Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad, Oskil front, threat of losing Vuhledar. Answers to questions

Author: Yurii Butusov

The stream is dedicated to answering questions.

Unfortunately, the situation at the front remains very critical in the areas where the enemy managed to make a breakthrough. Let's take a look at the general situation to get a clear understanding of what we are talking about. Kupiansk direction.

We see that this is the direction to Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad. Unfortunately, the enemy continues to advance. Our soldiers are trying to stop the advance in this direction. A lot of combat work is being done here. The Russians are suffering heavy losses, but we see that they continue to gnaw through, to pierce such small wedges in our defense. Unfortunately, there is a large number of these red arrows, and we do not see, unfortunately, our blue arrows, which could cut off these wedges that the enemy is driving. In Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad itself, the situation has not been changing significantly over the past seven days, but these several hundred meters every day are unfortunately making a difference. We can see that in some areas the enemy is gradually expanding the breakthrough zone with its wedges, creating conditions for further offensive actions. The most threatening situation is that the enemy is now expanding the breakthrough front north of Pokrovsk. That is where the main efforts of the Russian command are going. And we see a very threatening situation in the area of Hirnyk and Kurakhivka. That's the kind of huge advance.

Soldiers of the 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade are fighting in this area, and we have repeatedly talked to the command about the problem with command and control. The situation is very threatening, and, of course, such maneuver battles and operations cannot be won with orders to hold on. We need coordinated organizational and managerial decisions, we need coordination. And, unfortunately, because of this situation, I want to convey the opinion of many soldiers and officers of the 59th Brigade. Of course, complex solutions are needed here. Both solutions to strengthen the command and solutions to stabilize the front. Now, holding this salient, except in the area of Hirnyk and Kurakhivka, does not give us any advantages. It creates advantages for the enemy. Let's look at this map again. Look how threatening the situation is. Hirnyk and Kurakhivka are actually operational encirclement now, as there are no convenient supply routes there. The enemy is using drones and artillery to shoot at the approaches to this salient. Holding it is no longer profitable for us at this point, as there are no reserves in the area and, most importantly, no adequate command and control in the area. But, looking at this map, the enemy is, of course, trying to disassemble the front, that is, having broken through our front in the direction of Pokrovsk, they are now disassembling it up to the north in order to break our front completely and expand the breakthrough front. I would like to remind you that in this area the enemy has captured more than 600 square kilometers of our land over the past 4 months, even 650 if to count. This means that the enemy's advance in this area is the fastest. Of course, we understand what they want to do now. They want to destroy and capture this salient, which is now in the area of Hirnyk-Kurakhivka. Hirnyk is a plateau, the highest point in Donbas, which will allow the enemy to develop an offensive further south. And they want, of course, Kurakhove to be the next target of the Russian command. This means that they want to create a stable, long-lasting front so that they can make a breakthrough and reach the rear, flanking our troops defending Kurakhove. 

Second, let's look at the map, the next map.

This is the Oskil front. We see that there is also a breakthrough here, south of Kupiansk. As I mentioned yesterday, the enemy unfortunately managed to break through our defense near the village of Pishchane. Unfortunately, no counterattacks were prepared or organized here. And the enemy continues its gradual advance through the plantations. And, unfortunately, the enemy has already approached the Oskil River by almost a kilometer, a kilometer and a half. The enemy's goal is to reach the Oskil River completely. To do this, they are breaking through, they want to break our front. They need to crush our front into several isolated areas. And then, by striking at the crossings, they need to actually block and isolate our combat zone. To force our troops to withdraw or to suffer heavy losses and retreat beyond Oskil. We see that there are also more northern arrows. The enemy is fighting to completely capture the area of Nevske village. And then to move further north to break our front in Oskil in several sections. The situation here is very, very difficult. And, of course, we need to take some active steps. We need to reorganize our defense actions. And we need active actions to at least reduce the scale of the enemy's advance. We need counterattacks. Drones, perhaps some counterattacking actions by our troops. It's just a matter of time. If there are no such active actions, the miracle will not happen again. 

The third map.

This is the area of Vuhledar. The enemy is actually already on the outskirts of the city of Vuhledar. The Russians have approached very close to the main highway, which was the main supply line to Vuhledar, as we can see on the map. In fact, the enemy is already one and a half to two kilometers away from the main highway. And forward-deployed Russian infantry groups are already reaching the very outskirts of Vuhledar. The situation here does not seem particularly outstanding, the enemy does not show any military art. They just have a lot of infantry, small groups of infantry. Some of them are being destroyed, a significant part of them. But some of them, unfortunately, are taking advantage of the lack of people, first of all, in our positions, the inability to rotate infantry due to the lack of trained reserves and the inability to control the entire front line with tight barriers, and they are looking for some gaps in the combat order and come in. The situation is very, very difficult, and unfortunately, it is getting worse every day in all three operational areas. Obviously, it is not possible to fight counter-battles with Russian assault groups by simply exchanging infantry for infantry. A decentralized Russian offensive requires a decentralized Ukrainian defense. And in many parts of the frontline, Ukrainian soldiers are doing just that. And there are a significant number of frontline areas where all such attacks are repelled with huge losses for the Russians and without any results. The main need at the front is for such successful decisions at the tactical and operational level to be shared. So that those commanders of military formations who produce results, effective, skillful commanders of battalions and brigades, can get more forces under their control. This is the only way to quickly stabilize the frontline and control at the tactical level. To give those who can do it more power, more troops, more responsibility, more firepower. To ensure that where there are no such combat leaders, there are no organized headquarters, so that we don't simply lose people there. And not to train incompetents on the lives of our infantrymen. This is an absolutely critical situation. Those people who are in the trenches now, the lives of each of them must be saved not by false hype, as our leaders like to say, human-centeredness, people above all, but by technological, professional, managerial solutions, not just empty talk and slogans that have no real action behind them. 

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

How is the situation in Chasiv Yar?

The situation in Chasiv Yar is difficult, but there are several of our reliable units there, combat-ready units that are holding back the enemy with all their forces, and not allowing the enemy to develop an offensive. Complete, well-equipped Russian airborne troops, several regiments are attacking our combat formations, trying to create a bridgehead across the canal, but the soldiers of the 5th Assault Brigade, 24th Mechanized Brigade, 23rd Mechanized Brigade, National Guard Regiment, Donbas Battalion are holding back the attacks, holding back the enemy as much as possible and destroying large numbers of Russian paratroopers. They do not allow the enemy to accumulate forces to move forward. The situation is very difficult, close to critical, but thanks to adequate commanders, adequate command, the situation is still under control. No matter how difficult it is, how inappropriate it really is when people are not at their positions, there is a lack of ammunition and other means, and yet people are fighting. But, of course, this is not a situation where there is a breakthrough of the front and everything is collapsing, as we see in other areas that I showed you.

What is the situation with clothing in the military, do they really buy everything themselves, and if so, why?

I don't know where you got this information from. In fact, the uniforms are provided, and those military personnel who need them buy them. In principle, the infantrymen, the soldiers who are fighting, have opportunities. Now there are no problems with uniforms in Ukraine. People take what they need. Of course, there are always questions about the quality of what the state buys. I can't say that our uniform is the best for a soldier on the frontline, but it is something that can be worn to fight, really. This is a uniform that has a certain quality. It's not the highest quality, but many people really use it. I would like to say that Ukrainian military uniforms and equipment are leagues ahead Russian ones. The Russian one is really complete. It is impossible to use it. Our fighters disdain all Russian trophies because it's just disgusting to even hold. Our uniforms are of high quality.

What are the risks of losing Vuhledar?

The loss of Vuhledar is fraught with the danger that, after capturing this very favorable defense line with heights, it will be very convenient for the enemy to continue to advance and disassemble the front of southern Donbas. There are no prepared defense lines there, just like everywhere else. Unfortunately, our leadership does not consider it necessary to build defense lines, despite everything that is said here. Obviously, our public pressure is still insufficient, and everyone should write about the location of the defense lines so that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief can start doing something. And then, all our defense is always tied to large settlements, precisely because there are no equipped defensive positions. That is why we always build defenses locally around large settlements, where there are a large number of buildings, where there is an opportunity for hidden maneuver of troops, where there is an opportunity to deploy some units, and where there is an opportunity to control communication hubs. When there are communication hubs, of course, all actions in the area are concentrated around them. That's why the situation is very difficult, and the enemy will be able to advance further. We can see what the loss of Avdiivka threatened, and what dire consequences it had. And now we see that the loss of the Avdiivka heights, as I have talked about many, many times, has led to severe consequences, as well as Bakhmut and Avdiivka. We are losing cities, large settlements with heights, and then the enemy manages to drive our troops back because they have favorable radio horizons for drone operations and favorable positions, and we, on the other hand, do not benefit from controlling the drones, and the heights and tactical advantages go to the enemy. So, unfortunately, the frontline after that, the enemy will also push back, and unfortunately, it will roll back further and further. 

Where is our 72nd Brigade, what happened to it?

Soldiers of the 72nd Brigade continue to fight for Vuhledar. It is very difficult. The problem is with replenishment, of course, there is a shortage of people, trained people. Not people in general, whom someone somewhere took, put on a uniform and sent to zero line. People trained for combat operations as part of the infantry. There is a lack of means, of course, including technical means. There is a great lack of coordination and interaction, especially at the level of the operational and tactical group. The brigade commander was replaced. Colonel Oleksandr Okhrymenko was appointed as the commander of the 72nd Brigade. He was in command before. He used to be the commander of the 72nd Brigade, he knows many people well. Then he was in command of the 14th Mechanized Brigade for a long time, from the beginning of the war. And recently, for several months this year, he was the head of the Odesa regional TCR, after the scandals in Odesa. Now he has been returned to the 72nd Brigade. Let's look at the actions of this commander. The situation when he was appointed could not have been more critical. So we will see. Now we need organized actions not only at the level of the 72nd Brigade command. The whole frontline is collapsing, and the command of the Donetsk OTG needs competent actions. And there are much more problems with this at this stage, because there is a lot of pressure on two important, large areas at once, both Pokrovsk and Vuhledar. And, of course, there are also many problems with management. What is weak management? This is when there is always a problem with the organization of the defeat, with responding to numerous breakthroughs, with the allocation of resources, replenishment of forces, with the use of dozens of different units that are concentrated and operating, and they need to interact. The interaction of command and control is very critical, it affects the use of drones and electronic warfare. This is a critical problem in modern warfare, a key one. It is impossible to hold the front without such work. Especially the front that is penetrated, and the enemy is trying to undermine it with constant decentralized attacks. But the 72nd Brigade is fighting and doing, in my opinion, simply more than can be expected from people, from a unit. This is just boundless heroism. We have formations that are not rotated at all, which have problems with exhaustion and manpower use. And unfortunately, the 72nd Brigade is one of them. That is why the situation there is as critical and difficult as possible. And the fact that our soldiers continue to perform combat missions in these conditions and destroy large numbers of Russian invaders every day is a feat. And it is impossible to demand more from people. It is impossible to demand more from soldiers. It is possible to demand in these conditions only from commanders, from commanders. 

Ukrainian reconnaissance men completely liberated the aggregate plant in Vovchansk. What does this mean for us?

A general military unit of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine entered the aggregate plant in Vovchansk. This gives us the opportunity to control this one point in Vovchansk. In the field, many things are announced that do not have such a serious impact. This is important in the fight for Vovchansk in this small tactical area. And God willing, this will contribute to an even longer holding of the Vovchansk area. It is very difficult to advance in those areas. It is good that this was done. In general, compared to the general problems of the enemy's breakthrough, of course, this is a problem of a different order, this is a success. Our troops continue to hold Vovchansk. The enemy did not manage to capture the high-rise district and the city center, which is key to defense. There was a long struggle for the aggregate plant because the basements of this plant are not a favorable position for accumulating forces.

Could you please tell us whether the issue of transferring between units is popular or is it a problem for a very small percentage of military personnel? Because it seems to be an impossible task to implement.

The issue of transferring between units is generally a topical issue for most military personnel. It is very popular, very important. Currently, the practice is that it is done with great difficulty, it takes a long time, and only through the personal decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, can a person, a soldier or a sergeant be transferred from one brigade to another. This is a very slow way, very slow. And, in fact, these problems with transfers between units in a mobilized army, when everything is changing, is a big mistake, a big drawback that, unfortunately, is not being corrected. Of course, where there is inadequate command, there are inadequate decisions, so why should sane people have to follow the orders of idiots? If a person wants to fight, has a reputation, a history of military service, transfers, in my opinion, from one combat unit to another, to combat positions should be automatic. If there is a large number of transfers from a unit, a certain period should be set, perhaps once a year, once every six months. And those who want to be transferred should be transferred, but only if they are transferred to a combat equivalent position. This means that a person is not afraid of risk. He is not afraid of risk, he wants to take risks, but he requires other conditions for this. Maybe the team, maybe the commander. If this is not the case, it is the problem of the commanders where they serve now. That is, there are certain conditions. Of course, if there is a transfer from a combat unit somewhere to the rear, a person who has not served at all, there may be questions. It's a shame that, unfortunately, there are people who are very professional, who have experience in destroying the enemy and are not transferred to a position that will allow them to destroy the enemy even better. I don't see the logic of keeping such people in another unit, to be honest. 

Why didn't the flanks on the Oskil front to be cut off?

Any offensive actions are effective if we have a stable defense. Our defense is not stable, it is not built, it is not organized. In other words, we have strategic defense only in words. It is not implemented as a set of measures. That's why we don't have the stability of the entire frontline, there are always fires and problems everywhere. That's why there are no tactical reserves to cut off such areas, such places of breakthroughs. There are no reserves, and this is a given of war. We cannot fight the enemy with superiority in numbers. The Russians have the advantage in numbers, they had it at the beginning of the war and throughout the war they had more people at the front. And unfortunately, the leaders who do not understand this do not understand that we can counterattack when we reliably control smaller forces, control all other parts of the front so that there are no fires in other places. We control the use of technical means, means of destruction, more effective flexible management, organization of training of people. That's how we can do it. Numbers will not win us the war, but quality will. Unfortunately, when there is no quality of use, there are never any reserves. They are always burned up in some small battles, and then they disappear somewhere. This is what we are seeing happening near Pishchane. That breakthrough, so you understand, has been there for two months. They are crawling 100-200 meters, there is no surprise there. We had a lot of time to build a defense behind Oskil. A lot of time. It has not been used. Why is it not used? No one wants to answer for this. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief are not interested in these issues, it's just all lip service. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Syrskyi is not interested in these issues. They are interested in some media events. Unfortunately, our war is turning into a war strategy, into strategic planning. It contains all the elements of such a PR show. Now what Zelenskyy and Syrskyi are commenting with pleasure - Kursk. Nothing else is interesting. And the fact that there are 10 other areas of attack in Donbas and Kharkiv region is absolutely uninteresting, unfashionable, and below-the-line. They don't deal with it. That's why the entire burden of this war is on the shoulders of our commanders from the brigade commander, battalion commander, company commander, and ordinary infantry soldier in a trench. And the UAV operator who supports him. These are the main people who fight the war, and the people who support them with fire, supplies and everything else. And everything above that is some kind of politics, administrative things that sometimes have a very strange effect on the development of events at the front. Lack of responsibility is the main problem not only of the government, the main problem of the war. 

How do prisoners fight? Was there any point in them?

Well, according to the feedback, friends, from all the military units where prisoners were selected as volunteer fighters, the feedback is extremely positive. Very positive. And even now there is a struggle to see who can get more prisoner volunteer fighters to their unit. They are performing really well, and as I said, I talked to one of our instructors, one of the instructors of the 3rd Assault Brigade, Heorhii, who is known to everyone, the commander of the training unit, and he says that prisoners are the last volunteer fighters in Ukraine. He says that they are well prepared for war, because those people who voluntarily go to the front, to assault units, to combat units, are motivated, they have discipline, they are ready for restrictions, uncomfortable living conditions, and they are not afraid of violence. They are trained to the highest possible standard, and their use is of high quality. All commanders ask for more of these fighters. I would like to remind you that not all prisoners in Ukraine, like in Russia, can go to the front. In a number of categories, people do not get there. But those fighters who are there are fighting effectively.

What do you think of the law on demobilisation? When should we expect it and whether to expect it?

Friends, I don't see any possibility now, the government is not discussing it at all, it is not planning it, so I don't think it will be done. I don't see any prerequisites. Regarding the law on demobilization, I believe that we need a law on the adequate use of active troops, first of all, so that people can receive adequate rotations, adequate vacations, so that a person can rest for a year if he is, for example, an infantryman. If he is an infantryman, he should rest, get additional vacation, even more than he is at zero line. In other words, they should rest more than they do when they are performing tasks. And he should receive additional leave, because the stress on the infantry is the main stress in war. When they say "lack of forces", it means that there are not enough infantrymen. There are no scouts, no artillerymen, not even drone operators, not even soldiers in this war, but even they are not the main burden. There is no supply, no commanders in the headquarters, despite the fact that they do not sleep there. The main shortage in the war is infantry soldiers. In fact, in order for these people to recover, to be combat-ready, they need to be given a full rest, i.e. much more, so that they can recover after the war. This is the main problem of the war. If we had adequate use of people, we wouldn't have these issues. And you know, we are constantly told, by generals, politicians, the president, that there are no people, no people. In fact, there are a lot of people in the army who are not directly involved in combat operations. I've already told you on the air, we have cases where there are two battalions subordinated to one battalion commander, this is happening right now, he has no people in the infantry, and he has two battalions subordinated to him. They have more than 500 people. They get paid every month, but they have been in the rear for 4 months. They cannot be involved in combat operations because they have zero infantry. 500 people are support. And no one thinks that maybe these 500 people, if they are not needed to replenish the infantry, can be used to replenish UAV units, intelligence units, where people are needed, to staff the headquarters of those combat units that continue to fight, to give vacations to commanders at all levels, to improve controllability, to improve, for example, the use of drones, to increase the number of drones. But we do not. There are 2 battalions, 500 people, getting paid every day, just sitting there waiting to be replenished. And all infantry replenishment goes to those who are fighting. And these 500 people are sitting in the rear, just imagine. And then they say we don't have enough people anywhere. With this kind of use, controlling, illiterate, there will never be enough people. Everybody will be exhausted, everybody will be on the edge. Unfortunately, this is a common practice. In one of our brigades, a battalion was subordinated the day before yesterday. I'm talking to the brigade commander, asking how many people, what kind of reinforcement will you get? He says there are 300 people in the battalion, but I can use only 10. I say what do you mean 10. He says that just what he says, 10, these are 10 infantrymen. All the rest are support, which we can't send to zero line. And we can't use their fire support units, we don't have enough ammunition ourselves. Their commanders are not coordinated with us, we have different training standards, and we cannot apply them. That's why 10 infantrymen from the battalion will fight, the rest will stay behind, we've withdrawn them, they will sit in the rear and that's it. They will just get a salary. This is the situation on the frontline. And at the same time, we have an acute shortage of personnel in the units that deal with technical means of war. Drones, EI, EW. There is a shortage of staff in the headquarters of combat units. People are not resting because there is no one to replace them. No one pays attention to this. It seems that the General Staff is engaged in creative searches, arrows on the map, lines, and does not look at the organization of the troops at all. I don't know how to reach Oleksandr Syrskyi. Maybe he has some relatives or friends who can tell him. Well, he doesn't have time, as I see it, to solve the problems of organizing the use of the army. Let's do this, maybe we can influence the leadership. I'm not talking about Volodymyr Zelenskyy, he's always in the process of new speeches voiceover in the evening, and he's not interested in the situation in Donbas. He comes somewhere where he can do good PR, where there is some kind of offensive operation, some kind of success, and where we are retreating, he will never come there. He will not say anything, he will not influence the situation in any way. Well, it's a difficult case there, I don't know. Even his wife won't knock until one is heard, unless Yermak somehow pays attention. Well, we don't have much hope for Yermak, as we understand it. 

Kharkiv is having a hard time again, high-rise buildings again. Can nothing be done about it?

Unfortunately, Kharkiv is near the border and the enemy uses a lot of firepower. Therefore, of course, it is impossible to build air defense systems that would shoot down all Russian planes that drop GABs and destroy the system that would destroy Russian MLRS, missile systems that hit the city. The situation is such that there is only dispersal there and, of course, it is not an option to stay there in large groups. Kharkiv will continue to be under fire. Unfortunately, we do not have such a density of air defense systems to protect it completely. This is an objective reality. And I think it will remain so, sadly, for a long time. 

There are rumors that Budanov will be dismissed. Can you confirm them? How do you react to this dismissal?

There are rumors that Budanov is going to be dismissed because in principle the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine is involved in many, let's say, commercial topics. Mr. Budanov and his entourage, Mr. Hohilashvili, who is well known to everyone, and other people who gathered around Budanov, a people who simply did not have time to gain life experience in such things, so to speak. And of course, in my opinion, he is being dismissed not because of any military issues, but solely because there is competition. There is the main vertical of Andrii Yermak and Oleh Tatarov, and they remove anyone who interferes with their ability to raise money on all commercial issues. And Budanov is a competitor for them because he has his own channel of access to President Zelenskyy. Yermak is systematically firing all the people around Zelenskyy, all those close to him who can approach him on their own without Yermak's permission. This is Yermak's strategy to ensure that Zelenskyy hears information only from him. This continues. Now the President's office has been completely cleared and there have been dismissals in the government. They are all connected exclusively with these intrigues. For example, Oleksandr Kubrakov was dismissed there, the deputy prime minister and the minister of infrastructure were dismissed because of Yermak's intrigues. Similarly, Budanov will be dismissed here. Will I be particularly sorry? To be honest, during the war I did not see Kyrylo Budan as a competent head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, and I have repeatedly criticized some of the unfortunately stupid decisions he makes at the front for the sake of PR. He is conducting them at the expense of people's lives. These are simply poorly organized, irresponsibly planned landings on Zmiinyi, the operation in Enerhodar, and a large number of other operations that, unfortunately, brought us nothing but losses. And then Budanov just shamefully tries to justify his failures. And now the Kinburn Spit. What was that all about? It was just absurd. On August 6, people died, absolutely without any logic. What was that all about? Why is this being done? So I actually think that if Budanov is fired, I will not consider it a weakening of military intelligence. I will just hope that a competent person will be appointed there, who will stop giving interviews all day and start doing his direct duties. He will plan operations, be responsible for the personnel, and will take care of people's lives and think with his head about what he is doing. That's why I don't see Kyrylo Budanov like that. That's why I don't really think it will be that easy to dismiss him. After all, Zelenskyy likes this PR there. But if he is dismissed, I don't think there will be any problem for Ukraine. The man has some virtues, but he did not and does not correspond to such a high position, the head of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine. This is just my opinion. 

Friends, thank you for your questions. I am very grateful to you for the broadcast, for being with us, for supporting the channel. And in the near future, we will be broadcasting other topics, as the situation at the front is changing every day. Thank you for your support and Glory to Ukraine!