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Survive and win in battle. In search of BGMT (Basic General Military Training)

Author: Ihor Obolienskyi, Commander of 13th Brigade of NGU "Charter", for NV

training

What is it like to crawl on your side? Has anyone tried to do it in a bulletproof vest? If you have magazines in two rows and on the sides, you won’t even roll over, let alone crawl. And the main question is why do it? But this is taught at basic general military training (BGMT).

Colonel Ihor Obolienskyi, Commander of the 13th Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine "Charter", wrote about this in an article for NV

At the end of the third year of the Great War, we returned to discussing the basic training of our soldiers. The battlefield has shown that such training is still insufficient and ineffective. Recently, the duration of the BGMT has been increased from four to six weeks. For any training, the more time, the better. But time alone is not enough. The value of any training is what a person knows and is able to do at the end, i.e., the result. And the result depends on understanding exactly why we are training, i.e., the purpose of the training.

War and common sense tell us that the purpose of basic training is to teach a soldier to survive in combat and win, that is, to eliminate the enemy. This is the goal stated, for example, in the basic training programme for American soldiers. But not in the Ukrainian one. In Ukraine, the purpose of training is still to acquire the basic knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary for [...] obtaining the military speciality (VOS-100) 'rifleman'. That is, from the very beginning, when asked for which purpose we are training a soldier, we say - not for success on the battlefield, but for an entry in a military ID card. And all the flaws in the programme itself stem from this attitude. How can this be changed? First of all, to change the approach, we need to understand why we still think this way. I think there are two main reasons. The first is a lack of understanding of the threat and disdain for the army. After gaining independence, Russia pushed the narrative that we don't need an army because we are peaceful - we just need a plough and hard work. Since the Soviet era, the United States has been considered our strategic enemy. Everything was permeated with the belief that our enemy was on the other side. In addition, we thought that we were strong because of the Russians, who had the nuclear button and would protect us.

The officer's profession was demeaned. The experienced ones retired. New, young ones came in and were told that war was a myth. It may or may not happen. There will definitely be nothing full-scale. If there are any conflicts, they will not happen in our country, but somewhere else in the world, such as Afghanistan. Due to a lack of understanding of the threat and disdain for the army, the public need for quality military training disappeared. And with it, the training schools. At the beginning of the Great War, it turned out that we had no one to train our own soldiers. The second reason is the devaluation of education and training of any kind: military or civilian, higher or secondary. We have become accustomed to receiving not knowledge or skills, but a diploma, i.e., a MOS (military occupational specialty). And where the value lies in diplomas - MOS, knowledge and skills, on the contrary, are devalued. At the beginning of the large-scale invasion, we did not have our own training capabilities and started sending our people abroad for BGMT. But we didn't understand the nature of training and therefore mocked our partners – saying what they could possibly teach us. We still don't know military theory or history, so we claim to have a unique war and refer to ourselves as a "collective Clausewitz." Ultimately, due to ignorance, we have lost the ability to recognize our own mistakes and look for ways to correct them. As a result, over the past three years, we have changed the BGMT programme several times. However, it is still difficult to understand from this programme what knowledge and skills a soldier should acquire and how this should help him on the battlefield.

In order to qualitatively change the BGMT programme, we need to determine what tasks we are training people for, what they need to know and be able to do to perform these tasks, and how we will test them. And then, we must define the methodology — who should teach people and how. So, we agree that a soldier must survive and win in battle. Whether in defence or offence. Let's look at the most important knowledge and skills for a soldier in the current realities of war. A combat mission begins with a march. Nowadays, we dismount and reach the front line in 2-3 kilometers. How much weight can a person carry while marching on foot for such a distance? Hence, the first skills essential for survival are physical training and fitting equipment. From the very beginning, a future fighter must become accustomed to their equipment, understanding its purpose and weight. Moreover, during training, it is necessary to assess and develop each individual's physical capabilities. Today, it is impossible to move without the risk of contact, because 5 km or closer to the front line is within the drones' strike zone. Therefore, the next survival skill is the ability to seek cover. When dismounting, soldiers must immediately know where the nearest cover is, by studying aerial reconnaissance images in advance. This means that every soldier must be able to read these images and, once on the ground, quickly estimate the distance to a cover. Seeking cover must become an automatic reflex. The next task is to reach the positions on foot, but how to move – from where and to where. For this, terrain study skills are required, i.e. topography.

The next essential skills, critical for both survival and eliminating the enemy, are battlefield movement skills. First, the reflex to move must be developed, and only then the reflex to engage with the enemy. Soldiers must learn to move from cover to cover on the battlefield. Why is this important? Because cover helps you survive, cover helps you aim, the cover you leave behind can be used by a comrade-in-arms, and if necessary, you can assist them from there. Effective movement on the battlefield requires combining situational awareness—such as assessing the terrain—with proper movement techniques. For instance, why is it necessary to keep a low profile? To stay alive. Why is it necessary to crawl? To survive. It is equally important to practice movement techniques during enemy engagements. Why should you drop to your right knee when preparing to fire while moving? Because firing on the move is ineffective, and leaning on your left knee provides better stability for accurate shooting. Meanwhile, one soldier provides covering fire while the other moves. One soldier opens fire in a specific direction to suppress the enemy, while the other dashes to find cover, opens fire, and allows the first soldier to move again. The same principle applies to reloading weapons. Some may argue that different weapons require different reloading techniques. While technical differences exist, the fundamental principle remains: always keep a low profile when reloading. If you were firing from a kneeling position, you should lie down, crawl to a safer position, reload, and then get back up in a different location. This applies regardless of the weapon type.

When moving, a soldier must also be trained to count personnel. Everyone knows how many people set out on the mission together. This means that after each movement, you need to check for any wounded and ensure everyone is accounted for. All movement skills must be honed to the level of reflexes. Now a few words about fire and engineering training. The realities of the battlefield are such that fifteen people will no longer gather in one place. In the best case, there will be four together. This means that the fire system must be adjusted. Today, we observe the advance of North Koreans — they move in masses, as in World War I. They advance at a speed of 5 km per hour. You detect them 2 kilometers away. This gives you 20–25 minutes. You won’t have time to launch 100 FPV drones. This means we need engineer obstacles and machine gun platoons. For a machine gun to be effective, you need three to four positions for maneuvering. And this is what soldiers must be prepared for. The same applies to training in establishing and shifting fire. We are still digging trenches the Soviet way. And Americans do it differently. Their trenches are more effective on the battlefield and better protect personnel. If the enemy is advancing head-on and firing directly, there’s no point in digging a trench with a fire sector that is also directed straight ahead. Under direct enemy fire, you won’t be able to lift your head. Instead, a breastwork should be built in front, with fire sectors positioned to the sides. This allows soldiers to provide mutual crossfire, protecting each other. Regarding vehicle movement: this is also an individual, not collective, skill. Each person must know how to occupy every seat in the vehicle. You must know how to load into and dismount from the vehicle properly. Where to place your gear and what to do. And they must be able to do everything automatically, by touch. This is because it could be night, or the area might be filled with smoke, leaving you unable to see anything. You need to know how to dismount from every type of vehicle. From a low vehicle, you can jump with your gear on, but from a high vehicle, you cannot — otherwise, you risk injuring yourself due to the weight of the equipment. When dismounting, you must be able to follow the 5-25 rule: before stepping out of the vehicle, scan 5 meters in front, to the right, and to the left to ensure there are no "petal" mines. Then dismount, crouch, and observe farther ahead — up to 25 meters. Moving on top of armored vehicles may look impressive, but only briefly. In the current conditions, if you're on top, you become a target. The same applies to infantry groups moving alongside vehicles. With the use of FPV drones, vehicles on the battlefield survive only a few minutes. When an enemy FPV drone strikes a vehicle, it explodes. It demoralizes personnel. Additionally, the burning wreckage blocks the road. Ultimately, teaching soldiers to move alongside vehicles no longer makes sense today. Vehicles nearby do not help to survive. If a vehicle is hit, the infantry is left far from cover. Moreover, a burning vehicle produces smoke, which becomes a visual marker, attracting everything from artillery fire to FPV drones. Similarly, having equipment nearby does not contribute to destroying the enemy. Who are you going to eliminate if you're following a vehicle in a crowd? It's even harder to assist someone if the vehicle is already on fire and you're exposed in open terrain. Now, regarding tactics. All tactical skills—whether foot marching or in vehicles, moving with or without engagement—must be practiced under drones. Again, it is insufficient to merely discuss drones or demonstrate their takeoff and landing. Infantry encounters drones while they are airborne, not on the ground. For this reason, personnel must become accustomed to the sound of drones, learn to estimate their distance and flight direction, and adapt to simulated drone payload drops during training. I want to emphasize the importance of methodology and cross-disciplinary knowledge and skills. Tactical medical training cannot be limited to two days. The ability to provide first aid on the battlefield is critical for survival. These skills must be practiced daily until they become reflexive. During tactical, firearms, or other types of training, a medical worker should always be present with the group, and each recruit must apply a tourniquet at least twice a day. The same applies to techniques for evacuating the wounded. Finally, regarding physical and national-patriotic training. In the current program, 10 and 11 hours are allocated for these topics, respectively. This clearly demonstrates that the BGMT program is not designed to truly teach anyone. Physical training cannot be achieved through obstacle courses alone, and patriotic training cannot be instilled through lectures. Physical training forms the foundation of survival. And ideas of patriotism and morale serve as the foundation for the will to destroy the enemy and achieve victory. Therefore, they must be integrated continuously. To achieve this, the entire basic training system should begin with a comprehensive instructor assigned to a group of 10–12 recruits. These instructors should be sergeants who have experienced war and will train their group as if they were preparing for real combat. Each morning, as recruits emerge from their tents, the sergeant commands them to count off, establishing discipline and attentiveness. Tactical movement to and from the dining hall or training sessions in pairs further reinforces training. Every day he goes out with them to exercise. He also conducts competitive games designed to spark enthusiasm and foster a desire to win. The primary mission of a comprehensive instructor is to acclimate recruits to a specific way of life.This is how cohesion skills are developed, which are crucial for both survival and victory in battle. Often, people are unprepared to act because they lack a behavioral model. It is the sergeants who instill this behavior and motivation in recruits. If a sergeant participates in all activities alongside future fighters, he will establish expectations for how they will conduct themselves in combat. Later, when they join a unit, they will naturally follow and replicate the learned behavior. The same principle applies to national-patriotic training. It makes sense when it is not an academic lecture but part of the sergeant’s daily work. When the sergeant can explain in his own words to each recruit why we are fighting. When, in the morning, while raising the flag, he explains why it is important to give your all today. And in the evening, he reflects on why this day mattered. When each day begins with setting a goal and ends with evaluating how everyone has improved throughout the day. Everyone wants to hear they have done well and that their efforts are appreciated. There is always something to praise in every person. With this approach, six weeks of training will transform into a self-improvement camp where participants not only learn to survive and achieve victory in battle. They will strive to cultivate this culture of learning and cohesion in any unit they join.This is not a complete list of battlefield requirements that should form the basis of a soldier's basic training program. Someone will immediately argue that it is somewhere in our program: that equipment and movement on the battlefield are included in the "tactics" section, and the fire system is part of the "fire control within a unit" section. However, a program is effective only if each skill is described clearly and in as much detail as possible — outlining the specific actions it comprises and the precise sequence in which they must be executed. Similarly, each skill must be measurable — there must be a checklist of criteria to assess whether a soldier has mastered the skill or not. If you are interested, you can review how this is implemented in the US Army Basic Training Manual (STP 21-1-SMCT).  Without such detail and measurability, every instructor at every training ground will train as they see fit. Or they may not train at all. It's impossible to check the training in accordance with this program. In the end, with such a program, the commander will never know what skills his soldier has acquired during the BGMT.  And if the commander is committed to the soldier’s survival and success on the battlefield, they are forced to teach the soldier basic skills within the unit. This means the unit duplicates what the state has already invested in: instructors, ammunition, and time. If we truly aim to change the quality of BGMT, we must acknowledge that the current approach is ineffective. Every instructor must train soldiers as if they were preparing to enter battle alongside them the next day. Training should not start with individual classes but with the understanding that the trainee will spend 24 hours a day in the training camp, transforming from a civilian into a soldier. These 24 hours must be utilized in various ways to ensure the future warrior is equipped to survive and win on the battlefield.

Ihor Obolienskyi, Commander of the 13th Brigade of the NGU "Charter", Сolonel

for NV