Hot spots: Chasiv Yar, Toretsk, Kupiansk, Kharkiv, Kurakhove

The stream is devoted entirely to the situation at the front. The situation at the front is escalating and becoming very difficult. The enemy is not advancing very fast, there are no major breakthroughs. But unfortunately, where the enemy exerts pressure, the Russians cannot be stopped for a long time, many months.

And, of course, these advances, even 100 metres a week, add up to kilometres over time and lead to the tactical situation changing not in our favour and the threat of the fall of important defense centres and lines.

Right now, the situation is escalating in a number of frontline areas. What do we see at the front now? The Russian command, because it has suffered heavy losses, has completely abandoned the strategy of searching for vulnerabilities in our combat formations, of making any major breakthroughs with large forces. The Russians are trying to put pressure as much as possible on a wider front. They calculate the amount of meat of the manpower they have, the amount of ammunition they have, and distribute it along this front line. As of the beginning of May, the active frontline was about 800 kilometres long, but now the Russians have increased it, and the active frontline is now about 900 kilometres long due to the addition of an active front in the north of Kharkiv region. The situation is complicated because the enemy is planning its actions. In other words, the actions mean the expenditure of manpower, high-precision weapons in large quantities by increasing the production of drones, long-range drones such as the Lancet, increasing the number of reconnaissance drones, increasing the production of air bombs.

Despite heavy losses, the Russians continue to dictate the tactical initiative in a number of frontline areas. Now we see that after the start of the Russian offensive on 10 May in the northern Kharkiv region, the enemy has concentrated its efforts to prevent our troops from manoeuvring along the front line, to make rotation as difficult as possible, that is, to maximise pressure and exhaustion on those existing Ukrainian formations that hold the frontlines and are actively engaged in combat.

What is happening now? Let's first look at the situation in the Chasiv Yar direction.

According to the DeepState. The enemy is actively fighting in Chasiv Yar, trying to advance both on the city itself and to the north, heavy fighting is going on for Kalynivka now, and to the south. This is a very important area for the Russians, and the situation there is now seriously escalating. The problem, as always, is where we do not have a formation, i.e., the brigade level, where the brigade command and headquarters are. The situation is very difficult, the arrows here show a small advance, but the enemy is on the outskirts of Chasiv Yar. There is a real threat that the enemy will be able to enter the city itself and use the buildings to accumulate manpower and further attacks. We know that this is extremely dangerous. Very heavy fighting is taking place near the village of Kalynivka, north of Chasiv Yar. The enemy managed to drive our units out of Kalynivka a few days ago, a week ago. Then the 425th assault battalion "Skala" drove the enemy out of there. The fighting for Kalynivka continues, it is very heavy. And now the situation there is very difficult and uncertain. In some areas, there are heavy battles, our units are rotating, and the enemy sees this and tries to use it. And the situation at Chasiv Yar is very acute. The main problem is the organization of troop management at the brigade level. Unfortunately, the brigade that was there is a newly formed unit that has serious problems with management, organization, and intelligence. And the fact that such a brigade was placed in such a direction of the enemy's main efforts is surprising, of course, it is surprising how such decisions are made. We have a significant number of experienced staff brigades. Where there is an experienced command cadre, where there is a higher-level management organization, they are nevertheless not being replenished as a priority, and neither are their drone operator units. Instead, resources are spent on newly formed brigades, which need a long time to reach the combat capability of staff brigades, experienced brigades. And they need to be trained not in areas like Chasiv Yar, that's for sure. So now we hope that in the Chasiv Yar area, the command will be able to strengthen its management and organization. Because the number of people in modern warfare does not solve the problem. The number of people can only postpone certain events. But if there is no management of the organization, it is impossible to stop the enemy. We see in many parts of the frontline where there is control and organization, the enemy is held back for a very long time. In fact, they stop it completely. But where this is not the case, there are crises like the one in Chasiv Yar, where, you know, a brigade is withdrawn for some reason. Later it turns out that some positions were reported inaccurately, that the neighboring companies were given false information, and no one is punished for this, no one is held accountable. Then someone else is instructed, ordered to correct the situation when there is already a big problem and crisis. It is absolutely the impression that the combat capability of the troops and the tactical situation are not really of interest to the headquarters. OTG (Operational-Tactical Group) level, even OSGT (Operational-Strategic Group of Troops) level. And the war is fought on the map, by points. If you report on points, it doesn't matter what is really happening there. That's the crisis in Chasiv Yar right now, which has been going on for a long time. This is a crisis of management. It's a crisis of task setting that doesn't take into account what's really going on. It's just reports, reports, reports, reports, reports. Not a real war. I'm honestly surprised. And I would like to see Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, personally visit, for example, all our brigades in the Northern Kharkiv region. And in a number of cases, commanders say that these were hard-boiled appraisals, reasonable ones. And this had a significant impact on the organization of troop management in the Northern Kharkiv region during the Russian offensive. I am surprised why it is not possible to help the management of the OTG forces in the area of Chasiv Yar and the OSGT Khortytsia in this way. I hope that Oleksandr Syrskyi will find time to rectify the situation. Because this lie in the reports, we already had the experience of Ocheretyne, when they put a brigade that is not combat-ready enough and set a large combat task that can no longer fulfill it, there is false information reported, the defense fails, reserves are brought in very late, and they can no longer correct the situation, which, in principle, was very easy to correct in the beginning. 

I hope that someday there will be responsibility for the leaders, and they will begin to take responsibility, I'm not talking about judicial responsibility, even criminal responsibility in this case, but at least conclusions can be drawn from the same mistakes. Well, I don't know what the command of the OSGT Khortytsia, General Sodol, is thinking about. You just had the same situation in Ocheretyne. Why are you repeating it here at Chasiv Yar? It is completely incomprehensible.

Next, we have the situation in the Toretsk direction. Let's take a look at the DeepState map of Toretsk.

Over the past two days, the enemy has also managed to advance in the direction of Pivnichne. This is actually part of the Toretsk agglomeration. The enemy managed to get hold of the outer houses on the outskirts. Again, this is absolutely man-made... In this case, there is no tactical art of the Russians in this advance to Pivnichne. What was going on there? An experienced staff brigade with good command, intelligence, and control had been in the area for a long time, more than a month, and had been clearly repelling all enemy attacks. Suddenly, there is an order to move to another direction. This is a normal situation, of course, but if it is prepared, if it is properly planned and there is time to fulfill it, no, go ahead, go ahead, quickly change it, suddenly... Although, in fact, where they were being transferred, the situation was absolutely clear. There was no urgency. All this is in the minds of the people who are planning it, the OSGT and the OTG. And now the staff brigade has been withdrawn, and as soon as it was withdrawn, the enemy waited for it, because the enemy sees everything, there is electronic intelligence, there is drone intelligence, these things are big, they are very noticeable at the front, like the change of formations, the change of units. And the enemy immediately attacked in the place where the unit was withdrawn. As a result, he managed to advance and improve his tactical position significantly. And our defense line, which had been there for about a year and a half, was well equipped. It was unchanged, well-equipped, and suddenly it collapsed. Why did it collapse? Because of the loss of control, controllability and intelligence, weak intelligence, weak organization. Because a brigade was put there that did not have sufficient competence in this area. It's not that they are bad people, but they didn't have time to learn, they don't work as a coherent organism, they are inexperienced. Do they get this experience? It is not clear during such intense fighting. This is the situation, unfortunately. 

This is a question of how the stable situation in the Toretsk area was created by the leadership's decision to create a completely artificial crisis. Why? Next, let's look at the situation in the Kharkiv region, the Kupiansk direction, northern Kharkiv region.

In the area of Kharkiv itself, the North, the situation is stabilized there. The 92nd Assault Brigade, the 13th Charter Brigade, have stabilized the front there. And the Russian offensive, the way the enemy entered on May 12, they are generally not approaching Kharkiv, and they were even driven out of some of their positions there.

Then the situation in Vovchansk. In the morning of May 13, the enemy entered Vovchansk, reached the center, and they are basically standing there, and in principle, the enemy has suffered heavy losses there and is not able to make any progress. In the direction of Starytsia, the enemy was repelled and stopped. The Russians have created a bridgehead, but now, due to heavy losses, they can no longer expand it, there are battles, the enemy is trying to hold on to the captured bridgehead that it has, with small forces, but with the use of a large number of high-precision weapons, literally hundreds of GABs are used by the enemy, several dozen GABs are launched at the positions of our units a week, and a large number of drones. And, in principle, these forces are using infantry, high-precision weapons in large numbers to try to dictate the initiative, to try to counterattack somewhere and protect the bridgehead they managed to create during that "sudden" breakthrough on May 10-12. Well, I say "sudden" in quotes. The offensive that everyone was talking about, in two days the enemy managed to capture some territory.

And now I want to talk about the very scandalous situation in the Kupiansk direction. Suddenly, this scandal arose on the Internet. There was a message, and I wrote about it in particular, that the Russians have been conducting such an active offensive against the village of Borova since May 12. For a long time, there hadn't been such active, intense fighting there, but then the Russians sent large forces and attacked the positions of the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade. And it was obvious that the brigade needed a slight reinforcement relative to the forces the enemy had been throwing at the assault for over a month. This was written by several other bloggers and suddenly yesterday such a small scandal arose that several correspondents wrote that this 3rd assault brigade was being PR'd, why is it that a politician is in charge of the brigade, meaning Andrii Biletskyi, that other brigades do not complain. Friends, I want to say that I don't see any critical information at all in the fact that people who are holding the front and destroying the enemy want to be reinforced. This is actually the way it should be. This is responsibility for their combat mission. A person does not ask for someone to build him a house in the village. A person asks to be reinforced to destroy the Russian occupiers. Does the 3rd Assault Brigade have any successes in the Borova area? Well, I saw this video, I saw it earlier, the first mechanized battalion of the brigade, one of the four that holds the defense in the direction of the Russian attack, released a video of the destroyed Russian occupiers, who are lying right in the field of view of the Mavic operators. In other words, on the front line, at zero line. How many bodies of the Russian occupiers are lying in front of the battalion's positions within a few kilometers. An impressive video - 246 corpses. These are the results of a Russian offensive by one of the Russian motorized rifle regiments, a regiment from Voronezh. And this motorized rifle regiment suffered just such a huge loss of lives, these are the ones lying in front of the positions. This is not counting those who were killed in dugouts, in trenches, who were killed during artillery strikes in the rear, in the forests, in very dense forests and plantings. This does not include those who were evacuated to the rear. These are the ones in front of the positions. I think we all understand that such hundreds of killed Russian attack aircraft are a sign of very intense fighting. 

The offensive on Borova continues. It is obvious that, as I said at the beginning, the Russian command does not have the goal of breaking through everywhere. Their goal is to distribute the replenishment that they receive at the front and to put pressure in all directions to make maneuver impossible and to inflict defeat in those areas where they want to advance to improve their tactical situation. The Russians need to reach the Oskil line, and they are hitting it with all their means. And not only on the Third Assault Brigade. Just two days ago, there was a new intensification of Russian troops. They are trying to attack the area of Raihorodka. It is already south of Borova. They are concentrating their forces in order to attack our other brigade in that direction as well, and to advance and still reach the Oskil line. For the Russians, Kupiansk, as we have discussed many times, as we can see on the map, is a necessity to reach the Oskil River line and capture it. This line is of strategic importance for the enemy to control the Eastern Kharkiv region and for our troops as well. Therefore, the situation in the Kharkiv region remains very difficult. And while our troops in the north managed to stop the enemy in very difficult battles in the Kharkiv region near Kharkiv, and now there are heavy battles going on there to seize the tactical initiative, to drive the enemy out of important forests, the Russians are also trying to drive us out, the enemy has now moved its main reserves, infantry. If there are high-precision weapons near Kharkiv in large numbers of weapons, weapons that are collected hundreds, tens, hundreds of air bombs, then here they are trying to break through the front and bind our forces with attacks of infantry, artillery, drones in large numbers, and the struggle in the northern, in the eastern Kharkiv region is now intensifying. 

And now let's look at the situation in the Kurakhove direction. In fact, the enemy is trying to advance on Kostiantynivka, I mean the village, and on Kurakhove, and on Krasnohorivka, the town of Krasnohorivka. There are heavy battles for the town of Krasnohorivka, very heavy battles. There are also very heavy battles for the village of Nevelske. The enemy is advancing there now, throwing all its forces there. And, unfortunately, the enemy managed to capture a significant part of Krasnohorivka. A very large part. They have quite strong positions there. The enemy has captured the territory of the plant, and now they can accumulate there. The situation is very, very critical in this area. In the area of Krasnohorivka, there is also a problem with command and control of troops. It is very acute at the brigade level. I remember how in the beginning of 2023, the whole 2023, we were defending that area from Krasnohorivka to Vodiane near Avdiivka. There was one 59th motorized infantry brigade. It had only four battalions. Then they added a fifth battalion. Then the battalion that was defending Krasnohorivka was transferred to subordination. In other words, it was a very small force.  Now there are much larger forces concentrated in that area. But instead of Vadym Sukharevskyi, the commander of the 59th Brigade, they have appointed another officer who, unfortunately, obviously has no such experience and no such understanding at all. He is a young man, very energetic, but unfortunately, he has no experience in organizing military teams, managing in such a difficult situation, managing large structural units. Because in our army, very often, if the leadership likes an officer, he can fly through many ranks and make a career for no reason at all. What did he do during the war that was so special, what did he do that was distinguished, what is worth noting in his career. That he is not only appointed a brigade commander, but he leads the troops in such a key direction. The fate of such a strategic direction of the entire city, Krasnohorivka, which is of great importance as a defense line, depends on his intelligence, skills, and knowledge. Nevertheless, this is happening, to be honest, I have to say so harshly that the main problem is chaos in management.

Unfortunately, this chaos is created because the brigade command and the command of the OTG area do not pay attention to how the troops are working. They themselves lack an understanding of the situation in the area to make competent decisions. So again, I am addressing the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi. You know, it seems to me that even if personnel experiments are sometimes successful during the war, we need to see what the results of these personnel experiments are. And very quickly, if mistakes were made, correct them. This is intelligence, in my opinion, and flexibility, a manifestation of intelligence, flexibility, and efficiency of the system. It's not just a repetition of running on a rake. Talk to the commanders in the 59th Brigade and talk to those who have specific merits, who are fighting this war, about the way the 59th Brigade command is currently managed. If, unfortunately, there are no such decisions, no one will make objective conclusions. Do we need to tell you in detail about this officer on the air? About how he manages the mavericks, whom he sends, how he gives orders? I think it's a foolish way to acknowledge your own weaknesses during the war. Weaknesses need to be corrected. If a person cannot cope, if he is a young man, and he does not know how to lead in such a difficult situation, then he should not be responsible for people losing their lives. And important tasks failed. We need to honestly assess and correct these mistakes, and send incompetent people for training or, I don't know, to some unit where they can get the right command experience and understanding of how to lead troops in an important area. Why stick out their neck? He is now a young man who will get a lot of... Now, if things go on like this, he cannot hold Krasnohorivka even with those forces. He simply lacks the understanding to do so. Why do you continue this? I hope that Oleksandr Syrskyi will look at the situation in Krasnohorivka. Again, it's like Chasiv Yar, like Toretsk. This is a management problem at the level of those who appoint such commanders, at the level of those who evaluate their work. OTG and OSGT. If the question is only about "yes" and "sir, yes sir!" reports, or loud answers, and tactical understanding, thinking, ability to build a team, to lead troops, these are different things. If you like an officer, you can hire him as an aide, in the OSGT, in the OTG, or send him to the academy to study. Now you can send them abroad. Experimenting on the defense of Krasnohorivka is somehow... both Nevelske and this important line, somehow it is absolutely incorrect. And because of the criticism from the troops, the decisions of the command and the decisions of the current command of the 59th Brigade, if there are no changes, we will have to talk more sharply and more clearly, in detail about the situation in this brigade, which has a glorious tradition built by Colonel Sukharevskyi. We must not lose these traditions. 

The situation is as follows. What should I say in this area, if we are talking about Kurakhove? The enemy is trying to advance on Kurakhove. And, of course, it is trying to advance to the North. To create a threat to Vuhledar. Our soldiers, paratroopers, first of all the 79th Air Assault Brigade, are doing everything they can to prevent further advancement of the enemy and to threaten Vuhledar. And there are very heavy battles in these areas. And it is very important to have solutions. Competent decisions. Because if there is no command and control at the brigade level, then no amount of ammunition and people, no replenishment can stabilize the situation.

A very difficult problem at the front is that our troops in all these areas I'm talking about do not rely on pre-equipped defensive positions. They still do not have them. Where there are battles, where the frontline is shifting, there are some defensive positions, if any, in this line of defense, as there were in the Toretsk area, but these are all field fortifications. This is practically all done without concrete, without ceilings. And none of this can fully ensure the survival of infantry in the face of massive non-use of artillery, aviation and high-precision weapons.

I would like to say that there are certain developments. Over the past month, more intensive engineering work has begun on the construction of the defense line in many areas. Unfortunately, these defense lines are being built at a fairly significant distance. The troops are still fighting on the front line. That's why, on the one hand, there are reports that defense lines are being built, but there is no improvement in the situation. This is a big question. It is true that we need to build rear lines, but we need to pay attention to the fact that we need to build at least a second line of defense. On the front line. We need to build, there are opportunities for this. And small mechanization, the second and third line of defense, can work at a distance of even 7-8 kilometers. They can be used in dense greenery, and tractors can be used to mount ready-made reinforced concrete structures. If done quickly, of course, especially when the weather does not allow the enemy to use drones freely. There are all the possibilities. Recently, it was raining in Kharkiv region, and it was daytime for a long time to carry out engineering work even close to the front line. This is also possible in other parts of the frontline. All this requires, of course, organization and planning. And we need to strengthen the infantry in the positions that are fighting now. Or if people are going to retreat, at least tomorrow. In addition, we need to pay attention to the quality of these defenses. I looked at the defense lines that were being built in the Kharkiv direction. Friends, some of the positions are surprising. Who is planning this? I still don't know. Most of the defense line in the Kharkiv direction, where there are concrete dugouts and concrete bunkers, I see them being built in an open field, without camouflage. I mean, not in a planting to camouflage these trees, but right in the open field, where it is just convenient to build. There is no overhead protection of trenches. We just set up, demolish the position, and put in three concrete bunkers. For some reason, the view from those bunkers is very poor, because there is a height, there are loopholes right into this height, the enemy is not visible there, there is no view. I don't quite understand why this is done. Who is planning this? I saw a lot of construction materials in the Kharkiv region that were never used at all. They were lying there, all the soldiers can see it. Can we have the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who gave the order to build the defensive lines, and Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, who is in charge of the troops on these defensive lines. Can we publicly identify one person who is responsible for all these structures, rear and frontline, so that we can address someone? Because we are fragmented. Here the civil-military administration is building, here the engineer troops are building, here the commander of the brigade that is fighting heavy battles is designated as responsible for the construction. Here is the commander of some other engineering brigade. Then you ask them, what are you doing?  And this one didn't receive an order, that one didn't receive materials, that one didn't receive equipment, that one doesn't have enough people. And there is no single responsible structure. How long can this go on? There must be one control center responsible for ensuring that the defense lines stop being built in the open field, as they are still being built. Concrete structures, valuable and important, should be installed in such a way that people can actually use them. It should be convenient. We need mobile concrete structures that can be transported, light in weight, and can be installed right now on the second or third line of defense. To save people's lives right now, and not later, when the frontline moves far away. In other words, we need a responsible center. Where is it? When will it be there? It is not clear at all. At the front, I filmed a lot of our defense areas, which are digging everywhere. They are digging, but in an open field. As a rule, the experience of the battles for Ocheretyne, where such defense lines were dug in an open field, shows that they are used exclusively by Russian assault groups during attacks. It's convenient, you can hide from our own fire. Our troops do not occupy such open trenches in an open field at all. Because they are open, it is easy to adjust fire on them, and that is why our army does not use them. When will there be conclusions? It is not clear. 

Next, friends, I want to talk about organizational management. Why? What is evident in all these areas? There is a Russian offensive. We see it, the intelligence is getting full information. We know the composition of Russian units, how they will go, where, when. The troops are preparing. The Russians are launching an offensive of attrition. Every day, they send a certain number of assault groups to be slaughtered. At first, they are knocked out, knocked out, knocked out. But we also suffer losses. The Russians continue, they bring in new, new, new forces. And first we get reserves, and then for some reason, the brigade that is there in that area is replaced. And as soon as the people have gained experience, they are immediately removed. Friends, I talk to all the commanders, what do the brigade commanders of our command ask for during the Russian offensive? When there is an offensive in a certain direction, please reduce our area of responsibility so that we can move one or two of our battalions to the second echelon where the enemy is trying to impose intensity of combat operations and maintain this intensity, give people a rest, provide rotations and bring in a fresh, new brigade, or not a fresh brigade, but another brigade, a battalion nearby, to build our combat formations in two echelons in the same way. And what happens here? There is a brigade stretched in one echelon, the enemy starts attacking it. Sometimes they give it a company, sometimes they give it a battalion that is not quite complete. It is being eliminated, this brigade is standing up to the end. It loses, at first they send anybody to the infantry, mortar launchers, artillerymen. Now the artillerymen have cases where Paladin batteries, Panzer batteries, howitzers 2000, i.e. heavy artillery trained abroad, are all sent to the infantry. In other words, the brigades are completely eliminated. And when there is no one left to actually fight, only then is the brigade withdrawn and a new one is put in place to replace it. This new brigade does not know the situation, it is not ready, it does not know the area, it needs to learn everything, and the Russian offensive continues. What do all the commanders say? Let's oppose the Russian tactics of this permanent offensive, creeping, with our same tactics in defence. We know where they are going, there is no surprise. Let's build our troops in several echelons every day where they are going, and let's build our troops in several echelons. And not only will they not advance anywhere, but we will destroy them down there very efficiently, with fewer losses, several times over. And then we will discourage the enemy from continually entering in small groups every day. Because they will simply be destroyed over and over again, week after week. Unfortunately, we don't have this tightening of the battle lines. We demand that brigades fight to the last. Until there are no people on the list of combat personnel of the .combat and numerical composition of troops. Is this way effective? The war shows that it is absolutely ineffective. When the rear is being cut off, when supplies, engineers, artillerymen, mortar men, drone operators are being cut off, when everyone is forced to be sent to the infantry, fire control, manoeuvre of firepower, reconnaissance, and attack drones are becoming worse. Everything is getting worse. Because where you spend infantry on infantry, you need infantry. There is no need to set up a new brigade, new brigade commanders who know nothing about the area. There is no need. The command is not overloaded so much. The main man, the infantryman, is exhausted. This is the main vulnerable link. We need to work for the infantryman, not for some fresh brigadier to come in and make optimistic reports that everything is tense but under control. Such brigadiers who say that everything is fine are not able to hold on to anything at all. Let's look at the map of the situation, at any area where we have such optimistic commanders who always say everything is fine. Why is this done? I think that, you know, there is a big problem that we do not have a top-level analysis of those events at all. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office does not analyse the course of events at the front, does not set any requirements for the command, except for one thing - a point on the map. These points on the map are stupid, when it is necessary to hold at all costs a point that has long since lost its tactical value, which is not worth the effort. People are sitting in a bunker in Kyiv and assessing this point. What is happening there? It's happening in the direction of some village. Why did we leave that planting? Well, they don't know anything about it. Even the command of the OSG does not know anything about this village. Because they never visit it, and they never go into the trenches, of course. Because, as I said, our generals have turned into watchmen. In other words, general watchmen. They are watchmen who sit and do not let you in. They shout, hit the table with their fist, tell you who is going where, why you are retreating, back and forth. Well, these are just repeaters. Only brigade commanders are responsible for their defence line. And when we have brigade commanders who are worried about their defence line, their men, their combat capability, the destruction of the enemy, and they, of course, raise questions and ask for the first, second, third thing, give us men, give us ammunition load, give us reinforcements. We consider this bad. And this very disgusting anti-crisis from the command of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence, which yesterday was posted by a group of journalists who have never been to the ground, but who said that Biletskyi is a politician and that the third assault unit should sit there silently and watch what happens to it on Borova and what happens to this defence line. Well, this is just a manifestation of how our leadership, the Supreme Command Staff and its structures react to the situation at the front. They are irritated by the unrealistic situation. They are annoyed by the dots on the map, reporting and reports. Everything should be beautiful in the reports. And what is not really interesting? What is the price of this lie? A lot of lives and a lot of blood. These people, these journalists who wrote such nonsense about the third assault, who... The people who are in charge there, the generals, are scaring the generals there, our generals who are already scared, by scaring them with dismissals. If there is some point in some village, Ivanivka, which has long been demolished by Russian aviation, if someone has withdrawn from some point, some position. It's just nonsense. To all the bureaucrats, to all the bureaucrats, to all the journalists who think that the troops should not ask questions of the higher command at all, that the brigades should silently say that everything is fine, everything is tense and under control. I advise them, all these optimists, to just spend one day with the infantrymen in the Borova area. For example. You can do it in another direction, near Avdiivka. Go with the infantrymen for a regular shift, for five days. To a position where artillery, mortars, gabs, drones are constantly working. And the enemy is conducting assault operations. They may be able to capture us once, or try to recapture a village, for example. You know, like Kalynivka here, over Chasiv Yar. You have to go on the attack once to see what it's like. And then somehow transform your judgements and draw conclusions from this. I am sure that the vision will change a lot. Unfortunately, so far there have been no such changes in consciousness. And our army is sometimes forced to fight against the grain. Against even the will and understanding and consciousness of the leaders who give orders. The key figure in the army, the stabilization of the front line, unfortunately, now depends not on the top command, but on the brigade, on the combatant, on the company, on the main person in this war. An infantry soldier who trusts his commanders and holds that stronghold to the last. To the last, as long as he has the strength. And human strength is not infinite. What some journalists and politicians do not understand. And, unfortunately, not a single member of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's staff understands it at all. This is the impression that one gets. And they do not want to understand. So, friends, what can be the solution? Global vision, I want to tell you, is the key now at this stage of the war, we need post-operational analysis. An after-action review. After action review. We have to start drawing conclusions. We have repeated the same mistakes dozens of times. With terrible losses. Unnecessary losses that can be avoided. We are losing important milestones that we could have avoided. Because everything is completely repeated. Here is Ocheretyne. The 23rd Brigade is there. It's a newly formed brigade, but it has a high-quality headquarters. People have figured it out, there are quality commanders, quality staff officers. They understand the management. When the infantry runs out, they are replaced, and for some reason another brigade is assigned. They do not have this level of management. It quickly loses its positions. They put a third brigade. This is all in one month. They deploy the third brigade. And the enemy has already entered the area, immediately seeing the weakness, the failure of the front, his reserves. The third brigade was deployed. A few weeks later, it was knocked out. And the fourth brigade was deployed. The fourth one closes the breakthrough. What am I talking about? This charade, when there is no longer any surprise, when everything is clear at the front, when there is clear intelligence, when the enemy does not have such a total advantage in all forces and means. Now there is some ammunition at the front. This is simply shocking. Why are we not learning? The enemy has more soldiers, more shells, more bombs, more drones. But the only advantage we have is intelligence. We have to be ahead of them in management, in organisation, in intelligence, in tactics, in the use of troops. This is our only trump card, in fact, since the beginning of the war. They have always had more means of destruction. The only thing we have is the motivation and intelligence of people, not numbers. We also have more people, they have had more people from the very beginning of the war, the Russians had more people and still have more. Even before the mobilisation, they had more people. We need to draw conclusions, but we are not. How long will this go on? Why do we pay lip service to NATO, but neither the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office nor the Armed Forces Command apply the basic NATO standard, the after-action review, the after-action analysis? How long will this go on?

I would also like to say that, nevertheless, these advances are coming at a very heavy price to the Russians. I would like to say that our weapons and drone units continue to develop very rapidly at the front, despite the lack of a planned strategy from above. Most of the supplies, most of the drones, continue to come from volunteers, from civil society, not from the Ministry of Defense. But, nevertheless, there is progress. We are developing. And the losses of the Russians, despite such mistakes and the fact that they continue to advance, are very high, they exceed the losses of our troops. Strangely enough, despite the fact that they have both gabs and shells, these human waves that destroy our soldiers are heavy losses, and these advances are very difficult for the Russians. In a number of areas, the Russians have lost the ability to advance. They are stopping. All of their assault regiments are completely eliminated. Entire battalions, regiments, brigades are being destroyed. That's why I want to say that when we talk about the Russian offensive, everyone at the front understands. It is not about something insurmountable. It's not something we can't stop. It's not something we can't stop. More shells are fired in the world than there are soldiers in Russia. And it is being transferred to us. There are more drones in China, and already in other countries, than there are soldiers in Russia. And even more people will be produced than there are people there. There is munition;. There are means of destruction. The main issue of our day is to learn from the war that is happening now. To draw the right conclusions. Honest reports about what happened. Not to punish, not to beat on the head, but to draw conclusions. Promote those who succeed and remove those who fail. This is what happens in life. Unfortunately, these are the main problems, and this problem, unfortunately, comes from the top. Our main problem is that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief does not fulfill its functions. It is just a documentation office for fixing points on the map. They have no questions other than the points on the map. And unfortunately, this clerical approach is very much in the minds of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Armed Forces Command, the OTG, and the OSGTs, who are not asked to destroy the enemy. They are held accountable for some points and they go crazy there, afraid of losing their positions. That's why we have a gap. There is a higher level of management, and there is one vision of war, which is completely detached from the vision of war at the level of the brigade commander, battalion commander. Absolutely. This is a different vision. And then there is a third vision of war. In the trench itself, at the position. Of the soldier. The one who actually holds this front line. And the lack of respect for the soldier means a lack of desire, understanding, to understand how the battle is fought and what can be done to make people fight more effectively. To make sure that we are less exhausted and our enemies are more exhausted. This is the main problem. There are enough experienced, competent people in the Ukrainian army in the defense forces who destroy the enemy every day, who are able to create an advantage along the entire 900-kilometer front. It is enough right now. And that is why the front is holding and the enemy is losing a lot. 

But, friends, we will not be able to stop the enemy without strategic changes. And until we stop him, there will, of course, be no possibility of any negotiations at all, in order to politically create an advantage over the Russians in the world. As long as the Russian army continues, any conference in Switzerland, anywhere, is a conference about saving Ukraine. Save Ukraine from the Russian invasion. If we stop them, and they fight the way they are now, and just being eliminated and the front doesn't move, there will be a completely different peace conference. There will be a conference on how to get Russia out of Ukraine, how to give it back, how it should fight back, how to stop this war so that they themselves are not completely killed here. This will be a completely different approach. And it can be done. The number of munitions in the Ukrainian army is significant. And what our allies are giving us, and the number of drones that are entering Ukraine, are large numbers, quite sufficient to destroy the Russians. But we need to improve our organization and management so that we don't lose so many Ukrainians. This is the main problem. We need to make the ratio of losses one to ten. One to five at least.

Friends, this is why we are talking about these problems. First of all, these problems are the problems of the country's top leadership, which does not understand, does not want to feel the war. That is why we need public opinion and pressure. Unfortunately, I don't see how to reach them rationally. Hopefully, with the help of public opinion, with the help of broadcasts, we will raise these issues in the media. And on the frontline, I have just arrived, I want to tell you that the way Russians are being killed en masse is a high level. It's a high level, and on every section of the frontline, the Russians are paying a high price for every meter of Ukrainian land, even where they manage to get through.

Friends, today, more than ever, I am confident in our victory. I see the people who are creating this victory. I believe in their talent, in their perseverance. I have no doubt that we have an army that can win. We need political and strategic decisions, adequate ones, at the level of top leadership. We will fight for it. Today, more than ever, I am confident in our victory. Thank you for the broadcast and glory to Ukraine!