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19.12.24 22:19 14 021 21

Yehor Firsov, Chief Sergeant of UAV Strike Company of 109th TDF Brigade: "Almost all drones we receive from state need to be retrofitted"

We agreed on this interview back in mid-March, but due to lack of time and my hero’s workload, we were able to schedule it only in early December. Yehor Firsov, the Chief Sergeant of the UAV Strike Company of the 109th TDF Brigade, is currently in the Donetsk direction, where the situation has long been extremely difficult.

Before he began flying, he had been a volunteer and a military medical worker. And at some point, as he himself calls it, "in a past life," he was a Member of the Parliament of Ukraine. It was in the Verkhovna Rada where we first met ten years ago.

- "You know, I've started to perceive you only in your military uniform. I hardly remember you in civilian clothes," I tell Yehor.

- I perceive myself more in khaki clothes. Definitely not in a jacket and tie," he smiles back. "Sometimes my phone brings up photos from past years. It feels like a different life to me.

- One that will never return, because we will never be the same as we were before February 24, 2022. Let’s look back at how your journey to the front started. When we recorded our previous interview in April 2022, you were serving in the TDF (Territorial Defense Forces) and had just traveled to the newly liberated Bucha and Irpin. Then, in early May, you went to Avdiivka to work as a medical worker. What made you decide to do that?

- After the events you mentioned, I made up my mind to become a soldier and go to the front. But back in those 'glorious' times, you couldn't simply enlist in the army just because you wanted to. There were plenty of people, so you could only get in through connections. I started looking for a way in. I called a lot of friends and acquaintances. I also called your Editor-in-Chief, Yurii Butusov. I said, 'I want to go to the front. Please recommend which commander I should contact.' He suggested I first figure out what exactly I wanted to do there. He gave me three options: buy a car and drive, buy a drone and start flying, or become a medical worker. I chose the third option, which seemed more interesting to me, and went to Avdiivka to work as a volunteer - tactical medical worker. I immediately registered at the military enlistment office and was drafted into the brigade stationed in the city at the time.

- What was happening in Avdiivka was referred to as hell. You were also in Bakhmut, which was compared to a fortress due to the incredibly intense fighting. What memories do you have from those times?

- Very vivid ones... When I started as a medical worker, we had a protocol on how to provide first aid. All of it was theory. In practice, it turned out to be about quickly grabbing a wounded soldier who had already received first aid from more experienced medical workers, putting him in a vehicle, and rushing him to the hospital. So that first experience was quite different from what we had been taught. But of course, there were all sorts of situations. The most unforgettable were the ones where we couldn’t get the guys to the hospital in time. No matter how fast we drove, the trip from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk took 30-40 minutes.

There were times when we provided help to civilians too. Let me tell you a story that really shocked me. We got a call over the walkie-talkie saying we had to go and pick up a heavily wounded. I thought it was some kind of hit so the person must be bleeding. On the way, I put on gloves and got ready. When we arrived, it turned out that a young man had a blood clot. It was already too late to give him medical help. His wife was in shock: 'He was alive 15 minutes ago, and now he’s dead.' I was so overwhelmed that on the way back, I started laughing hysterically and couldn’t stop for about 20 minutes...

- Stress reaction...

- It must have been a protective response because there were hits and explosions all around, there was this man lying there, whom we were taking to the morgue, where no one had been working for a long time, and his wife kept asking how to bury him?! When we got there, the shelling started, and 120mm mines or Grad rockets started falling right next to us. And the stench in the morgue was unbearable! There were dried blood rivers on the floor. It was terrifying! A guy from the Emergency Service who came with us started vomiting. I stood there at the doorstep, looking at the shelling, then inside, and I couldn’t decide which was scarier—outside with the exploding shells or inside where I could die from the stench...... Truly, the memories from Avdiivka will stay with me forever."

- Recently, I interviewed a pilot with the call sign 'Chief,' who initially fought in the infantry. I asked him why he switched his specialty, and he said that at some point, from everything he had seen and the exhaustion, he started losing his mind. Then he was offered a chance to train for FPV drones. So, why did you decide to fly?

- To avoid being in the infantry. There were moments when we found ourselves in dugouts under intense mortar fire. They radioed us that enemy infantry had advanced. Most likely, they were preparing to storm our position. And you're trying to decide how to respond in a hurry! In order to avoid getting jumped and do some good, I started looking for alternative paths. I wasn’t interested in going to headquarters for desk work. That’s when my friend suggested the following idea: "In China, there’s this electronic dog that follows you around. Let's load it with explosives and send it to the enemy's position." We began searching for it. He estimated it would cost around three thousand dollars. But it turned out to be far more expensive, and we didn't have enough funds. And that was the first time I accidentally saw the SOF training to fly an FPV drone. You know, it was love at first sight—I took it in my hands and said, "This is it! I’m going to do whatever it takes to get this thing in the air!" (he smiles. - O.M.). Everything seemed so romantic to me: launching these drones straight from the dugout, sending them exactly where I wanted. It turned out that everything was much more complicated.

-Why is it more difficult? Didn't you come across in?

- From the time I took this drone in my hands to our first full flight, it was probably six months. First, we had to raise money for the equipment. Back then, an FPV drone cost around a thousand dollars and took several months to assemble. And we needed about twenty of them. At that time, fundraising wasn’t what it is today. Nowadays, everyone knows what FPVs are. But two years ago, getting the funds together was a real challenge! As our brigade commander likes to say, it was an asterisk task. That was the first thing. The second was: now that we had the drone, how do we configure it, fly it a few kilometers without losing the signal? The third problem was figuring out which kind of payload to attach and how to ensure it detonated. We had to solve all these questions. Me and my comrades in arms say this about that time: we went through hell trying to solve those problems. But then hundreds of units were going through the same thing. My task was to make the guys I gathered believe that this thing worked because many were skeptical because they preferred Mavics.

- What was your first flight like?

- I wasn't there at the time. The guys called and said, "F@ck, we were flying and crashed!" I asked how far they got. "500 meters. Did the drone detonate? Yes, there was an explosion." I replied, "Well, that’s f@cking awesome!" And I start to rejoice (smiling. - O.M.). They said, "Why are you so happy? The battalion commander is going to scold us because we didn’t complete the mission." I said, "But this means everything is working! The only thing left to do is to fly." They were upset about losing the drone but didn’t realize we had already covered 90 percent of the journey. This was our situation, but we still flew and gained a huge amount of experience from mistakes which we needed later.

- Since we've already mentioned the lost drone, let me ask you, how many of them do you spend per day on average? I counted 29 in your Facebook photo, under which you said it was the daily norm.

- I was referring to the deployment rate. It’s day-night-day or just day-night, depending on the situation. It also depends on the team working. For example, our well-known MURAMASA group can use up to 40 drones in one deployment (day-night). It’s quite easy! I think the record was 44. On average, depending on the weather and the situation at the front, the number is between 15 and 25. But this is just for one group. If we’re talking about a brigade, where five such groups like ours might be operating along a 10-kilometer stretch of the front at the same time, then 100 drones could be used. But the technical side is crucial: if the drones are properly configured, everything will be fine. If they’re using the standard frequencies that worked two years ago, it’s money wasted – the drone will crash, and there will be no result. The advantage of our unit is that my guys spend a lot of time configuring the equipment, doing pre-operational work, which often takes longer than the actual deployment itself.

- The military told me that they often have to retrofit drones supplied by the state on the spot...

- I'll tell you even more: almost all the drones we receive from the state need to be retrofitted. First, it takes time. Second, it costs money. The good thing is that our unit, as we say, comes from a "wealthy family" (smiles - O.M.), so we can afford sponsorship. Imagine: a unit looking for sponsors! That’s the reality of the current Ukrainian war. You need to buy separate components, soldering irons, modules, antennas, and so on. Additionally, you need the proper knowledge. That’s why I believe a system should be created where brigades and military units can order UAVs for themselves. They may not purchase them outright, but they should be able to select the specifications from the manufacturers. For example, how many day and night drones are needed, what sizes—seven, ten, or fifteen inches—and what frequencies they should operate on. All these details should be specified, and manufacturers should fulfill the specific order. Otherwise, we’re just wasting time and extra resources.

- Why is there such a situation with state supply?

- Because the state thinks of a drone as just a 155-caliber shell. But it's not! It's not like a stick of sausage that you can just order individually. It's a complex piece of equipment! Even in different regions, the characteristics of drones vary. Those that work in the Kherson direction may not be effective in Donetsk. Even within a 30-kilometer range, the situation can change drastically due to terrain features, radio horizons, lowlands, hills like spoil tips, and so on. The unit on the ground knows its needs much better than an official in Kyiv. If that official can tell the difference between an FPV drone and a Mavic, that's a step forward. This is why we need to outmaneuver the enemy with the quality of our organization. Our organizational structure has to be much better.

- The enemy has an advantage in the number of means. True, they steal ideas, though...

- Speaking of stealing, their corruption works in our favor. Just as ours sometimes helps them. In fact, a large number of their UAVs crash because they are of poor quality. We track and know how the occupiers complain about the terrible quality of their drones. This is more proof that corruption negatively affects the frontline, especially in the technological aspect.

- But, again, their numbers are significant. In the Donetsk direction, who dominates the sky now?

- They have long-range capabilities. They’re constantly flying 20-40 kilometers with their "Fixed-wing UAVs," which we try to shoot down. Their "Lancets" fly even further. For our FPV drones, a working range of 20-25 kilometers is easy. Theoretically, we could fly into Donetsk and see the Donbas Arena. But we don't really need to do that right now. Why should we do anything there? We’ll have to return soon anyway. But in general, we have that capability because we’ve been doing this preparatory work for a long time. So, I’d say this: the occupiers have more drones, and they’re more varied, but their ability to use them, especially FPV drones, is lacking.

- And what is the situation with the EW (electronic warfare)? Ours and theirs.

- Their situation is more complicated, while ours is more multifaceted. Let me explain with an example. My crew is out working. I need to fly over a certain part of the territory under our control. While I’m flying, our EW system is also active. An infantryman, whose wife raised money for an EW system and sent it to him, turns it on to protect himself from an enemy drone, but it interferes with my flight. The challenge of technological warfare is that all these processes need to be carefully coordinated. The command has to provide a conditional corridor for our drones to fly through. This is the conflict between the old cadres and textbooks and the realities of war, where some fighters have adapted, while others continue to fight "like before."

- In October, your brigade was among the top three units in terms of destroyed vehicles. I know you hit different targets. What is the "high-value target"?

- In general, we have already hit a lot of different targets. The most emotional one was the Sontsepok more than a year ago. First, it was our very first "high-value target" at that time. Secondly, we hit it suddenly: we were flying, we saw something interesting driving by (smiling - O.M.), and we had to smash it! Then we rewatched the video: what the f@ck is that? "Grad"? It's a little different. It looks like a "Sontsepok"!

The second place was taken by the first Grad. It was also an interesting story. I came out of our dugout room, and the guys said: "Hey, we hit a Grad!". I asked them why they didn't wake me up. They didn't want to disturb me (smiles. - O.M.). That is, subsequent strikes were no longer as emotionally vivid. It just turned into statistics. But such "high-value" targets like the TOR, S-400, Grad, and Sontsepok, unfortunately, can only be destroyed by luck. Especially the Grad, because it is maneuverable – it stops, shoots, and moves on. It doesn't happen that way: intelligence reports that Grad is firing, and you fly out and hit it. To do this, you need to have UAVs on duty in the sky constantly, loitering and waiting for the target.

-What is the hardest thing to hit?

- Infantry. It’s clear how to hit a tank. How to overcome the enemy's electronic warfare is also clear. But infantry scatters and hides, so you need to adapt, search for them with bombers carrying high-quality fragmentation ammunition that works quietly and can reach different points. This is the hardest target for kamikaze drones.

- The pilot of the Drongo UAV Strike Group, call sign Zub, gave me an example when they spent six drones on one Russian infantryman...

- It can easily happen. That's why the f@ckers have changed their tactics and are trying to advance in small groups. Now it’s difficult to catch a tank on the battlefield. There used to be entire columns. Now a tank appears, fires, and quickly leaves if it hasn’t been destroyed during its operation. However, dealing with manpower, which is more dynamic and equipped with EW or the Bulat system (a smartwatch that vibrates when a spectrum analyzer detects a drone), is more challenging. But we are adapting. I think in time we will be as ready as possible to effectively kill infantry.

- What period of time are you talking about? The president said that the war could be ended next year. Do you believe that?

- I'd like to believe it. But negotiations are the diplomats’ and politicians’ task. Ours is Plan B. That is, if the negotiations fail. On the battlefield, no one is planning to give up. You could say that we’re in the final rounds now. By boxing standards, it’s about the tenth or eleventh round. The enemy is placing their highest bets, throwing all their forces in, and trying to take more. We have Toretsk and Kurakhove at stake (this interview is being recorded on December 5, while heavy fighting is underway for the city – O.M.), where the situation is critical, and Pokrovsk, which the bastards are targeting (I think they’ll attempt an assault by New Year’s), as well as Chasiv Yar—cities and territories we risk losing. Even if Trump has some influence, we still face several months of very tough battles. And if diplomacy fails, it’s unclear how much longer it will last.

- Can we knock out the enemy?

- We can, but we need more than we have now. First of all, people. You can't fight successfully with a small number of infantry. Secondly, drones. We need many times more of them and a change in the organization of their supply so that we do not receive junk, as I told you today. Third, we need parity in other types of weapons for the same artillery. Fourth, we need to change our approach to warfare. In other words, to rely on motivation rather than commanding like: I am the leader, you are a fool, so do what I say. We need to embrace technological organization. With a combination of these factors and a shift in approach, I believe we could—and will—win. As things stand, I don’t see the factors we need for this, except for some "black swan" event, like "someone" dying.

- By the way, Zelenskyy noted in his Resilience Plan: "We should not be afraid to talk about difficult things and problems in the army. Effective solutions are possible only if we have an honest conversation." So let's be honest: the same mobilization has failed. You say that we need to rely on motivation. How to encourage people to go to war?

- I’ll refer back to my previous answer: we need to change our approach. This is possible if society sees real changes in the Armed Forces. First, there should be a guarantee that you can apply for the position and to the brigade you want, and not end up in some random place. Second, units need proper provision. The best advertisement is word of mouth, when a soldier says, "We’re getting the drones we need, and our commanders know how to use tablets and Kropyva. Join us!" But what do people see now? Another scandal with mines. People think, "I could end up in a mortar unit handling rounds that don’t just fail, but might explode near me. If corruption like this exists and I die because of a faulty mine, why would I even bother?" So, there need to be real changes in the management of the Armed Forces—not just slogans and concrete actions, like firing those unfit for their positions and appointing those who understand modern warfare, punishing those guilty of corruption, and rewarding soldiers who do their jobs well are at least rewarded. This would be more or less fair. I am convinced that then there would be more people willing to join the Armed Forces.

- But now Ukrainians are living in a flood of information about peace talks mixed with plans for victory and resilience and promises from Western partners to end the war. So a person may think: "Why should I study, why should I join the army if everything could end soon ?" It seems that the society is being lulled to sleep...

- Yes, the society is lulled to sleep. We can also see this from donations, which have become many times less, and we are dependent on them, because most of the drones are still supplied to us from private organizations, such as MHP-Hromada, Sternenko Foundation, and your publication constantly helps. We are very grateful to them! But the fact that this is happening shows that the state system is failing, and it needs "treatment."

- The three recent high-profile appointments of Mykhailo Drapatyi, Oleh Apostol, and Pavlo Palisa may indicate that this "treatment " will begin?

- Drapatyi, Apostol, and Palisa are top-level figures in the Armed Forces. They are experienced and respected. But the question is, is this enough? Supposing we now see how quickly General Drapatyi will be able to make personnel decisions, will he have such carte blanche? I look at the situation not only from a military perspective because I also understand the political and organizational component when a person can hold a position but not be able to change the situation. We hope that all three will be given the green light to implement these changes. Today they are a ray of light for us. In addition, now experienced military officers (generals and officers) need to bring up the younger generation as much as possible - those who have shown their capabilities on the front lines. At the headquarters, they can become effective and scale up their experience.

- You're talking about the younger generation. There is still a discussion about lowering the conscription age. In your opinion, is there a need for this?

- Let me tell you an example. I was on furlough. I went to my home "Sportlife" on Chernihivska Street, where I had been going for seven years before the full-scale invasion. So, I couldn't park the car because there were so many people there! There were no women's group classes inside, but men aged 35-45 were training - in their prime. So, on the one hand, we need to think about lowering the draft age. On the other hand, we have a huge number (I think hundreds of thousands to millions) of such athletes who could feel comfortable at the front. But because they are hiding behind fake certificates and corruption, 18-year-olds who don't have five thousand dollars to pay off or connections to be exempted must fight. I am against this! We are suffering on the frontline today for the future of the country, so that the younger generation is not lost. Otherwise, they will be killed or crippled here, and we will turn into a crippled nation. I believe that we have enough reserves, and we can look for a mobilization resource in the current age range.

- As I listen to you, I remember how a year ago you said that there is already a certain split in society because of the war - some are involved in it, living it, while others are aloof and only concerned with their own lives. What do you think today? Is this gap growing?

- Once there was a gap, but now there is a certain abyss. Indeed, there are people involved in the war who even identify each other on the street. There was an incident on furlough when I was walking in civilian clothes and a guy came up to me, stuck out his hand, introduced himself and asked where I was from. We started talking. He was an assaultman. He also has seven contusions, just imagine! We talked about symptoms and memory problems. Somehow we supported each other through this conversation. I am convinced that a man who did not fight would simply avoid such communication. Therefore, I repeat, there is a gap. It will have to be "sewn" somehow. It is not yet clear how.

- Why did this gap form?

- Because society was told in 2022-2023: "Friends, there is no need to fight. You have to believe in the Armed Forces, which will do everything for you!" It turned out that the whole country had to be involved in the war. But it turned out that some people are waiting, while others are fighting at the front. So that's the reason.

- The Telethon also had a lullaby: the Russian military are chmobiki, incapable of doing anything...

- This was also used to cool people down. Chmobikis are chmobikis (chmobiki are russian citizens who were mobilized as a result of partial mobilization in Russia in September 2022 ) but nevertheless, they have had success.

- They also involve their allies in the war, such as soldiers from North Korea. Is it easier to fight with someone else's soldiers than with your own?

- If they are fighting, yes. If they are fleeing the battlefield, no. The army is a complex and multifaceted thing. There is one very important factor that was once underestimated in the world (both by our enemies and our allies) - our psychological stability and motivation. They did not calculate that from the first days of the war we were all ready to suffer and die, but to fight. However, another issue has now emerged: we’ve become accustomed to focusing on the quantity of weapons and ammunition, while the factor of morale in the trenches is overlooked. Morale is affected by many things, from the news to the way ordinary soldiers, especially infantrymen, are treated. That’s why I said that it’s not just about changing the names in leadership, but about changing the situation in the dugouts as well.

- You and I recalled the President's words about the possibility of the war ending next year. In conclusion, I want us to take a broader look into the future (as much as we can). In one of your interviews, you called 2023 the year of hope, and this year, the year of fatigue and anger at everything. What do you think 2025, which is approaching soon, might look like overall?

- Indeed, there were hopes that did not materialize, so the year of anger has come. I understand that everyone is tired of the predictions that every next year will be the hardest. But 2025 will really be like that. It will indeed be a year of survival in all aspects - energy, economic, social and, above all, military, as well as a year of final rounds. They are always the most difficult. We must not lose focus and strength, find the last reserves in ourselves to survive. I realize that for many people, the battle for the village of Lysivka near Pokrovsk is not important in terms of the geopolitical situation. But for us, it is very important, because if it is taken, the threat to Pokrovsk will become even greater. We have spent so many shells and drones here and, most importantly, lost so many human lives and shed the blood of our soldiers. That’s why every meter of land matters to us. Despite the dizziness and the urge to be knocked down or even knocked out, we must keep standing and fighting.

P.S.: Dear friends, the 109th Brigade has launched a fundraiser for drones. If you are willing and able to help, here are the details: