Commander of airborne battalion, People’s Hero of Ukraine Serhii Kuzheliuk: "Many positions were lost because we were unable to station personnel there – not single soldier was available to secure position"
Prior to the full-scale invasion, Serhii served as an onboard technician on a Mi-8 helicopter. In 2014, he participated in combat missions as part of a crew that successfully evaded an enemy missile. In 2022, fate led Kuzheliuk to join an airborne unit, where he has served ever since. Currently, the battalion, as part of the 46th Brigade, is engaged in combat near Kurakhove.
On August 31, 2014, Serhii Kuzheliuk was evacuating the wounded in the Ilovaisk cauldron as part of the crew. But another flight could have ended in a shootdown - Serhii saw a missile fired from an anti-aircraft gun at their helicopter. None of those who were in the vehicle can explain how they managed to avoid it. However, the crew not only managed to escape themselves but also managed to report the ambush to another crew flying along the same route, thereby saving another helicopter and everyone in it. For this act, the entire helicopter crew received the non-governmental award "People's Hero of Ukraine" in 2017.
When the full-scale offensive began, it soon became known that the commander of that crew, Vasyl Mulik, was burning columns of Russian occupiers near Kyiv, and Serhii Kuzheliuk ended up in the paratroopers. And eventually he was appointed as battalion commander. For me, it was a bit strange - how can a helicopter onboard technician be a commander of an airborne battalion? But - given the will. Then everyone will have a place to effectively defend the country.
We met and had a chance to talk to Serhii in Kyiv, where he had come for a short time to get the necessary "goodies" for his unit. A couple of days later, when I was near Kurakhove, he was expectedly unable to meet with me because it is one of the hottest areas of the war. And there is no way to distract yourself there. So I was glad that we had the opportunity to talk for a little over an hour in the capital.
"I WAS WORKING IN CIVIL AVIATION. IN FEBRUARY 2022, I WAS PREPARING DOCUMENTS FOR MY NEXT CONTRACT. BUT ON FEBRUARY 24, I JOINED THE 95TH BRIGADE TO QUICKLY TAKE UP ARMS."
- How long have you been in Kurakhove?
- We have been in the Marinka direction – it used to be Marinka, now they have moved to Kurakhove – since December 6, 2023. If I’m not mistaken, we replaced the 79th Brigade. By then, Marinka had already been lost, leaving just a small patch of land that we tried to hold. There were no positions left, only ruins.
- Do people still live in Kurakhove?
- Quite a lot – between one and one and a half thousand locals remain, and they’re not on our side, they help the enemy: guiding them, betraying our soldiers... We tried to evacuate them, but they refused. They come up with excuses like, "We left before, no one is waiting for us there, we have nowhere to live..." Those who are determined, who are not lazy, will always find a job, a way to work, and a place to stay. And they are used to humanitarian aid being brought to them, all the basements and apartments are crammed with aid.
For more than a month now, we’ve had only one road left for movement. It’s already being called the "road of death": FPV drones, payload drops...
- What position do you hold in the 46th Brigade, in which battalion?
- Commander of the 1st Airmobile Battalion. I have been in this position for about a year and a half.
- I knew you as a helicopter pilot...
- And so it happened. In 2018, I left the army and joined civil aviation, the Ukrainian Helicopters airline. I worked in North Sudan, Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic... After that, I joined a Moldovan airline and worked in Afghanistan on its behalf. Then - Turkey, in 2021, when there were severe fires, I extinguished them.
- Is it more terrifying to extinguish fires or to fight in a war?
- People lose their lives in both situations. From the air, you can see everything burning—people trying to put out the flames, only to perish in the fire themselves... From above, it’s clear how plantations burn, orchards burn—everything that people worked so hard to build over the years.
In the winter of 2022, I was supposed to renew my contract with a Moldovan company to work with them again that summer. Then the full-scale war broke out. I was at home in Zhytomyr. On the morning of February 24, local airfields were bombed, missiles struck... I immediately went to the TCR—my personal file was still there after my discharge. They asked me: "Where will you go? You’re a helicopter pilot." I said: "Send me wherever you want, as long as I can take up arms quickly." The enemy was already advancing on Korosten and Ovruch. I arrived at the 95th Brigade and went to the parade ground. The commanders saw my rank as a major and immediately gave me a task: "Form a detachment for Kyiv. Do you have any objections?" - "None." I started forming the detachment.
- How is this done?
- A detachment was formed from those willing to defend Kyiv. At that time, there were many willing to join. 238 people signed up, but not all of them could fit into the transport we were provided. We were given three small buses and two trucks. Within a day, we had formed the unit and received our weapons. Even then, I met Volodymyr Shevchenko, the owner of the VeteranoKava coffee shop chain in Kyiv. He had served in the 95th Brigade during the ATO, so he arrived at the brigade on the very first day. Since then, Sheva and I have been side by side. Around the same time, I also met Vitaliy Yurchuk, a People's Hero of Ukraine, who had previously served in the 2nd Battalion of the 95th Brigade, call sign Staryi (Olden).
On the 24th, we rushed to the unit, and by the 26th, we were on the move. We received weapons, first aid kits, ammunition, and deployed to defend Kyiv. We entered the city from Vasylkiv, received our assignment, and moved to the Boryspil area, as there was intelligence suggesting the Russians would attempt to seize Boryspil airport. We were preparing for an airborne landing in the fields. The planes wouldn’t have been able to land—the runway had been blocked with vehicles and aircraft. We were expecting landing of paratroopers. Every night, we saw enemy missiles—red and green, just like in aviation. The red meant the flight corridor was closed, and the green meant it was open. That’s how we observed and stayed on alert.
The Russians planned to take control of all the airfields in and around Kyiv—Zhulyany, Boryspil, Hostomel, and Vasylkiv. They landed in Vasylkiv... but these paratroopers were quickly eliminated in the forest. Hostomel bore the brunt of the assault, as the Russians managed to land there during the first days. However, they suffered significant losses.
- When you were working in civil aviation, did you imagine that there would be a big war?
- About two weeks before the full-scale offensive, I felt that there would be a war. About a week before that, I went to Poltava to visit my comrades-in-arms. Military units were already on full combat alert. I felt that something was going to happen. That's why my wife and I prepared the basement, and I moved the most necessary things there...
- Did they also allow for the possibility that they would attack Kyiv?
- I did not expect them to attack Kyiv. From Crimea - yes, I was sure they would. I reassured my family and friends that they would not target civilians, but would first attack military units and airfields to prevent planes from taking off. This is exactly what happened on the first day of the offensive. This is logical, every soldier could run through these scenarios in his head.
- You spent a lot of time in Africa. Would you like to return there?
- Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya - there are very beautiful cities there. But home is the best. I have no desire to go anywhere else. I want to go on holiday only home, to my family. And why not - we have everything: rivers, lakes, forests. Ukraine is the richest country in the world, everyone knows that. Ukraine has the most land resources. It's just that there were no owners, as they say, who could manage it wisely and raise Ukraine. The battered cities and houses will be rebuilt. If we don't do it, our children will.
In 2015, when I was in the Democratic Republic of Congo, I first met Syrskyi, a simple officer with the rank of colonel, and got to know him. I did not expect Syrskyi to be in such a senior position now. And so it happened to many military men with whom we had crossed paths somewhere. The commander of our brigade... I could hardly expect him to become a commander, knowing him in Africa as an interpreter. We also crossed paths with Maksym Myrhorodskyi, call sign Mike, who led the airborne troops, in Africa, and flew together in the same crew...
"THE FIGHTERS OF THE NEW AIRBORNE BRIGADE WERE THE FIRST TO GO TO TRAINING IN FRANCE. WE WERE THE FIRST TO RECEIVE EUROPEAN EQUIPMENT. WE STILL USE IT"
- How long were you near Boryspil?
- Until April. On the first or second of April, representatives of the higher command came to us and said that they were accepting the detachment. At that time, I was the commander of a reserve platoon, and unofficially the chief of staff of the detachment. They said that a brigade would be formed, and the personnel would go to Zhytomyr, to the training ground. I went there two or three days earlier. I was still returning along the Zhytomyr highway, where the bodies of killed civilians were lying. Terrible memories...
We started selecting personnel who wanted to serve in the 46th Brigade. There were a lot of applicants.
- And everyone was experienced?
- No, they were all civilians. I talked to everyone: "Raise your hand if you served in the army". Out of twenty men, five or eight raised their hands. Then I asked: "Who has any medical or veterinary education?" - Two or three men responded. "I have a veterinary clinic, I know how to give injections, bandage..." - "Are you going to be a doctor?" - "Yes, I will." This is how we selected our personnel back then. At first, we formed a reconnaissance platoon - we immediately told them what it was and what they had to do. Then I asked: "Who is willing?" One or two young guys out of twenty raised their hand.
Snipers were selected in the same way. At that time, there were no trained snipers. "Who is a hunter? Who went hunting? Who wants to be trained and become a sniper?" - I asked. One or two raised their hands. Similarly, who wants to be a driver. Although at that time we had no idea what kind of transport we would have. We did not know what kind of weapons we would have. It was clear that we would be carrying Kalashnikov assault rifles. And what else... That's how we manned perhaps 95-98 per cent of the brigade. It was a good manning of personnel - only those who were willing.
- At that moment, did you feel the desire to return to army aviation?
- I did, but no one would have let me go... Besides, I was already deeply involved... From the very first days, we all bonded with each other. At that time, everyone looked up to me, which imposed responsibility. That’s when I was appointed as the deputy chief of staff. I started training the personnel.
- Who was the battalion commander, who was appointed?
- Andrii Leonidovych Khorunzhyi. He is now the deputy brigade commander. A competent and intelligent officer. At that time, he had just graduated from the military institute and was assigned to form our battalion. As for the brigade’s command, probably about 15–20 percent consisted of career officers. These were battalion commanders, chiefs of staff. They were sent from the 79th, 25th, and 80th brigades—from all the brigades... The brigade commander was Valerii Viktorovych Skred, a competent officer whom, honestly, I would like to see in high-ranking positions in the future. Probably the best commander I’ve encountered in my entire service.
- How did you train your staff?
- At first, we pitched tents and prepare board beds to accommodate the personnel. When we started firearms training and tactics, foreign equipment and weapons started arriving at this stage. And we started sending drivers to France for training - for different types of equipment.
- Were these the first foreign training exercises?
-Yes. After these exercises, we started receiving equipment. Different battalions were provided with different types of equipment. The 1st Battalion received British Husky vehicles. Honestly, it's the best armoured vehicle available today. We’re still using them. We don’t have many left, but some are still operational.
- Can they be repaired, do you have spare parts?
- We have a technical support platoon. These guys thoroughly service every vehicle—they know each one down to the last bolt, including all the wiring. They repair not only Huskies but also French VABs, Iveco vehicles, and even Soviet-era equipment: ZILs, Gazons... We have our own mechanics. We also repair Hummers ourselves. The platoon consists of skilled, intelligent guys who have repeatedly participated in combat operations, some of whom were wounded before joining this unit. But there were moments when even they were involved in combat operations. After Marinka, for instance, there were times when we had to deploy 100% of the personnel to construct fortifications: dugouts, trenches. This was just 500–800 meters from Marinka itself, in the nearest tree line to the town. There, we began setting up positions designed to withstand FPV drones. We tried to cover the trenches from above. It’s not like the state-built fortifications we see now: they put up concrete pillboxes, dug trenches, fenced them with walls, but left them uncovered from above! These trenches may be located at advantageous hills and look well-constructed, but… how can a soldier enter such a position? It’s impossible! These are open-top positions, vulnerable to FPV drones or Mavic drones with payload drops.
- These buildings need to be built differently.
- Yes, considering the realities of modern warfare, taking into account FPVs and Mavics with payload drops. Trench lines need to be completely covered. Even toilets should be constructed inside dugouts. We planned and equipped everything with this in mind. The technical support platoon, logistics personnel, and medics who were not directly involved in the defence were fully engaged. The entire personnel was mobilized.
- Didn’t anyone complain: "What’s the commander thinking with this?"
- No, on the contrary, everyone volunteered; no one was forced. We explained that this wasn’t a direct order but a request – a measure to save the lives of soldiers on the front line in the future. Of course, there were one or two refuseniks, but where doesn’t that happen? There are always some who refuse to go into combat. They were assigned to other duties.
- You’re talking about Marinka. Do you recall where you headed with all the new equipment after your training?
- To the Kherson direction. It was the summer of August 2022. We set out to liberate Kherson. Our assault operations began toward Bilohirka. We focused on amassing forces and trying to establish crossings over the Inhulets River. Our brigade managed to achieve this, along with support from auxiliary brigades handling the necessary equipment. We successfully crossed the river. There was a forest belt we called "Sherwood," where we amassed our forces and launched further assault operations. All battalions were involved except for the 4th, which was still forming. We advanced with three battalions. I can say that we operated very effectively. No one expected a newly formed brigade to fight like that. The enemy put up fierce resistance... Opposite us was the 76th Division, marines, as well as forces from the DPR and LPR. They were well-fortified along the riverbed and held the high ground, which gave them a clear view of us as we approached the river.
- How did you manage to establish the crossings?
- At that time, everyone worked with enthusiasm and patriotism. I won’t say there were no losses. Considering our strength at the time—around 800 personnel (I won’t disclose the exact numbers)—about 300 of them had already experienced the 2014–2015 war. They had seen combat firsthand and knew what it meant. Many had served multiple army contracts and understood weapons, machine guns, and grenades. Moreover, we had undergone excellent training: personnel preparation and unit coordination, starting at the platoon level, then progressing to company, battalion, and finally the brigade as a whole, involving all three battalions simultaneously. This preparation paid off. Without it, we wouldn’t have achieved any results. At that time, both the equipment and the personnel made a significant contribution.
- And there was more ammunition.
- Of course, we had more ammunition. But if we compare today's artillery and UAVs with those that we had back then, we were, as they say, firing shells blindly. There were intersection sights, we knew where they were shooting at us, and our ammunition flew there. At the time, we had five or six pilots whom we were trying to train, but we lacked the means because we had only three or four UAVs. The enemy had a strong electronic warfare system, and we were losing UAVs. Back then, we didn't know how to use remote antennas. Even the firmware for the drones was not yet available. So the enemy would detect the UAVs and jam them, and we would lose them. The flight was usually in one direction... But with the development of all these means, it became clear that now it is impossible to fight a war without them.
"THE FIGHTERS WERE JUMPING OUT OF HIDING AND SHOOTING AT THE PLANES WITH MACHINE GUNS. THEY WERE FED UP WITH THE AIRCRAFT"
- Where have you reached in the Kherson region? What settlements did you liberate?
- We crossed the Inhulets River, liberated all the nearest forest belts around Bilohirka, took the front line of the enemy and drove them out. We did not take anyone prisoner at that time - they did not surrender, they were prisoners of war later.
- Didn't surrender - what do you mean, did you blow yourself up?
- No, we fought to the very last. There were moments when we were on one side of the asphalt road and the enemy was on the other. We exchanged fire and threw grenades. If we had tools like Mavic drones with payload drops or FPV drones back then, things would have been much better. At that time, we managed to seize the front line without a single loss, but during the clearing operation, we lost three soldiers. Later, there were additional personnel losses during the defence, as the enemy shelled us heavily with artillery and tanks. We held those positions for a couple of months, rotating battalions. Then, the higher command decided to push through and conduct raid operations. A small detachment was formed from our 1st Battalion and a tank company from the 57th Brigade. We managed to break through to Sukhyi Stavok and continued advancing along the forest belts. We ran into the enemy in such way that they were surrounding us 360 degrees. We secured one forest belt, from which the enemy fled, leaving everything behind. Then we moved to the next one.
- Was the enemy already retreating by then?
- Yes, they were retreating. When we drove into the forest belts in armoured vehicles and started clearing the areas, the Russians were really fleeing. The forest belts were strewn with weapons and ammunition, which later came in handy for us.
- There were dense mines in those places.
- Everything was mined. We crossed the minefields with significant losses of equipment. Many later criticised the command for those losses. But how can you liberate occupied territories without losses? Naturally, there will be losses of both equipment and personnel.
The enemy fled from the two forest belts where we had advanced. On the second day after this, we came under heavy aerial bombardment. There was nothing we could do. The terrain and the intact forest belts made it impossible for us to effectively use the MANPADS we had at the time. We couldn’t shoot down the aircraft. It takes 9–12 seconds to lock on and fire, but we were always short by five or six seconds. There were even moments when our fighters would jump out of cover and fire their rifles in frustration—the aircraft had driven them to their limits. But we endured that thing too. After that, we continued to storm forest belt after forest belt, steadily pushing the Russians back. Our brigade was advancing from this direction, while other units pressed from the left, near the Dnipro River. Eventually, this formed a small encirclement. We pushed into Velyka Oleksandrivka, Mala Oleksandrivka, Dudchany, and continued along this path. Fierce battles and assault operations continued in those areas. The enemy had already heavily mined the terrain, which created significant difficulties for our vehicles. That’s when we started using small assault detachments—four soldiers, sometimes eight. These small groups successfully pushed the enemy out, even without the use of heavy equipment.
In the end, the enemy fled. We pursued them all the way to the Dnipro River, reaching Darivka. There, too, the enemy abandoned ammunition and other supplies. We crossed the Inhulets River again to the other side, repaired a bridge, and restored a pontoon crossing that we had destroyed at least ten times before—it was originally the enemy’s crossing—between the villages of Inhulets and Darivka.
Afterward, we were pulled back for a couple of days before being deployed for the first time to the Donetsk direction: Ozarianivka, Kurdiumivka, and Klishchiivka
- This is all just near Bakhmut.
- There, we stormed the forest belts where positions had been lost. We were reassembling them... Other battalions of the brigade were engaged in different areas: the 2nd battalion was already near Marinka, assisting the 79th Brigade, while the 3rd and 4th battalions were in Bakhmut.
Near Klishchiivka, the enemy was pressing hard; the Wagner mercenaries were fighting there at the time. Afterward, we were withdrawn for reсovery.
- What’s your opinion: when a brigade is dispersed across different directions and subordinated to another brigade, isn’t that detrimental? Many argue it’s better for a brigade to fight as a single unit rather than pulling out individual units and leaving them detached...
- It’s detrimental. If, for instance, a brigade is held in the command reserve and a single battalion is temporarily assigned to support assault operations or to plug a gap, that’s acceptable. The brigade remains in reserve, one battalion carries out its task, and then it returns to its parent unit. But scattering active battalions across different directions... Currently, each battalion has its own artillery—though not much—and a mortar platoon. But these resources are insufficient. When the entire brigade operates as a cohesive unit, battalions utilize their own resources and have the confidence that higher command will provide additional support. This leads to much more organized and effective operations.
And every commander tries to take care of his own personnel, and treats assigned personnel... We have assigned personnel, we try to treat them as our own, try to provide them with everything, to show them right away: you are ours, forget that you have your own commanders. If you want us to take care of you, then listen to us at the moment. And we will take care of you as if you were our own. But it happens that the battalion's assigned personel is treated like a "daughter-in-law". And they send it to the most dangerous areas, without thinking about losses, without planning actions... Unfortunately, this happens
"A LARGE PERCENTAGE OF SOLDIERS LEAVE THE BATTLEFIELD BECAUSE THEIR FAMILY OR WIFE GIVES THEM AN ULTIMATUM: CHOOSE..."
- When the fighting was going on in Bakhmut, it was clear that we would lose the city. The enemy forces were superior. The same is for Kurakhove... It was clear that its loss was a matter of time...
- Kurakhove, and other settlements like Hirnyk, Hostre, and Krasnohorivka. We could have prevented their loss. There were well-prepared positions there, but we faced a shortage of personnel, ammunition, and artillery shells. Weapons were sufficient. There were significant sanitary losses among personnel. Why "sanitary losses"? Because the hardest part was entering personnel to the positions and extracting them. It happened repeatedly: a soldier spent two weeks in the trenches without leaving. Everything seemed fine—they felt like a warrior, effectively resisting the enemy. But upon leaving, they became disabled or sustained a concussion.After that, as a rule, they do not return to service, even if the injury or concussion was minor. The soldier no longer wants to go back, looking for any way to get discharged. If that doesn’t work, they go AWOL. These are purely psychological reasons. We had psychology teams working with them—not everyone can keep fighting after everything they’ve witnessed...
- Do you have any fighters, stormtroopers who are not wounded?
- No, probably not. Except for some young recruits who joined recently. But as for those who have been fighting since the first days of the full-scale war—there are none left such one. They've been wounded three or four times. Yet they returned to the ranks—some within a month, others needed six months to recover mentally. But they came back. The worst thing is when a soldier is afraid. Fear leads to personnel losses. But it's equally bad when a soldier loses his sense of fear. He needs to maintain a balance. Let me give you an example: a tank and two armored personnel carriers are advancing toward fortified positions. The soldiers who stayed in the trenches and confronted the enemy survived. The one who jumped out of the trench and ran across the field was killed. Fear is what killed him. I have another example: a soldier who had been wounded three times and went through hell—Kherson direction, Zaporizhzhia, Marinka—returned to the front but was killed near Marinka. He died because he lost his fear. Two sergeants decided to crawl to the enemy's positions to eliminate them. But they didn’t make it. They took an unjustified risk. There aren’t many such cases, but it’s in situations like this that we lose our best fighters.
As for me, I haven't been wounded throughout this whole period," Serhii knocks on wood. "I don't know who's protecting me—my late mother or some other forces... I really don’t know. I've been in many difficult situations, but, fortunately, I'm still alive."
- Helicopters were definitely flying over your positions...
- They flew.
Not a single Katsap was shot down?
- We didn't.
- Did it make you angry? You know where to hit...
- At that time, we didn’t respond to the helicopters. They didn’t cause us any harm, neither in terms of equipment losses nor personnel. The biggest damage came from aerial bombs – first unguided, then guided. As for the helicopters, I saw the Russians hovering above us, shooting. I know the technical specs of the Ka-series and any Mi-8, Mi-24, Mi-28... I often think back to the flights, but I can't go back to aviation. No one will let me.
- But the sky does not let go either...
- Of course. There are constant moments when you find out that comrade-in-arms helicopter pilots have been killed. I witnessed our helicopter being shot down near Kostiantynivka. It’s tough to see that. In such moments, I really want to return, but I've already built my own military family here. If I leave, others will follow me. From the very first days, I wanted to return to aviation because I have experience with more than one type of helicopter. I have experience operating both combat and transport-combat helicopters, I have all the qualifications, combat experience, and flight hours. I would be useful there as well.
When I got into the trenches and dugouts, I thought: how easy it is for the infantry! You’re sitting underground, hidden, while the pilots fly overhead and get shot down. But later, I changed my mind. Because there's no comparison; it's a completely different thing, a completely different war: the war in the air and the war on the ground. In aviation, you can complete a mission in an hour and a half to two hours, but in the infantry, no task can be completed in such a short time. Even if the personnel launch an assault or raid, they still need to hold their positions while constantly being shelled. And since the war has now shifted toward more advanced technology—FPV drones, payload drops—we must constantly evolve our electronic warfare, UAVs, and invent something new. But the hardest part is that we don’t have enough time to train our personnel.
- To replace the wounded and killed?
- Not just them. It’s not even that the soldier himself can’t cope; his family can’t. A significant number of soldiers leave the battlefield or desert from the war because their family or wife gives them an ultimatum: choose... There are also other situations. For example, a soldier applies for leave to go abroad, and his documents are signed for him to travel to Italy or France. He calls his wife: "I’m being released, I’m coming to you." And she says: "Why are you coming? I have a new family here." "And why didn’t you tell me earlier?" – "Why would I? I have kids, you sent me money." And that’s it. The soldier goes back to his parents and says: "I’m not going back to war. I can’t. I’m mentally broken."
- Do you see many such examples?
- From what I know in my unit from talking with soldiers, there were five such cases. And that's just in one battalion! Communication with the soldiers is crucial. You have to talk to each one. Lately, I don’t have enough time to visit the new reinforcements, but six months, a year ago, I would personally talk to them, observe what they might be capable of in the future. They saw the battalion commander and could ask any question. It lifted the soldiers’ spirits. Even back then, I was already selecting: this one won't make a warrior – so we assigned him to clerk positions. This soldier is technically in the role of an assault trooper, but in reality, he’s dealing with disposal—that’s necessary too because if we don’t disposal the equipment we’re using, it will create huge problems in the future for the company commander, battalion commander, and the whole brigade. Some say, "I want to be a driver." – "Do you understand what being a driver entails, where you’ll be driving?" – "Yes, I understand." – "Alright, you’ll try, you’ll ride as a trainee first." Some of those who wanted to be drivers, after their first trip when 30-40 shells explode near the road, with FPV drones hitting as well, say: "No, I’d rather be an assault trooper… I’ll assault - sit in a dugout and stay there." There have been moments like that. But some drivers say: "Yes, this works for me, I’ll stick with it!"
"PEOPLE OFTEN SAY AFTER THE TRAINING CENTERS: ‘WE LEARNED MORE IN ONE DAY ON YOUR TRAINING GROUND THAN IN A MONTH OF PREPARATION'."
- Is it really possible to turn a civilian who has no idea about the army, discipline, or command into a soldier in a month?
- It’s possible, if the person has the will. Even those who don’t have the will can still be turned into decent soldiers, even assault troops.
- How?
- I don’t want to criticize the training centers or other units, but I’ll say this: even after training at airborne training centers, we work with them for another ten days in the unit, and our battalion sergeants conduct cohesion exercises. Only then can we understand what a soldier knows, what he doesn’t, and what we need to focus on. That's when he becomes a good soldier. But when new recruits come to us from other training centres and we start working with them, after the first day of training, they say: "We learned more in one day here than in the entire training center."– "What did they teach you there?" – "We shot a few times, did some guard duty..."– "Did they teach you medicine?" – "No, they just opened the first aid kit, showed it to us, and that was it..." – "Did they teach you engineering?"– "No..." And then after ten days of training with us, they say: "If we had been trained like this for a month, we would have..." I consider this a negligent approach to personnel training. This in itself demoralizes people. Naturally, they tell their families and friends that they’re not learning anything, and the rumor spreads that it’s better to avoid joining the army. This results in draft dodgers and refuseniks.
- This is directly linked to casualties
- It is true. There are large losses among those who have not been trained to hide from FPV drones.
- Is it even possible to hide from them?
- Of course, it is. Let’s break it down. A vehicle is a target the enemy aims to destroy first because it’s carrying personnel. To keep an armored vehicle or tracked vehicle from being destroyed, it needs to be prepared: fitted with an FPV screen and electronic warfare (EW) systems should be found. The state can’t provide everyone with EWs, so we have to source them through volunteers. But this needs to be developed and installed. Maybe an EW will only last two or three missions, or even just one, but it can save at least one soldier's life. When we take care of these things, the soldier sees that he can safely reach the position and that he can be safely evacuated if wounded. This builds confidence that they won’t be left behind. That’s crucial for morale across the unit. It’s something that needs to be taken into account. Sometimes it’s painful to see for me: another unit’s vehicle heading to the front, completely unprepared, as they say, "naked and barefoot," and then it burns, soldiers die. I’ll say it straight: this is negligence on the part of commanders, from the company commander to the battalion commander. The battalion commander has technical and logistics platoons under his command. If the brigade can’t provide the necessary resources, you have to find solutions and resolve the issues. Those who are proactive will always find a way. You can always find some metal and weld it to protect the vehicle—this will improve the vehicle’s survivability and ensure the survival of the personnel.
- Why is there a constant loss of our land? What is the reason for this? Is it because there are no people?
- Yes. Many positions have been lost because we were unable to station personnel there - not a single person was found to secure the position. There is a shortage of personnel - not just trained personnel, but none at all. It is possible to train people, but we need to find these personnel. Give us the personnel and we will train them ourselves. We don't need a month and a half or two months in a training centre - we can train them in a month or ten days. There is simply no one to train. As for the talk about unprepared people being thrown into the trenches, this phrase "we are being thrown for meat" is used by those who are trying to either escape or make someone else who is left holding the bag.
- You can hear that officers and commanders do not know what war is, do not visit the positions of their units...
- No matter what position I held, I was constantly out with the unit, in raids, and we were together everywhere. Many people think that the battalion's command and observation post is located four or five kilometers back, and some even think it’s ten kilometers from the front line… Someone says, "You’re sitting ten kilometers away at headquarters..." In the 46th, no one ever sat ten kilometers away.
And during the raids...
- Have you set up a mobile command post?
- The mobile command post burned down when a tank hit it…
- What is the most frightening thing? When a tank is firing at you, GABs, or endless artillery?
- Everything is terrifying because all of it comes in and takes people's lives. We got used to the GABs. Well, let them fly, they hit to the side... At that time, I was still the chief of staff, and another officer was the battalion commander. A Grads landed very close to our location. The battalion's chief sergeant was wounded. And that was scary. Artillery is terrifying, and so is the tank. A payload drop from Mavic is scary, and FPV drones are frightening too. If we compare, nowadays there are some ways to hide from these weapons. But from a GAB… well, if it comes, it comes...
FPV drones are currently the most dangerous weapon for soldiers. After being hit by one, the scariest thing is to be left disabled for life.
- You see how difficult the situation is, every day a piece of land is taken away from us. How will we hold out? Thanks to what?
- If we had all the resources and forces we had in the Zaporizhzhia direction before the counteroffensive, we could have gone on a raid, launched assault operations, and taken Donetsk in three days. I’m confident in that. The reality today is that even if we’re provided with equipment, weapons, ammo, and combat vehicles, we still can’t do anything without infantry. Right now, there’s no personnel. We can’t retake these territories by force, we can’t win them back. We can say they’re lost territories. I won’t say lost forever, but for now, they’re lost. In the future, as I see it, we’ll get everything back. Maybe it will come back in the political sphere. But militarily, we won’t be able to take them back because there are no longer patriots willing to defend the country.
How many people are hiding in apartments, in cellars, and how many have paid off the Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCR)... That’s the reality today. There are no longer those who are ready to liberate Ukrainian lands through military means. Maybe they will come in five years—those who are 15-18 years old now. Or in ten years, those who are 10-12 now will grow up.
- Do you have young fighters in your unit who were just children in 2014?
- I had such guys who died, saying their final goodbyes live on air... Six men, 19, 20, 21 years old. It happened in Marinka, when they were stormed all day, they were all wounded, and we could not help them. And they said their final goodbyes on the air: "Thank you for your service" and blew themselves up. The mother of one of them still calls, cursing the commanders... She can’t understand her son’s actions. You tell the truth, but the families don’t believe you; they interpret it in their own way. They have their own grief... But I will never forget that day.
It’s very hard when a conversation with a grown man ends with tears in his eyes. And in mine too...
Violetta Kirtoka, Censor.NET
