On availability of defensive positions in northern Kharkiv region

Author: Yurii Butusov

Questions and answers about the work performed:

1. Are the defence lines built?

- Three lines of defence were built by the Civil-Military Administration (CMA) around Kharkiv,  and a significant number of defensive structures were built, although the lines of defence were not fully completed. 

The city of Vovchansk - there are no defensive structures built by engineer troops or other contractors in the city and its surroundings.

The distance between Kharkiv and Vovchansk is organized with separate defense positions and defense centers.

Fighting is ongoing on the line of field fortifications built by our troops deployed along the border, and enemy breakthroughs are being stopped at improvised positions where they have to dig in on the fly.

1. Why are the military complaining about the lack of a defense line and why are our fighting troops digging themselves in?

- The video of the positions shown on television as a demonstration of the actions of the CMA does not correspond to the conditions on the front line. The planning of the defence of Kharkiv was carried out without taking into account the tactical situation, and the defence lines built by the CMA cannot be used by the troops in this battle. The first line of defense was built in the village of Lyptsi, but for some reason, it was built in the lowlands, under the ridge of hills that dominates the village, and for some reason, this ridge of hills was not included in the first line of defense. Our troops are forced to defend Hlyboke village and the ridge of hills in front of Lyptsi, which controls the border, as the surrender of the hills would have led to the enemy's penetration into Lyptsi and intrenchment in the buildings with further advancement. Capturing Lyptsi would allow the enemy to bring in artillery and reach the outskirts of Kharkiv. The dominant ridge of hills is covered only by field fortifications dug by the soldiers themselves, but the quantity and quality of these positions are insufficient for the assigned tasks. That is why most of the positions are being built now, as it is not profitable for us to surrender the Lyptsi - Ternova line. The military says that the construction of the first line of defense with all resources should have started no further than 3-5 km from the border, and this line should have been made deep to ensure maneuver in defense. It is obvious that the density of mines is very low, and the mines do not limit the enemy's maneuver. The enemy can see all this clearly from drones, so the information is not secret, but obvious. 

1. What is the quality of defensive structures?

There is a significant number of defensive structures, dugouts and trenches that have been built in the rear by builders, and there are high-quality field fortifications and defensive posts on the border built by soldiers. However, there is no quality control and no systematic approach to equipping positions along the entire line. Overhead cover of trenches from high-angle fire and from drops, camouflage - these issues are not completed in many places. There is a great shortage of blind positions for artillery, mortars, armored vehicles, and transport, which greatly limits the maneuverability of firepower and logistics. It seems as if the planners had not heard of drones and did not take them into account at all. A significant amount of construction materials were not used. Therefore, it is impossible to say that specific objects were not built, there are many high-quality dugouts and deep trenches, but there are big questions about the quality of the entire defense line.

1. Why is the defence of Vovchansk not prepared?

- It is unclear why strategically vulnerable Vovchansk is not protected by defensive structures. After all, the city should have been prepared for defence. There were no mines or reliable defences. Only field fortifications on the border. Mine clearance is also insufficient.

1. Who is responsible?

- For the defense of Kharkiv region, they bear their share of responsibility:

The leadership of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;
Commander of the OSGT (Operational-Strategic Group of Troops);
The commander of the OTG (Operational-Tactical Group);
Brigade commanders;
Civil-Military Administration;
Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

All of these bodies and officials have repeatedly spoken about their readiness to repel an attack and build defense lines. But in reality, we missed a number of painful blows that showed that not all the necessary measures were taken. We need to figure out who is responsible and to what extent. I hope that in the third year of the war, Supreme Commander-in-Chief V. Zelenskyy and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces O. Syrskyi will want to see what NATO standards recommend in this regard and will analyze previous actions under the After-action review protocol. The price of falling into the trap by leaders who do not want to learn is the blood of many Ukrainian citizens.

Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET