Butusov on exposure of FSB agent within SSU leadership
Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov comments on the detention of Dmytro Koziura, Chief of Staff of the SSU (Security Service of Ukraine) Anti-Terrorist Center, who was exposed as an FSB agent. Koziura had been holding positions granting access to top-secret information for over 20 years and maintained extensive contacts within the SSU.
A high-profile event took place: The Head of the Security Service of Ukraine, Vasyl Maliuk, announced the exposure of a high-ranking Russian mole within the SSU leadership. Vasyl Maliuk personally took part in the arrest and stated that all details of the special operation were reported to and approved by Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
The situation is unprecedented, as Colonel Koziura is a well-known figure within the SSU, he is a career SSU officer, he has served in the Security Service of Ukraine all his life, building a highly significant career. He began his service in the personnel department of the SSU Academy and later spent his entire career in the Department for the Protection of National Statehood, steadily advancing within "T" Directorate which specializes in counter-terrorism. With over 25 years of service, Koziura established connections with nearly all key figures in the SSU leadership, having witnessed multiple changes of government, he remained here before, during, and after the Maidan, continuously advancing his career. He initially headed the counter-terrorism department within "T" Directorate before rising to lead the counter-terrorism division of the Department for the Protection of National Statehood. Notably, one of these four divisions within the central SSU apparatus was, for many years, under the control of a Russian agent. In 2016, Koziura was appointed Chief of Staff of the SSU Anti-Terrorist Center. It is a highly critical position, particularly during wartime as the SSU Anti-Terrorist Center and its Chief of Staff have access to nearly all intelligence possessed not only by the SSU but also by other branches of Ukraine’s defense forces, including the Armed Forces, the National Guard, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. All intelligence related to potential terrorist threats, as well as any information concerning the activities of the defense forces—particularly matters of war and combat operations—flows in its entirety to the SSU Anti-Terrorist Center. The Chief of Staff of the Anti-Terrorist Center has full access to this information, enabling him to comprehensively analyze issues and events within Ukraine’s defense forces and assess their overall combat readiness. This position is among the most well-informed and influential when it comes to the conduct of military operations. Therefore, discussing this event is undeniably important.
We often speak in abstract terms about Russian agents infiltrating the structures of power. However, there are concrete examples of high-ranking officials who have been exposed as agents of the SSU and are now either convicted or under investigation. This is not the first such case, but what is significant is that during active hostilities in this sector, the SSU successfully carried out a counterintelligence operation while maintaining its secrecy. Moreover, it is clear that the head of the SSU informed Supreme Commander-in-Chief Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and this information was not leaked—an important factor.
I will also add some details not included in the video released by the SSU, particularly concerning Dmytro Koziura’s relatives, who hold positions in the leadership of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
The details of this case are truly shocking and, above all, command respect, as identifying and exposing an agent of influence—a Russian intelligence operative—at such a high level is an extremely difficult task. We all understand that a senior official is at the center of all information flows, maintaining contact with a vast number of people, and over the decades, he becomes fully perceived as an insider. Detecting, suspecting, or uncovering any unauthorized connections in such a case is exceptionally challenging. Therefore, it should be noted that the counterintelligence of the Security Service has demonstrated truly high professionalism in this case, and this is by no means an exaggerated situation. It is now evident that Dmytro Koziura had unauthorized communications with individuals identified as FSB operatives, regardless of the specific content, the information he was transmitting should never have been shared. His discussions about cryptocurrency further suggest that this colonel had personal interests he was pursuing. It is clear that he had access to an enormous volume of classified intelligence, including highly sensitive data obtained by Ukraine’s security agencies. He was in a position to assess the scale of intelligence gathered on the Russian Federation. As we can see, he could legally and very quickly obtain any information about strategic facilities in Ukraine, strategic communications, adjust strikes on these communications, and assess the damage caused by Russian attacks. And, of course, this is a vast amount of operational data—simply invaluable intelligence for the enemy during the war.
What is important to note? Koziura comments on the strike on Antonovycha Street (December 20, 2024 - ed.), which was carried out by the Russians after the Security Service of Ukraine eliminated the Chief of the Chemical Troops of the Russian Armed Forces in Moscow. In this case, it is clear that he is discussing the strikes—behind this residential complex shown on the map, there is also an SSU building. His interlocutor asks if he was there. Indeed, that building previously housed the Special Operations Center, and this has been widely known for years. Koziura notes that the missile hit the roof of a newly constructed building, but had it been two floors lower, it would have struck the SSU building directly. His interlocutor then asks if he had worked in that building. He replies no, as he was not actually part of the Special Operations Center but served in the T Department of the DPNS (Department for the Protection of National Statehood) and the SSU Anti-Terrorist Center.
Contacts with Sytienkov
Maksym Sytenkov is a lawyer at the Vyshneve Territorial Election Commission and a former assistant to People's Deputy Iryna Berezhna from the Party of Regions.
Sytienkov, like many other members and supporters of the Party of Regions, as well as its officials, was an active participant in the Anti-Maidan movement. Do you see the pattern? Anti-Maidan was closely linked to Russian intelligence services. The individuals who orchestrated Anti-Maidan can, in fact, be considered direct agents of Russian intelligence services.
High-ranking officials, including those who were lustrated but were also involved in Anti-Maidan as its leaders, may have reason to worry because I believe that sooner or later, all these Russian operatives who fought against Maidan will be purged.
This is unlikely to be the last mole embedded within the government—one who once worked for Russia, sought to suppress democratic protests, and later secured a comfortable position in the state apparatus. As we know, such individuals continue to operate at the highest levels of power. This case is highly revealing and underscores the extent to which Russian infiltration persists within government institutions.
About the parents. Their appearance in the SSU’s video is no coincidence. After all, Dmytro Koziura’s father’s brother was, for some time, one of the top-ranking officials of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB). He currently holds the rank of Colonel General—Oleksii Kuziura.
He was still a lieutenant general at the time.
Kuziura remains in place. His surname is spelled differently in Russia—there, he is listed as Kuziura. Oleksii Fedorovych Kuziura, Federal Security Service, Lieutenant General. I am not sure whether he is still in active service, but it is a fact that he was promoted to the rank of Colonel General. Did the SSU know that Koziura had such a high-ranking relative in the FSB? And did it affect his career? In fact, this information was known. It was repeatedly brought up during Koziura’s polygraph tests, including when he was being appointed to key positions. However, a polygraph is by no means a safeguard. The mere fact that someone passes a polygraph test does not indicate that they will incriminate themselves. If a person is well-prepared for the test or has a naturally calm and composed nervous system, they will not exhibit signs of stress, leading to a high margin of error in polygraph results. Moreover, much depends on the examiner—who conducts the test, what methodology is used, and how thoroughly the assessment is carried out. And, of course, in my opinion, when an officer with a relative who is an FSB general is appointed to a leadership position, this should, at the very least, attract heightened scrutiny, a wide range of counterintelligence and operational units should be actively monitoring and vetting such an individual, his track record—what he did, the decisions he made, and the information he had access to. Appointing someone like this to a key position is highly questionable if they have never been tested through real actions, if their entire career has been spent behind a desk. It is even more alarming when such an individual is placed in a position critical to national security. This raises serious questions for those who facilitated Koziura’s rise—those who appointed him, allowed him to advance over the years, and conducted his polygraph examinations—because he spent his entire career within the SSU.
And now, the key question for the investigation is: when exactly did he start passing on information? From the moment he joined the service, he was familiar with almost the entire leadership of the SSU. Currently, he has access to an immense amount of critically sensitive information within the ATC.
First and foremost, this is a high-ranking mole—extremely dangerous—who, unfortunately, had extensive access to classified data. I believe that, as long as active combat operations continue, exchanging a person with such access is simply out of the question. In the hands of the FSB, he could cause catastrophic damage. It is worth noting that a lower-ranking SSU officer has already defected to the Russians. He is now giving testimony in Moscow.
Who else was among the top officials in the highest echelons of power exposed as an SSU agent?
We have Oleh Kulinich under investigation on suspicion of high treason. He was the head of the SSU department in Crimea. And we had Andrii Naumov, the head of the Main Department of Internal Security, who was supposed to be responsible for all the checks, for all these polygraphs, but in fact was responsible for smuggling and was detained in Serbia. He is now there. Brigadier General of the SSU, head of the main department.
Vasyl Prozorov. There was also an SSU officer. He also held a minor position in the Anti-Terrorist Centre for a short time, but not for long. And he then betrayed Ukraine and has been living in Moscow for several years now, engaged in propaganda there. His access to information, of course, cannot be compared to that of Koziura. Koziura had access to everything, practically in wartime, to a large amount of information. Fortunately, he did not have access to the internal security units of the SSU, to counterintelligence and to the president, as we can see from the fact that he was detained. And the facts we have just heard raise at least one key question: whom did he communicate with? How will he now explain who these contacts were and what kind of conversations he had with them? Why did he receive or attempt to receive cryptocurrency? This case is very important for all of us.
It is worth noting that the system's ability to respond depends on how agents, Russian agents, are exposed. We understand that they are still in power, and it is the authorities' task to check all those involved—everyone who had contacts with the Party of Regions in power, all the leaders of the Anti-Maidan movement or those who supported the Anti-Maidan, the dispersal of Maidan, for links to Russian special services and the FSB, and all those who have relatives in the leadership of Russian special services or connections with them. All these people—potential agents, suspects—if they hold high government positions, and we do have such people in power, must undergo the same rigorous vetting and scrutiny that was applied to Dmytro Koziura. We will now wait for the statements.
The head of the Security Service, Vasyl Maliuk, pointed out, and we can see in the video, that every step was monitored and controlled. His phone conversations, even when he was in the toilet room, wherever he was, and all of Koziura’s residences were under surveillance. It is crucial to present what other evidence of treason we have regarding the amount of information Colonel Koziura may have passed to the enemy. This is key now, and I hope he will not be exchanged, because the amount of information he holds is critical, and he must reveal everything he knows.
Here, we have found information about Oleksii Fedorovych Kuziura, the uncle of detained SSU Colonel Dmytro Koziura. He was born in 1954. He graduated from the Higher School of the USSR KGB (Committee of State Security) with a degree in international relations in 1980. He also graduated from the FSB Academy with a degree in public administration. From 1972 to 2024, he served in operational and managerial positions within the state security agencies. He is a retired colonel-general.
For example, I am not at all surprised that the head of the SSU personally took part in this operation. One might wonder why it wasn’t done earlier. I can only express my gratitude for this exposure. I would like to thank the leadership of the SSU and the unit that carried out this operation
Answers to questions
Who appointed Koziura to this position? Apparently, he was meant to be appointed Chief of Staff of the SSU ATC.
Yes, he was supposed to be appointed. At that time, Vasyl Serhiiovych Hrytsak was the head of the Security Service. Hrytsak also appointed General Valerii Shaitanov, who had participated in the operation against Maidan, to a position in one of the departments of the Security Service of Ukraine. The same goes for Sytenkov. It was Shaitanov who stands out in my memory, I wrote an article about him as the person who refused to give an order to the Alpha special forces to carry out combat operations against Colonel Igor Girkin's Russian FSB unit in Sloviansk in April 2014. I have written about this multiple times, and there are posts online. I wrote about Shaitanov and the Alpha command at the time, highlighting their refusal to eliminate terrorists in Sloviansk. I wrote back then about Shaitanov that this was simply unacceptable. Shaitanov was suspended, but not for long, and then returned as one of the heads of a department. And yes, it was Vasyl Hrytsak who did this. By the way, I have repeatedly written about Shaitanov in 2014-2015, pointing out that it was unacceptable to appoint people who were connected both to the crackdown on Maidan and to the failure to follow orders to fight the terrorists. Unfortunately, this practice persisted. Reputation seems to mean nothing in our government, and now we see that an FSB agent held such an important position for a long time during the war, and a large number of such FSB agents were appointed under the leadership of the SSU by Ivan Bakanov, right to the highest and most critical positions.
After the outbreak of war, a large number of high-ranking SSU officials appointed not only under Hrytsak but also under Bakanov were exposed.
On the frontline: are there any changes at the Khortytsia OSGT (Operational and Strategic Group of Troops) after Drapatyi's appointment?
I don't see any changes at the OSGT "Khortytsia" yet, and there are still questions about who controls what powers, what Mykhailo Drapatyi is responsible for, what Oleksandr Syrskyi is responsible for, what the commanders of the OTGs (operational-tactical groups) are responsible for, and what the commanders of the tactical groups are responsible for. This is a political issue that has not yet been determined. If it is not resolved in the near future, I will write about the fact that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief must finally clearly define the powers of all the leaders that the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief appoint to various positions. And I will tell you about the consequences, that there are cases of complete chaos and disorder in the management of setting tasks and their implementation. I hope that this warning, which I am also passing on there unofficially, will be enough to prevent the country's leadership from embarrassing itself once again and act to prevent scandals.
When does the SSU state that there is complete chaos in Ukraine, and when will the SSU start shaking up the Presidential Office?
We understand that Volodymyr Zelenskyy did not appoint the leadership of the SSU to shake up Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself. We understand that the responsibility for the previous government lies with the next one. Zelenskyy will not judge himself or his people, who, on his orders, engage in smuggling, money laundering, asset seizures from businesses, criminal schemes, pressure on courts, law enforcement, alleged or even obvious contacts with Russia. Of course, Zelenskyy will not allow these people to face any problems. Therefore, we need to understand that every government must be taught to punish at least the crimes of the past and be accountable for certain crimes in its sphere of responsibility, at least at the middle level or for senior officials, and at least in law enforcement agencies within the government.
I believe that as long as Zelenskyy remains in power, we will not hear any objective investigations or even comments about those he has brought into his inner circle, people connected to Russia — and almost all of them are in his entourage
Yurii, you're making fun of me now. Do you really think Tatarov will be investigated?
Well, I said not under this government.
Comment on Trump's statement about talks between the US and Russia with Putin.
Trump, who, like now many in our country, is a populist, is trying to lead the news trends. He is creating information waves to address the tasks he has set. At the moment, these information waves have no real connection to what is happening in Ukraine. Therefore, personally, I do not believe that this manner of speaking is conducive to a constructive negotiation process, but Trump believes it is. And since President Trump and the United States are our main allies, the main partners who are currently fulfilling all the commitments they have made, I emphasize, to support Ukraine, we can only be grateful to the US government and the people of the United States for their support. Everything else – let’s look at the concrete actions. We need to see what the US will actually do. There are a lot of words – in Ukrainian, American, and European politics, where many populist politicians are just trying to say something to get into the news for any reason. Of course, let's not focus on this, let’s follow the actions and initiatives that lead to a kinetic effect. Right now, I don’t see it.
The OPFL openly works in parliament together with the servants of the people, and nothing. Does the SSU not see them?
Well, you understand that the OPFL deputies, Boiko and all the others who traveled to Moscow for support, openly filmed and posed with the leadership of the Russian Federation – they are not there because the SSU would not like to bring them under suspicion. They all have the elements of a crime. They are simply partners of the authorities. The government that cooperated with the Party of Regions, as well as a large number of leaders now in the 'Servant of the People'. And, of course, they will continue this cooperation now. That’s why the OPFL is beneficial to them as a structure that votes strictly according to Bankova's instructions on all sensitive issues. And, for its part, the pro-Russian party always supports whatever the Presidential Office tells it to. And in return, it is allowed to exist and operate in peace. I think that if all these leaders and members of the OPFL had their phones checked and video cameras installed, even in the toilet, you could probably make several films about their communication with Moscow, maybe even longer than Koziura's. But the 'servants' won't betray them. It’s more convenient for them. They just do what they’re told. They work to avoid being jailed.
Can you imagine how convenient it is? You don’t have to pay bribes in envelopes like other deputies, you can just threaten them: if you don’t vote, we’ll come and arrest you tomorrow. It’s a convenient arrangement for the authorities.
Podoliak's brother served in the Russian army, and no one was bothered by that. How many more are there?
Mykhailo Podoliak has quite a strange history regarding how he appeared in Ukraine. What were his first articles? I’d like to remind you that he arrived in 2004, just before the elections, and his first articles were about the poisoning of Yushchenko. Of course, this wasn’t a coincidence. His connections to his brother, who was an officer in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces, definitely need to be investigated. I’m sure that if Mykhailo Podoliak were under the same kind of surveillance, there would be a lot of interesting facts to uncover. I emphasize once again, Podoliak is an adviser to the Office of the President. This is a typical case. It’s difficult to find anyone without ties to Russia. Finding such people is hard. And just look at all of them. Podoliak handled communications, and now Lytvyn is in charge, who also wrote for Russian magazines that he doesn’t really look down on Ukraine and the Ukrainian army, and he was fully integrated into the pro-Russian regional network.
Do you think Sodol is a Russian agent?
No, I don't think General Sodol is a Russian agent.I think this is a typical example for our army when a person with the mindset of a company commander or battalion commander rises very quickly through the ranks, and during this rapid ascent, they primarily learn that they need to follow orders very well, and that no longer, as a brigade commander for example, do they need to communicate with people or listen to subordinates, but simply be loyal and do exactly what they are told. And that is enough to hold a position and a chair. Unfortunately, this is a common issue when it comes to the promotion of leaders, because very often, when a person is formed as a commander dealing directly with people—when you’re a company commander or a battalion commander, you see your soldiers up close, and that’s where a person truly shows their best at such positions. Then comes another level of management, when you no longer see the people, don’t see their eyes, and you just manage structural units with assigned tasks. And not everyone can have such abstract thinking and such abilities. Unfortunately, very often in the army, despite this, a person builds a career because they are someone’s close acquaintance, very obedient, and does everything well. But we expect someone who can learn, who can improve themselves, and, unfortunately, it turns out that not always, when someone is appointed, they start learning. Sometimes they begin managing without realizing it, without self-reflection or feedback.
Tatarov kills Chechens in the Bankova bunker...
Well, yes, by the way, there are some interesting statements there, which we will comment on later. I’m amazed by the new revelations regarding the storming of Bankova Street, which happened and no one has heard about. It’s very interesting, but unfortunately, we don’t know
Naiev didn't go to the front?
As far as I know, Serhii Naiev has just arrived from the area of operations to the front today. And, as I understand it, he will soon take up the duties of a tactical group commander. We will see. I will write about this soon, and the area of the frontline there is very difficult, requiring decisions on withdrawal and shortening the front line. This is an important issue, so I will cover it separately. I want to make it clear right away, so there is no misunderstanding: I do not consider Naiev’s appointment to the tactical group as a punishment. In fact, it is a very responsible and important position. It is a sign of trust from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. And it doesn’t matter what rank the general holds; it’s clear that he was appointed after the interview. Only because of the interview. I will discuss and write about this separately. But the position is important, and any general, like any soldier, must carry out the decisions that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief makes during the war. A tactical group is not about defending a forest plantation. It’s work at the headquarters, field work, and at command posts. In my opinion, this is an honor for a military person, regardless of their rank.
How do they vet people for such positions? What is your opinion on the photo? Is it appropriate?
How are people vetted? As we can see, the vetting process is not very thorough, because we have a constantly changing government. The government introduces lustration, but then appoints people who should be lustrated. For instance, lustration has now been completely abolished, and, in fact, under the current government, the "Servants of the People" do not carry out lustration, still appointing anyone in violation of the law. Now, in 2025, the lustration law has expired. But before this, people had been illegally appointed for nearly 6 years in violation of the lustration law.
As for the photo, well, this reflects the position of the state leadership. I believe Vasyl Maliuk is confident that this is indeed a Russian agent, and the photo serves as a warning, signaling that the relative of an FSB colonel general can no longer hold such an important position and has been detained. It's a form of challenge, perhaps even an invitation to negotiate an exchange.
Why wasn't this rat imprisoned?
Well, maybe they will imprison him.
If officials have Russian relatives, and this is a known fact, how do they pass the vetting process?
They pass it like that. Yes, they were participants in the Anti-Maidan, and there are plenty of people in power who move around, have connections and business with Russia. So what? They continue to serve quietly, and no one does anything to them. Polygraph examiners are also just people, and different individuals can influence their tasks. But to set up an operation like this—with so many video cameras, inspections, and phone interceptions—you can imagine how many people had to be involved in such checks. In fact, I firmly believe that if someone served in Personnel Manager office for a long time before the war started, and over 10 years of hostilities never proved themselves in concrete cases, never took part in fighting Russian agents, such a person has no right to hold leadership positions. Ten years of war is the only real school, test, and academy for any branch of the Defense Forces. If a person has not held a command position during these 10 years, has no personal record of conducting operations to eliminate or detain Russian agents, for instance, in the SSU, has never participated in combat, has never been in the ATO, JFO, or on the front lines—such a person has no right to be appointed to any position within the Defense Forces. I believe the same applies to law enforcement agencies. This is categorically unacceptable. The fact that we even spend time on these so-called "checks" is nothing but an impious act What exactly qualified Koziura for such a high-ranking position? What did he contribute during the war? I have no knowledge of this, and I seriously doubt he did anything at all. Did he ever participate in any active operations?
What is Bakanov doing? When will he be held accountable for his crimes against the state?
Not under this government, obviously. Bakanov is too closely connected, he knows too much. I want to say that if Volodymyr Zelenskyy had done what the law requires, and Bakanov were behind bars now, along with those whom he submitted to the president for appointment decrees, it would have removed a lot of suspicions about the country's leadership itself and its ties to Russia. As Lee Kuan Yew once said: "Try imprisoning three friends." In this case, one friend—Ivan Bakanov—is a person directly connected to the FSB. Maybe they tell him he is delusional, irrational, or unaware of his actions. But if a delusional, irrational person appoints FSB agents —just as Bakanov appointed Kulinich, Naumov, and others—then that person should be placed in a specialized prison treatment facility if he is incapable of understanding his actions. I do not rule it out. Well then, subject Mr. Bakanov to a medical examination if someone believes that his inadequate behavior could exempt him from responsibility. There should be a court ruling that states Bakanov submitted recommendations for Kulinich and Naumov’s appointments to the SSU leadership while being in a fit of passion —he was in an unstable state lacked self-control, and was mentally incapable of assessing his actions. In that case, he should be legally exempt from serving a prison sentence—from the life sentence, at the very least, that he has earned. Instead, he should be subjected to compulsory treatment in a specialized institution for the entire duration. That would be an objective approach. But there is no trial, and Bakanov remains free. Kulinich is in Kyiv without him, while Naumov is in Serbia, where they deeply miss him. It is truly absurd that a man who appointed traitors is still freely walking around Kyiv.
Thank you for your important and interesting questions. We have been on air for an hour. I sincerely appreciate your support. And I am grateful for the opportunity I have thanks to the sponsors of the Butusov Plus channel—now almost 2,800 of you. Thank you all, friends, for supporting our work every month and enabling us to stay on the air. Thank you for being with us—Glory to Ukraine!
