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7 kilometers to Dnipropetrovsk region - Yurii Butusov’s overview of events at front

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During the stream, Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov analyzed the situation on the critical frontline as of November 16. The focus is on the situation near Kurakhove and Velyka Novosilka, as well as the problems that arise in the organizational actions and decisions of various operational and tactical departments, and the consequences of organizational and managerial decisions in general.

The situation at the frontline

The hottest and most difficult place on the frontline is the Kurakhove direction.

Обстановка біля Курахового 16.11

The enemy is concentrating its main efforts in this area, the town of Kurakhove is under attack. The enemy is advancing from all sides. And we can see how deep the enemy is making envelopment maneuvers from the south after capturing Vuhledar. The Russian offensive in this direction cannot be stopped. Literally hundreds of square kilometers have been captured by the enemy in this area alone this year. Kurakhove is already deeply outflanked by the enemy. And holding this area, which is actually a very favorable tactical defense line, is now disadvantageous for us because the enemy has deeply outflanked the lines of communication and complicated the defense. In fact, our troops now have to think about an organized withdrawal from some parts of the front, where we can actually say that the enemy has outlined an operational encirclement in the Kurakhove area.

At this point, it is already very close to the borders with the Dnipropetrovsk region, with central Ukraine. The closest point in this area is 8 kilometers away. Just 8 kilometers and the enemy will already reach the Dnipropetrovsk region. The enemy has an advantage in this area, and they control the fighting in a more organized and purposeful manner. Sadly, we will talk about the actions and management methods of the command of the "Donetsk" OTG, which cannot stabilize the situation. The enemy has now made Kurakhove a very convenient frontline for them, which they are trying to cut off. For us, holding Kurakhove now is already a very tactically disadvantageous task, very difficult, because it requires a lot of forces, and the enemy can dictate the initiative, strike from different sides.

The situation in the Rivnopil

Обстановка в районі Рівнополя. 16.11

The enemy is now trying to attack from two flanks, to besiege Velyka Novosilka from the zone of Zaporizhzhia region and from the east, from Vuhledar. The situation here has escalated, the enemy captured Rivnopil, the positions of one of our TDF brigades were also attacked, and we failed to hold the battalion defense area, which, in principle, the enemy attacked, and our units had to withdraw quickly enough.

Velyka Novosilka

The enemy will try to concentrate all its efforts to capture this very important settlement and district center and thus reach the broad front in this area, in the southern Donbas, to the borders with Dnipropetrovsk region and then develop the offensive further into Zaporizhzhia region and central Ukraine. The situation is very difficult and there is a question for the government.

Pokrovsk

Покровськ карти 16.11

In the Pokrovsk direction, the enemy is advancing very, very slowly. It is clearly seen that the enemy is driving a wedge south of the city, trying to build on its progress there and at the same time reaching the rear of our Kurakhove grouping in the complex logistics in the area. We should not think that we have stopped the enemy here and that there are some very powerful defense lines. In fact, there are very heavy encounter battles going on here. Our soldiers are making great efforts to stop the Russian offensive. But it should be noted that for more than 2 months after the enemy reached the near approaches to Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk at a distance of 3.5 kilometers, approximately 3-3.5 kilometers to Myrnohrad and 7-8 kilometers to Pokrovsk, the enemy was stopped on the outskirts of these cities.

Now the Russian command has concentrated its main efforts at the operational level to the south. First, they captured Vuhledar, and now they are concentrating their efforts to capture Velyka Novosilka. And now they are trying to push through the defense in that direction. It is important to mention the situation with the command and control. I am traveling along the frontline and I want to tell you how different are the organizational actions and decisions of the two neighboring operational and tactical grops (OTGs).

OTG "Luhansk"

There is the Luhansk Operational and Tactical Group, headed by Mykhailo Drapatyi. There was a very difficult situation, a completely inexperienced and incompetent commander, an office colonel Ledovyi, who completely destroyed the entire division. There was a lot of chaos, big problems, shouting, complete misunderstanding. I don't know what Ledovyi wanted: an order or a rank. Oleksandr Syrskyi was giving him an opportunity to earn an order, perhaps for his good friend. This absolutely incompetent person ruined the OTG management. He received only negative feedback from all his subordinates. Finally, Ledovyi was replaced by Drapatyi. And there, the man just stopped swearing and began to at least listen to what his subordinate brigade commanders were saying. And suddenly, a miracle happened - the stabilization of command - Ukrainian soldiers who were effectively fighting, fighting, inflicting losses on the enemy as part of the Luhansk OTG, and as soon as the command, instead of interfering with them, began to help them a little, control of the real situation began, control of real positions was restored, because the inadequate management style of Colonel Ledovyi led to continuous lies at all levels, to falsification of reports, so that no one would receive inadequate superior anger all the time, and so that they would not be dismissed from the position of commander suddenly, and this leads to tragic consequences. So, Drapatyi quickly overcame this, and it stopped being so tragic: at least the management became logical, reasonable and consistent. Yes, there are a lot of problems, but there is some logic, and the OTG commander hears, at least tries to understand the real situation and check the reports. This is very important. And an adequate tone of communication, it stimulates trust.

OTG "Zaporizhzhia"

I would like to draw attention to the Zaporizhzhia OTG. An enemy offensive is also expected there. In the area of the Zaporizhzhia OTG, you can see several defence lines dug in the OTG line with the naked eye. I cannot say that these defence lines fully meet the requirements of modern warfare. The methods of building strongholds are a bit outdated, the quality of work is not quite high, and there are certain problems. But the defence lines in Zaporizhzhia have been built. And not just one, but several. And the troops can enter the open field, but occupy certain positions. If they have time to equip them, it's very convenient and we can work with it.

OTG "Donetsk"

And what about the Donetsk OTG? This is striking to everyone in the area. 500 meters from the area of responsibility of the Zaporizhzhia OTG and from these defense lines that have been dug there, and an empty field, zero, nothing has been dug. This is the management style of the "Donetsk" OTG, which is constantly fighting in an encounter battle mode, constantly throwing troops into encounter battles, into wood lines because it is not able to equip at least some adequate defense lines. And because of this, there is constant managerial and organizational chaos, which many commanders of units and subdivisions in the area complain about. If you compare the Luhansk and Donetsk OTGs, many subordinates say that in this headquarters it is just complete neurasthenia at the command level, which commanders pass down for some reason. 

It's a shame because the leadership of the Donetsk OTG is led by officers who have proven themselves well as brigade commanders and are respected by many soldiers. Lutsenko is a former brigade commander of the 79th Air Assault Brigade. His deputies are Maksym Marchenko, a former brigade commander of the 28th Brigade. And Pavlo Fedosenko, a former brigade commander and his deputy, of the 92nd Brigade. It would seem that these people have some experience, they themselves have been subordinated for a long time to the not always adequate decisions of many commanders. And now they have been promoted to higher positions, at such an operational level. And, unfortunately, we see how they manage and what they do.

Let's take a look at the organizational decisions at Zaporizhzhia OTG and here at Donetsk OTG. The difference is immediately noticeable. Let's compare the management style of the Luhansk OTG, how the headquarters works there, collects information, sets tasks, monitors the implementation of tasks, evaluates the actions of commanders, and how the Donetsk OTG works. Unfortunately, a large number of unit commanders tell me about this neurasthenia in the headquarters, constant shouting, constant lies in reports and ignorance of the real situation. And the lack of knowledge of the situation is due to the distrust of commanders at various levels, which is created in the OTG headquarters. And, unfortunately, this is a management problem. The enemy has an advantage in this area not only in the number of troops but also in the management of the organization, at the operational level. And this affects the situation. This is not my personal opinion, but the opinion of commanders and different levels in those units of troops that are fighting there. Unfortunately, instead of building defense lines and deploying troops on these defense lines to stop the enemy, thus saving their forces and killing as many enemy soldiers as possible, there are constant encounter battles, constant attacks on commanders, accusing them of all sins, and dismissals from office, which are completely groundless in most cases because of this neurasthenia and hysteria at the level of the OTG. And what does this lead to? It leads to the fact that the soldiers' manageability is very low, not the soldiers', soldiers do not take positions in the wooded line or withdraw not because they have poor manageability. It is the manageability that is lost in the first place when setting tasks. When there are lies, inadequate tasking, then there are lies in reports, because when commanders try to force their subordinates to adjust their reports and reports, of course, nothing good comes of it. 

I don't know why the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, doesn't pay attention to this... However, why can't we compare the situation in the Luhansk OTG, where the situation was also critical, and the forces allocated there are much less than the reserves allocated to the Donetsk OTG... Why can't we compare the preparation of the defense line at least with the Zaporizhzhia OTG? Well, if people cannot determine for themselves what is good and what is bad, if our General Staff and the Army Command cannot understand the situation and stop this non-stop offensive to the borders of Dnipropetrovsk region, and constantly blame the soldiers, battalion commanders are dismissed, brigade commanders are dismissed, maybe we should look at what is not working? Maybe something should be changed at the level of the OTG? Maybe the General Staff has an inadequate assessment of the situation? Otherwise, why are there always soldiers in the wood lines, but not generals?

I believe that if our high command, the OTG, the OSGT, the General Staff, the Commander-in-Chief in Chief do not have an adequate assessment of the situation and do not have solutions to why we have such a disorganized command, then we need to create separate general officer platoons and place them on detached service to the infantry for at least a week. Just like the General Staff places repairmen, doctors, medics, etc. on detached service. If the army is all infantry, then it should be all infantry. I believe that if the general's driver, the OTG commander's driver, fights in the field for a week, and if some officers who issue orders there go into the wood line for at least a couple of days and experience how they formulate orders, how they are perceived, how they are executed down below, this will only strengthen management. After all, they cannot cope... They have obvious problems with management. And I'm not the only one talking about this. I can just say it publicly, and those people who serve in the army cannot say it publicly. They have no right to. 

Therefore, I would like to draw the attention of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi to the absolutely inadequate situation in the command of the Donetsk OTG. And it is precisely because of this inadequate situation that we have no order at the front and our defense lines are collapsing. And our troops are doing their best there, and we can't blame them. There are continuous encounter battles, a lot of videos and stories about how the enemy is being defeated, how Russian units are being eliminated. And of course, the soldiers and commanders who are fighting directly on the front line, inflicting losses on the enemy, cannot be blamed. They are doing more than humanly possible. And it is impossible to demand more from the troops. That is, we need organizational and systemic solutions and better management. Let's hope that Oleksandr Syrskyi will take a look at this situation, at the fact that combat missions are constantly being disrupted, there is a constant gap between reports, and how the OTG headquarters affects this.

Kupiansk

Карта Куп’янськ 16.11

The enemy has managed to enter the outskirts of Kupiansk recently. Here, too, the enemy is trying to drive in such narrow wedges and is getting through, infiltrating. Our defence in this area, we understand, has all the same problems. As elsewhere, the main reason is management and organisation. A large number of units, low cohesion, low interaction. Our command is used to the idea that if there is poor interaction and cohesion, the soldiers will somehow sort it out down there. And, of course, such an order does not work in the management of the military organisation. That's why the enemy managed to infiltrate, and they are constantly trying to break through our combat formations in small groups. And a Russian infantry fighting vehicle with troops broke through to the outskirts of Kupiansk. It was destroyed there. Such groups are always being eliminated.

The enemy approached Kupiansk from the north. In fact, they have already reached the last ridge of hills that controls Kupiansk. If the enemy takes this ridge of hills, they will be able to take control of at least half of the city, under fire control, direct fire. The enemy is also trying to attack from the north. Taking advantage of the fact that the Oskol bridgehead of our defense forces is cut in half in the area of Pishchane and Kruhliakivka, the enemy is now trying to expand this wedge, including in the direction of Kupiansk, to the north. The situation here is quite difficult, and the main problem is, again, organizational and managerial.

There are units operating in this direction, and the third assault brigade is there, a little to the south. It could, of course, be used to stabilize the front line. The third assault brigade has a large number of fire reconnaissance and attack drones. But in order to use coordinated units, organizational management decisions are definitely needed. The command has a certain vision of how to do this, and we hope that something will finally be done. There is no reason to retreat under such enemy pressure when the situation there allows us to stabilize the situation, as we saw in Makiivka. The enemy went and captured the village of Makiivka, and even captured part of the ridge behind Makiivka. But he was driven out, and now the situation is stabilized, there are no attacks, no advance, on the contrary, they are being shot there, like in the kill zone.

QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE

What do you think of the new features of the Army+ app regarding transfers?

Let's see, the idea of electronic transfers, reporting, and commanders' responsibility is adequate. We just don't know what the wave of these transfers will be, because it is obvious that it is impossible to transfer everyone in the army wherever they want. During special combat missions, combat operations, there must be certain statistics, certain logic. In this story, I like the fact that with the help of the Reserve+ app and the voluntary nature of the service, which anyone can apply to, we will have a database of military personnel, and a certain number of people can already have access to it, and this database will already have a lot of requests. And we will be able to compare which units and positions people are most willing to transfer from and to which other units. I think this will be a very important rating for our army, which will show where there is more motivation, where there is a higher quality of management, where there is a more difficult team environment, and vice versa, where there are military units where people want to transfer most of all. It seems to me that when the army has such clear data, when the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Commander of the National Guard have clear, objective statistics on where people are most likely to flee and where they most likely want to be transferred, this will be the best assessment of the combat capability and competence of the command staff. And of course, this will also be one of the important criteria for assessing the combat effectiveness, command and leadership qualities and command staff of certain formations. Therefore, I am looking forward to seeing how the first month will see a certain base of requests for transfer from unit to unit. 

What can you say about the battalion commander of the 110th TDF Brigade, who was in the DPR in 2014 and fought for them? How can this be?

I think that the military counterintelligence, the Security Service of Ukraine, should make an assessment here, since this situation has become public. If we're talking about a battalion commander whose personal file is reviewed at many levels when he is appointed, signed by many officials, I think it shouldn't be such a big secret. It's just a matter of responsibility, we have to find out now: first, whether all this is true and confirmed, and we expect the SSU to conduct an inspection and in the near future, perhaps, we will even request and receive information about this case; and second, there will be a question of who controlled and evaluated the examination of the personal file and the appointment of this official. But we will wait for the results, there is a procedure, there is publicity, and we will now wait for the conclusions of the SSU.

Is there any movement towards a divisional system? Maybe you know something?

There is no movement towards a divisional system, even after many broadcasts, statements and speeches, even by some military officers, who talk about the very poor level of management in our Armed Forces, in the National Guard, due to the lack of an operational level. We have a brigade, an OTG, and that's it. The OTG is simply nothing. We have a brigade and that's it. And then there is no control at the front. We fight in brigades against divisions, corps, and armies. So, when we raised such a public wave, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff obviously asked why we have no divisions, no corps. But so far there is no adequate solution.

The high military command does not want to change anything. They would like to create, perhaps, more corps, that is, increase the number of general positions at some level. But these corps are nominally in our army, but they do not operate at the front as a coherent unit. A corps is an administrative structure in the rear. Something like an operational command, which is sitting around and not engaged in operational command. Our operational command is not an operational command structure, but an administrative structure similar to the former Soviet military district. That is why, unfortunately, they do not want to create divisions. And why do the military at the front, the brigade commanders, stand for divisions? In order to improve management, primarily at the operational and tactical level. So that the brigade does not fight with its limited set of troops. So that a brigade becomes part of a division of three, four, or five brigades. Around the strong brigades, where they have a strong headquarters, command, staff, aerial reconnaissance, attack drones, weak brigades would be joined by weak brigades where there is a lack of staff, not enough weapons, no organization of aerial reconnaissance. That is, they cannot be suitable for modern warfare. There are just people and some weapons, and that's it. When they talk about a division, that's what commanders mean. When they talk about corps, they talk about unions from several divisions. And when this is discussed at the highest level, and Zelenskyy is told something, another fantasy, it means that another administrative structure is being created. Not a division. Divisions are not being considered. All the generals are torpedoing this issue. The point is that corps can be created within the Armed Forces and the National Guard, but not to take over an area of responsibility and be responsible for it with their own set of troops, which are assigned to them. This is just another administrative structure that essentially duplicates the operational command. Therefore, unfortunately, there is no progress here, no qualitative changes in the management and organization of the Armed Forces in terms of the responsibility of leaders for people's lives. 

Do you see any positive changes in response to your criticism?

Sometimes there are changes, indeed. I have repeatedly spoken with the leadership of the Ministry of Digital Transformation, for example, about some aspects of drone development. I also talked about the idea of creating a drone rating, a rating of the best units and focusing efforts on providing drones, giving a minimum to everyone the same and also giving additional drones to those who are better at killing. I was just talking about this as an idea, but I am very happy and consider it a significant achievement of our government that the Ministry of Digitalization implemented this idea together with the State Special Communications Service. In October of this year, the first month, we launched a rating of the best units in most of our Armed Forces and the National Guard, which, the more they produce results, the more targets they destroy, earn points and, at the end of the month, additional drones are provided to the best units. In other words, in addition to centralized distribution, there is also targeted provision of those who are able to produce results. So some things are happening.

I spoke about Ledovyi on the air. I hope that there was a lot of discussion about it.

I had a whole air about Zelenskyy's "Victory Plan," and I said that this is a completely fake story, because in his victory plan, for some reason, Zelenskyy gave orders to the West, to NATO countries, that NATO should ensure Ukraine's victory. But there is no plan for victory for Ukraine, no plan for what Ukraine should do. There are just words with no tasks, no deadlines, no logic behind them. And it should be noted that almost three years of war have passed, but President Zelenskyy has ordered the preparation of an action plan for Ukraine. And the General Staff, like other structures, received the order and fulfilled it: to convey to the President their comments, their vision of how to go to victory. I hope that now several agencies will collect this information about their positions and what needs to be done to win. I hope that finally, in the third year, at the end of the third year of the full-scale invasion, President Zelenskyy, our Supreme Commander-in-Chief, will have an action plan. Let's hope that it is more practical than these political declarations in the "Victory Plan" that was announced with such pathos, but there is simply zero content.

In fact, the authorities only respond to criticism. No one is interested in any suggestions or desire to improve anything. Zelenskyy and Yermak, who determine our policy, are much more influential than the president in some matters. So, in matters of war, they are not focused on finding any solutions at all. They only respond to criticism. When we create some kind of wave of public discontent: there are no defensive structures, no divisions, no drones, then Zelenskyy looks at ratings, the number of likes on Facebook, Yermak reads what people are writing, he gets monitoring reports, and the two of them, just so you understand, watch a lot of different stories and social media. In fact, they live only by this. And this is what they react to. So when there is a lot of public discontent, then yes.

I would like to say that the scandal with disabled prosecutors, to which I also devoted both my posts and airtime, led to the dismissal of the Prosecutor General and certain changes in the MSEC. I am not saying that this is solely my merit. As a journalist, I am just trying to analyze and structure the position and opinions that exist in the active part of civil society, in our army, in the defense forces, and bring it to you, to make it public. And only because I take this information from those people who work, who fight, who, in fact, defend Ukraine primarily with their hands, their minds, their actions. That is why it resonates. That is why I believe that the government is responding to some things. Where there is very sharp criticism, and where there is a very big resonance, they react.

What are the reasons for the retreat? Lack of people at the front?

I don't think so. The first reason that all the commanders on the front are talking about is not a lack of people, not a lack of ammunition, and not even a lack of drones. First and foremost, everyone is talking about inadequate management and organizational measures. When the command's decisions do not correspond to the situation, do not correspond to real conditions. When they don't hear and don't want to hear, even prohibit truthful reports. There are real cases when brigade commanders are dismissed for providing truthful information. Two commanders in the 24th Brigade were dismissed. The commander of the 58th Brigade was dismissed for a truthful report back in 2022.

Unfortunately, in our country, those who tell the truth are often disliked by the highest military command. Because they are interested in telling us that everything is stable, tense, and under control, and when a person reports a crisis at the front, about real problems, they usually shut him up. And then it turns out that, you see, the frontline is collapsing, because the troops are exhausted and in unfavorable positions. No decisions have been made, and no general is responsible for this. We have lost several hundred square kilometers in a couple of months in the Pokrovsk and now in the Vuhledar directions. No one is responsible. Everything is fine, it's probably the way it should be. But before that, someone lost some wood line, and they dismiss a commander, dismiss a brigade commander. And then cities, villages, dozens, hundreds of square kilometers are lost. Who is to blame? Nobody. They were in charge, everything turned out to be fine, but the soldiers did not fulfill it. This lie from the top, of course, comes from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff, because Zelenskyy himself wants to hear only good news, to report only good news, and to report all the bad news without him. Mariana Bezuhla will be sent and told that these are all generals, they are on their own. In fact, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's staff is held in this style. In an atmosphere of complete lies. That's what people who visit it say. The situation in the south, 5 minutes, everything is fine, it's difficult, it's under control, we're moving on. That's how they analyze and consider the situation. Then the demands to lie come down from the top and these reports are drawn up. And then we look at the map, and why is the enemy advancing? And what's been done there? And there are no defense lines there. The troops there, instead of deploying and meeting the enemy in positions that have been cleared, shot through, are rushed into wood lines and counter-battles, and there are never enough of these troops. 

There will never be enough people if they are constantly thrown into a encounter battles with the troops of a country that has a 6-7 times superiority in numbers. This is impossible. Instead of meaty assaults from the Russian side, in many areas we are trying to stop the enemy with meaty defense, in the same wood line. This is absurd. And this has not been working in the Donetsk OTG for many months, and there are no changes.

Will there be an attack on Zaporizhzhia? Are the defences ready to hold the city?

The offensive on Zaporizhzhia has already begun, the enemy will disassemble the front from Velyka Novosilka, it is obvious. It is true that defensive structures have been prepared in the Zaporizhzhia OTG zone. There are very big questions about the quality of these structures. They do not meet the conditions of modern warfare either in terms of camouflage or the scale of this construction. In modern warfare, digging platoon strongholds that are designed for 30 people in defense is absurd. Of course, modern positions are held by squads, groups of 2-4 fighters, 6 - small groups of people, up to 10 people. And an ordinary position, in order not to be quickly destroyed by the enemy, must be camouflaged, logistics must go through the wooded area, adjacent to the wooded area, fortifications, dugouts must be in the wooded area itself, so that they are difficult to notice and difficult to observe, there must be well-digged communication routes so that logistics can be foreseen, there must be holes on all logistics routes. In other words, the position should be made the least vulnerable to drone strikes, first of all, to strikes from high-precision weapons, and artillery that conducts adjusted fire. And, of course, so far, these strongholds are still digging in for a tank attack with infantry. So there are problems. But the defense lines in Zaporizhzhia have been built. This is good news.

It is much easier to equip these defense lines than when a soldier is sent, as in the neighboring OTG "Donetsk", with a shovel to the wooded area. That's why I don't think the enemy will be able to break through the defense in the Zaporizhzhia direction very quickly. Even despite what happened in Rivnopil, I don't think the enemy will be able to get through there quickly. The enemy will obviously make the main attack on Velyka Novosilka from the east, where there is no defense and counterattacks continue.

How many resources will the Russians have to attack so intensively?

But that's enough. Russia can, it has a coercive repressive apparatus. In Russia, there are not so many people who go AWOL; they use execution on the spot, catch those who escape from the army, and then send them back to the assault unit in penal subunits that have to advance. And people are tortured and killed for refusing to perform their tasks. This is a common practice. We do not have this in a democratic country. That's why we don't have any coercion. Because if incompetent commanders sent people the way they do in Russia, it would be a meat assault from both sides. Therefore, Russia can attack intensively. It is attacking intensively only because it is constantly sending people. And these small groups of people, because of our disorganization and problems with combat capability, with the proper organization and use of troops, they are pushing the front. 

But there is nothing special about this intensity. We have areas of the frontline where our well-organized combat-ready units are fighting, where all these offensives are simply destroyed. This is the Ka-2 battalion, the Freedom battalion. And every day a platoon section is destroyed. And not in words, but on video. So, is it possible to stop the Russian offensive? Of course it is possible. This requires obvious elementary solutions. We need to take successful units, battalions, and brigades and scale their experience and management model to the entire front. There is nothing so strange or unusual here.

Why is this not done? Because of the lies from above, the unwillingness to take responsibility, the unwillingness to make decisions, the desire to simply write down evening reports. Unfortunately, during the war, Volodymyr Zelenskyy behaves exclusively as a PR specialist. He does not deal with any practical issues at such a critical time. And I want to tell you that the president has not been going to the front, to the Donbas front since at least February of this year. It is no longer interesting. You can't record good news there. He stopped going there altogether. How can we lure him there? To lure Zelenskyy to talk to the soldiers, we need only public opinion. Yermak will not let him go alone to talk to people. He does not gather brigade commanders, he does not gather battalion commanders. Only PR methods. He had to show that he was communicating with civil society. He gathered representatives of civil society. And the front is collapsing.

Maybe the brigade commanders could be assembled on the spot once, to visit them? No, the president does not do this, he is not interested. And in the sixth year of his rule, he tells fables that it's all the generals who are fighting the war. And the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's staff, which constantly hears reports that today we surrendered such a village, yesterday such a village, the day before yesterday such a village, we are losing such cities here, and she has nothing to do with it. Just to record the evening appeals. Irresponsible, wimpy people, weak. So how long will the Russians keep advancing? As long as we have such a mess in Kyiv's administration, as long as there is such irresponsibility at the level of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Staff, they will keep advancing. As soon as there are adequate management decisions and Kyiv simply stops interfering the army, gives it a normal organization, stops exerting political pressure and influence, and at least allows the army to fight adequately and stop the enemy.

As all the unit commanders who are holding their positions say, there is nothing extraordinary about stopping attacks by small groups of enemy infantry and small groups of armored vehicles. We have the ammunition, people and means to do so. We just need the right organization and use.

Why didn't Syrskyi invite you when he spoke to the bloggers, is this meeting possible?

I don't know. To be honest, I don't see it. The Commander-in-Chief has this desire to communicate with bloggers. Let him do it. Why does he have to talk to me? Syrskyi really can't talk to me, because Yermak will punish him for it. You understand. The man does not want to lose his position because, as I said on the air, Syrsky is terrified of Yermak and Zelenskyy, terrified of losing his position. And he says only what they say. For him, it's just a white whale. And he is really afraid of them. So why? What am I going to tell him? He reads many of the things I say on the air, he watches in the monitoring. The General Staff, essentially, transcribes and analyzes the broadcasts to review what I discuss in the Public Relations Department. But just what is the result? Syrsky is only interested in not being criticized. He is not interested in real changes. I don't see it. There are no systemic solutions to many issues. I keep repeating and repeating some things, and he even pretends that everything is fine. But in fact, I'm not the only one who gives signals. There are a lot of people criticizing in the army itself. There are no changes.

Why don’t we cut off these salients? Is it the incompetence of the officers or something else?

Why do we allow them to make these attacks at all? We can maintain a solid front and prevent the enemy from doing so. 

Because other units don't get caught in the pincers for one or two years.

And why do we let them make these salients at all? We can keep a complete front and not let the enemy do this.

So in fact, the issue here is not that someone is telling Syrskyi something, that he will meet with me and want to do something. But he doesn't want to do anything. A meeting with bloggers is not given to hear suggestions. Just like Zelenskyy. He does not meet with civil society representatives to hear suggestions. He needs to make a PR event and put a checkmark: I met with such and such influential people, don't touch me for a while, I did something, now don't criticize me for a long time. These are imitative actions; the authorities do not show any systemic desire to change anything.

The President made an interesting speech today (11/16/2024 - ed.). "No one has created any dozens of new brigades," said Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The entire army is laughing at this statement. Let's read what he said: Zelenskyy was asked why he was creating new brigades. What did he answer? "Who told you that we are creating them? Who is spreading the message that we are creating new brigades?" Zelenskyy answered with a question to a question. "Their core were people who went through the war. Around them are those who have mobilized. It is better if they (the newly mobilized - Ed.) have experienced commanders. If the entire vertical is experienced. They were not thrown straight to the front. After training, everyone was waiting for procurement with military equipment. All this talk about new brigades means that in order for there to be a rotation, another brigade must replace one. We can call it "new". That's why no one has created dozens of new brigades. There are some moments when, for example, a particular brigade can no longer hold a certain width of area. Because they are tired. Not only can't you replace it, but the number of Russian troops in the area means that you need to reinforce it with an additional brigade. Because the Russians are one to eight, or one to three.

I can admit that I am one of those who actively criticize Volodymyr Zelenskyy for creating new brigades, since he approves it and allocates money and resources for it. New brigades are being created, and there are more than a dozen of them. Why are they being created? Why, instead of forming divisions on the basis of experienced brigades with experienced personnel, why are new formations being created, dozens of them? This is simply an inadequate approach by Zelenskyy himself, as we can see from this statement, and by the high military command, who simply do not understand what military formation is. And because they obviously haven't read much history, they simply don't know how it should work in the context of mass mobilization in a major war. That is, they have not studied the experience of either the First or Second World Wars. They have no doctrine, no concept, and they are doing things the way they did during the ATO. That is, these OTGs, now OSGTs, were made - and that's it.

In this statement, Volodymyr Zelenskyy openly lies to the journalist that he is not creating new brigades. And the 140th brigades? And the 150th brigades? And the 160th brigades that are being formed? That is, the president either deliberately decided to lie to the journalist, to mislead the journalist, the audience, and civil society, and thus to absolve himself of any responsibility for these new brigades. Or he is simply in space and has no real information about what he is signing and where he is allocating money and weapons. There is only one conclusion: either he is a liar or he does not understand what he is doing. This conclusion from this ridiculous statement is very sad. How can you say such a thing? 

The big problem we have is that a large number of new troops have been deployed without personnel. That is, the president thinks that there are experienced people there. In fact, there is a severe lack of experienced personnel in all these brigades. On the contrary, experienced brigades lack people, infantry. Do you see how inadequate the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's perception of reality is? He says that the brigades are getting tired. He does not even realize that brigades do not get tired. It is the infantry, the people in the brigades, who get tired. And they are tired because the losses in the brigades that hold the front are not being restored. They are not being replenished. So instead of infantrymen who are supposed to hold the front with support, they send anyone into the trenches: Base area soldiers, weapons, fire support. Sometimes they even send drone operators. And our brigades are getting tired, they are not getting tired. Our brigades do not get tired, they are not withdrawn anywhere, most of them. They are simply destroyed. Because they do not receive replenishment. And the personnel backbone is destroyed. There are no soldiers to go to the position all the time. The platoon commander, the company commander, is also wounded there. Staff sergeants are killed and wounded. Those who control the weapons use them. And then what do we have left? There is no one to operate the weapons, they sent everyone to the trench. There is no one to maintain combat vehicles, because all experienced drivers were sent to the trench. Tankers are sent to the trench. Artillerymen are sent to the trench. Why is this? Because instead of constantly replenishing these experienced, well-coordinated brigades with a staff core with infantry, letting them train people themselves, Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the military leaders he appointed are creating these new proportions on the map. They are probably happy about it. I don't know why this is being done. Perhaps this is so that an additional budget item can be simply sprayed on the right people. Or maybe it's just done out of ignorance, a lack of understanding of what military organization is. Where there is an experienced backbone in brigades, it is destroyed and the brigade is withdrawn because there are no people. And then a new brigade is put in its place, completely inexperienced, without personnel, without training, without cohesion, a new brigade, just a large number of people in uniform. It suffers huge losses and is still unable to fulfill the task and hold the front. Well, we see that our Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I don't know what world he lives in, someone wrote to him, and I realized from this text that Zelenskyy simply does not understand what is happening in the army and military formation. He signs some things that someone has obviously written to him on a piece of paper, he reads out theses that he doesn't even realize. And these are ridiculous things that every person in the army who knows a little bit about these new brigades, and everyone knows this, will just laugh at this Supreme Commander-in-Chief. 

Why do this, why disgrace yourself, Volodymyr Oleksandrovych? Don't lie to people, don't spread false information, because your words are important in a war, you have to motivate people with your words and inspire trust. And when you lie about obvious things, instead of inspiring trust, you make people fear that you don't understand what you are supposed to be doing in your position. I hope that we will cut this episode, tell him that Volodymyr Zelenskyy will eventually get it, because he follows social media, and somehow correct this mistake. You can't do that, you can't lie like that. And we need to stop this completely unjustified, shameful practice of forming new brigades, which continues. 160th have already started. What is the point? All the experience of using newly formed brigades is negative. Just think of the 115th Brigade. It is sad, of course. Think of the other brigades. Those 140th, 150th, how they suffer. Another 160th have just started. What's the point of this circus? A lie on blood. And it's all on Zelenskyy's conscience, first and foremost.This is a self-incriminating act.

I would like to say that in many parts of the frontline, these Russian meat assaults end up in piles of corpses. Excuse me, I will now analyze the situation in the Kursk region.

The situation in the Kursk region

Our troops are constantly receiving reinforcements there, and there are no problems with ammunition for our troops. And our drone units are working very effectively in the Kursk region. The enemy is constantly attacking there. Attacks have intensified in the Kursk direction. The enemy is trying its best to narrow this bridgehead, which controls the sanitary zone created by the Ukrainian army, and is attacking literally along the entire perimeter of this bridgehead. But all these attacks are repelled with huge losses. There is no defense line there, but our high-quality troops are concentrated there. Reinforcements are sent there, there is ammunition, there are drones. And we can see from the number of videos that masses of Russian troops are being destroyed there on a daily basis. Therefore, there are heavy battles in Kursk region, but there is no threat of collapse and rapid encirclement of our troops, or that the enemy will quickly be able to capture and drive our troops out of the sanitary zone again.

Wherever Ukrainian soldiers have more or less high-quality personnel, ammunition, and weapons, they can defeat and stop the Russians, even with a certain advantage in numbers. Where our troops are not enough, where there are no high-quality, well-organized, trained, well-coordinated brigades, of course, we need to do the obvious things, we need to improve management, organization, use, build defensive structures, think about how to save lives, how to fight with drones, not people with machine guns in the wooded area zone. And in fact, this is working in many parts of the frontline.

That is why I am absolutely sure that we have all the opportunities to win, to stop the Russian offensive. But if there are no immediate changes in the management and organization, there is a great threat that the enemy is now advancing on large areas of the front, on the borders to the Dnipropetrovsk region, to central Ukraine, and the enemy will not stop. Their next offensive will be aimed at the Zaporizhzhia region, and then they will, of course, advance to the Dnipropetrovsk region. They will not stop at the border, they will go further. And where are the defense lines? Where are the positions? Where will the troops withdraw to? What troops? We have no answers to any of this. Because our "Victory Plans" are only for export, to tell someone something in the West. And the high command has not yet come up with a "Victory Plan" for its own army and people. Not even as a doctrine.

Therefore, I understand one thing: without the pressure of civil society on the authorities, neither Zelenskyy nor Syrskyi are going to make any organizational changes and decisions. Neither Umierov. Where is our minister? A person who does not exist is huddled himself up into a chair and is doing everything to avoid making any statement or taking any action, God forbid. Minister Cellophane. So this cellophane minister does not exist. And so, of course, we need to put pressure. We need to put pressure on the Headquarters, on the Ministry of Defense with information and force them to make changes at the front. We need to assign more forces to the best brigade commanders. Deploy the best units of our drones, reinforce them with the best commanders, in the widest possible stable areas of the front. Improve the organization of management. And not to wait for a miracle.

Because while they are there waiting for Trump or NATO to win the war for them and stop the Russian offensive for them, we are losing more territory every day. And, most painfully, we are losing hundreds of lives every day. This is a tragedy that the authorities do not pay attention to. And it is in our power to make the authorities act adequately. I have presented my action plan to you. But without such organizational management decisions, no miracle will happen. And this creeping offensive will continue. Because the crisis is not at the front, the crisis is in Kyiv, in management, in people's minds. Thank you for the broadcast! Glory to Ukraine!