Hero of Ukraine Serhii Ponomarenko: "Big problem of our commanders is Soviet remnant, when we are afraid to report real state of affairs in unit to top."
On improving the efficiency of Ukrainian tank units and the problem of interaction between units, on the major trouble faced by Ukrainian commanders—the fear of reporting the real state of affairs to the top leadership, on the cooperation between tankers and infantry, on the ingrained Soviet mentality, the younger generation, and those who sabotage the country’s defense.
Dear friends, I am pleased to announce that Serhii Ponomarenko, a famous tanker, hero of Ukraine, Deputy Commander of the 9th Battalion of the 3rd Separate Tank Brigade, is with us today. Serhii, I am glad to welcome you.
Good evening.
We recently had a conversation with a Ukrainian tanker, a battalion commander, Petro Skyba, who was on our air. By the way, he mentioned you warmly on the air.
This is my first commander; I fought under his command in 2014–2015. The main wealth of experience and knowledge was passed on by him.
You see, he modestly didn’t mention that he was your first commander. But today, we’re continuing this discussion not just about Ukrainian tankers but also about what reserves and resources the country has at its disposal in this difficult and exhausting war and how to use them effectively. But, with your permission, let’s begin with this: when it comes to improving the efficiency of Ukrainian tank units, what do you think should be the top priority? What is the key solution?
The most critical shortfall in the Armed Forces right now is the organization of interaction. To this day, I can’t understand why this is still an issue, based on my own experience, when I was actively participating in combat, I frequently encountered situations where unit commanders—even at lower levels—acted as though their unit was an isolated kingdom, I’m not even talking about large command groups or operational forces, but rather company or battalion commanders. For some reason, they often consider going to neighboring units, discussing cooperation, and coordinating efforts to be beneath them, as though it diminishes their dignity or authority. I’ve faced this issue many times myself. You approach a unit in your area of responsibility to establish cooperation, and they tell you, "Come back tomorrow," or "I’m not ready to see you now." Seriously? This is your safety, the support of your infantry with powerful tank fire. If this doesn’t seem necessary to you, are you truly looking out for your people? This issue was particularly evident at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. Early on, you could somewhat excuse it due to the rapid pace of events—everything was chaotic, and everyone had to react quickly to changing circumstances, leaving little time for coordination. But now, after all this time, we should have already addressed these mistakes and shortcomings. This lack of interaction remains one of our major problems. Recently, there was news that we’ve gained tank superiority. But this wasn’t due to receiving more tanks or better tanks. The number and quality of tanks remain the same—they’re still 1970s models. Nor have the crews significantly improved. Instead, this progress is the result of better coordination with unmanned systems, which created the conditions for tank crews to operate effectively. In the past, FPV drones made tank operations nearly impossible. Perhaps this example illustrates why we shouldn’t focus solely on making one branch of the Armed Forces overwhelmingly powerful, expecting the others to follow. Instead, it’s better to ensure all branches are at least average but capable of excellent coordination, rather than having one branch in the vanguard while the rest act as ballast, unable to keep up or provide support.
And you know, it's strange, because even Petro Skyba said that the appearance of a tank in the positions is such an uplift for the infantry. He also said that there are cases when the infantry has already withdrawn, but when they see tanks, or at least one tank breaking through, they return to their positions because it is a very strong moral stimulus. How can we explain that we lack this coordination? You are now talking about the organization of the war, about the fact that we hear that we should fight not in brigades, but in corps or divisions. Is this the way you are talking about organizing the frontline?
The point is that the issue here is not the consolidation of military units, but rather the establishment of interaction between existing ones. Even two platoons, if they exchange information well and work in the same mode, and are informed online about changes in the situation, then two completely different units will work perfectly. Again, unmanned systems forces and tankers are completely different branches of the armed forces, but they were able to coordinate their work so well that both were successful in their mission. They don't belong to the same military unit, they don't belong to the same unit, but they were able to get the interaction right. This is what I have always said, that before I went on any operation, any mission, I always drove a car, not a tank, a car to the infantry, walked through all their trenches, talked to their commanders, the battalion commander, then the company commander, the platoon commander, directly to the person who will be sitting in the trench. In front of the soldiers, I said, "Guys, my tanks will be coming from this side, from behind you, don't be afraid, don't be afraid, they are ours. When they start shooting, keep your head down so that you don't get muffled." These are such elementary little things that for some reason are not taken into account, but they mean a lot. It's the same even in this "friendly fire", when one unit captures a forest belt, the other goes to storm it, but ours goes to storm it because they didn't exchange information in time. That's what I'm talking about. There is no need to make any global changes in the staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We need to make changes in the mindset that you can't do it alone on the battlefield. Only with the help of neighbours and cooperation with neighbours.
Then it turns out that everything depends on the commanders. Even if we imagine that the General Staff does not issue orders to organize such coordination, that you have to walk to an infantry unit and talk through everything, this should be done at the horizontal level by commanders among themselves.
Of course. And that's the only way. No one will think through your agenda for you. In general, the ideal war tactics, in my opinion, is when the command plans the strategy and communicates globally what we need to do. And on the ground, middle and lower-level commanders carry out the task, for example, we need to take the next platoon stronghold there. The task is set, and let the company commander who has been assigned this task plans it himself. Firstly, there will be 100% no information leakage because the person who is doing it will know, and he will obviously not tell the enemy about himself, as I plan. He will do his best to do it secretly so that no one can guess and there is a surprise effect. Let him think it over himself, let him rely on his own strength and means. This is also a very big problem for our commanders, this Soviet remnant when we are afraid to report the real state of affairs in the unit to the top. And I had a case when I was in charge of a unit, and I was told that you will report, morning and evening reports, so you report that we have eight vehicles in the ranks. I said, "Wait a minute, why eight if there are only five?" Because then we'd get a lot of flak from the top, and they'd scold us. I said, "Wait a minute.
In other words, it is misinformation of the command, which is counting on a certain number.
For example, tomorrow the command will set our unit a task based on 8 vehicles because we told them that 8 are working. In reality, we only have 5. How can we complete the task? Well, they don’t think about that. And this is also a remnant from the Soviet Union, where it doesn't matter what's going on, the main thing is that the picture looks great.
How often did infantry commanders come to you and say, "Hey, buddy, let's coordinate all our actions"?
Well, I usually went to the infantry commanders, because the infantry holds the positions, and the tankers work as reinforcements. So, whenever there was an escalation in a particular area of the frontline, or if the infantry couldn't hold out, they would call and say, "This is the area of responsibility, we need help here." And then I would go to them, because they are holding the defense, they know all the dangerous areas, all the paths, all the roads, the whole situation—where they are coming from, how they are moving, where there are mined fields, where there are gaps in the minefields, where they provide support, delivering ammo, food, and other supplies.
So 99% of the time, I came to infantry units, but there were isolated cases when the infantry asked for help because they were in dire straits. And then we used a trick, and the higher command and the Armed Forces will forgive me, when we couldn't go because there was no order to use tanks, but you understand that the infantry can't stand it and ask for help, so we organised exercises. It's when you draw up a training plan for a unit to improve combat capability and combat readiness. And the shells that you are supposed to fire at the training ground, you go out and practice on the enemy. The support for the infantry is excellent, as well as for the tankers - they are always in good shape.
Serhii, how do you explain this lack of coordination, because Ukrainians say that our resources are unequal with the enemy, so we have to fight a technological war. We have different tools, we have the same situational awareness programmes on the battlefield, Delta, Kropyva, and others. And they are aimed at ensuring that all units act in a coordinated manner. Because it's not just an annoyance, it's a tragedy. You mentioned friendly fire when our guys have already taken the forest plantation, and it comes from our guys. And what do you see as the problem, since there is a clear understanding that Ukraine must wage a technological war?
I don't understand why, perhaps because military personnel with combat experience are not involved in planning or in any development ideas. I'm not just talking about officers here, I'm talking about soldiers and sergeants. There are soldiers with higher education who are much smarter than officers. All the officers will forgive me, I am an officer myself, but let's admit that among the soldiers, there are people who are knowledgeable in technology, in innovation, great programmers, great technicians, who simply did not graduate from a military training alongside a degree and do not have an officer's rank. But they have such a tremendous amount of knowledge and combat experience, they could bring so much to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and yet they are not being engaged. I once came up with a proposal and shouted that I had an idea on how to properly organise a battle. Technically, the people who work with Kropyva told me that it could be implemented. This was two years ago, and we were talking about turning the battle into a computer game, where a drone would fly up and observe the entire battlefield, where telemetry would determine friend or foe, and where the command would see the deployment of forces in real-time on tablets: where our equipment was, where our infantrymen were, and where the enemy was. This was also the time when one of the officers, who had served in our unit for a while before being transferred to another unit, became a company commander and was taken prisoner. During a battle, he broke out of the formation with just one tank, which was immobilised and then captured. And I said, this is the problem: during a hot, intense battle, you cannot always see the whole situation around you. That's why you need enormous experience to understand that when you drive your vehicle, you also have to manage other vehicles in parallel. If you're a platoon commander, it's two other vehicles; if you're a company commander, you have to manage nine vehicles. At the same time, you give commands to your firing pointer and motor driver mechanic, and also to platoon commanders, ensuring they understand and execute them correctly. So, making a technological breakthrough, transforming the war into a computer game, where everything is clear, where you see the overall picture from above, can maintain control of the front line, see enemy positions, and at the same time, tanks and artillery can observe and provide fire support when tanks or infantry can't manage. But at that time, we did not listen, and it was left unimplemented because, for some reason, we thought it was unnecessary.
You know, I’m not just listening to you now; I’m actually taking notes on what you’re saying. If we really want to attract young people, there’s an ongoing discussion about this generation—the computer generation, the gamers. There’s even a science fiction film, Ender’s Game, if I’m not mistaken, where a boy was given a chance to play a simulator but wasn’t told it was a real interstellar battle. He ended up defeating an enemy civilization, thinking it was just a computer game. We can declare all the right ideas, generate plans, and talk about them, but it’s nearly impossible to drag young people, I am sorry, into the Soviet system. It`s unreal. If they’re offered the chance to do what they already know and excel at, it’s a completely different story. What’s stopping us?
It’s hard to say. Maybe some commanders are afraid that fresh blood and new ideas will expose their shortcomings. That’s possible. Or perhaps it’s some kind of feudal mindset, where a leader wants to ensure everyone around them is just slightly worse to maintain their own image. I don’t understand it; it’s just really challenging.
Strategically. Look, the Russian horde is advancing with human-wave assaults. We respond with similar tactics. It’s incredibly difficult to engage young people in this kind of warfare concept. However, we can see that many young people are excelling in areas like unmanned systems. They’re incredibly effective. When we see something burning brightly in Russia or the occupied territories, that’s the result of their skillful work.
Let’s be honest. Two or three years ago, if someone had said that FPV drones would become a key asset and Mavics would play a decisive role on the battlefield, people would have laughed and said, 'What are you talking about? You think some Chinese toys will decide the battle?' No."
Wedding drones, that's exactly how it sounded.
Yes. Let’s push forward with the tanks. Maybe this is how they were taught, and they don’t want to break out of this shell where they spent five years studying. They were taught that the charter is everything: you must march in step, hang identification tags, rely on lots of equipment, and push forward with sheer mass. I don’t know, it’s tough.
You know, you’re still quite tolerant of all this. For example, today I read that a case has been initiated regarding the supply of machine guns to the troops, where low-quality weapons were delivered. And the person involved in this story is the same one responsible for purchasing mines and tank shells. You didn’t see those at the front. Because the contract wasn’t fulfilled. The state handed over one and a half billion hryvnias—that’s a lot of money. And you, as a tanker, never received those shells at the front
It was a major disaster. To prepare for the liberation of Kharkiv, we used between 100 and 120 shells per platoon of three tanks daily. Then there came a time when an entire company was given just 10 shells, and God forbid you actually used them, because we were facing a severe shortage, keeping them in reserve for a rainy day—just in case there was a breakthrough.
So, the same person is involved in both cases. And sometimes my hair stands on end thinking about how lenient our state is towards those who, to put it mildly, fail to understand certain things—or, to put it more realistically, deliberately sabotage the country’s defence. Frankly, it’s incomprehensible to me.
This defies the logic of any rational person because it’s clearly a matter of the nation’s survival. We understand this is not just about Donetsk, Luhansk, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. It’s about the survival of the entire nation. And no one will stop along the Dnipro, as those ideas of dividing Ukraine were being circulated. Let’s not delude ourselves. Either they already know where they’re planning to flee—they’ve got places lined up—or they’re simply living in some parallel universe
Abu Dhabi, Monaco, and all the other luxurious places on the planet, obviously. Because, unfortunately, you can make good money on this. But we must have effective intelligence services, after all. What’s your take on the quality of training? We’ve talked about young people and incentives. I believe that these incentives need to be established first, and only then should we seriously revisit the discussion about 18-year-olds. What about other age groups? How would you assess the quality of training, the performance of our boot camps? What would you change?
This is a very broad question. I would probably start from the very beginning—with psychologists in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Frankly speaking, there are no psychologists working with military personnel. Moreover, the mobilisation potential still exists. And those shouting that no one wants to enlist, or forcible abduction of people from the street into a van and other excuses, are usually those who are afraid, who genuinely don’t want to contribute to the defence of the state. At the same time, there’s a significant group of people who are not volunteering themselves but would agree to go if they received a call-up. However, they want to feel safe and protected—not in the sense that they leave today and are gone tomorrow—but with a real chance to complete the mission and achieve the goal of defending the state, rather than just die. So, first and foremost, we need psychologists who, at this stage, will identify truly motivated individuals. After all, one motivated individual is worth more than ten demotivated ones. Sending someone abroad for training, investing significant money, time, and the effort of instructors, only for that person to face their first combat mission and voluntarily surrender—what’s the point of that? Wouldn’t it have been easier for a psychologist to assess their threshold—whether they would fight, surrender, or be captured—at the initial stage, and avoid investing resources into such individuals? I’ve always said, and have been saying since 2014, that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have many military specialities and non-combatant positions that are no less important than combat roles. However, a clear distinction must be made. There are combat units, and I have even criticized the idea of not distinguishing between combatants and war veterans—separating them with different benefits, you know, through separate compensations. Because someone who storms the trenches and someone who cooks meals or distributes equipment and ammunition are performing entirely different types of service.
This is also essential.
Both are important. I am not diminishing the role of those who work in warehouses or handle salaries in accounting. These tasks are vital. The same goes for psychologists who are trying to help. But they are not combatants, and we need to make a clear distinction—not because one group is better or worse than the other, but because some are ready to go on an assault, while others are not psychologically prepared. It’s just like athletes—well, not everyone can jump like Bubka. And if someone can’t jump five meters, it doesn’t mean they are any less of a person. It just means they are not mentally ready. So let’s assign them to the roles they are prepared for.
There’s also a synergistic effect, right? When someone is in the rear and, at some point, they say, 'I’m ready now.
I have examples of this. Back in 2022, when I was traveling from Yahotyn to a military unit, I had four people in the car with me. Among them was my compadre, Oleksii Hrasymenko, a tank crewman with experience dating back to 2015. He immediately declared he was going to the tanks because he wanted to fight. But there were others, like another of my compadre, who worked at a service station and had never fought before. He said, 'I’m afraid to get into a tank right away.' This is completely understandable, and I’m not saying he’s a bad person—he was just not ready. That’s why they were immediately assigned to positions in a maintenance platoon. He was excellent at repairing equipment, and at that time, he could contribute much more in that role. There were also two brothers, the Shevchenkos—Serhii and Oleksandr—who joined the maintenance platoon. After about a year of service, or even sooner, they witnessed how the unit was fighting. At some point, they came to me and said, 'Serhii, we feel uncomfortable in front of the guys. You’re out there fighting, shooting, defending, and we’re just here turning screws. We want to do the same.' And now they are mechanics-drivers and firing pointers; they have transitioned to combat roles.
There is such an induction, a psychological induction. Serhii, we have to finish. What do you think? This may be scholastic, but is it possible to synchronise the supply of equipment from our partners and the training of people so that at some point in time and space it coincides so that we don't argue about what is more important?
Of course, it is possible. And it is not difficult to do. And constantly... Equipment is supplied. Why don’t we equip these combat units, which have been trained and have experience, with the new equipment? This is a question I don’t understand either. We form new brigades, throw in people who have not passed the psychological selection for professional aptitude, for the ability to fight, but we provide them with the latest technology and weaponry, throw in a lot of resources, and then they fail to deliver results. Meanwhile, combat brigades, which are relying on exhausted people and broken, Soviet-era equipment, are achieving things that, well, need to be reinforced with fresh blood. And again, if you draft 10 people and put them into a combat unit where there are 30 battle-hardened soldiers, those 10 will be instantly brought up to their level.
And it would seem that, as a reward, as a bonus, the best weapons should go to the most experienced warriors.
Of course.
They will pull up new recruits and bring the newcomers up to speed.
No weak-willed soldier, surrounded by 10 or 20 battle-hardened warriors, will say that we’ve been betrayed, that we’ve been abandoned, or ask why we’re sitting here. That’s the kind of thing they like to spread around—that it’s betrayal. No. And of course, if they’re all young, all plucked straight from a market or a cinema and put in a trench, then of course they will say that we’ve been abandoned and we’re not capable.
You know, I will say my opinion. In 25 minutes, you have outlined a concept, a new concept of effective mobilisation and training of people in Ukraine. I think it's important that the High Command hears this. My opinion.
I am ready to share my experience. The only question is whether they are ready to listen to me.
Well, there you go. That's what I'm talking about, too. Serhii Ponomarenko, Hero of Ukraine, tank crewman, deputy commander of the 9th Battalion of the 3rd Separate Tank Iron Brigade. Serhii, thank you very much.
And thank you for the invitation.
Glory to Ukraine!
Glory to the heroes!
Host - Dmytro Tuzov
