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Butusov on 150-series Brigades: main problems and solutions

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The livestream by Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov is dedicated to the challenges of reserve formation, utilization of personnel, and the manning of Ukrainian forces

In 2024, a number of new brigades of the 150- series were formed. They are now engaged in combat in strategically important directions, primarily in Donbas. Unfortunately, there have been numerous complaints from servicemen performing tasks in these brigades regarding serious issues with organization, personnel utilization, command and control, and logistical support. There have also been several scandals. Today, another investigation has been published concerning the situation in the 157th Mechanized Brigade. Previously, highly publicized investigations covered the situation in the 152nd Ranger Brigade. I have also written and spoken on air about issues in the 155th and 153rd Mechanized Brigades.

In 2024, at least eight new brigades were mobilized to the front, each with an authorized strength of five to seven thousand personnel. In total, tens of thousands of mobilized troops have been deployed as part of these brigades. Unfortunately, our soldiers are facing numerous challenges that are not as prevalent in more experienced military units. The issue of personnel utilization is particularly critical. This will be our key topic on today’s broadcast.

But before I go on, I would like to address the situation and apologize for the post that was published on my channel yesterday. I neither wrote nor spoke about it during yesterday's broadcast. However, I take full responsibility for all content published on my platforms, including my YouTube channel, the Censor.Net website, and the Butusov+ Telegram channel. The post in question featured a soldier complaining about faulty F1 hand grenades, showing that they were malfunctioning in his case. Additionally, I published an actual excerpt from a combat order regarding the recall of a batch of F1 grenades from the front lines due to defects. The information about the recall of these grenades, which was posted on my Telegram channel, is authentic and remains available. However, the video sent by a soldier at the front turned out to be misleading. The person in the video, who claimed the grenade was faulty, was likely unfamiliar with its design and composition, leading to an incorrect conclusion. As a result, there is currently no evidence to suggest that the specific grenade he disassembled was faulty. That being said, I sincerely apologize to our viewers and readers. In times of war, any information published on my platforms must be verified to the highest degree. In this case, it was not. That is why we immediately removed the publication, and I would like to apologize once again.

However, the report confirming that a batch of faulty F1 grenades had been supplied is accurate. The issue of ammunition quality remains a sore point. Soldiers sometimes struggle to assess such matters correctly and may record videos based on incomplete information. This is especially true when they simultaneously receive combat orders indicating that certain types of ammunition are faulty. The situation undoubtedly requires investigation, and the leadership of the Armed Forces is already looking into it. Instances of faulty ammunition being supplied do occur. I want to emphasize that all previous reports we published regarding faulty mines, which were mass-produced and delivered to the Armed Forces, were verified and confirmed. We will continue to investigate such cases, as ensuring the quality of military supplies is a matter of utmost importance. In this particular instance, we shared unverified information provided by a serviceman. Moving forward, we will implement stricter verification procedures for similar reports. That said, the army does face issues with F1 grenades, just not with the specific batches mentioned in the soldier's video.

So, now we are moving on to the 150-series brigades. The situation is very important because the big problem in Ukraine is the attitude to the lives of people and military personnel. This topic is constantly on social media, constantly in the media. And it is extremely important for the most effective utilization of people. This is the main value, the main core of Ukraine because this war is not just about territory. First and foremost, this war is for the Ukrainian nation. And every person who may not be quite ready for war, but goes to war, every person, their life is of the highest value. And there are a lot of inquiries now about the fact that experienced brigades have been left without replenishment for a long time, they do not have time to prepare reserves, they do not have time to prepare qualified replenishment. And where do the people who are mobilized go?

The 150-series Brigades are just such an attempt by the Ukrainian leadership to change the situation, to prepare some operational reserves in order to strengthen the front. Nevertheless, there were problems with this, and conclusions must finally be drawn from these things, from these mistakes. First of all, why these new brigades were formed. What does the Supreme Commander-in-Chief say?

- There is a shortage of personnel in existing brigades, many of which are truly powerful. We are forming new brigades.

- Who told you that we are forming them? Someone is spreading this message that we are forming new brigades.

- So no new units have been formed over the past year?

- Reserve units have been formed—reserve units. They were still built around professional personnel. The core of these units consisted of people who had combat experience. Around them were mobilized troops—those who had been called up and trained. It's obviously better if they have experienced commanders if the entire chain of command is battle-tested. And these people were not immediately sent to the front. They served as reserves in one way or another. Then, after training and manning, they were all waiting for equipment. That’s how it was. And all this talk about new brigades, as if someone is forming new brigades while existing strong brigades lack personnel—it’s... look, perhaps there are isolated cases like that. But any brigade stationed on the front line must go through rotation: so that the unit can rest, so that soldiers can take leave, visit their families, or deal with personal matters. Another brigade must take their place. We can call it a new brigade, an old brigade, a new unit—but the key point is that one brigade must replace another. There is no other way to conduct rotations. That’s just how it works.

We see that Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy has explained why... He did say that someone is repeating the message that no one is forming new brigades. It's a bit strange. Perhaps he is not informed about everything, he is not aware of all the information that is happening in the Armed Forces.

Let's show the Supreme Commander-in-Chief what new brigades we have formed and sent to the front in 2024. We have made a selection to make the numbers clear. So, the 150th, 151st, 153rd, 154th, 155th, 157th mechanized brigades, 152nd ranger brigade, the fifth heavy mechanized brigade, it was reorganized from the fifth tank brigade of the Reserve Corps, which had not been sent to the front in full force before. And now another brigade, the 156th Mechanized Brigade, is preparing to go to the front, but it has not yet been deployed.

So, 9 new brigades were formed in 2024. We inform the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and all Ukrainians about this. This information is not secret, because information about all these military units is also available in the media, they all have their own pages on social networks. So, the new brigades do exist. It is important to say that a large number of personnel are assigned to these new brigades. A brigade is a staff of 5 to 7 thousand people. And, of course, we see that 9 brigades are at least 50,000 people. That is, even a much larger number of people were sent there, and in fact, even more people went through these brigades. Now we will discuss why this happened.

And the second point noted by the Head of State, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and the head of the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters was that, in addition to the large number of mobilized personnel in 2024, they were assigned specifically to new brigades. It is also important to consider how these brigades were utilized. I want to emphasize that this statement was made by Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a video we saw in December 2024. However, in January 2025—following the scandal, the publication, and the stream I shared, which was prepared with the help of our sources in the Armed Forces regarding the situation in the 155th "Anne of Kyiv" Brigade—Volodymyr Zelenskyy instructed the Supreme Commander’s Headquarters to conduct an investigation. As a result of this presidential directive, Zelenskyy made the decision at the Headquarters meeting to halt the formation of new brigades. In other words, while in December the position was that "new brigades are needed," by January, this stance had changed. This is extremely important—it demonstrates that significant public attention, when a large number of people engage, when there are widespread views, likes, and when many journalists investigate, analyze, and critically assess certain issues, all of this public scrutiny plays a crucial role. I want to stress again—it was not just me. A large number of journalists worked on exposing the situation with the 155th Brigade and other cases. We will now present additional publications, all of which ultimately led Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the country’s leadership to reconsider the situation and make an objective decision.

Is Volodymyr Zelenskyy's decision to stop forming new brigades in 2025 being implemented?

I want to say that this is indeed the case. Following the decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Headquarters, only one brigade—the 156th Mechanized Brigade—was not disbanded, as it had already reached a high level of manning. Instead, within three days, additional personnel were assigned to it, and it has now been sent for training to a European country. At the end, we will discuss the conclusions regarding the 156th Brigade, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief instructed that the mistakes made during the formation of new brigades, as well as other brigades, must be taken into account to prevent further international scandals, high-profile incidents, and media criticism. To avoid this, the General Staff is implementing certain measures to ensure such situations do not recur. The risks remain high, but we will discuss how to prevent this from happening again.

Regarding the halt in brigade formation, the process of forming four brigades began back in 2024. As of now, there is information confirming that the formation of these four new brigades—158th, 159th, 160th, and 162nd—has indeed been halted. This means that the President's directive has been carried out. This is a reasonable and positive decision, which was supported by the military leadership after due consideration. Therefore, I personally welcome this decision. I hope that beyond merely reviewing brigade formations, there will also be a reassessment of how troops are manned and trained to prevent these mistakes from being repeated.

What did the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Oleksandr Syrskyi, say in his recent interview about the formation of new brigades?

- Is the idea of creating new brigades from scratch with Western weapons effective?

-You know that during my nearly one year in office as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the decision was made to create only two brigades, and they have actually been formed. These are brigades to be manned abroad by our citizens, and all decisions regarding the creation of brigades were made earlier. Therefore, if we are accused of creating new brigades and not scaling up or replenishing the old ones, that is incorrect from one perspective. On the other hand, you also know that during the battle for Avdiivka, virtually all the reserves were engaged at that time, meaning all old brigades were already on the front lines when the enemy launched the Kharkiv offensive, and then we initiated our Kursk operation, 255 kilometers of active frontline were added. So, how could the brigades that were already stationed on the front line cover an additional 255 kilometers? Then there is the issue of brigade rotation. How do you replace brigades if you don't have a reserve? However, we have many examples of new brigades that were created just last year, and they are showing quite high results, but all new brigades went through a certain crisis, what I would call a period of adaptation. They had to endure and hold their ground, and afterward, they showed results no worse than the older brigades.

So, we heard from Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Oleksandr Syrskyy two main motivations for creating new brigades. First, the brigades need to change them, to change the troops at the front. In other words, experienced brigades need to rest, there should be a rotation of brigades. And the second issue is that the frontline has emerged and we need to strengthen it, to secure the frontline with new brigades. The logic is clear, but the only thing that is not clear is why they are trying to turn away from this decision. I don't quite understand either Volodymyr Zelenskyy or Oleksandr Syrskyi's desire to constantly absolve themselves of responsibility for any problems. It's a kind of infantilism - people are afraid of any responsibility, even though they were the ones who made the decision. Volodymyr Zelenskyy, as the head of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, made the decision to deploy new troops, and it turns out that he now says, I don't even know that they are being formed. All of these brigades were formed as part of the Ground Forces, which were commanded by Oleksandr Syrskyi all along, and now he says that it was not in my time.

And who issued the orders to create 152nd, 153rd, 154th, 155th, 157th? This is all from March, they all started forming in March 2014 after the appointment of Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi.

I have never understood this childish fear in our leaders: they are afraid to take responsibility for any actions, to admit any mistakes in interviews, and always try to shift the blame, showing that the problems lie beyond their responsibility. It’s so childish—closing off, shutting down, and saying, "I have nothing to do with this."

Of course, Syrskyi and Zelenskyy are fully responsible for the fact that a large number of mobilized soldiers were sent to these new brigades. And I think that we should not be afraid but instead investigate what happened, as this is not only about new brigades but about the broader issue of manning the troops.

For instance, the 156th Brigade is currently being formed in the European Union, and it needs to go through training. It will be trained, armed, and supported by our allies for some time, and this is our responsibility – and how we treat their assistance. We must ensure that what happened with those 150-series brigades does not happen again with the 156th. To do this, we need to analyze the situation honestly, not lie.

So what happened to the 150-series brigades?

The main problem we have, the deployment of troops, was known and obvious back in 2022 and even in 2014, when the deployment of volunteer battalions and the scaling up of the army at the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation had already begun. All these problems already existed then. We still have one problem in our state institutions. Our leaders never admit their mistakes, do not want to analyse them and do not conduct research that would describe exactly what happened in detail and draw conclusions from it. That is why the issue of forming, manning and training new troops, deploying new troops, working with recruits, volunteer fighters and mobilized people has not changed since 2014. We have been running on a rake for 10 years and repeating the same mistakes every year when we start mass mobilization.

So, first of all, why is it important to talk about these 150-series brigades? Look at the coverage in the media: Hromadske TV channel published a story about the 157th Brigade. Then there were publications about other brigades: "The True Story of Anne of Kyiv", 155th Brigade, What Next? 153rd Brigade, 152nd Brigade, and the Ranger Brigade. Why is it important to understand this? Because this is actually a question of where we send our mobilized people? And what kind of training do they receive? These are constant problems for us.

Let’s look back to 2014. A large number of mobilized people joined the army. There were waves of mobilization. And what did this lead to? At the time, there wasn’t a sufficient command structure. There were no experienced commanders, no individual combat experience. There was a lack of supplies and necessary weapons. Most importantly, there were no commanders who could serve as leaders across various levels. The main issue that emerged in 2014 was the command structure. Back then, our army was in a very weak state, with very few capable commanders who had both professional skills and the motivation, morale, and willingness to lead. This is what gave rise to the phenomenon of volunteer battalions, which were organised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Guard. Essentially, these were made up of civilian activists. We experienced this in 2014, but then the army began to gradually expand. Brigades and a reserve corps were created within the military. A special reserve corps with a specific arsenal was established for wartime. Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) were also deployed, but these forces underwent limited, targeted training exercises in 2021 and earlier. However, they were not fully deployed. It was already clear at that time that the same problems would arise in the event of a full-scale war. The core issue for these new troops was proper organization. A competent commander needed to lead each unit—someone who understood how to assign personnel, who had leadership qualities, who possessed technical skills, and who could manage staff work or technical roles related to weapons. All of this was obvious back then. However, these conclusions were not drawn. At the start of the full-scale war, the army quickly expanded. Initially, the TDF forces were deployed.  It was originally planned to establish 25 TDF brigades, but in the end, 32 TDF brigades were deployed. The reserve corps, designed before the war, comprised 10 brigades, and a large number of people were added to its ranks. At the start of the war, these were 60-series brigades: 61st, 62nd, 63rd, 65th, followed by the 68th, and the newly formed 67th brigade. There were also the third, fourth, and fifth tank brigades. The fifth brigade was created later—it was only a part of the initial plan. The third and fourth brigades were deployed in 2022. In 2022, the problems from 2014 re-emerged. Yes, since the ATO period, a large number of commanders had gained experience—around 400,000 people had become combatants, and there were already experienced personnel at different levels. But the army expanded rapidly. The peacetime brigades needed to be staffed according to wartime requirements. Then, the large TDF forces had to be manned, followed by the many reserve corps brigades. None of this had been planned. In the early days, there was chaos. People were not assigned to planned positions but rather went wherever they could or wherever there was an opportunity. Organizational issues were through and through. Various individuals were appointed to different positions, and the troops had to learn how to function as a team. Initially, the key problem was organizational. People had to self-organize, learn how to function as a basic military unit, then a military team, and only after that, they began mastering specific military specialities and gaining professional skills. There was some personnel selection to determine who fit the roles and who didn’t—all of this while hostilities were ongoing.

Why did they manage to do it in 2022, and there were no such high-profile scandals as there are now?

Because it was the shock of the first days, the first months of the invasion. It was chaos, which was compensated for by what? The fact that vast majority of people who immediately joined these mechanized brigades of the Reserve Corps and the TDF were volunteer fighters. These volunteer fighters were highly motivated, eager to learn military skills, and among them were still a significant number of combat veterans. People with some experience and an understanding of organizational structure. However, there were not enough of them to make these brigades immediately combat-ready. All of these Reserve Corps brigades had, and continue to have significant organizational issues. Some of them managed to learn and adapt through the harsh reality of combat, and over the past three years, a hardened core has formed. Others didn’t adapt as successfully, but the brigades were deployed nonetheless. Additionally, I must mention the 110th and 115th mechanized brigades of the Reserve Corps. These brigades were also formed in 2022 alongside the rest of the Reserve Corps.

So, these brigades all acquired a certain limited combat capability, but there were always some people in them who could be relied upon. And there were issues. For example, at the very start of the war, the situation was extremely tough, especially for the 110th and 115th brigades, which were immediately thrown into battle. The 110th was sent to Avdiivka, and the 115th to Sievierodonetsk. These brigades were essentially crowds in uniform, with only a handful of experienced commanders, but there were volunteer fighters among them. The 110th Brigade, under the command of Colonel Chumak, eventually managed to organise itself, and for a long time, it heroically defended Avdiivka. However, the 115th Brigade had a different fate. Without a strong leader, it struggled in the battles for Sievierodonetsk. The brigade had good people, but they lacked commanders, leadership, and proper organisation, and as a result, it fell apart. No one has studied the experience of the 115th Brigade, and efforts to restore its combat capability during continuous fighting, with a shortage of commanders, unfortunately, have not succeeded. The brigade continues to struggle: its units are scattered, assigned to patch up other units or fill gaps. We remember that the 115th Brigade was deployed to Ocheretyne, which led to a breakthrough near Avdiivka, unfortunately, in 2024. So, there are problems with the combat capability of the newly formed units. No one has studied these issues, no one has analysed them, and no conclusions have been drawn.

This is the institutional problem that led to the situation with the 150-series brigades.

Initially, there was a reserve corps, and in 2023, another wave of brigades of the 20 series, 30s, 40s, and new formations were formed. To man these brigades, people from experienced brigades have already been recruited. There were certain cadre there, but these brigades also had a large number of organisational problems that seriously limited their combat capability. Again, no conclusions. Neither for 2022 nor for 2023.

In 2024, infantry brigades 141st, 142nd, 143rd, and 144th were deployed to the front. These brigades were initially used as infantry, meaning they were meant to serve in a support role. Then, in 2024, the formation of the 150th series brigades began. At first, there seemed to be a certain logic to it. There was a mobilisation resource, a large number of people, who joined the brigades and received initial training with experienced commanders. However, from the very beginning, people were taken from these brigades and transferred to other units. This was a bit puzzling because, based on the experience of the Second World War, the First World War, and other wars with mass mobilization armies, training units for infantrymen were always established within the military units themselves. We can look at the experience of the USSR, the Russian Empire, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom. In all of these countries, during wartime, training units for infantrymen and sergeants were part of the infantry divisions themselves. Soldiers were never trained separately in standalone training centres.This was primarily a matter of responsibility and quality of training. Who is best suited to train an infantryman in wartime? Another infantryman. And who has the greatest interest in the quality of that training? The commander of the infantryman being trained. When a mobilised infantryman is transferred to a combat unit's training unit, the commander of that unit knows that this soldier will be serving and fighting alongside him. Therefore, the commander selects an experienced soldier from another unit, and that experienced infantryman passes on his knowledge to the newcomer, understanding that, in the future, they will be going into battle together, or that the newcomer may replace him. This approach increases the combat readiness of experienced troops. This is how it’s done all over the world, in fact.

What path did we take? In 2023, at least, there were people, there were reinforcements at the front, and at the same time, new troops were being formed. There was some logic to the process—although poorly organised, lacking experience, and with insufficient personnel—but there was still a flow of reinforcements to the troops at the front, and new troops were being formed from additional mobilised personnel and volunteer fighters. What changed in 2024? There is no longer the same number of volunteer fighters or the same number of mobilised personnel to replenish the active army. Despite this, the formation of new units continued, even though reinforcements were no longer coming in. Why did so many scandals arise? Because, in 2022-2023, there was still a significant number of ATO participants and motivated individuals learning military skills, as well as a substantial number of commanders. But now, in the third year of a gruelling war, the number of experienced infantrymen has significantly declined. This decline is due to losses at the front. How many losses? People become exhausted, fall ill, or are discharged for various reasons. People are not made of iron to fight for so many years. Physical resilience is needed to fight on the ground, and of course, a person cannot keep fighting on the ground indefinitely. It’s impossible. In no army in the world can one live in the trenches for years. It takes a serious toll on physical health. That’s why rotations are necessary everywhere, and, naturally, changes and rotations are required. But how? It turned out that these new brigades lacked experienced personnel. Infantry soldiers are not only suffering casualties and breaking down but they’re also being transferred because the infantry is the backbone of the military—the primary force bearing the brunt of the combat—and from them, new branches of the military are formed. First and foremost, the unmanned forces and intelligence units. Essentially, everything starts from the infantry. Therefore, the outflow of personnel from the infantry is the largest, and the rotation of infantry personnel is the most significant. And, of course, 2024 is not 2022, nor is it 2023. The situation has drastically changed. And we needed to prepare for this shift. How did we prepare? What did we find out?

When it became clear that there were no personnel, for some reason, it was decided that essentially anyone could command these units. So, to form these new brigades, personnel—mainly officers from the territorial recruitment centres—were sent to the operational commands, despite having no real combat or organisational experience.

I want to emphasise that before you can create a combat-ready unit, you must first establish an organisation and a cohesive team. Leaders are necessary for this, but this step was not taken. Additionally, the leadership gap—particularly the shortage of section commanders, platoon commanders, company commanders, and battalion commanders—was filled by people with no relevant experience. Many of these individuals were drafted from the reserves and sent to short-term officer courses at various military academies. These people were essentially just as mobilised as the rest and had no chance to demonstrate or test their leadership abilities. They were unable to organise the process or build a team. As a result, all these new brigades were, unfortunately, very weak organisationally right from the start. There simply weren’t enough command personnel. The situation was further aggravated by significant losses at the front, leading to these brigades being used as depots to replenish other troops. A batch of mobilised personnel would be sent, they would undergo training, and then representatives from another brigade would come, take the most combat-ready individuals, and leave. Then, the same 150th brigade would be replenished and sent for training once again, but with fewer and fewer experienced personnel each time. And the cycle would repeat, starting everything from scratch. This repetitive situation was exacerbated by another factor: the duration of training. Although the brigade was officially created with 150, the bulk of them came in March. However, due to the constant outflow of personnel, by the time they were ready to deploy or engage in combat, most of the soldiers who had been thrown into the brigade at the last minute had, on average, only two months of service experience. No more than that.

And what was the result? First of all, there were no experienced personnel. People couldn’t come together as a team because they were constantly being taken away and shuffled around. Secondly, there was no time for proper preparation. Thirdly, there was a lack of logistical support. For instance, these brigades weren't provided with drones for training—no drones, no antennas, no power supplies. As a result, during their training, they were unable to practice how to operate reconnaissance drones or ensure situational awareness.

I also want to highlight that the situation became particularly critical when the brigade was sent abroad. The composition of the unit kept changing. Some people in different positions remained, but then an order would come to send them abroad. And there simply weren’t enough people. So, personnel from all positions were gathered to plug the gaps, filling in wherever necessary, just to send them abroad. And so, the brigade would depart. But what would happen? People weren’t working in their respective specialities. Then, when they returned to Ukraine, they couldn’t be reassigned. For example, an electronic warfare (EW) operator who had been sent for training as an infantry commander couldn’t be reassigned back to EW. And where would you find a new EW specialist? This led to massive organisational chaos. All of this resulted in brigades being sent to the front without anyone truly assessing their actual combat readiness.

In the case of the 155th Brigade, we know that initially the brigade received an unsatisfactory rating from the Ground Forces Command. Then someone from higher up intervened, and the next commission gave them a satisfactory rating just a few days later. So, it went from unsatisfactory to satisfactory, and the brigade was deployed. What did this lead to? Let’s examine the consequences. Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that we need to hold the front and carry out rotations. However, none of the deployments of these brigades to the front resulted in the rotation of any of our brigades. In other words, the goal set by the Supreme Commander’s Staff was not achieved. The deployment of these brigades did not lead to the withdrawal of any of our other brigades from the front.

Let’s look at a specific case—the 155th Brigade. They were deployed, but they still haven’t been assigned their designated area. They can’t hold it because the brigade was simply not prepared for this. It’s not the fault of the soldiers; they are honestly and conscientiously trying to perform their duties, and most of them are doing their best. But they can’t succeed because they weren’t properly trained or organised for this. Then there’s the 153rd Brigade. This brigade was also formed and trained in Germany, as I mentioned earlier. One of its battalions even received Bradley infantry fighting vehicles. However, six battalions were created within the brigade. Now, this brigade, which according to the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander in Chief leadership's plan was supposed to replace another unit at the front, is currently occupying only a 4-kilometre sector. It can’t cover any more than that. I’d like to remind you that according to the Armed Forces regulations, a battalion’s defence zone is up to 5 kilometres. Theoretically, a brigade should be able to hold a 30-kilometre sector, or if deployed in two echelons, a 15-kilometre sector. In this case, one of the battalions is already being considered for disbandment, while three others are going to be reassigned to more experienced units. That leaves only two battalions. To help maintain their combat readiness, we’ve sent reinforcements—a unit from the 1st Da Vinci Assault Battalion.

Instead of replacing other brigades, rotating them, in fact, a large number of resources are now being pulled from different directions at the front so that these brigades can, in principle, perform their tasks. And because of this attitude, because of this application, because of this organisation, these new 150-series brigades have a record number of AWOL cases.

And the problem is not only that several dozen of them have deserted abroad. Well, there is not a single 150-series Brigade that, after being deployed to the front, currently has fewer than a thousand soldiers who have gone AWOL. There is no place where this number is lower than a thousand. Unfortunately, in many cases, the number is significantly higher. Why? Where there is poor organization, people, of course, desert in much greater numbers. And this is a loss. We carry out mobilization with such efforts, spend resources on people, but then fail to provide them with proper training, leadership, or a cohesive unit where they could understand that they are warriors capable of effectively carrying out combat missions. As a result, there is a high number of AWOL cases. I want to emphasize that in each of the 150-series brigades, to their credit, military commanders ask, "Here are the mobilized troops—why aren't they shooting? Why aren't they fighting like the volunteer fighters did in 2022?" I want to stress that, in reality, the attitude toward the mobilized soldiers is largely positive. Most of those in the 150-series brigades are combat-ready and are trying to fulfill their duties honestly. Therefore, all these scandals should not tarnish their honor and responsibility, nor diminish the significance of what they are doing on the front lines.

I spoke with the commander of the 1st Da Vinci Assault Battalion, who arrived at the 153rd Brigade, and I spoke there. And my friend Perun, the commander of the 1st Assault Battalion, he says yes, I saw the soldiers of the 153rd Brigade, and he says that every single one of them, of these mobilised men, I would gladly take every soldier to my battalion because they are all very good, motivated people who honestly want to defend the country. And the problem is that, he says, I could not take any of their commanders to my battalion, because these people simply need more training, it is too early to trust them to lead people into battle. Well, this is objectively true. And this is not to humiliate these people. They just don't have the training, and they haven't had the experience. This is just the reality. Indeed, these commanders, they need to test themselves in real conditions, and they need some practice. It's not offensive, it's just reality. And this is the situation with the 150-series brigades.

And I would like to say that now we need to draw conclusions about the manning system. I'm grateful that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief has praised the decision to stop creating new troops, but if we don't take full account of this experience, and why is the experience? You can't send people to the front, even to experienced brigades, even to very experienced brigades, if you don't give commanders time to prepare. You can't send mobilised people into brigades where there are no people, where they have never been given, and then demand that they immediately engage in combat. Experienced brigades need time. By the way, I want to remind you that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said who told you that experienced brigades do not have people. The case I was talking about was when the 1st Rifle Battalion of the 93rd Brigade, which consisted of 12 infantrymen, had to be sent from another direction to the village of Shevchenko in the 155th Brigade's area. Eight battalions entered the position at once, but the battalion consisted of 12 infantrymen. Just imagine. A battalion of an experienced brigade with experienced commanders, with scouts, aerial reconnaissance. In such a state. Instead, this battalion was supposed to perform tasks in the area of the 155th Brigade, which was sent there, it's not the fault of these people. They were not trained by the organisation, they were not ready to perform combat missions. Because they were not given time, commanders were not given, supplies were not given, drones were not given, equipment was not given. And this is the result. So I would like to say what my conclusion is.

The conclusion is this. People should be sent to the front to train within the training units of experienced brigades that have the personnel to prepare them properly. They should not be handed over to a brigade with the expectation that "Here are 100 men—send them into battle immediately." Unfortunately, this often happens. Soldiers should not be assigned to training centres just for the sake of bureaucracy, where unmotivated and inexperienced instructors lead the process. Instead, they should be integrated into the training units of experienced brigades. These brigades must also be given enough time to work with the recruits—ideally, a minimum of three months. This period allows soldiers to build physical endurance, receive comprehensive training, and gradually integrate into their units, taking on assignments step by step. When this approach is neglected, we see the same issues arise as with previous waves of mobilised soldiers, as my friend Perun mentioned. In reality, these men can be good soldiers—most of them want to be good soldiers. But the state fails to give them this opportunity due to poor organisation.

I want to talk about the 153rd Brigade.  Initially, there were plans to integrate the 153rd Brigade into the 3rd Assault Brigade so they could gain experience under seasoned leadership. However, at the last moment, the high command decided to assign them their own sector on a different front. Why? What was the reasoning? It makes no sense. It's as if military planning disregards history—as if the First and Second World Wars never happened, as if military academies don't teach these principles, and as if no books exist on proper troop deployment, training, and the challenges involved. It feels like Ukraine’s entire military history has been forgotten, with everyone focused solely on the present. Instead of addressing these systemic issues, they wait for investigative journalists to point out what should already be obvious. I want to say that people need time to prepare, responsible people and organization. And then there will be no such number of AWOL, no such number of losses due to AWOL. Just imagine, these 50 thousand people are approximately the staff of these new 9 brigades that were sent to the front in 2024 and are being trained. In those brigades that are at the front, there are over a thousand AWOL cases in each of them. You can imagine the number of people who are much larger. In the 155th, when it had not yet reached the front, there were already 1700 AWOL cases. Just imagine the losses. People come and are simply lost. And instead of solving this problem, they keep funneling more people. 

I want to say that simply banning the formation of new units is not an option. We absolutely need high-quality and responsible training, along with time for this training. And then, a gradual test run of these people. This is nothing special; all commanders say this. It's a standard practice in all armies worldwide. All of this has long been described. That’s why I want to say that the 156th Brigade is now going for training. I would like to tell all the soldiers and commanders of the 156th Brigade that the country's leadership wants this brigade to avoid the scandals and problems it has faced. So, please, if you notice any issues you want to address, feel free to report them and reach out to your commanders. The General Staff has assigned a very responsible and decent Ukrainian officer from the General Staff to the 156th Brigade – Yevhen Mezhevikin, Hero of Ukraine. He personally participated in combat operations as a fighter in 2014, knows what mobilized troops are, and how to lead them into battle. Therefore, there is a genuine interest in correcting these mistakes, and a responsible person is overseeing this.

Please contact journalists; we all want to make sure the 156th Brigade does not repeat the mistakes of others, nor generate new scandalous articles. And to prevent this, as the experience of these brigades we’ve discussed shows, after returning from Europe, the 156th Brigade should be given at least two months to organize coordination here in Ukraine. They need at least two months to learn how to be a team here. We also need to objectively assess the quality of their training. We need to ensure drones are provided in advance and that the calculations are prepared. Moreover, if the training time is insufficient, we should not force the Ground Forces Commission—I'm hopeful that the new commander of the Ground Forces, Mykhailo Drapatyi, will not allow such formal approaches—but we need to properly verify if the brigade is truly ready. It should not be sent to the front, even if it gets a satisfactory evaluation. It’s not acceptable. If there isn't enough time, the brigade must be given as much time as necessary to achieve a high level of readiness. Otherwise, there’s no other way. Why send a brigade to the front when it’s only satisfactory or unsatisfactory? It's better to just replenish combat-ready units that are fulfilling their tasks. So, in fact, we may have to train a new brigade. Not just a couple of months abroad, not just two more months in Ukraine. It might take three, four, five, or even six months. We need to assess the results: how ready is each unit? There’s no other option. I hope that these mistakes and shortcomings will be taken into account.

I would like to say that Volodymyr Zelenskyy's decision to ban the formation of new units is now being implemented. There is only one new brigade left. I hope that this experience will be taken into account when it is formed. The brigade will have as much time to prepare as necessary to make it combat-ready. Really combat-ready. This will be a question for the new commander of the Land Forces, Mykhailo Drapatyi, who is also the commander of the Khortytsia OSGT (Operational Strategic Group of Troops). This is his area of responsibility.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

Have you read Budanov's assessment that Ukraine has resources for another six months? Do you agree with this assessment, and why is it being made public?

I disagree with this assessment. Look, Kyrylo Budanov is someone who gives so many interviews that I stopped analyzing all the information waves he likes to stir up long ago. I understand that he simply enjoys being in the media spotlight, and his goal is just to be quoted in the news every day. He often says things that contradict each other, so let's not focus too much on that. Unfortunately, our government often makes statements that don't reflect the real situation. Of course, there are opportunities in Ukraine to change the course of the war and to withstand. But to do that, we need to focus on our work, not just talk in interviews. Specifically, the Chief of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine should focus on intelligence, planning, high-quality operations, and be responsible for his people—not spend all his working hours on regular interviews. That’s when results will come.

And is the 140th any better? Look at the 143rd – see what’s happening in Dvorichna.

I agree with you completely, because in the Dvorichna area, the 143rd Infantry Brigade is also not combat-ready. These brigades were initially created as infantry without equipment, just to fill some gaps. It’s a poor approach, but at least they weren’t "filled" with equipment. The idea was that they wouldn’t perform independent tasks or would serve as an infantry screen. However, it turned out that when the 143rd Brigade was placed in their assigned area, the enemy took advantage of it, this was because no attention was given to the organisation and quality of these brigades. These newly formed units should not be given an independent area; they should be integrated into high-quality, organised, combat-ready troops. That way, they’ll learn on the job and help strengthen the more capable forces that can actually execute tasks. That’s when you get a real result.

Why does AWOL remain unpunished?

We have a big problem in the country, the state does not understand how to work with people, how to organise them during the war. There is no military justice in Ukraine, no military police, no judges, no military justice, no discipline in this regard. Everything is based solely on self-motivation and self-organisation of people. There is also no proper organisation of the troops. That is why it often turns out that the AWOL is the only way to solve some internal problems in the relationship between servicemen and commanders. There is a large set of problems. It requires systemic solutions, many solutions. We have an institutional problem. We do not admit mistakes - our government is the one we elected. We have no other, and our institutions are very weak. The only way we can influence the government is through public pressure. Therefore, dear friends, the AWOL is not being resolved, because we have a large number of other organisational problems that are not being resolved either. Organisation of troops, utilization of troops, military industry, production of defense items, mobilisation of industry. What is being solved? What problem is being solved? We solve only those problems that are organised by civil society, volunteers, and the army itself. Where structures are created by the people themselves, they are effective. But where the state creates them from above, like these 150-series brigades, they are not effective. It needs support, efforts from below, from the people themselves. And here, the Ukrainian leadership is even waiting. Why is it that the people do not organise themselves, do not decide? How is this possible?

Many say that the newly created brigades are not capable of fighting. This means that many brigades will continue to fight in the rear.

In fact, no. Newly created brigades, if we look at the experience of world wars, no one creates a large number of new military units. Let's look at the experience. General Eisenhower, the commander-in-chief of the American forces in Europe during the Second World War. He and his generals, including Omar Bradley, the commander of one of the American field armies, all say in their memoirs that the main value in war is experienced divisions. In America, they have a divisional structure. They don't have separate brigades, like the Armed Forces of Ukraine, they have a higher, better organisational level. Their regiments and brigades are organised into divisions. So, they have brigades, their own high-quality American divisions, during the Second World War, they did not create a large number of new ones, but replenished experienced ones. For example, the American First Infantry Division, Big Red One, as they call it, renewed two regiments of this division, according to Eisenhower's memoirs, and sent replenishment there. That is, tens of thousands of people passed through the division. Why was this done? Because where there is an experienced cadre of sergeants and commanders, new mobilised people are constantly added to the division to preserve this experience, rather than creating a large number of new brigades and divisions with a large number of people. It's a simple logic. That's why we have a problem that in the same direction, Pokrovsk, there are old brigades with experienced ones, who have an area, but no people, and they have 5 kilometres of area. Brigades of five battalions. And there is a newly formed brigade with six battalions. And it cannot hold anything either, because it has no commanders. There are commanders and experience, and aerial reconnaissance, but there are no commanders, and the number of people is several times higher. But it still holds 4-5 kilometres. It's absurd. So instead of rotations, we created problems for ourselves. Heavy losses, AWOL losses, losses of personnel during combat missions. Why? Because our institutions are not working. As a state, we do not analyse how money is spent, how people are spent.

We came as volunteer fighters in 2022 without training. We didn't have as much training time as the newly created ones. Even now, we don't have the same support as the newly created ones. So maybe the problem is different?

Yes, the problem is different. There are volunteer fighters, people with special motivation. And the state, unfortunately, has not provided volunteer fighters, has not relied on the deployment of a volunteer army to give it the maximum amount of resources. Instead, resources are being funneled into newly formed units, but in 2024, these are no longer made up of volunteer fighters or experienced first- or second-line operational reserve soldiers. They are made up of civilians who have been mobilised, many of them forcibly. And, of course, this leads to the fact that these people, who do not know what the army is, some of whom are afraid of the army, need training and understanding because all people are different. Someone can learn, someone cannot. Well, this is the reality. And these people need quality training. They are mobilised. They need to be trained, they need commanders who tell them what to do, how to do it, who bring their actions to automaticity. In a critical situation, people need to have reflexes, so that they don't think and act immediately. Their hands should know what to do. Their feet should know what to do. Their heads should know where to focus first. This is the most important thing. Without this, how can it work? If this is missing, no miracle will happen. Not everyone is a volunteer fighter and not everyone can fight. Every country has faced challenges like ours. This is documented in the memoirs of military leaders from all over the world—look at Germany, America, Britain. Wherever there are mobilised soldiers, there are problems. These issues need to be addressed.

And the enemy has problems too. The Russians solve theirs with methods like executing people on the spot and torture. But we are not Russia. We need to spend time on organisation, training, and motivating people. We need leaders whom people will follow. We need discipline, organisation, and skills. Without this, nothing works.

Should we bring to justice the commanders who destroyed more than 20 leopards and people in their crews? 155th Brigade.

Bohdan, well, fortunately, the losses in Leopard tanks are much lower. And there are more people in the crews. That is, the losses in Leopard tanks are less. And most of the equipment can be restored. But, of course, the losses are very serious and unjustified. Will anyone be punished? How? The commander who was not given time to prepare, Riumshin, is now in prison. Absolutely for nothing, really. Just on a trumped-up charge. He did not have time to utilize the brigade. A new commander was appointed, who also simply does not know the situation, and it is difficult for him, he had no experience of this kind. Now he is somehow utilizing the brigade. All the commanders in the brigade are also new, and they also have no experience. The tasks are set without matching the ability of the troops to perform them. To unprepared people. Of course, there will be losses. Who will be responsible for this? We have no one. Of course, those who gave the assessment - the Ground Forces Commission and the OC (Operational Command) West  - who gave the 155th Brigade a "satisfactory" rating and pushed it to the front - should be responsible. According to the law, these people who gave it a "satisfactory" rating should be held accountable. Or those who ordered them to give it a 'satisfactory' rating. Well, that would be fair. Unfortunately, Riumshin is in jail, and he was not even given time. Neither to prepare, nor to organise, nor to do anything. They just made him a scapegoat.

Are there no such problems in other brigades?

There are problems everywhere, but the more experienced people, the more experienced commanders, the more problems there are in all brigades because the army has grown. Not everywhere there are competent commanders at all levels. But, of course, there are fewer of these problems in experienced brigades. Much fewer. And this should be taken into account. Now mobilized soldiers should first of all be assigned to those brigades with the best training. Brigades should be enlarged to the size of divisions. You can call it divisions. You can call it a corps. Whatever you want. But the units that have the training, the command structure, the command, intelligence, drones, should be enlarged. This is what needs to be increased, scaled up. And mobilize the conscripted servicemen. Instead of just pulling numbers out of thin air and saying, "Let's create more brigades," we should ask—why? These brigades are not fulfilling their tasks. I made this stream specifically to document the newly formed brigades.

The tasks set by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, particularly the rotation of experienced brigades, have not been fulfilled. These brigades are unable to perform the tasks assigned to them. This issue must be acknowledged, and conclusions must be drawn. The solution is not simply to reassign personnel but to fundamentally reform the organizational training system for mobilized soldiers. The focus should be on expanding well-structured, high-quality brigades—those with strong command staff, a well-established NCO (noncommissioned officer) corps, and effective training units. Where this is prioritized, accountability is present, and proper logistical support is provided. Such brigades already exist in our military, and they should receive more personnel and resources to scale them up. Commanders, leaders, sergeants, and support staff are those who fight. The American General Barrow said a very famous phrase that amateurs in war are interested in tactics, while professionals are interested in logistics. And this phrase is well-known. It's just obvious. The problem is in the organization, in logistics, in supply, in the use of resources, in the utilization of people. This is the main problem. The resource that the state, the nation has, must be protected. 

Because the one who preserves his resources better has the ability to inflict more losses on the enemy and destroy and deplete his resources. Therefore, we need to make the right conclusions about 150-series brigades. They must all be reinforced with combat-ready units. Not mechanically replenished, but reinforced with combat-ready units that should be the core of defence. They should be reinforced by UAV units, which should organise reconnaissance, control and situational awareness in their area. Just as it is now being done in the 153rd Brigade. Then there will be a result. Or it is better to include these new brigades in the experienced ones. Then their command staff will learn the work of the headquarters, their aerial reconnaissance units will learn the work of the regular aerial reconnaissance units that are already operating. The fighters will simply have adequate command and organisation. Of course, the brigades need to be combat-ready. By the way, this was the plan for the initial utilization of the 153rd Brigade. Unfortunately, it was not implemented. This is obvious now, it was a mistake. The plan to utilize the 153rd Brigade, which was supposed to be temporarily included in the 3rd Assault Brigade, was reasonable and justified. It would not have led to such unpleasant consequences. And we still have such brigades that can be included. For example, the 46th Airmobile Brigade is standing next to us. Why couldn't the 157th have been included in the 46th Brigade and temporarily work together in the same area and perform tasks. Instead, we have an experienced brigade without personal control of the replenishment, and an inexperienced brigade with personnel, and they suffer equally. And the 46th cannot be changed, and the 157th cannot be changed, let's say, for a long time, and they need to be trained. And what is training at the front? This is a loss that we must avoid and save people's lives.

Friends, thank you all for the stream. I hope we will follow the formation of the 156th Brigade. We wish the soldiers and commanders of the 156th Mechanised Brigade success and that they take this experience into account so that they do not repeat these mistakes, and that the brigade has sufficient time to prepare, quality of training, command staff, and that they receive drones and all the weapons they have in advance, train at the training ground, and get antennas, power, everything. Not later, when they are sent to the frontline. This is the problem. I mean, all 150-series brigades were not given enough drones to train, and then they were sent to the front in a small batch. We need to draw conclusions from this, avoid it and improve it. Because the situation is really difficult, and every person is combat-ready. Every person is the highest value for our nation. Thank you for the broadcast and Glory to Ukraine!