Is any ceasefire noticeable on frontline?
The broadcast is entirely dedicated to answering pressing questions.
The main focus is the situation on the frontline. Is any ceasefire noticeable on the frontline or impact from any negotiations? Absolutely not. Combat operations are ongoing, and their intensity continues to grow, becoming increasingly dynamic. The enemy is actively engaged in fighting and applying pressure along the entire front, from Sumy to Kherson. Battles are raging everywhere; enemy forces are highly active and continue offensive operations on multiple sectors of the frontline.
So, what’s happening? The enemy is trying to completely drive our forces out of the Kursk region. We are holding on to two settlements in that area, around which active fighting is ongoing — the villages of Oleshnya and Gornal. These locations include key high ground and forested areas that allow control over the situation on this sector of the frontline. If the enemy succeeds in seizing full control and pushing our forces out of the Kursk region, the fighting will undoubtedly shift to the Sumy region. The enemy has already crossed into the Sumy region near the village of Basivka. However, the incursion is shallow, and there is currently no direct threat to the city of Sumy. Nothing of the sort is observed. Our troops are striking back and inflicting significant losses on the enemy in this area as well. The second direction is Kharkiv itself. Battle-ready Ukrainian forces are fighting near Kharkiv, and on many parts of the frontline there, our troops maintain tactical initiative. I’ve shared several videos on my channel dedicated to this, including a rather notable event. A Russian company commander surrendered to the soldiers of the 13th National Guard Brigade "Khartiia" near Kharkiv along with the remaining troops from his unit. That’s five soldiers in total. This clearly shows how difficult the situation is for the enemy in that area. The enemy is attempting to carry out offensive operations, continuing its advance toward Vovchansk and, more broadly, in several areas of the Kharkiv region. The Russians are trying to break through our Oskil frontline — the frontline along the Oskil River — and to capture Kupiansk and the settlement of Borova. The situation there is extremely difficult, with intense fighting ongoing. The enemy has crossed near Dvorichna and is increasing pressure on our grouping near Kupiansk. Russian forces also crossed to our side of the river near the village of Terny. Fierce battles are also taking place in the Lyman direction. The enemy is trying to seize commanding heights near the village of Novokaterynivka. The fighting is very intense, and for now, we have not been able to stop the enemy’s advance. However, our troops are putting in significant effort to break up the Russian strike group in that area.
The enemy is currently continuing to build up forces to capture the city of Siversk. They are concentrating their strength and conducting focused assaults to seize the high ground near the village of Bilohorivka in Luhansk region — in order to create a direct threat to Siversk and to take control of the key elevation that covers Siversk in the area of the village of Verkhnokamianske. Heavy fighting is also ongoing near the village of Spirne. The enemy is trying to launch concentrated attacks to seize our dominant heights and take Siversk. The situation there remains extremely difficult. The Russians are also attempting to fully capture the city of Chasiv Yar. Another enemy grouping is advancing toward Toretsk. Two Russian groupings are now creating a direct threat to the city of Kostiantynivka. The main objective for Russian forces in this area is clearly Kostiantynivka. It appears they are preparing to strike the city in the near future. Kostyantynivka is a key logistical hub located just ahead of one of the largest urban agglomerations and the most advantageous defensive line in Donbas — the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. This area holds critical operational importance for controlling Donbas. That is why the enemy is also pushing in this direction.
Heavy fighting continues near Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. The enemy is redeploying reserves to this area. However, our command, by concentrating combat-ready assault units and improving coordination and control of UAV units, holds tactical initiative across several sections of the frontline. The enemy is attempting to seize the initiative, but direct assaults on Pokrovsk are being repelled with heavy losses. Still, the enemy is trying to create a threat to the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area by maneuvering around from the south and attempting to advance toward the Dnipropetrovsk region, just south of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. This is why intense battles are now unfolding in the zone of the "Vuhledar" tactical group. The enemy is throwing everything it has into this offensive and is preparing a new large-scale assault in the coming days, aiming to capture the village of Bahatyr. Russian forces are attempting to seize full control of the Kostyantynopil–Rozlyv–Bahatyr area to push the offensive further into the Dnipropetrovsk region to reach the administrative border between Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions and move beyond. The fighting there is extremely intense, and the enemy’s command is preparing a large, concentrated assault in the immediate future. I hope that Ukraine’s command at all levels not only fully understands the threat in this direction but will also reinforce this area with timely deployment of real reserves — in order to strengthen our defensive lines, boost firepower and strike capabilities, and enhance UAV units. So that these offensives, which we clearly see coming, are crushed — and that any advance by the enemy is met with concentrated and devastating fire.
Thus, heavy fighting is taking place along the entire frontline. On the Zaporizhzhia front, the enemy is also trying to capture the entire village of Kamianske.
Politics and negotiations — none of that is visible on the frontline. There is no reduction in the intensity of combat. The fighting is extremely fierce. The enemy is increasing its use of reconnaissance drones, firepower, and precision weaponry. Holding the line and defending positions, unfortunately, comes at the cost of casualties among our soldiers. The Ukrainian army maintains high combat capability in each of the frontline areas, despite the lack of people, first of all, the lack of drones, which is very acute, unfortunately, the lack of artillery ammunition of various calibres, nevertheless, our soldiers inflict many, many times higher losses on the enemy.
Unfortunately, Ukraine’s leadership is once again completely neglecting the proper supply of the army. All commitments — the promised mass production of drones, procurement efforts — are not being fulfilled. All the statements made by our top officials, including the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defense, about supplying the army are simply not being carried out. The military is not receiving the necessary number of basic drones like Mavics. There is a severe shortage of drones of all types. FPV drone deliveries are happening, but still fall far short of actual needs. The quality of many of the drones provided by the state is often insufficient. In many cases, the drones delivered have to be modified in the field by the troops themselves, because a large share of them are unfit for immediate combat use. This is disgraceful. Recently, the General Staff held a special meeting led by General Lebedenko to discuss why the Ministry of Defense continues to supply the army with low-quality drones — drones that need to be repaired, upgraded, or retrofitted with additional components bought at the expense of the units themselves. It’s simply absurd. Why is the state making such ineffective, incompetent purchases? Why is this needed? Is this driven by corruption, bureaucratic failure, or sheer incompetence? The result is tens of billions being allocated — and yet the frontline is suffering from a critical shortage. First of all, it all starts with the lack of Mavics, and all other types of drones as well. So, please, help is needed, and help is needed from civil society and maximum involvement.
Answers to questions
One of the main issues that keeps coming up for me in recent months is the question of missing soldiers — and the situation of troops who remain at frontline positions for extended periods without rotation.
Regarding the missing in action. This is an extremely acute and painful issue across the entire frontline, and it clearly requires a systemic response. This matter cannot be resolved solely through media inquiries. To effectively monitor the status of service members, there must be a clear and binding directive in place. In my view, such an order must first and foremost be issued by the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.
At the moment, according to the database of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are over 50,000 individuals listed as missing. This is already a problem of such magnitude that it must be addressed at the state level. I believe the Supreme Commander-in-Chief must take responsibility and issue an order that regulates the procedure for urgent, immediate internal investigations and official reports. These reports must be open in nature and must clearly define the timeline — no later than one month after a soldier goes out of contact, their relatives must receive a clear notification explaining when, where, and under what circumstances the servicemember went missing while carrying out a combat mission, either individually or with their unit. The notification must include information on where exactly it happened, how it happened, whether drone footage exists confirming the location and conditions, what the current situation is at the last known position, and what the soldier’s last communications were. This is a very serious and important issue. If there are concerns that this might in any way compromise security, expose the covert nature of operations, or hand the enemy actionable information. Okay, then the information must be conveyed—if not in writing, then at least verbally—within roughly a month, and in any case no later than four to six weeks. It has to be delivered without fail. If the information is not provided within that timeframe, the reason for the delay must be stated clearly, together with a specific date and time when the relatives will receive it. It is categorically unacceptable for families to receive no information at all; there can be no justification for that. A soldier goes into combat, and there is a known point where they are supposed to be. A drone fly‑over of that point must be organized. If this is not done, what does that say? It is a matter of responsibility—and incompetence—on the part of the unit commander who fails to arrange proper control and documentation of the location where his troops went missing. This means that proper investigations must be carried out. In my opinion, commanders who fail to do this — it's not a crime per se, but it is official negligence. If a commander is unable, over the course of a month or two, to provide any information about what happened to his soldiers, where they went missing, and under what circumstances, that is unacceptable. And this issue is not being resolved. Why? Because the military and political leadership — the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief — despite repeatedly declaring that the lives of our soldiers are a top priority, those are just words. These words are not being backed up by concrete action. Volodymyr Zelenskyy is doing nothing to bring order to the situation with missing servicemembers. And that responsibility lies exclusively with him. He is the one who must assign a clear and direct task to the military command. Let me emphasize once again: Zelenskyy must establish a clear timeline for when information must be provided to families of missing servicemembers, stating where and under what circumstances they disappeared. If there are witnesses, their accounts must be recorded. If not, there must be mandatory geolocation data from the last known radio contact and drone video from the area. This is necessary to ensure that families clearly understand that the military leadership is, at the very least, concerned about the fate of their loved ones — that everything possible was done to determine what happened to them, to find them, and to reduce the number of missing servicemembers as much as possible. Right now, being listed as "missing in action" is, in many cases, simply a way for commanders to wash their hands of responsibility. That is absolutely unacceptable. I believe this is a matter for the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. When more than 50,000 citizens in the country are missing, then it is the top leadership that must be held accountable. I receive countless inquiries about missing servicemen from all sectors of the frontline — it is clearly a widespread problem. Judging by the number of appeals I personally receive as a journalist, this is without a doubt the number one issue. I don’t believe that providing families with a verbal or written update within a clearly defined timeframe would in any way hinder combat operations as long as it comes from a representative of the military unit and includes a full account of all known circumstances. That way, relatives can understand that everything possible was done to find their loved ones and determine their fate. I believe that if a particular unit has a large number of missing servicemembers, such cases must be subject to especially close oversight. And this is not solely the responsibility of the unit commander. I have received a significant number of appeals from families of soldiers who went missing while serving in assault units — in assault regiments and battalions — during combat operations. Clearly, the responsibility here lies not only with individual unit commanders, but also with the commanders of tactical groups, operational-tactical commands, and with the leadership of the Armed Forces — those who assign missions to assault units that effectively make evacuation impossible from the outset. So accountability should not rest solely with the commander of a specific unit, but also with the colonel or general who points at a map and orders an operation somewhere deep in the grey zone, where it is clear in advance that evacuation will not be possible. I’m not saying this is always a criminal act. I’m not saying it’s always incompetence. Sometimes, in war, there are situations where people knowingly take risks. And I want to emphasize — it’s not always under orders. Ukrainian soldiers often risk their lives for their comrades voluntarily, without any command. But we cannot allow a situation where the issue of missing servicemembers is pushed down onto unit, battalion, regiment, or brigade commanders and then no oversight is applied to how they report or handle such cases. And this reporting doesn’t happen simply because there is no order that defines how this communication with the families of the missing should be organized. This issue must be addressed. And this is President Zelenskyy’s responsibility. We will continue to remind him of this — because he is very good at speaking about how deeply he cares about the fate of our soldiers. But he is doing nothing within the powers he actually holds as Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He shouldn’t be acting with words — he should be acting with orders, directives, and decrees. He has entirely different tools at his disposal — and he’s simply not using them. We will push Zelenskyy to take responsibility for the lives of his subordinates — the lives of our troops — as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. That is his duty. And we will not allow him to shirk it or shift that responsibility onto others.
The issue of troops who are effectively encircled at certain positions or unable to withdraw is extremely urgent. It is directly tied to the problem of soldiers going missing in action. We have positions — and I receive reports from certain settlements — where our units are still holding out, continuing to fight, defend, and destroy the enemy. In many cases, these positions are heavily flanked; the enemy has already infiltrated deep into our rear in those areas and remains there, yet our soldiers continue to hold the line. There is no rotation happening in such positions. As a journalist, I cannot publicly name these specific positions. In modern warfare, the withdrawal of a unit is a separate combat operation in itself. And if I were to publish detailed information about where exactly this is happening, which unit is stationed in which settlement, it would only worsen the situation for those soldiers and would serve no constructive purpose. When certain units are fighting in partial encirclement and cannot be rotated out, it is very often due, first and foremost, to the enemy’s tight aerial surveillance with drones, the inability to reach them with vehicles, or to evacuate personnel. All of this has to be carefully planned. It depends heavily on weather conditions, on the responsibility of commanders, and on well-coordinated actions. Simply issuing a withdrawal order in open terrain can, unfortunately, have tragic consequences. That’s why every one of these cases — and I know many of you have contacted me, friends — must be handled personally, through direct consultation and communication with the soldiers themselves, or with their platoon or company commanders. Any outside interference in such situations can be extremely dangerous. So when wives or family members call and ask me to help pull soldiers out from a certain position, I simply can’t do that. Because in these circumstances, my intervention could end up putting those soldiers in even greater danger.
If you are aware of such cases, I need a direct contact and you need to be in communication with the unit commander, platoon leader, company commander, or at most the battalion commander. These are the people responsible for their soldiers. They are the ones who fully understand the situation on the ground, who know what’s happening, and who have the authority to issue an order to withdraw. It depends on them.
Why was an operation conducted in the Kursk region, but not in Transnistria, where potential losses would be lower?
This is a very valid question. In my view, an operation in Transnistria is urgently needed. I understand that there are certain political factors involved — formally, this is Moldovan territory; in reality, it is occupied by the Russian Federation. That raises serious questions about how combat operations can be conducted there. In my opinion, Ukraine should not conduct military operations against Moldovan territory, but actions against Russian military personnel and Russian military bases from which espionage against Ukraine is being conducted and from which threats to Ukrainian troops and national security are emanating must take place. Especially considering that the enemy is using a large number of drones against the Odesa region — drones without any identification marks. The same type of drones should not only be flying over Odesa and Bessarabia, but also over Transnistria, striking Russian occupiers stationed there, who are part of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The enemy must suffer losses on all fronts — wherever it threatens Ukraine. And Transnistria is one of those fronts. The fact that we are not eliminating Russian occupiers in Transnistria, in my view, is a major mistake by Ukraine’s leadership — and something that must be done.
What about rotation or demobilization for soldiers who have been on the frontline for a fourth year now?
The issue of rotation is entirely legitimate, any competent unit commander who has personnel that have been continuously fighting since 2022 — and I don’t mean since 2014, but specifically since the start of high-intensity warfare in 2022 — obviously tries to preserve those soldiers and they understand that in such conditions, physical and mental health deteriorate rapidly, especially for infantry. So yes, the issue of rotation must be addressed. Unit and battalion commanders should have much broader authority to send soldiers home on their own orders. And for those who have served three years on the frontline, there should be longer annual leaves for family reasons, mandatory additional leave for medical treatment and recovery in proper healthcare facilities. This too should be regulated at the level of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff. If they exist in practice, because at times it feels like the Minister of Defense only exists in press releases. When it comes to real responsibility for the defense of the country, he’s missing in action. Most real issues in the military bypass him completely and he simply doesn’t respond. He seems to be learning from Mr. Zelenskyy, who also prefers to record... upbeat video messages — but when it comes to difficult, systemic problems that can’t be solved instantly, he acts as if they don’t exist. And that’s exactly why we rely on public pressure — that’s why we hold these broadcasts: to push the country’s leadership toward decisions they would otherwise ignore.
Are corps operating on the frontline? How effective are they?
At the moment, army corps are still in the process of deployment. They have not yet begun active operations. Hopefully, the corps will be granted real authority and will begin functioning in May — that is, next month.
What is the benefit of conducting assaults in the Belgorod region while Russian forces are entering the Sumy region?
That’s a very important question. There is indeed a serious issue around how large-scale our actions in the Belgorod region should be. I want to note that at the initial stage — during the offensive operations in Belgorod — the first two weeks were, in fact, a successful and effective offensive. The enemy was caught off guard, and Russian forces suffered heavy losses — many times higher than those of Ukraine. This forced Russia to redirect a significant portion of its forces that had been concentrating for attacks on Ukrainian troops holding several settlements in the Kursk region. So at that moment, the operation was justified and effective. But again, this is similar to the raid in Kursk. The value of a high-quality raid lies in its surprise element. A raid, by definition, is meant to be sudden and hit a weak spot in the enemy’s defenses. Otherwise, it turns into a full-scale offensive — a drawn-out battle, a war of attrition. In my opinion, the Belgorod operation should not be allowed to shift into that kind of format. The successful Kursk raid was turned into a setback because troops were forced to fight unfavorable defensive battles in positions where we had no advantage. The same thing could happen in the Belgorod region. That’s why I hope a timely decision will be made. There is no point in holding on to yet another Russian village at any cost. Russia has a long border, many vulnerable areas, and an extended frontline. We can always find opportunities to strike Russian forces, inflict significant losses using small units, reduce our own losses, and divert the enemy. But that requires a clear understanding of timing. Military leadership must know when to stop indulging in fantasy. I understand that our government and the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief like to make bold statements — saying that we’re "trading one territory for another." But they’re ignoring tactics. They’re ignoring the balance of forces and capabilities. It’s just empty rhetoric. We must start drawing real lessons from the battles of 2022, 2023, from our failed offensive operations — like those in Krynky and elsewhere. Sometimes we need to stop. We need to understand that when a successful raid, a sabotage mission, or a surprise offensive turns into a battle of attrition, we have to ask: do we actually have the strength and resources to fight that battle? And we must know when to change course. Tactics must be chosen based on available resources — not on the desire to point at a map and pretend we’re winning. I believe that’s the situation we’re now facing in the Belgorod region — and it needs to be addressed.
Do you think Zaluzhnyi will be president?
You know, what surprises me more is that there are still people who fall for the political atmosphere in Kyiv — this pre-election propaganda being pushed by the President’s Office — and still believe that we’re heading for rushed elections. At this point, there’s absolutely no indication that any elections are on the horizon. What candidates? The only obvious thing is this: until we stop the enemy at the frontline, no political agreements of any kind are possible. Russia is doing everything it can to capture and destroy Ukraine — not just to reach the border of some region, or to take a single village or city. So what elections are we even talking about? Only people completely detached from the front and the war — sitting comfortably in Kyiv — keep thinking only about protecting their seats and expanding their corrupt schemes to become billionaires. Meanwhile, a brutal and terrifying war is raging, nothing is decided yet, and the enemy continues to do everything it can to destroy us.
As for the Drone Line project, are such steps to develop UAV units relevant? After all, despite having the Unmanned Systems Forces, we do not hear about large funding for this structure, even though it is a specialised one.
The "Drone Line" project was created with one purpose only — to allow Volodymyr Zelenskyy to take photos with a few drone unit commanders who are popular online, and to tell the public that he’s supposedly doing something to supply the front with drones. It’s just another publicity stunt by our government, yet another clumsy move. I fully support those drone unit commanders — they absolutely deserve funding. But we have around 150 effective drone units in the Armed Forces — strike drone companies, brigade-level battalions, separate battalions, regiments, and brigades. And yet the president is promoting the fact that he funded 5 out of 150. Sure, it’s better than wasting money on some corrupt scheme to buy nuclear reactors, or another shady renovation project, or just siphoning money abroad. But still — this is absurd. How is it possible? So instead of actually supplying the army with drones, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief picks five units, gives them the money — and then declares, "We’re building a drone line." Seriously? Does that even make sense? We have 1,200 kilometers of active frontline and 150 drone units. I’m not even talking about individual platoons or drone support for infantry. Just the 150 dedicated drone units. And funds are allocated to five of them — how should we perceive this? It’s complete nonsense. And why was the Unmanned Systems Force even created with such a PR? The Unmanned Systems Forces were created and a huge administrative structure was formed — two brigades, two regiments, independent units, a training center. And yet they’re not the ones receiving targeted funding from the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. That money goes to some other five units. And he calls that developing Ukraine’s drone capability? It’s absurd — completely absurd. Zelenskyy got his photo op with the Unmanned Systems Force, posed with Hero of Ukraine Sukharevskyi, got his PR hit — and that was it. For months afterward, pro-government bloggers kept pushing the line that Zelenskyy was "developing drones in Ukraine." Then comes the lack of any systemic development — the topic is no longer of interest. And what do they do? They don’t fix the existing system, they just launch a new project. In 2024, everyone was running around with the Unmanned Systems Force: "Look, we’re doing reforms now!" There were presentations, the president made announcements, held meetings. And in 2025? He’s no longer interested in the Unmanned Systems Force. He’s no longer meeting with Sukharevskyi — he is already meeting with the commanders of the drone line. It’s absurd. It’s just a clown show — a performance by Mr. Zelenskyy. No systemic solutions whatsoever. Every day, I get calls from commanders on various sections of the front — dozens of calls. And they’re saying: we don’t have Mavics, we don’t have FPVs, we don’t have FPVs to counter enemy drones, to shoot down Shaheds, to hit winged drones. No fiber-optic FPVs, no logistics or infrastructure to support them. These are massive problems. There’s 1,200 kilometers of active frontline, rear cities — all of this needs systematic supply and support. But no — it’s not interesting to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. He’s simply not interested. So, what can be done? I can only offer one piece of advice. You have to start building your own YouTube channel, become popular — and maybe then, the President’s Office will finally pay attention to you. That’s the absurd approach we have to planning. If you’re popular, maybe the government will throw something your way, so Zelenskyy can take a photo with you — and then you’ll get some funding. If there’s no photo, no money. You’re left to turn to volunteers. It’s absurd. And all the while, they keep shamelessly lying — saying they’re buying millions of drones and sending them somewhere. Meanwhile, lives are lost just because Mavics weren’t purchased, weren’t delivered, no sponsors were found. Nobody relies on the government anymore — because they’re simply not providing Mavics. Maybe a few, sure — ten drones for several brigades. That’s nothing. It’s meaningless. And sadly, this dishonesty from the government is one of the biggest problems on the frontline today — when they say they’re doing something, that they’re responsible for something, but in reality, they’re not. It’s all just words. They make a media appearance today, announce something for the headlines — and then time passes, and they lie about something new. Just to shift public attention, so people don’t remember there was already this popular project — the Unmanned Systems Forces. We’ve already seen it all: the PR, the meetings — and in the end, zero funding. Let me emphasize again — within the Unmanned Systems Forces there are two regiments and two brigades. That’s a massive amount of money. So why were they even created? This is a whole administrative structure. Dozens of battalions, engineering centers, an entire hierarchy was built. So why recruit people, build up this massive bureaucracy — finance officers, accountants, managers, commanders? For what purpose? If you don't give money and drones there, then why did you do it?Now the money that could have gone toward drones will instead be spent just on maintaining people — people who have no drones to work with. Because you decided to play around — you created two brigades, two regiments, some separate battalions, played your game — fine, people got their salaries. And now, in 2025, the president says, "We’re going to create new regiments, a new brigade, with a large staff." What is this? It’s absurd. You didn’t even finish what you started. This clown show from Zelenskyy — it’s like watching someone just play pretend. I don’t know who he thinks he’s playing with, but it’s madness. He seems completely unaware that behind his lies there is blood. Real people. State resources. And instead of finishing a single project, he keeps launching temporary ones — none of which ever reach completion. And as a result, we’re wasting billions that could have been used to kill the enemy, to destroy Russian forces. And let’s be clear — the money does exist.
Let’s take a look at the investigation by the Anti-Corruption Action Center — absolutely compelling. Between 2022 and 2024, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense spent 51 billion hryvnias on weapons procurement that never materialized. In other words, the money was simply stolen. Fifty-one billion. That’s $1.2 billion. Just so you understand — 51 billion is roughly the entire annual budget allocated for drone procurement by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Digital Transformation in 2024. In fact, it’s even slightly more. With that amount, we could have fully funded the entire Unmanned Systems Force, the National Guard — all the top 50 units most effective in eliminating the enemy. But that wasn’t done. The money was stolen. So where is the accountability? Where are the statements? There are none. No one cares. Where are law enforcement agencies? Where is even a single statement from the president? A billion dollars were simply handed over to fraudsters. And then they say, "We don’t have the money." So they won’t fund what they themselves created. They created specialized drone units in the National Guard — three of them, in fact. They created two brigades and two regiments in the Unmanned Systems Force. Separate drone units were established across all branches of the military — in Air Assault Command, in the Territorial Defense Forces, in the Ground Forces, and even naval drone brigades in the Navy. It’s all been built. Find your own funding. Today, the president is interested in taking photos with certain soldiers. And as for the rest of you — he’s simply not interested. I believe this destructive behavior by Zelenskyy, Umerov, Reznikov, and Yermak must be held accountable. Not just morally or historically — but criminally. That time will come, when this government is replaced. And I am absolutely convinced that those who play with public money, who toy with people’s lives, who treat war like their personal PR game — can never be forgiven.
When will people be drafted into the army starting at age 18? Won’t that be too late?
I don’t think we should draft people into the army at 18. The normal conscription age we had—20 years old—is absolutely sufficient. If conscription begins at 20, the draftee should first spend a full year in intensive training in rear areas—at brigade garrisons—so that, over that year, they become physically and psychologically ready for war. After that, these young soldiers can be employed in rear areas for air‑defence duties and the protection of strategic facilities. In other words, with at least one year of training, we can, within two years, have fully prepared soldiers who form a reliable, combat‑capable reserve for the active army. This would not be a short course where someone is sent to the front after just a few months. It would be a real, capable state reserve, needed in wartime not only for training but also for carrying out rear‑area combat tasks—allowing recruits to adapt gradually to the army, to war, to their missions, and to responsibility. That is a very important direction. But I absolutely don’t think it should start at 18. Twenty to twenty‑one is a sufficient conscription age
Where are the missiles Ukraine produces?
Ukraine does produce missiles, though, unfortunately, not in the quantities we would like. Several types are in production. Neptune cruise missiles are being built, but only in small batches—everything depends on state‑budget financing. We are also manufacturing missiles for the Stuhna and Korsar anti‑tank missile systems, along with a few other models. At the same time, there are glaring failures. Some state‑owned enterprises—and, above all, the Ministry of Strategic Industries headed by Mr Smetanin—are run by utterly irresponsible people who have torpedoed numerous weapons programmes. That ministry has become a black hole, swallowing vast resources while delivering minimal results. The root cause is the incompetence and lack of professionalism of Mr Smetanin and the team he and his predecessor, Kamyshyn installed there—people completely removed from defence planning and the defence industry, now wasting public funds through sheer ineptitude.
Why was the mobilisation order for Nasirov cancelled? A regular guy from Chernihiv could have taken the place of the special guys who have been stuck in the trenches for four years.
This is a very curious case. First, Nasirov was already on trial, yet he was mobilised as an ordinary soldier. Public outrage was understandable, but the fact remains: a lawful mobilisation order was issued, and Nasirov became a sapper in an engineer company. Had he been assigned to a purely rear‑area unit that never sees combat, the outrage would be easy to explain. In reality, however, the 101st Security Brigade of the General Staff is actively deployed: separate battalions from that brigade conduct direct combat operations. In fact, there have been striking videos showing the brigade’s 4th Battalion engaged in prolonged close‑quarters fighting with Russian troops in the city of Toretsk. Would motivated combat engineers be useful in those battles around Toretsk? Absolutely. That is why I am astonished that—after such public attention—the military command, instead of fulfilling its duty and sending a volunteer soldier to the front, simply demobilised him. In my view, this is corruption—plainly illegal. On what grounds? The Supreme Court delivered a judgment that even if mobilization is illegal, it does not mean that the decision to mobilize can be canceled. That is, another decision can be made after the mobilization decision. Decision on demobilization. But instead of sending that soldier into combat, the authorities simply discharged him—an absurd decision. Every day the media report dozens of cases in which people with serious health problems are mobilised—truly ill individuals whom the Territorial Center of Recruitment and Social Support somehow fail to screen out—and these people are still sent into service. There are dozens of such cases. Yet their mobilisation orders are never revoked. Never. It makes no sense: the state wastes money on soldiers who will never be declared fit and will never see combat because of genuine, severe illnesses. And yet, for Mr Nasirov, the order was cancelled. That is sheer absurdity. All the other people who point out legitimate medical exemptions are told their mobilisation orders stand—while one single private, out of the entire Armed Forces, has his order publicly annulled. And then the authorities complain that they lack manpower to carry out combat missions at the front. So if such a precedent exists, what does it tell us? That everything here can be handled in manual mode. This raises the question: just how seriously does the military command take mobilisation? How many people, quietly and without publicity, have had their mobilisation orders cancelled the same way? By the way, we’ll send a request to the Ministry of Defence — it’s very interesting to know what the statistics are. A large number of people are being mobilised and told: "No, no, no — under no circumstances will your mobilisation order be cancelled," while others are told: "Okay, you’re exempt." That is a very important question, and in the next few days—literally tomorrow—we will send a formal request to the Ministry of Defence. It is crucial to find out what the military leadership thinks it can get away with.
A 159th Brigade is being formed, even though you said the creation of new brigades had been cancelled. And what about the 160‑series brigades?
Andrii, you’ve surprised me. As far as I know, there was an order to disband the 159th Brigade. I’ll check that information and report back. Any decision to form a 159th Brigade directly contradicts the resolution adopted by the Staff of the Supreme Commander‑in‑Chief in January after the 155th‑Brigade scandal, so we will definitely respond to this.
Is it true they want to reassign Sukharevskyi to Corps command?
I’ve heard that information, and I’m sure such plans exist. This media wave looks like another test run from the President’s Office—floating its ideas to gauge public opinion. Sukharevskyi himself is aware of it, which is why the news sparked a sharp reaction among many service members. And yeah, from what I know — those plans probably do exist. But let me tell you straight: the plan to remove him? That one’s real. But as for where he might be reassigned — a gamble and a guess. There’s no concrete position on the table. To my knowledge, no one has spoken with Vadym Sukharevskyi about dismissing him and assigning him elsewhere. So this is really just an information wave — a way to test how the public would react in principle to Sukharevskyi’s dismissal. What they’ll do with him next? That’s completely up in the air. A lot of well-known, influential, and competent brigade commanders in our army get quietly removed without any publicity. They’re shoved into some reserve battalion — and then nothing. Their future often isn’t decided at all. Everyone assumes they’ll be reassigned somewhere, but in reality, they’re not assigned anywhere. And then they end up looking for some secondary administrative job just to stay in the army, waiting for better times. This looks like exactly the same kind of story.
Denys Merzlikin, the new brigade commander of the 157th Brigade. What is your opinion on his competence?
I don’t personally know Denys Merzlikin. Since 2015, when he served as a battalion commander and was wounded, he commanded a battalion of the 93rd Brigade. Later, he was appointed commander of the 32nd Mechanized Brigade when it had just been formed. As for now? We'll see. In current conditions, a brigade commander plays a different role compared to early 2022. Back then, at the start of the war, brigade commanders had significant responsibilities. It was possible to clearly see and evaluate their command and leadership qualities because brigade commanders were effectively independent figures, empowered to make numerous tactical and even operational decisions on their own. Unfortunately, the current senior leadership, such as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s Headquarters and the General Staff, punishes any initiative or independence shown by commanders. They remove them from their posts and push them out of any command positions. So now, what happens with Merzlikin will depend on the kind of tasks he’s given, and how willing he is to compromise with his conscience if those tasks don’t correspond to the real situation on the ground or the actual capabilities of the troops under his command. This commander has experience. Denys Merzlikin does have critical thinking. He’s already somewhat battered by the service, having been removed from his post for reasons that remain completely unclear. I hope Merzlikin understands that in our army today, a commander’s rank or position means very little. Commanders are constantly shuffled around, dismissed. In many brigades, brigade commanders have been replaced six or seven times already. It’s a very fine line. I hope that as the 57th Brigade becomes part of the new army corps, it will be under a competent corps commander — someone who gives reasonable orders and takes responsibility, instead of just pointing fingers and shifting the burden onto brigade, battalion, or company commanders. If that’s how it turns out, I think the Corps will end up with an effective team, and Merzlykin could absolutely be a capable part of that command. We’ll see. There are a lot of factors at play — it all depends on the commander, on the pressure they’re under, and what’s being demanded of them. We’ll be keeping a close eye on the fate of the 57th Brigade. And I want to say — the 57th Brigade is fighting heroically in Vovchansk. They’ve shown strong combat performance. Thanks to their actions, Vovchansk has been held, and a large number of Russian units have been destroyed there, with the enemy suffering massive losses.
Thank you all for the broadcast, thank you for being with us, thank you for your support to all the sponsors of Butusov Plus. With faith in victory and glory to Ukraine!
Yurii Butusov, Censor. NET
