Situation in Donetsk OTG area of responsibility
The broadcast was devoted to the situation in the area of responsibility of the Donetsk OTG (Operational-Tactical Group).
We will discuss the operational encirclement of our troops in Velyka Novosilka, the enemy's continued efforts to draw а noose on the Kurakhove salient, driving our forces out from the flanks, and the threat of encircling Pokrovsk.
The enemy is continuing its offensive operation. So, what should be done? Recently, I have met with a significant number of commanders at various levels — senior, mid-level, and junior — who are directly engaged in this direction of the frontline. Based on their input, we’ve managed to develop a fairly comprehensive understanding of the situation on the ground.
Today, we’ll aim to quickly outline the complexity of the situation and the decisions Ukrainian military personnel are expecting from the High Command to stabilize the front, eliminate the Russian strike group, and prevent the enemy from advancing into the Dnipropetrovsk region.
I would like to thank the soldiers of the 422nd Unmanned Systems Battalion, the Kryvyi Rih Battalion, and the battalion known as the Luftwaffe for this hoodie. Let me clarify: this is the official emblem of the 422nd Battalion. They adopted the name of the Air Force of the Federal Republic of Germany. This is the official cross of the German Armed Forces. The Luftwaffe is the official name of Germany's Air Force.
So, let’s analyze the situation on this direction.
First of all, Velyka Novosilka is of the greatest concern. In fact, the enemy is drawing а noose on the flanks and unfortunately controls them. It is now possible to enter or leave Velyka Novosilka only on foot. According to OSINT data, the highest point where the enemy is trying to draw а noose in and encircle our units is 2.2 kilometers away. Two kilometers separate the enemy from drawing а noose there. At the entrance to Velyka Novosilka, our troops hold a corridor of about 3.7 kilometers. With the presence of FPV drones, surveillance, and reconnaissance drones, this effectively means that this small, narrow area is being fired upon by the enemy from nearly all types of weapons. Enemy drones are constantly hovering over the heads of our soldiers. It is impossible to establish communications, organize supplies, or carry out quick evacuations. How can this be consolidated? I wonder what the value of all this military education and leadership is if it permits such a critical and catastrophic situation for our forces. Why hasn’t a decision been made to withdraw? I want to emphasize that the 110th Mechanized Brigade and the 110th Territorial Defense Brigade have been assigned to defend Velyka Novosilka. Let me remind you that it was the 110th Mechanized Brigade that fought such heavy, desperate battles in the defense of Avdiivka a year ago without receiving reinforcements. Now, the same situation is repeating itself. There are no reinforcements, no fire support, and yet the order is to hold the position. How is this even possible? This is sheer absurdity. I wonder if any of the commanders or leaders have ever approached the enemy within 3 kilometers, 2 kilometers, or ever passed under such intense drone attacks? Of course, not. Then why are soldiers sent to carry out missions under these conditions? I am truly outraged. And still, there are no decisions to withdraw.
The situation in the area of Kurakhove. This is an elevation map. We specifically created an elevation map of the Kurakhove area because modern warfare is a war of drones. Whoever controls the dominant hills, whoever holds the high ground, gains the radio horizons needed for maximum range and effectiveness of drones. Currently, the enemy has taken control of the dominant hills, which now work in their favor in this area. Our troops, as you can see, are defending this salient, which is almost entirely shaded in blue. This blue-shaded salient represents a lowland. Our forces are stationed in the lowlands near Kurakhove, within this salient. They are forced to hold this defensive line in a completely disadvantageous position, which is deeply flanked by the enemy. From the south, observe how deeply the enemy has encircled our positions. Instead of withdrawing to the Andriivka-Kostiantynopil line, where they could obviously move out of the effective area of enemy drones, which currently hold a significant advantage, and saving the units from pointless losses, the leadership who apparently approved this. These leaders, who evidently approve such actions, seem unaware of the realities of drone warfare. They clearly do not understand that drones have become the primary means of destruction, responsible for up to 70% of troop losses, the troops are being stationed in this vulnerable salient.
The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is looking at this, I don't know, it's just that it's probably entertainment for them. Volodymyr Zelenskyy does not visit such places at the front, he is not interested. It is dangerous to take photos there, and if there is no PR, then why go there? Right, Volodymyr Oleksandrovych? You're not interested in it. There is no show. The soldiers of our three brigades, who are forced to hold this absurd salient, have a show. Of course, neither Oleksandr Syrskyi nor other leaders came here. Why risk it, you can get hit by a drone. Indeed, apparently, this is not interesting, and therefore others, the military, must risk themselves. The situation here is also absolutely unfavorable for us. We are holding the frontline, which has no prospect of being held, because it is all lowlands, and it is inconvenient for our drones to operate there. The enemy has deeply maneuvered around our flank, so they are shooting at us, controlling our positions, communication routes, positions of our rear units, our UAV operators from the flanks. These are obvious things that any soldier in this area understands. Nevertheless, it is not seen by the Ukrainian military and political leadership, which pays lip service to the fact that they are in control and managing something there.
Now let's look at the situation in Pokrovsk.
We see how deeply the enemy has advanced. The enemy's plan is now obvious to anyone. The enemy is advancing, and the main efforts are concentrated to the west and east of Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad. That is, the enemy is trying to repeat this situation. The enemy is trying to outflank in order not to engage in battles, in urban areas, to reduce its losses and improve controllability, to realize its advantage in the number of personnel and weapons and the number of drones. Therefore, the enemy continues to advance. We can see that the advancement since January 1, highlighted in yellow, is the confirmed advancement of the enemy since January 1 this year, in three weeks this year. We see where they are advancing. The advance is significant. The enemy cannot be stopped reliably. And now we see the red arrows, the enemy has closely approached to the villages of Zvirove, captured Pishchane, which is just a suburb of Pokrovsk, and approached the villages of Kotlyne and Udachne. If they capture Kotlyne and Udachne, then the enemy will be able to seize the Pokrovsk-Dnipro highway with infantry, even without drones. This is a key area now. The red arrows are marked here. In fact, the enemy was driven out there. Our soldiers are now fighting in this area.
Kotlyne and Udachne are held by the soldiers of the 425th Skala assault regiment, which is reinforced by other units, the 155th and 152nd brigades, and the SOF (Special Operations Forces). Nevertheless, there are very heavy battles going on there and the situation there requires some kind of adequate, competent leadership and management of a high-quality organization at the tactical level. To avoid the hodge-podge of military units there. In the areas of Zvirove, Pishchane, Kotlyne, Udachne, we need changes in the organization to stop the enemy's further advance. We need responsibility. We do not see this yet. There are no comprehensive solutions. And so we look at the situation. Deep envelopment of the flanks in Kurakhove. Operational encirclement in Velyka Novosilka. The threat of encirclement of Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad. Where are the decisions of military leaders? Those people who have decades of service, academies, schools. And big sad faces because they have been serving in the army for many years. And they are allegedly military professionals. I would like to ask. Here the problem arises with the assessment of the situation. Because it turns out that even such a catastrophic situation on certain parts of the front can be interpreted in different ways. Perhaps you think it's bad, the enemy is advancing, there are no forces. In fact, it is not so. I want to tell you that I talk to a lot of soldiers in these areas. Indeed, the military, many of them, are very irritated and sometimes very depressed. But not because of the enemy, but because our command does not make adequate decisions that the map dictates, that the situation requires, that should relate to the adoption of tactical and operational decisions in troops management and does not take the necessary measures. This is what is annoying, not the enemy, not his advantage. Every day in these areas, tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers go into battle, inflict heavy losses on the Russian occupiers, inflict maximum losses on them, and fulfill their duties and tasks with the utmost honesty and professionalism. We have those who can stop the Russian offensive, we have those who can defeat the Russian groups. But our commanders, our commanders, our staffs at all levels, they need adequate decisions from the higher command. And who is in charge of all this and why do we have this information that you see now, the map of the situation, it is obvious to all the military personnel who are performing tasks there, obvious to any person who just looks at the map. So why is this information not being critically perceived by the top leadership? Why is no decision made to withdraw, to define the defense lines? This is exactly what I was dealing with. And in order to show you better, a remarkable event has just happened. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Oleksandr Syrskyi gave an interview. In this interview, I found the answer to why Syrskyi does not perceive this situation as critical. Let's see a small fragment.
"When I first withdrew from Debaltseve, on February 7, we were already withdrawing along a road that was being shelled. And then I returned to this salient but not directly to the Debaltseve area, but to the Luhansk area. On the night of the 12th, when preparations were underway for the offensive on Lohvynove. It was after the enemy had cut the road and actually blocked Debaltseve. The assault was successful at first, but then the situation, let's say, turned out not in our favor. We had to shield the troops, and after Lohvynove we managed to hold this salient. We ensured the passage of the convoy, and then we ensured the withdrawal of our troops directly from Debaltseve. At the time, as far as I remember, this operation was recognized, in my opinion, as the most successful among similar operations after World War II."
Do you see how? It all depends on the point of view, on the position held by the person. It turns out that the encirclement of our troops in Debaltseve, their breakthrough, significant losses of personnel, large losses of equipment, the abandonment of important positions in the Ukrainian city, a significant number of other settlements, is, in the opinion of someone, though it is not said who, an outstanding combat operation, one of the most outstanding after the Second World War. I wonder who these big names are who have stated this. For some reason, Oleksandr Stanislavovych did not say anything about this in his interview. Who thinks that this operation, which was commanded by Syrskyi exactly 10 years ago, was the most successful after World War II? In my opinion, the encirclement of troops, and not only in my opinion, in the opinion of any military man, and in the opinion of the statutes, combat regulations, combat planning documents of any army in the world, including the Ukrainian army, encirclement is the most dangerous tactical situation, the most unfavorable for combat. And there is nothing outstanding in this, in this environment.
Now a brief context to make it clear what Syrskyi said. Exactly 10 years ago, Oleksandr Syrskyi was the commander of the BARS task force, which was in charge of the fighting in Debaltseve. As we can see, in 10 years, Syrskyi has not drawn the right conclusions from those events. And he talks about this in his interview. By presenting the encirclement of the troops as a success, it turns out that it was an outstanding success. Perhaps, back then, it was necessary to award higher awards for the encirclement. So, what is Oleksandr Syrskyi talking about? Just imagine, 10 years have passed and this is already a victory. And now I want to talk about the context. Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander of the BARS task force in the area of Debaltseve, is telling about how he withdrew from Debaltseve on February 7, 2015. That is, two days before the enemy cut the road near the village of Lohvynove on February 9, and at that moment our group in Debaltseve was operationally encircled. It was similar to the situation in Velyka Novosilka. As it has happened, unfortunately, more than once in this war. Syrskyi says that he left the encirclement, he was not there. He left his subordinates there to lead the battle on the outer, safer perimeter of the troops. He did not stay there because for some reason he realized that it was bad, risky, and difficult to lead in the encirclement. And he left in time. On February 9, Lohvynove was captured. Then it is about the battle on February 12, 2015, about the attempts of the BARS task force, the troops of sector A, to recapture the village of Lohvynove.
For some reason, Syrskyi says nothing about this battle. Why? Perhaps it was also outstanding after the Second World War, and it would be worth mentioning. For some reason, he doesn't say a word. He says it went well at first, then not so well. In the near future, I will do a separate broadcast about this interview with Syrskyi, and I will do a separate broadcast about it on the 10th anniversary of the events in Debaltseve. Because I can see now from this interview that the people who were in charge there have a very poor handle on the situation and, unfortunately, distort the history of real events. Perhaps they simply do not have the information. I don't rule this out now either. So, friends, the surrounding is a bad story. The way they relieved the siege of Lohvynove, the way they tried to attack Lohvynove, is just a super-cautionary tale. How did Oleksandr Syrskyi manage the attack on Lohvynove? And what went wrong there? Well, significant forces were gathered to attack Lohvynove. Lohvynove is a small village of a few dozen houses. The biggest house there is an abandoned farmhouse. It was the main enemy stronghold. It's such a big hangar of a farm. The enemy was sitting in these houses in the town, in the private sector, and in this farm. The size of the village of Lohvynove on the map. 400 by 500 meters. It was a small settlement located in the lowlands. And at a height above this lowland, our command and observation posts were located. In particular, the command and observation post of the 25th Kyivan Rus battalion, where the artillery intelligence officer of this battalion, now known as blogger Artie Green, who witnessed this battle, was stationed. So, we had a dominant height, a command and observation post, we had artillery from Sector A, these were Grad MLRS batteries, Uragan MLRS batteries, 122-mm and 152-mm cannon artillery, artillery from Sector A and the 30th Mechanized Brigade, a significant amount of firepower. But our volunteer soldiers of the aerial reconnaissance unit made several overflights of Lohvynove, and we knew exactly where, in what numbers, in what houses and buildings the enemy was located. The Ukrainian command had this information. Nevertheless, all this advantage in artillery at the observation posts was not realized. The artillery was unable to destroy the enemy's strongholds, and even that farm could not be destroyed or hit. It was not organized. The command of the BARS task force did not organize the defeat of the enemy in Lohvynove. As a result, consolidated units from several of our brigades were sent there on February 12. A battalion under the command of Maksym Myrhorodskyi from the 24th Brigade, the 30th Brigade, and the 79th Brigade was to be the main one to perform these tasks. They arrived there, but it turned out that a smaller company of infantrymen, actually about a platoon, supported by two tanks, could attack from the 30th Brigade. They attacked in an uncoordinated manner with other units. Then Myrhorodskyi's battalion attacked, with 69 soldiers and armored personnel carriers, with two tanks from the 30th Brigade. Due to the absence of communication, one of our tanks hit a mine, the second tank fired ammunition at these houses and was forced to withdraw. The enemy was sitting in the houses, in this farm, firing back, and their fire could not be suppressed. During the battle, two tankers of the 30th Brigade and one infantryman were killed.
After that, our troops fired off ammunition and were forced to start withdrawal. Later, it was said that Lohvynove had been cleared, and the Bars task force sent about a platoon of Donbas battalion fighters there. They said that the enemy was no longer there, they would just clear the houses, and that was it. The platoon arrived there, and due to the lack of communication and control, it went directly to the enemy's positions, and these were the main losses. Seven soldiers of the Donbas National Guard battalion were killed. After that, our units faced the fact that five Russian tanks of the 5th Tank Brigade had come to our positions. The situation was saved by one tank of the 92nd Brigade, there was a company-tactical group of the 92nd Brigade, nearby in Luhansk, where Oleksandr Syrskyi was sitting, he says, leading the battle. But only one tank from this company-tactical group was engaged. Similarly, units of the company-tactical group of the 24th Brigade and tanks of the 1st Tank Brigade did not enter Lohvynove. This was also due to the loss of control and communication. As a result, the hero of Ukraine Vasyl Bozhok destroyed two Russian tanks in Lohvynove, one was hit, and another soldier was killed on the withdrawal, unfortunately by a Russian tank of the 79th Brigade. As a result, we lost 11 Ukrainian heroes who fought all day, did their best, lost several pieces of equipment, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, but we failed to hold the village 400 by 500 meters, having a complete advantage in artillery, ammunition, and observation posts.
Now Oleksandr Syrskyi, who was unable to ensure the attack of several dozen soldiers, several hundred soldiers, on Lohvynove and the liberation of this village, says that there were actually significant successes there. And the fact that Debaltseve could not be unblocked and that the troops had to break through with losses is a success, a victory. Therefore, having watched this fragment, it is clear that the situation in Velyka Novosilka, in Kurakhove, Oleksandr Syrskyi, who is sitting somewhere far away and does not approach the front further than the brigade command and observation posts, also believes that perhaps this will be a victory later. Because far away, all these maps are perceived differently. If the generals themselves are not sitting in that environment and are not leading the battle there, then, of course, their perception of the situation is completely different. This may sometimes seem like a victory, and then in 10 years they will again tell us how heroic the command was, what outstanding victories Syrskyi won in Velyka Novosilka. If this is done for this purpose...
What I want to say, friends. The perception that troops must fight to the last, at any frontier, in any situation, even when surrounded, is sheer madness. Moreover, the criminal madness that undermines the combat capability of the troops leads to unnecessary losses, and, as it did in Debaltseve, to the complete exhaustion of physical, moral, psychological, and personnel resources. It undermines combat capability and then leads to consequences like those in Debaltseve, where the troops had to be withdrawn and took a long time to recover. Unfortunately, we see that no conclusions have been drawn. There are false assessments of the events of 10 years ago, and no conclusions are being made. Instead of learning from Debaltseve, Syrsky is now creating several more Debaltseve-like situations. For what purpose? All the commanders in the area are unanimous. I want to say what is needed now, from the point of view of the commanders with whom I have spoken. And I have spoken to many commanders. I believe that many servicemen who have seen me understand what the level is. I want to say to the military personnel that the commanders in this area have a very clear understanding of what needs to be done. But unfortunately, there is no courage or will to demand and make the necessary decisions. People, especially the leaders, are afraid for their positions. They are afraid to demand certain decisions and give orders that are appropriate to the circumstances.
They are afraid. That's why when I said that we need Mykhailo Drapatyi in this area, I didn’t mean that I personally like Drapatyi. I simply understand that Mykhailo Drapatyi is the only one in the Armed Forces, apart from Oleksandr Syrskyi, who has a certain reputational authority that will allow him to say NO to inadequate decisions from above. And to take responsibility when Mr. Syrskyi and Mr. Zelenskyy are afraid to take responsibility.
What should be done in these circumstances? What do the commanders say? First of all, we need to reduce that absolutely ridiculous salient near Kurakhove, which will allow our troops to reduce their forces and at least release two or even three brigades that are currently holding this disadvantageous salient. This is a common position of all commanders who are fighting in the Donetsk OTG and understand the situation. There is still no such decision. Syrskyi is once again creating a situation reminiscent of Debaltseve, which he himself is not in, which is interesting to note. None of his subordinates, including his closest superiors and commanders, are there either. I understand that the general makes decisions and is surrounded by his people. This is a normal situation. He is responsible for the consequences of his decisions. Obviously, the high command should be with their subordinates at such moments. This is not the case here. As a result, we are constrained to fight to defend the perimeter of this disadvantageous, inconvenient Kurakhove salient, which is all in the lowlands, under the fire of Russian drones, and completely under their control. The three brigades that we are forced to keep there are suffering losses in equipment and personnel. Simply because our leaders do not understand the role of drones in modern warfare. No one has given them a nuts-and-bolts course. They don’t know, they don’t understand. And they keep people there.
The Supreme Commander-in-Chief's office, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and Defence Minister Rustem Umierov. Well, what can I say? Just to state. Well, zero. And again. The President and the Minister are for press releases. We met with the US Secretary of Defence, we met with such one, so everything will be fine, we held a meeting of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Blah, blah, blah. No results. It's simple. Heads who talk a lot and, unfortunately, do not bear any responsibility for their words. And it is especially unpleasant for the lives of people who are their subordinates.
The second solution. Velyka Novosilka. Obviously, a withdrawal is needed there. It is necessary to save those soldiers of the 110th Mechanized Brigade, the 110th Territorial Defense Brigade who really need to be withdrawn to save their lives and the combat capability of these units. How is it possible to continue fighting in such conditions? Why don't the cowards who sit in all the commanding positions beat their fists on the table and force Zelenskyy and Syrskyi to give such an order? Yes, you will lose your positions, most likely, because they are led by people who consider even Debaltseve a success. Friends, we need to be realistic. Yes, someone has to make sacrifices. Either a general who loses a position in his career or his subordinates who lose their lives. That is why I am asking General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, General Andrii Hnatov, commanders of the Donetsk and Khortytsia OSGT (Operational Strategic Group of Troops), to take responsibility for the lives of your subordinates. If Syrskyi and Zelenskyy do not understand this, then you do. And someone has to say: I am giving an order. And let them try to cancel it.
So, the third solution. Pokrovsk. I mean, the situation there is both to the west of the city and to the east. What is missing there, what do all the soldiers say? Commanders, first of all. There is a lack of organization. Not tactics, who to station where, but organization. There is a hodge-podge, a mixture of many units and subdivisions. There are no responsible, combat-ready units in this hodge-podge. A significant number of brigades are on the enemy's attack lines. New brigades that have no command staff, no experienced personnel, no sergeants, no squad leaders, no platoon leaders. Because the high command did not consider that the army needed operational control, not just the number of people in uniform. That's why, at every breakthrough area, all the military personnel ask for one thing: place one combat-ready unit there, determine if it is indeed combat-ready, and subordinate the other units in each of these areas to that unit to avoid this mixture. So that there is one responsible commander and soldiers from non-combat-effective units can be reinforced and used together with those that have proper control. Is this some groundbreaking innovation? Isn't this a clear and logical step? It is understandable, logical. But if you don't assess the combat effectiveness of the troops and just sit there, saying, you know, the enemy is advancing because they have the advantage. Not at all, the enemy is advancing in the direction of Pokrovsk, because the enemy has a better organization of troops. The organization of the battle in the offensive is better. The enemy is acting more purposefully, more organized. Our soldiers, who are fighting bravely there and have an advantage in individual motivation, individual training and desire to kill the enemy, cannot realize all their advantages because of the lack of organizational decisions. Because we have complete chaos in the formation of combat orders. You may be wondering why the chaos. I ask this question because I understand that the enemy may be really attacking somewhere with such columns. Every day, aerial reconnaissance is conducted in this area of Pokrovsk, where all units record the approximate location and number of enemy soldiers they see moving. In different directions. There is no such day that in that direction, on this entire front, from Vozdvyzhenka and below Pokrovsk, that someone notices the movement of more than 400-500 enemy soldiers per day. In different directions. The enemy is attacking in small groups, trying to infiltrate. Groups of two, even one, to seven or eight people. There are no large masses. Even the equipment is not attacking south of Pokrovsk, Kotlyne, Udachne. Just small groups of infantry. Can we eliminate them? Our commanders say that we can simply grind all this mass if there is organization and responsibility of combat-ready units, and there is no constant collapse on the flanks because someone has been stationed there.
How reporting is done at all levels. Brigade commanders do not report to the top about the defense lines, about how they have built a fire system, what lines they control. Our superiors, the commanders above, demand that they be shown the front line in the form of points, where each position is located. The report to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, to Syrskyi, is a report on the number of points along the front line. Three people are sitting at one point, four at another. No one really checks who is actually sitting at all these hundreds, thousands of points. It's impossible to check because our defense organization does not have a drone front. We simply have a front of infantrymen. MOS-100, military occupational specialty 100, an infantryman, is fighting. Everything else does not exist. We don't have defense lines, brigades, battalions, we have individual points on the map where some people are sitting on reports. They may or may not be sitting on reports.
No one is interested in this. It's a bureaucratic process, and they set up the points and then ask in the report, well, where the point is. In other words, the top management interferes in this process at the tactical level. They come to see, do the work of a platoon commander, a company commander. They demand reports, papers, and points on the map, and that's what they do. Instead of organizing the defense, organizing troops, training troops, planning the destruction, how firepower works. Instead of organizing the work of drones. This means that we have an infantry front on the map, but no drone front. Sectors of observation are unclear. Which drone unit is surveilling what, at what distance, at what range, how many units are involved, who is responsible, who is responsible for hitting, targeting other drones, other firepower, artillery. None of this exists on the map, only points from the infantry. I am not exaggerating at all, friends. This is not hyperbole. Any serviceman who is in the headquarters will confirm this. Battalion headquarters, brigade headquarters, OTG headquarters, OSGT headquarters, the operational department of the General Staff, point operators, and what I call "watchmen"—military leaders who sit, look at points and bark at their subordinates: is there someone at the point, why isn’t someone at the point, get to the point. Map pointers. Map pointers who fight for points instead of for defense lines, instead of securing favorable radio horizons needed for drone operations. Another key issue the troops on the front are helping to resolve is the centralized organization and use of drones. Drones now cause 50 to 70% of losses for both our forces and the enemy. They have become the main tool for control, reconnaissance, and strikes. Yet we lack a coordinated "drone front." Somehow, combat orders are issued for the use of numerous units—some handle it themselves at the brigade or battalion level, while others are attached to specialized units. They are deployed along the front, organizing their own interactions, finding launch sites, setting up antenna positions, and operating autonomously—often interfering with each other in the process. On top of this chaos, electronic warfare systems intervene, also being uncoordinated, shooting down our own drones and hindering our operators.
All of this is pure Maidan, a self-organized use of high-tech systems. That’s why commanders on the frontline, particularly in Pokrovsk, are demanding the establishment of centralized headquarters so that specific specialized units are assigned responsibility for coordinating the deployment of drones, reconnaissance, and strikes in designated sectors. There needs to be clarity across the board—one specific commander, one specific unit must be responsible for the use of drones of all types and electronic warfare systems in a given area. Only then will coordination, reconnaissance organization, strike planning, oversight, control, and accountability begin—something that is sorely lacking right now. This lack of coordination is undermining the effectiveness of drone operations. As a result, the enemy is able to avoid suffering even greater losses. So, friends, there are numerous critical issues that I’ve mentioned, and what I’ve shared here is just a general overview.
Of course, it is also important to mention the fifth point. This is the construction of defense facilities. Practice shows that we have a gap. The main budgets for defense facilities are spent for some reason. The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief allocates funds to the president's subordinates, to the heads of civil-military administrations, who, according to some plans of their own, dig these ditches with excavators, set up some unknown concrete structures. I will show you a video of how the enemy is hitting our fighters, unfortunately, I will show you photos, I will not show the video on this broadcast, I will make a post where the enemy shows how he is hitting our fighters with drones in one of the huge and poorly built, expensive company strongholds that were built absolutely thoughtlessly by civil-military administrations for millions, tens of millions of hryvnias, which are absolutely unsuitable for defense. Most of them are not taken up by troops. And where they do, unfortunately, there are tragic cases. I will show you a photo, there is a video of the enemy attacking our soldiers, all big, huge and unprotected from drone attacks in the strongholds, for which the heads of the military-civilian administration report that they spent all this on their companies. What we need are proper defense lines—adequate defensive positions where logistical routes to the front are camouflaged, shielded, and dug into the ground. The positions themselves must allow for maneuverability in defense, with numerous small, concealed, reliable, and well-fortified protective covers. Where needed, these should include 3, 4, 5, or even 6 layers of wooden overhead logss, concrete where necessary, and reinforced concrete where appropriate. Everything must be covered and camouflaged in such a way that it becomes difficult for the enemy to strike. Such defense lines must be dug, but not somewhere distant, as is currently the case, where funds are being diverted into projects disguised as defensive structures near Dnipro and Pavlohrad. Meanwhile, we lack defensive lines where they are critically needed to allow our troops to maneuver effectively in defense. We have no proper second line of defense. This is why commanders are requesting that an officer be designated—a person with tactical insight, willpower, and combat experience—who will take responsibility for the planning and coordination of all efforts. Engineering units from the armed forces, the State Special Transport Service, and contractors from military-civil administrations should all be mobilized to ensure that our troops have solid second and third defensive lines they can rely on. These defensive positions must not be constructed based on outdated 20th-century doctrines designed to repel tank assaults, infantry waves, or cavalry charges. These must be defensive structures that protect personnel from the main threats: high-precision weapons, drones, artillery, and mortars. These structures should allow rapid response to enemy strikes and enable detection of troop maneuvers during defense. Unfortunately, we currently lack such a defense system, and we are aware that Mezhova, for example, is now in the Dnipropetrovsk region, practically a frontline town, with the enemy just a few kilometers away. It is crucial to take concrete action to defend the Dnipropetrovsk region—not through superficial spending of billions on defense structures, but by constructing real, tactically necessary fortifications for the troops that are well-integrated into the terrain, expertly camouflaged, and properly fortified. A military line that is not just scattered, poorly understood points along a trench. If even these basic measures I have outlined are implemented, the commanders of the military units, such as OTG Donetsk, will see that the national leadership accurately evaluates the situation and is genuinely working to support the army in destroying Russian strike groups and defending central Ukraine. If this doesn’t happen, and we continue with this "ostrich policy" of simply telling the troops to "hold on, hold on" while the leaders sit comfortably in Kyiv and dictate how people should survive being encircled, then we are bound to face serious problems. If we have a Commander-in-Chief more focused on giving interviews than on looking soldiers in the eye with honesty, we are heading for big problems.
So I hope that political decisions will be made and that the commanders fighting in the Donetsk OTG will receive adequate decisions on the situation that they are all talking about. This is very important for each of us. Can we protect the center of Ukraine from invasion? Yes, all our military say so. We have a sufficient number of motivated soldiers, motivated commanders who know how to fight and inflict heavy losses on the enemy. We need a realistic analysis of the situation and we need to stop people sitting in Kyiv telling soldiers how to stay in Donbas instead of acting on the situation. This is just getting absurd. There is time to spread these lies, to talk about Debaltseve in interviews. But there is time to go and see what you are doing in Velyka Novosilka, how you are giving orders to hold on there - for some reason, Oleksandr Stanislavovych does not have time for this. So you need to give interviews there in Velyka Novosilka and tell them that it is normal to be surrounded and that this is, in fact, an outstanding victory, a breakthrough from that encirclement. This should be told there. You need to look the soldiers in the eye, go there, since you are giving such orders, and report there. If the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief believes that this configuration of the front is adequate, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief should at least visit Pokrovsk. There are fiber optic drones flying there now. You will feel the atmosphere a little bit. Because you've relaxed a bit in Kyiv and don't understand what's happening at the front. People are losing their lives because of your cowardice and irresponsibility. And Central Ukraine is under threat. This is all the responsibility of the Central Command. Kyiv is responsible. What maps are you looking at? Here are all the maps on the Internet. What is not clear at all? What level of intelligence do you need to have to not understand the basic things that the frontline requires?
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
Why did the questions about Syrskyi's lies disappear from the topic of the broadcast?
I have already said, friends, there is a critical situation, critical issues. And the topic of "Truth and Lies" in the interview with Oleksandr Syrsky will be the topic of the next stream. Right now, we need to talk about the decisions that the commanders demand. In order to stop the panic in our Dnipropetrovs'k region. So that the troops stop being annoyed with their command. And for Zelenskyy and Syrskyi to start fighting for the trust of the military, who are protecting them in their warm chairs in Kyiv. They are protecting their right to sit there and tell something, fables, fairy tales in an interview. The interview is long, so we will analyze it a little later. The interview is more than an hour long.
On the ground, commanders must take creative initiative and not wait for commands from zero leadership.
This is impossible. There are combat orders. And everything is not done on command. If there are opposite orders, the brigade commander alone will say to withdraw. However, the neighboring units have not received such an order from their superiors. So what happens? Does one brigade put another in a tough spot? This is impossible. War and the army are a hierarchical structure. Commands must come from the top. In our country, this is the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Then the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, according to the hierarchy. Then all the others. And there are reports going to him, please, please, please. And now I understand why there are no decisions. Syrskyi is sitting in Kyiv and giving interviews, saying that the encirclement in Debaltseve was an outstanding operation that he led. He was the only one who left Debaltseve in time to avoid taking a personal part in this outstanding, historic breakthrough. Why didn't he do it? Why didn't he want to be surrounded and break through? It is an outstanding success to do so. This is irresponsibility and this game with lives-it's just shocking. People are already there, they have reached the border with the Dnipropetrovsk region. In a year, the enemy has marched from Avdiivka to Pokrovsk and is already near Mezhova. And here they are still playing in interviews, in evening videos and in stories that they are influencing something there. It's a remarkable irresponsibility. Therefore, I appeal to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. If anyone has strength of character there, I hope that there are such people. There are people there who can take responsibility and raise the issue. If Oleksandr Syrskyi wants to be trusted by people, his subordinates, he must make decisions based on the situation, hear people, and not count these points. This is absurd. The war for points on the map needs to end. If leaders are not able to do anything but count points, these are watchman methods, they are not able to lead, then they need to be changed. If this is Zelenskyy's demand, this nonsense game of points, to continue, then he should just step aside. We don't have the people to fulfill such stupid orders. The army is not a stand for the president to take photos and photo shoots. These are people who are defending Ukraine, unlike politicians and blabbermouths in Kyiv. Their lives and their demands should be taken seriously. I hope that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief will soon consider the real situation and will be forced to raise issues, and the issues will be considered, and decisions will be made so that the military leadership receives clear orders to build a more adequate front line along adequate natural boundaries, to determine the responsibility of commanders, and to give combat-ready units their powers and their lanes. If we improve the organization of the troops, we will have better management. We will protect people's lives not in words and talk, but in deeds. If we have a centralized coordination of the use and management of drones and precision weapons, if we have responsibility for each area, for reconnaissance, for destruction, we will also be able to eliminate many more enemies and stabilize the front. These are all elementary things that commanders on the frontline of the Donetsk OTG require.
I do not view the situation on the front as something beyond repair. This is not merely my opinion. I am gathering the views of people who eliminate Russian occupiers daily, who are delivering tangible results, who are waging this war through their actions, not by giving unreliable, deceptive interviews. I am hopeful for sound decisions. Should the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief take these decisions, I will objectively report any positive changes or progress, support them, and stress that everything I have mentioned is not a matter of preference, but a necessity—a demand from those defending Ukraine, defending Donbas and central Ukraine, and eliminating the occupiers. I am hoping for widespread attention, as our government only reacts to publicity. There are popular issues they are compelled to address. They do not respond to logic; they only react to certain popular media coverage. That’s why, in all seriousness, I ask for your help in sharing this video.
The more views this video gets, the greater the hope that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will take notice and understand that this is a public demand. They are compelled, obligated, to respond at the very least, to avoid facing public condemnation. Frankly, I'm surprised. The President, his entire family, all his friends are from the Dnipropetrovsk region, yet they remain indifferent—like they don’t care—about the defense of this region, which the war has already reached due to their ineffective leadership. They continue making the same senseless decisions that have already cost us a large number of cities and allowed the enemy to advance. They neither change nor learn from their mistakes. Perhaps, and I can only hope, that some friends, acquaintances, or even the President's family—if not him directly, then at least his family, his wife—will relay to him the critical nature of the situation, that the enemy is now at our doorstep. This is the only hope.
So, dear friends, our army, our defenders in the Armed Forces of Ukraine, are doing everything within their power to defeat the enemy. We have the people and the strength to build a solid defense and halt the Russian invasion. Let’s all do whatever we can to make this happen as soon as possible. Thank you for the broadcast, for being together. Glory to Ukraine!
