Loss of Vuhledar

Author: Yurii Butusov

Yurii Butusov, Editor-in-Chief of Censor.NET, analyzed the situation with the loss of Vuhledar and named the reasons that led to it.

1. The importance of Vuhledar.

The defense of Vuhledar is a real feat of Ukrainian soldiers, who for two and a half years inflicted losses on the Russians near Vuhledar that were many times higher than ours and repelled two major offensives in 2022 and 2023. The city had a key position for controlling the southern flank of the Ukrainian defense forces in Donbas, it was an extremely favorable position, dominant height, densely built up, which gave the best radio horizons for drones and firing positions for all types of weapons.

2. Consequences.

It was favorable to keep Vuhledar. The loss of Vuhledar is a defeat that will have severe strategic consequences. An important fortified area with a large number of equipped positions and minefields has been lost. After that, the enemy will "disassemble" the front and attack Velyka Novosilka from the east and Kurakhove from the south, and there are no more such convenient defense lines. In fact, it is necessary to immediately create a new defense line to cover the borders of the Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions from the east.

3. When it was necessary to withdraw from Vuhledar, was the military order timely and what losses did our soldiers suffer?

The only road to the town of Vuhledar-Bohoiavlenka was taken under enemy fire control on September 24, and the occupiers came to a distance of 1400 meters to the road. At this point, the command of the "Donetsk" OTG (Colonel Lutsenko) should have issued an military order for the planned organized withdrawal of troops from the city, as there was no way to unblock the city. On September 26, the enemy completely blocked the entrance to the city with drone strikes. However, the OTG command did not issue a timely military order to withdraw, but continued to demand to "hold on". On the night of September 30-October 1, the command of the 72nd Brigade withdrew the last cover units under its own responsibility due to the impossibility of further defense, which was carried out with losses due to heavy enemy fire. During the last four days of the defense of Vuhledar, the 72nd Brigade lost about thirty (30) soldiers as missing in action in the city and on the retreat route. At one of the positions, the Russians captured 5 servicemen, whose names have not been established, and shot them on the spot, as recorded by our drone.

4. 4. What are the reasons for the loss of Vuhledar?

а) The lack of combat-ready reserves and combat-ready replenishment to replace the losses of our troops and strengthen the 72nd Mechanized Brigade, which was directly defending the city. This is the responsibility of the AFU command;

b) The enemy outnumbered the 72nd Mechanized Brigade by at least 5 times - according to the official report of the Russian Defense Ministry on the capture of the city, the Russians concentrated 36th, 37th Motorized Rifle Brigades, 5th Tank Brigade, 40th Marine Brigade, 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment, reinforced by units of the 14th Special Forces brigade. Plus, the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 139th Assault Battalion attacked the 72nd to the north. In other words, against one of our formations, reinforced by several incomplete and poorly armed armored battalions of the 125th and 123rd TDF (Territorial Defense Forces) Brigades and the combat-ready 1st Da Vinci Brigade, which, moreover, did not receive replenishment to cover losses, there were six enemy formations reinforced by special forces and assaultmen and constantly replenished to continue the advance; 

c) Poor organization and interaction in defense, setting tasks without taking into account real capabilities and without assessing the real combat capability of the troops. The leadership of the OTG (Operational-Tactical Group) and OSGT (Operational-Strategic Group of Troops) did not pay attention to the organization of massive use of drones, EW (electronic warfare), EI (electronic intelligence), and troop cover from enemy drones, in combination with firepower. The tactical position of Vuhledar and the open spaces around it made it possible to destroy the advancing enemy groups with drones in cooperation with other means, to save infantry lives as much as possible, but the high military command did not concentrate drone units that could ensure the density and massiveness of strikes, which did not allow to compensate for the enemy's significant advantage in infantry;

d) Lack of well-organized counterattacks. For a long time, infantry units with low manpower and weak weaponry from the TDF were sent to the breakthrough area, which could not restore the situation, but only heroically suspended the enemy's offensive for a while. The line battalions of the 72nd received neither time to restore combat capability nor trained replenishment. The only assault unit that the AFU command has redeployed over the past four months to reinforce the 72nd Brigade, the 1st Da Vinci Assault Battalion, was used due to a lack of reserves to defend north of Vuhledar and was drawn into battles with units of the 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the occupiers' 139th Assault Battalion; 

e) Lack of a high-quality second line of defense that would allow stopping the enemy in the area of mines north of Vuhledar in pre-equipped positions covered by minefields. 

5. Regarding the circumstances of the death of Ihor Hryb, commander of the 186th TDF Battalion of the 123rd TDF Brigade.

I am collecting information and communicating with the soldiers of the 123rd TDF Brigade. In the near future, I will write about the circumstances of Hryb's death, the actions of the 123rd TDF Brigade in the Vuhledar area, the adequacy of decisions to use it, the brigade's control and organisation, and the consequences for the city's defence.

Yurii Butusov, Censor.NET