missile systems, but also positions for antennas for operators of enemy attack drones, mavic drones, and reconnaissance drones. How can you leave the hills behind the defense line? That is why our troops are still fighting. They are actually keeping the enemy out. Instead of defending themselves in equipped positions, our troops are still forced to fight closer to the border, outside this line of fortifications, and set up temporary positions there. This is a strange situation. So the fighters say, where is our defense line? And the leaders say: it is there. Indeed, it is there. Only in the depths. And the troops are not fighting on it. Well, this is the strange story of this planning. The question arises: who planned it all? Why is it organized in this way? I want to say that the main thing for our troops, what the soldiers say, what the commanders say, is not even the lack of defensive structures, but the lack of preparation for the Russian offensive and planning of countermeasures. The enemy follows certain routes. Our intelligence knew these routes. What does this allow? You can emplace engineering positions, minefields, prepare ambushes using artillery, mortars, find the range, make positions for drones, and in certain convenient areas also ambush with the help of attack drones. At least plan such measures. For this tactic, emplace camouflaged positions, reserve positions for artillery maneuvers, especially armored vehicles. There are many things that allow for defense. There are many components. Unfortunately, it turns out that we have been standing in these positions for a year and a half and we are improvising again. It's just unbelievable, and it raises a lot of questions for the military. I hope that somehow the authorities will pay attention to this. We should at least start drawing some conclusions. Otherwise, it is simply incomprehensible.
I THANK THE MAYORS AND COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES FOR THEIR SUPPORT
Friends, I want to thank you. I wrote a post, addressed local government leaders, mayors, leaders of territorial communities, heads of local authorities, and I received a very big response thanks to your reposts and comments. The mayors of many cities - Kyiv, Dnipro, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, representatives of various communities, Kryvyi Rih, Lutsk - wrote about their work in the post, and many, many cities wrote in the comments. I'm pleased, though, you know, you watch and hear a lot of people talking in such despair that it's everyone for themselves, there is no unity. But in fact, when another disaster comes, there is a terrible war going on, and the Russian offensive and to stop the enemy, to raise funds for drones, for the necessary things for the brigades that are now going to the border in separate units or entire brigades - a huge number of people have united. Now we are getting a lot of help from all the units I listed in the post, and now, by the way, I have added a few units that are also involved - they are very pleased and happy to report that help is coming to them. It's really very cool.
I want to say that today I did not share a donation card in my post, but I want to inform you that at the moment people who know the address of my foundation, the details of my foundation for this day transferred to the fund for the purchase of drones and equipment for the use of drones 3 million 300 thousand UAH and more than 40 thousand dollars and euros, the equivalent of about 40 thousand in one day. Friends, all this money will be spent in the near future to purchase the necessary equipment, thermal imaging cameras for fpv drones, attack drones and to purchase night and day Mavic drones. I understand that these are the most scarce items. So we will spend all this money and provide it. And antennas, of course, avenger antennas, are also needed. We will solve all these problems. A large number of needs will be met today and in the coming days through the efforts of Ukrainian civil society. I hope that the state will also get organized. Drones are now a key tool that allows us to deter and repel Russian attacks. Therefore, if we want to destroy this massive offensive, we must first of all strengthen those drone units that can work and destroy the enemy. And such units are now starting to work. Unfortunately, I did not see this in Vovchansk. I hope that in the near future some teams will be deployed there that are very good at fpv, very good at dropping, and the capabilities of the 57th Infantry Brigade will be increased. Today, they were also promised the transfer of a significant number of drones from various city halls and territorial communities. So, friends, I am very grateful to everyone. This is such a great inspiration for the soldiers, for me, that after the post, such a huge help. Believe me, all the units that are there will use all this valuable and expensive equipment, this number of drones, with great effort. And we will add more to it.
THERE IS NO THREAT TO KHARKIV AT THE MOMENT
I would like to briefly tell you about the situation. There is no threat to Kharkiv at the moment, as you should clearly understand. This has already been concentrated, and now the nature of the enemy's actions is clear. Our reserves are concentrated in the north of the Kharkiv region. The enemy will no longer be able to sneak through. Now they managed to battle through Vovchansk because there was no preparation, no organization. I would say, first of all, there was no responsibility for all this. Yes, they succeeded. But they have not yet captured the city. Our reinforcements are also going there. Our soldiers are also fighting the enemy with great quality and efficiency. The fate of the battle for Vovchansk is far from being decided. I don't think the enemy will be able to cross the river in a parade march and mop up everything so quickly. I think there will be serious battles ahead.
But this Russian maneuver, of course, raises questions. There was a certain underestimation of the enemy. We noticed that the enemy made armed reconnaissance and then began to increase its efforts. Now we have to drive them out of the forest areas and it will be quite difficult in some areas. Nevertheless, heavy fighting is going on. I want to say that in those areas where we have organized command, where we have responsible commanders and combat-ready units, the Russians are certainly not advancing, they are being beaten and suffering very, very serious losses. That's why this infantry invasion on a wide front in the north of the Kharkiv region, they will not be able to go on for so long and storm continuously.
WHAT IS THE ENEMY PLANNING?
The situation at the front has become more stable, as the Russians have moved all their infantry reserves to the north of the Kharkiv region. The Russian army is large, but not so large that it can attack everywhere at once. Russian aviation is concentrating its efforts, and Russian artillery is concentrating its ammunition on the northern borders. The enemy has suspended its offensive in other areas, and its attacks have become less active. Nevertheless, in Donbas, in certain areas, such as Novomykhailivka and near Avdiivka, they tried to conduct several such attacks. In one case, they even managed to enter with tank columns, and our soldiers destroyed and knocked out them all. The defense is holding.
What do I think about the situation in the north? What is the forecast? Of course, the enemy will want to capture most parts of Vovchansk. Of course, the enemy will want to gain a foothold around the city and, using the forest areas, try to infiltrate further with infantry forces. But the pace of advance is slow because they are already experiencing resistance everywhere. Previously, there were not enough forces and the enemy could simply bypass certain defensive posts but now it is impossible.
I would like to point out, of course, that we always say that there were some shortcomings in the troops somewhere, someone left, some brigade left, abandoned positions. I have heard this about one brigade, even several brigades. I won't even mention the number specifically. But, dear friends, I, for example, do not see the soldiers' fault at the front. And most officers with experience in 2022 do not see it either. Soldiers should not be held responsible for organizing their own battle. It seems to me that our military command is a little bit... I don't know how to say it, it's probably the wrong word, spoiled... but complacent and wants to see that in their imagination... they are spoiled by this infantry of the year 2022, highly motivated, trained during the war, infantry of the year 2022 with high morale, who went to war knowing that there was nothing but a small amount of ammunition and they had to do everything themselves. They had to look for engineering support themselves, dig in themselves, organize their own intelligence, create this intelligence, create artillery, mortars, look for ammunition, look for weapons. We had to do everything ourselves. But infantry of the year 2022 is not forever. The infantry must be formed in a quality manner. People cannot fight continuously for 2 years in the infantry. It's just physically hard - physically and psychologically a great burden. And the infantry of the year 2024 cannot fight when someone points a finger at the map and says: look, there are not enough of you here, you have to disperse 2-4-6 people at most. And hold everything here. But you won't even see where your neighbors are, because we will stretch you all out here and hold the line, hold on. It's not going to happen. It's not possible. It's not possible. People do not hold out in such conditions.
Who should we ask? The soldiers who are leaving their positions? I think that once we should look at the commanders. Look, in the first offensive, the commander of the OTG was dismissed. And it was not the first replacement. As soon as the enemy started talking and there was intelligence data, it became clear that there would be an offensive in the north of the Kharkiv region, the commander was dismissed and Halushkin was replaced by Hrytskov. That is, they replaced one with another. And then on the day of the offensive, it turned out that they had to change him again. Tell me, whose fault is this? We understand what a change of commander is. This is a serious managerial chaos in such a critical situation. Is it the soldiers' fault? No, it is not. There must be some responsibility for the commanders. Someone appoints them, they make some decisions. These are wrong decisions. We must draw conclusions from this. We shouldn't just write comments about soldiers. We need to write about the commanders. This is the third year of the war. Not the first, not even the second.
Similarly, here in the brigade, we have one brigade that is accused of leaving in several cases. Friends, people are leaving... Ukrainian soldiers who go to war and stay at the front, they leave when they lose control, when there is no fire support and when the enemy has many, many times more fire support. In other words, if there is no communication, no interaction with neighbors, no fire support, no reserve, no rotation, yes, people leave. But is it a problem that they are weak, poorly motivated? No. They are sitting under the GABs. They sit under shells for months. Will an unmotivated person tolerate this? No. People leave when management fails. That's why they leave. And who should be responsible for this? For some reason, they say that soldiers are leaving. In fact, you always have to look at the commanders, and how this brigade can be managed - I looked on Wikipedia, and in the brigade that is accused, the commander is 60 years old and the last time he commanded troops was in the army, he commanded a division in 2004, and then served in the border guard service. Then suddenly 20 years pass and he is a brigade commander. Friends, doesn't it seem that this is a bit of an inadequate experience? He hasn't even been through the ATO, he doesn't know what drones are, he can't just quickly adapt to these changes in tactics... we have elderly officers who are competent, but who served in the ATO, who are constantly on duty, they are in the know, they understand what it is. Why take a person who has no modern experience out of retirement? It's just absurd. What kind of claims can be made against the soldiers? These should be claims against those who appointed the brigadier, against the brigadier himself, and against those combat training departments that checked combat readiness, against the commanders of the OTG who were here, who drew beautiful battle formations with flags in two echelons here, here, here. Then the enemy suddenly advances and it turns out that the flags are flags, but the front line is unknown, the situational awareness is unknown. Help! And the units that are supposed to save the situation arrive are sent.
Our soldiers are basically the same everywhere now. There are no special ones. The only difference in the quality of combat capability of our brigades is the quality of management. The people are the same. If a person goes to the front line under such heavy interference from Russian aviation and artillery, I believe that this person is already motivated. They need quality management, quality organization, and they will fight well. He is already motivated. Here we should not blame the soldiers for the fact that someone left, but blame and look for... You know, the word "blame" is a bad one in our country. Behind it, I see a lot of writing by SBI investigators and military counterintelligence, which ends up as just waste paper, then thrown into a trash can, we have no analysis of previous actions. We do not have the NATO after-action review standard, which we have talked about 100 times, a hundred million times. How can this be? There is no one. No one draws conclusions. And everything is blamed on the soldiers: the conclusions about Soledar are blamed on the soldiers, the conclusions about Bakhmut are blamed on the soldiers, conclusions about Avdiivka are blamed on the soldiers. Someone left there somewhere. Excuse me, but when will there be conclusions about those who were responsible for the deployment of troops, about the construction of a defense line in the lowlands for some reason under the hills? Who came up with this idea? It was signed and agreed upon. About combat capability, when someone writes that no, you have a large combat strength at 20% manning, and no one looks at it. And no one looks at what this strength consists of. We have a lot of paperwork. Every month we have new reports and documents. And who is responsible for the result? There is a lack of this responsibility. It's not a lack of people. It's not a lack of motivation. It's not a lack of weapons or even a lack of ammunition. The main problem is the lack of responsibility for the result. The fact that there was no such responsibility at the highest levels of command, where the causes should be investigated and analyzed, is why we see such a crisis, which, in principle, our troops will heroically localize and stop the enemy, there is no doubt. The Russian offensive in the north will be stopped. There is no doubt about it. We have enough commanders there who, in critical conditions, in chaos, when the situation is unclear to higher headquarters, take the initiative, organize drones, reconnaissance by drones. This work is going on right now, at this moment. Every day, every day. And we will form a - time will pass and a front will be formed up here and the Russian infantry will fight against it, they will be killed much more than now, when there are problems in management, organization, interaction.
But this will be overcome soon. But, dear friends, when will we stop falling into the trap? We know everything. All the intelligence has given us a complete timetable. Why is there no preparation and objective assessment? Why are reports and papers substituted for real work and results? And what is the result of the war? Is it to write a bunch of reports? To give you an idea, we have a company commander, for example, who is the key person in the war who makes the war happen. Every day he has at least 16-18 documents of mandatory reporting. There is reporting. It is increasing at every level. There are more and more commissions. But where is the result? Where is the responsibility? Who is responsible for this? And here we have this - oops! One was there, the other was replaced. Nothing happened. Let's put a third commander in charge during the enemy's offensive. So maybe we should have used our heads, checked and appointed Drapatyi at least a month earlier. And the troops that are now coming in as reserves - at least a third of those troops should have been deployed a week earlier. It would have been just another operation. The enemy would have just fought, they would have been knocked out. And they would have just had mountains of corpses and they would not have advanced anywhere. And that's it. Unfortunately, for some reason - for some reason it was a problem then, and it is a problem now. This lack of responsibility. But I hope that we will draw conclusions. And I want to say that I'm speaking very restrained, very laconically now. But a little later we will talk in more detail about what happened and why it happened. And now the answers to the questions you asked.
COULD THE RUSSIANS EXPAND THE FRONT AND REPEAT SUCH ATTACKS ALONG THE BORDER IN THE SUMY AND CHERNIHIV REGIONS?
Could the Russians expand the front and repeat such attacks along the border in Sumy and Chernihiv regions?
They can. The enemy can. They realized they felt that our defense was as reported, not maneuverable, and these small chains of observation posts were an illusion of defense that existed only in the imagination of the people in the headquarters who drew it. The infantry must be able to maneuver in defense. As it is, we have defuzed combat formations, where the enemy enters and bypasses or breaks through in compact groups wherever it wants. From this, we must draw conclusions. But, dear friends, the enemy will not be able to conduct another additional offensive on a wide front on this scale. All these offensives, believe me, all these seizures of square kilometers along the border, are not a cakewalk for Russian troops. They are suffering losses. They could have suffered many times more losses. But they are still suffering losses and this is a rather bloody operation for them with significant infantry losses... so they will not be able to go on the same scale along the entire border. But it is likely that, just like here in the Kharkiv region, they will first organize an armed reconnaissance to test our combat formations, inflict damage, and see how we will react. They will come in and check. If the resistance is weak, they will advance further. Just like they are doing now. They are looking for gaps in the battle lines and this kind of fluid or creeping offensive - flows here and there. There is resistance here, so they go around and go where the resistance is weaker. So, of course, we need to be prepared for this, but, dear friends, our troops have shown that, unfortunately, not all of them have combat capability, but many of our units do, and it is being formed. We have people who can destroy and stop the enemy. Therefore, we will not have such a catastrophe at the front.
The news of Drapatyi's appointment to the Kharkiv direction has made me feel a little warmer, but the situation still requires explanation. Especially in the context of Mr Halushkin and his responsibility for the fortifications. I think the entire border now requires thorough inspections.
Inspections and commissions will not save our army, because inspections, commissions, investigations and criminal cases are not tools for determining the responsibility of leaders, conclusions, analyzes, so that this does not happen again. And these are folders of compromising material that are getting bigger and bigger, so that at any time, when it's interesting, you can take them, grab them and hit a general or a brigade commander on the head and knock him down easily. Or a commander, or a company commander. That's what it's for. This is not to show off. That's why, dear friends, no commissions, no inspections - all this has turned into a complete profanation that simply hinders the troops and distracts people and the combat situation. It's just a fetish that has nothing behind it, no real results. The responsibility for the result here, I think, is not only Mr. Halushkin's. The same fortifications were approved... some of them were built by the civil–military administration, some by others. The question arises: who did they coordinate with? Because the civil–military administration is the presidential vertical. And who coordinated this plan of fortifications with them, who drew it for them? Many questions arise.
Was it possible to build fortifications right on the border with Russia?
No, it was impossible to build it and there was no tactical need to build fortifications on the border with Russia, there is absolutely no logic in it. But the defense has to be different. If the defense is built at the 3, 5, 7, 19 km line, what does it allow you to do? It allows you to shoot certain areas. For example, to prepare certain routes for the enemy in terms of engineering, or to make obstructions, or, on the contrary, to burn vegetation, make minefields, make places for ambushes. To equip positions for artillery manoeuvre, manoeuvre of drone units, mine certain areas. For example, if the enemy infantry is moving along a route that needs to be captured, a communication hub. There is a minefield there and the drone constantly monitors this minefield. And a couple of guns are pointed and waiting for someone to come up there and want to clear it. And this is called a defensive manoeuvre, a manoeuvre by fire. It's not just sending people with a shovel to dig in somewhere and waiting for someone to come at you. All of this is planned in advance. It can be done not directly on the border, but using this territory as a buffer, as a cover. The enemy enters there, we notice them immediately and we adjust our attack. This is the right approach to the border area. That's why the first thing I want to say is that in no way should we blame the soldiers here. The only ones who are not to blame are the soldiers. Only respect can be shown to them.
Did you manage to meet the needs of the Kharkiv region that you wrote about?
Of course, this cannot cover all the needs. It covers the needs of specific units that are currently under a heavy combat load. And these units will cover their key needs - and the key need is always drones - for a while. For a while. But, of course, now society has lent a hand, volunteers are constantly donating. But they won't be able to do it every week. Of course, the state should use the time to ensure that these contracts for Mavic are eventually fulfilled, that the purchase of FPVs becomes flexible and that only those FPVs are bought that are really in demand at the front in the configuration that is needed now. These standards should determine the best combat teams. The state also needs to draw conclusions. Not only civil society needs to learn.
Is the loss of Vovchansk a threat not to Kharkiv, but to Kupiansk and Sloviansk?
Yes, of course, this is the enemy's attempt to threaten our holding of the Oskil baseline. The Oskil baseline along the Oskil River, including Kupiansk, is a key line that actually allows us to control the eastern part of the Kharkiv region very effectively, and it is a line that is easy to defend if it is prepared for defense properly. Therefore, the enemy will certainly want to disassemble the front - to come down from the north and disassemble the front to Kupiansk. This is a serious threat. But again, it's not all that easy for the enemy there. Vovchansk is also divided by a river, and forcing it across will by no means be a cakewalk for the enemy.
Why, in your opinion, did they change the commander of the SOF again and is Trepak the best candidate?
I stopped a long time ago... to analyze the personnel decisions of the Presidential Office, I think you need to be more of a psychoanalyst. I don't understand the reasons for replacing the Commanders of the SOF. Oleksandr Trepak is a person I respect because he is a person who, after many years of service in the army, his entire career in the army and receiving a high rank, nevertheless reads books and has not stopped in his development, loves to learn and listens to criticism. He likes to analyze what has happened. These are really rare qualities for a leader of his level. I like them. But why was he appointed? I never understood why his predecessors were appointed. And now I don't know why he was suddenly appointed. There were no conclusions, neither open nor closed, so what can I say? Why? I would like to believe that these are some echoes of some problems with the use of special operations forces that we have objectively. But no one in the SOF knows the information.
WHY DID PUTIN REPLACE SHOIGU?
Why did Putin replace Shoigu?
Because Russia is in crisis, and Putin has decided that the war needs to be managed, by civilian managers. In fact, this is correct, and I also believe that modern warfare is a war of technology. This is obvious to everyone. And mobilization for the industry is underway. It is needed first and foremost and no less urgently than mobilization in the army. Since the army has to fight with equipment, industrial products... and now Putin wants to overcome the positional deadlock at the front by using a person with civilian competencies, who also has experience in the special services, that is, from Putin's team, a person close to him in psychology. And in his eyes, he is a manager who can organize the work of the Ministry of Defense in a different way. I see this appointment as a threat. Shoigu did not understand a lot of things... it was obvious in the development and construction of the modern army, we understand it perfectly well, we see it. For me, such changes in the enemy are a serious problem. They put a person in charge who has a lot of experience. This should not be underestimated in any way. This is a serious challenge for us. It would have been easier, to be honest, if they had appointed some kind of a solemn general. Unfortunately, they appointed a manager. This is a challenge for us. Because modern warfare is a war of technology. The one who develops technologies better, applies them on the battlefield, uses constant innovations, creates huge tactical advantages. I would like to believe that this fact of the change in defense policy in Russia will be appreciated by the Ukrainian leadership. I would like to believe, so to speak.
Have those responsible for the lack of defensive fortifications been identified?
The enemy is advancing on the fourth day, so here... In order to say guilty or innocent, the state must have at least some state institutions in law enforcement, and we know how they work.
How long will 3 assault brigades' strength last to "extinguish these fires"?
I think that what is happening is a serious signal to our military leadership, to the Minister of Defense, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces about the need to reform the Armed Forces. What creates an advantage in war? The quality of the command staff. Brigade commanders, battalion commanders, company commanders, and their staffs must work as an ensemble. They must understand modern tactics, modern means of warfare. This creates an advantage. Not the number of flags and brigades on the map. If you looked at the map near Kharkiv on May 10, everything is covered in flags, everything is in two echelons... and it seems from the map that everything is fine in general. And then problems arise. Someone leaves their positions. You start to figure out why. And there is no interaction, no management, no support - no, no, no. You know, everything is objective. So it's obvious that brigades that have good management and administration, such as the 3rd Assault Brigade, like the 92nd, 93rd, 80th, and we still have brigades where this personnel cadre, the school, some sergeants, even company commanders have stayed, and in the 3rd Assault Brigade, there are even many quality platoon commanders. This is the irreplaceable, unique cadre that needs to be built up. They can be given people without training, and they will use them well, and they will train them. In other words, these poorly organized brigades should be entered added to, and take on strength to regular brigades. This will reduce the number of these military forces, but it will increase the combat capability of the army as a whole. We are ignoring this. A huge pile of new units is being created for which there are no sergeants, no officers, no commanders, no support - nothing. Just flags. Let's draw more flags on the map. Let's create more positions with vacancies. This is just absurd. When I recently heard the statement of Army Commander Pavliuk that he was creating 10 more brigades... to be honest, I was very disappointed. Oleksandr Syrskyi and Oleksandr Pavliuk really seem to be... well... quite intelligent people. When you communicate, you listen to them. How can you come up with such strange ideas? Projects must be staffed. If there is no staff, why deploy people? The number of people in uniform with weapons, no matter how many you gather, is not an army, it is not a brigade, it is not a battalion. They are just a crowd that is dressed and given weapons. This is true. A person does not become a soldier, does not become a fighter, does not gain coherence, control of all this just by wearing a uniform. These are obvious things. Nevertheless, we keep repeating this rake and creating new brigades that are not provided with anything, while quality brigades with quality commanders do not receive the necessary number of people and weapons. This is absurd. This needs to be reconsidered. By the way, I will make a separate program about this.
Is this situation on the frontline in Donetsk, the enemy's advance and the situation in the Kharkiv region the result of the new Commander-in-Chief, Syrskyi?
Objectively speaking, I cannot say that it is all the fault of Syrskyi alone. These mistakes were also made under Zaluzhnyi. They were also made. We see all these new brigades being created from scratch, with no provision for anything, we see Bakhmut, Soledar and Avdiivka - the reasons are the same. And even earlier, Sieverodonetsk and Lysychansk. It all happened. We are repeating these mistakes. Why? Because we, the country's leadership, have no desire to achieve results. There is a desire to balance. You cannot achieve results by balancing. If you are leading people somewhere, you have to follow a certain course, and not be nice and gentle to everyone, smile at everyone, think about the rating. Someone will be happy, someone will not be happy. But, I'm sorry, the loyalty of generals should be ensured by their results and battles won, soldiers' lives saved and the respect of their subordinates. This is the path of a general's career. Not just like that. That he came in, reported: everything is beautiful, tense, controlled, once, once - and then he is dismissed on the first day of the offensive. This is because he is not ready. Someone appointed him, heard his reports? The president came, inspected the defense structures, listened to the reports. He liked everything. Commissions were visiting. Inspections visited. Everyone liked everything. And then - bang! And there is no combat capability. We have to draw conclusions from this. This is Syrskyi's problem at the moment. But I want to tell you that if Oleksandr Syrskyi does not draw conclusions, he will lose his position much faster than his predecessor Valerii Zaluzhnyi did. Much faster. The precedent has been set and it is very convenient.
I would very much like to see Oleksandr Stanislavovych Syrskyi analyze it. Okay, no one wants to study the reasons for failed operations, mistakes, the appointment of someone's friends as brigadiers, and the fact that they do not dismiss their cousins-acquaintances-friends from their positions because they are just very nice despite all the mess and disruption that is happening. Okay, that's understandable. But at least look at your career politically. If you are losing land, losing cities for the same reasons, you will be dismissed faster. Do you really want to do this and will you go on stubbornly and not want to take a critical look from the outside, and what can be changed qualitatively in the army? It won't be long, Oleksandr Stanislavovych, when people look up to you and do everything. There will be a few more breakthroughs like this, and you won't have enough people to cover everything. People will not cover everything. Why would they do that? Why not think about changes? About what needs to be taken into account, what conclusions to draw? Is it so difficult? I just don't understand the logic behind sometimes saying that the third assault battalion needs to be replenished, that it needs to be reinforced. It has shown its combat capability. For example, we have weak brigades that do not have the necessary number of commanders and non-commissioned officers. We have brigades that are constantly on the lips of the Land Forces command - 115, 62. They are good people. But they need leadership. And they will prove themselves perfectly well. TDF brigades. Turn the third assault brigade into a third assault division. Give them two more weak brigades, the weakest ones. And there will be combat capability. Then there will be enough personnel. Perhaps you can give them not three, but four brigades. You will reduce this unnecessary administrative apparatus and increase the operational strength. Everyone will benefit. People will live better, fight better. And the army will fulfill its tasks. Instead, 3 assault brigades are not being replenished to full strength, and Mr. Pavliuk wants to form 10 new brigades from the air.
Can the Russians reach Kharkiv?
Theoretically, they can. But right now they have no opportunities. Our troops are there, we have reserves, and we have the will to defend Kharkiv. Believe me, our soldiers are much more motivated than the Russians. As soon as management, interaction, and organization are established there - which is not there now, this chaos is being managed - another war will be fought there. This is not because the enemy is too powerful and we are too weak. It is because we cannot, do not know how to use our advantages, to get ahead of the enemy through operational management and organizational decisions. This is because we cannot outnumber the enemy in terms of aircraft, bombs, shells, mortar shells. We cannot be ahead of them. What do we need to think about? We need to think about where we can be faster, more accurate, and better. We have to think about it. And what does this provide? This is a requirement for management. Not to the soldiers-executors. So, friends, I don't think the Russians will reach Kharkiv. I think that they will be stopped now, they will suffer huge losses, and in some areas where it is not profitable for them, they will withdraw, perhaps even to the border. But for this to happen, a lot of work needs to be done. Now, unfortunately, it can only be done with the enthusiasm and independence of brigade, battalion, and unit commanders. That's because the right hierarchy is not here. It is unclear when it will be re-established on such a front in such chaos. I hope that this crisis will not be resolved by increasing the number of headquarters, as we are very fond of, some special headquarters named after some cities. In other words, by increasing the number of temporary positions. More headquarters, more confusion for the troops. But on the basis of improved brigade management. There will be shorter lanes, greater troop density, the ability of troops and brigades to deploy in two echelons, not in a thin chain of observation posts, to have some kind of tactical reserve in this way. To give people rest, to maintain the intensity of combat operations. I hope that the decisions will be of high quality. I hope so. And if they are not, we will talk about the responsibility of officials - moral responsibility on the air - I don't see how else to re-educate them. This is the third year of this rake. I understand that many people at the top do not study and do not want to study at all. They like it. They are blockheaded and a little lacking in empathy, that their mistakes are blood, they are losses. Losses of people, first of all. Failure of combat missions. These are living occupants who could be destroyed, and they are running around. Today I watched on the streamers how the enemy simply walked in full-length groups into some streets in Vovchansk during the day. Where is everything? Where is the organization? Where is the fpv? Where is the artillery, where are the mortars that hit? Where does it all go? It is there. Management, management and management is the main problem. And this problem is unfortunately not being solved here because whenever someone is criticized, it is perceived as the end of the world, that they will be dismissed. And everyone fights back against criticism to the death, and we need an after-action review. I am sure that until we have an after-action review of the work of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and the commanders of the OSGTs, who also like to run around with their thoughtless "move forward" orders, until the commanders of the OTGs are accountable, there will be no order.
And finally, I want to say one more thing. About leadership. How can we make a high-quality army? We need to appoint not our 60-year-old friends to command positions, with all due respect, but those who have proven themselves in the war, who are energetic, healthy, and versed in technology. We have such officers in the army. This will be competent leadership. We will talk about leadership and army organization in the next episode. Because this is a separate topic. I'll tell you how many brigadiers we've had replaced in recent years. What did it lead to. Whether it has strengthened the army. Whether the army is now better managed than it was in February-March of 2022, for example. Let's look at the situation.
I have been to many of our combat units. I've seen a lot of our soldiers in recent days. I'm just amazed at how many of our brigades, our battalions, our soldiers are trying to save the situation, fix the situation, inflict losses on the enemy, hold the territory in a professional, dedicated manner, without sleep, without rest. It is simply incredible. Now, when the command is going in the doldrums, it is weak, there are moments when commanders can prove themselves, take decisions. We have some brigades that are doing this. I saw this in some brigades of the Armed Forces and the National Guard that were deployed to cover Kharkiv. This is nice.
I am more confident today than ever that Ukraine will win. We have the strength. We lack many things. But we have people who can change everything. Glory to Ukraine!
