Chaos and corruption in ammunition procurement: why it happens and what it leads to
Censor.NET Editor-in-Chief Yurii Butusov shares his views live on air about the problems with ammunition procurement for Ukraine’s Armed Forces, analyzes the frontline situation, and comments on the terms of Trump’s peace plan.
The first deputy minister of defense, Ivan Havryliuk, responsible for weapons and ammunition procurement, has been dismissed. At the same time, there are serious problems on the front line. Another high-profile development is the appointment of a new head of the Sumy Military-Civil Administration: Oleh Hryhorov — a man directly linked to Russian senator Andrii Derkach. Numerous accusations have been made against him in Sumy, as well as in Luhansk region, where he allegedly abandoned his subordinates — with specific claims publicly voiced in the media.
Despite this, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has gone ahead with appointing yet another questionable figure. It’s clear that such appointments are simply brought to him for signature. Zelenskyy, seemingly a hostage to Yermak and Tatarov, is now forced to sign off on whatever is put before him — likely without even checking who it is. Let’s begin with the situation on the front line.
The situation in the Kursk-Sumy region
Ukrainian troops are currently maintaining control over two footholds — effectively small buffer zones — along the border in Russia’s Kursk region. These positions are located near the settlements of Guevo, Gornal, and Oleshnyа. At the same time, we see that the so-called "grey zone" now extends not only along the Russian border, but also into Ukrainian territory. The enemy has also seized a small salient pointing toward the Russian Federation. In other words, active combat is taking place on the territory of the Sumy region as well. The enemy continues to claim that Ukrainian forces have been pushed out, but in the areas of Oleshnyа, Guevo, and Gornal, our troops are engaged in extremely intense fighting and are inflicting massive losses on Russian occupiers. The enemy is launching continuous assaults, but their casualties are enormous.
Today, I would like to highlight the exceptional operations being carried out by the 82nd Air Assault Brigade near the settlement of Gornal. The way they effectively routed both the assault units of Russia’s 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and the 30th Motor Rifle Regiment along with the headquarters of that regiment deserves the highest respect. These are truly outstanding battlefield achievements.
Situation in the area of Kupiansk
The enemy continues to advance, expanding its bridgehead across the river in the area of Dvorichna, attempting to encircle our forces and push toward Kupiansk both from the north and by expanding from the south. Heavy fighting is ongoing, but there is no rapid progress. The situation here remains extremely difficult. Judging by the current frontline configuration, the situation around Kupiansk, unfortunately, continues to deteriorate. If the northern advance is not stopped, holding Kupiansk will become extremely difficult.
I also want to note that our side has serious tactical advantages. The enemy is forced to cross the river and carry out assaults without heavy equipment. However, we’re also facing problems. Russian forces that we’ve not yet been able to push back are continuing their advance, and a serious threat is building from the north against Kupiansk.
Offensive in the area of Terny-Yampolivka
The enemy has now shifted its main efforts across the river. They are advancing with the goal of capturing the villages of Nove and Katerynivka. Katerynivka is practically under enemy control.
Nove is a key high ground that allows control over the approaches and lines of communication across nearly the entire Oskil front. The situation here is extremely tense. The enemy appears to be advancing without heavy equipment—just infantry, supported by dense artillery and drone coverage. Despite this, they have not yet been reliably stopped or destroyed. Our forces are doing everything they can to rout the enemy in this area. If this direction is not held, it could lead to the collapse of the entire Oskil front in the coming months. That said, the situation is not hopeless—our soldiers are doing everything possible to stop and defeat the Russian strike group in the Katerynivka–Nove area on the Lyman direction.
Situation in the area of Siversk
The enemy continues to throw everything it has into assaults on the Siversk salient. They’re launching frontal attacks and also trying to break through the seams near the village of Bilohorivka, which they still haven’t managed to capture. They’re pushing from the south as well, toward the village of Spirne. For two and a half years now, attacks on these positions near Siversk have been nonstop. Still, the dominant ridge of high ground that allows us to defend Siversk effectively remains firmly held by Ukrainian forces. What the soldiers of the 81st Air Assault Brigade, the 54th Mechanized, the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, and the 4th National Guard Brigade "Rubizh" are doing here is just an extraordinary feat and a display of exceptional professionalism. Not a week goes by without heavy assaults and multiple infantry attacks. And yet, all of them are repelled—enemy losses here are staggering.
But the situation in Siversk is very difficult. Because our lines are stable there, we don't get as many replenishments there, because some of the leaders apparently have the impression that if they hold the lines for 2.5 years, they can hold them indefinitely. And there is a need for reinforcement with people and ammunition, a very serious reinforcement. Because this is a favourable position and our troops are able to grind any number of enemies here. But nevertheless, we also have losses. If these losses are not restored, it will be impossible to hold such a fundamentally important area. And it is important to hold it. Siversk is a very important hub, a very important logistics hub and a dominant hub. It is the dominant ridge of heights that covers the entire Liman front and the approaches to Sloviansk.
Situation in Chasiv Yar
The enemy continues to launch attacks, suffering heavy losses, minor assaults are still ongoing. Enemy assaults have been temporarily halted in recent days due to heavy casualties, but a renewed advance is imminent. Enemy attacks here remain continuous. Elite Russian units, including airborne assault troops, are being ground down here. Despite this, the situation remains extremely difficult. Our soldiers are fighting for every building under dire conditions, and reinforcements are urgently needed. Chasiv Yar serves as a defensive buffer for the approaches to Kostiantynivka. This is why, even after the loss of most reinforced structures in the city, our troops continue to hold out, defending each building to the last possible moment. Fighting remains fierce, and the enemy is making gains, but each advance comes at a staggering cost. And yet, the assaults do not stop.
The situation in Toretsk
The enemy is making every effort and deploying all available reserves to fully seize the Toretsk area. Intense fighting is ongoing within the city. Ukrainian forces are demonstrating extraordinary resilience and dedication. It is important to highlight the heroic efforts of all our combat-ready units. It is important to acknowledge the heroic combat efforts of all our combat-capable units. Engaged in the fighting are special forces, special operations units, and the Ukrainian police. Units of the Armed Forces are engaged in the fighting, including units of the 101st Security Brigade of the General Staff, which have proven themselves as highly effective infantry. The 100th Mechanized Brigade is also engaged in heavy fighting near Toretsk and the town of New York. Additionally, the 12th Azov Brigade of the National Guard is actively involved in combat operations.
The enemy is suffering massive losses, and their advance here is minimal. Nevertheless, they continue to deploy reserves in an effort to fully capture Toretsk — a city they have falsely claimed to have taken 10 or 15 times already; it's hard to keep count. Ukrainian forces remain in Toretsk. They are holding the line and fighting for every building. As in other directions, the enemy is failing to achieve its objectives.
The situation in Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad
The enemy is actively attempting to advance in this direction. However, their attacks in this area are being repelled. Just two days ago, there was an exceptionally large assault — it took place east of Pokrovsk, targeting positions held by the 117th Heavy Mechanized Brigade and the 14th Brigade of the National Guard. It was a massive offensive, and the enemy was decisively crushed.
For the first time, 96 motorcycles were used in this assault. The Russians mounted an entire company or rather, even more than a company, as some of the motorcycles carried two soldiers each. At least a company and a half of motorcyclists attempted a breakthrough using bikes. All of them, along with armored vehicles, were destroyed. Russian forces suffered heavy losses. The Commander of the National Guard released a video — the results are truly impressive.
As for Pokrovsk itself, here’s what’s important to note: the perimeter remains virtually unchanged. The enemy has been unable to advance. They are attempting to move south of Pokrovsk, but right near the city, the frontline hasn’t shifted at all since early February. The only movement is toward the enemy. Our troops have carried out a series of counterattacks. The Russian command has been unable to dislodge our forces or make any progress near Pokrovsk for almost three months now. This is thanks to the heroic efforts of Ukrainian soldiers, the unmanned systems command operating in the area, and all the drone units involved — they are exceptional. And here, not only has the enemy’s advance been halted — and that’s important — but our forces are consistently inflicting losses, destroying all reinforcements, and not only holding the line, but also carrying out effective counterattacks. This is a powerful example that leadership at all levels should pay close attention to. It’s a matter of the quality of command and control.
But the enemy is still trying to push southward, well below Pokrovsk, in an attempt to break into the Dnipropetrovsk region and achieve a deeper envelopment.
In the area around Bahatyr, Rozlyv, and Konstantynopil, the enemy continues relentless assaults, attempting to advance further. However, they have been unable to fully capture this zone — Dniproenerhiia, Rozlyv, and Bahatyr. Heavy fighting is ongoing, and Russian forces are suffering significant losses. The enemy has made no meaningful progress here. At times, they manage to gain a couple hundred meters — no more. But the scale of their losses prevents them from pushing forward or continuing full-scale assaults.
Mala Tokmachka
A recent large-scale assault by Russian forces involved motorcyclists, armored vehicles, and long columns advancing across open terrain in an attempt to capture Mala Tokmachka. The attack did not lead to any changes on the ground. The enemy is trying to advance, but they failed to take the village. Eight Russian motorcyclists managed to reach Mala Tokmachka — and were quickly eliminated. As a result, the entire assault was repelled, and the enemy forces were destroyed, despite the scale of their attempted breakthrough.
That said, the situation in this area remains extremely difficult. The enemy is slightly reinforcing its troops on the Zaporizhzhia direction. Here is also a critical need to strengthen our own forces with personnel and ammunition. Russian losses are significantly higher, but we are also suffering casualties.
Kamianske
Heavy fighting is ongoing in this area as well. The enemy is trying to fully capture the settlement and is suffering significant losses. Russian forces are using drones to effectively block the battlefield. Nevertheless, our soldiers continue to heroically repel these attacks, hold their positions, and defend the Zaporizhzhia direction, preventing the enemy from advancing.
So overall, across all directions, I wouldn’t call the situation stable. The reality is that the enemy is unable to make any deep advances anywhere. Whatever progress they claim—creeping forward, declaring the capture of towns or units—most of it simply isn’t true. In most cases, it doesn’t happen. What is happening is that the enemy is taking massive losses, and our forces are not retreating. This is all a testament to heroism, to skill, to the quality of our command and control. I’m not saying it’s perfect everywhere, but in those areas where the enemy is failing to break through, our organization and coordination are clearly superior. And of course, our soldiers there are putting in significantly more effort than the enemy.
Heavy fighting continues across the entire frontline — high-intensity combat is ongoing. The need for sustained support, drone supplies, ammunition, and the quality replenishment of trained personnel remains a critical issue everywhere. Nevertheless, the situation demonstrates that our soldiers are capable of stopping the enemy and smashing assault formations. And if our successful combat experience were properly analyzed and lessons were learned, we could reliably stabilize the front across its entire length and we are fully capable of defeating all Russian assault groupings. And that is precisely what drives political shifts and strengthens our position for future negotiations.
QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE
Your thoughts on the 1st Consolidated Rifle Battalion of the Air Force, attached to the 225th Separate Assault Regiment?
Yes, I’m aware of the situation. They’re engaged in heavy fighting — Air Force servicemen attached to the assault regiment, operating near the border between Sumy region and Russia’s Belgorod region. Unfortunately, the situation is extremely difficult, because personnel were assigned to this Air Force battalion with records indicating they had completed training. In reality, no proper infantry training was conducted — the training periods were minimal. The core issue is that these soldiers were not systematically prepared for close-quarters combat, combat actions, to fight as infantry under challenging conditions. They were neither trained to fight independently nor as part of small units, yet they were thrown into extremely difficult missions — including across the border into Russia’s Belgorod region. This is, unfortunately, a failure on the part of Ukraine’s military leadership, which, even in 2025 — the fourth year of the full-scale war — continues to send unprepared personnel into infantry roles simply because their records state they’ve served a few months in the military. In some cases, even two years but without receiving proper combat training. People need to be assessed based on their actual skills and knowledge. But no one is doing that — as long as there’s a piece of paper, that’s it, off you go. This leads to losses, to some problems, to difficult questions from families, and to a drop in morale. Why? Because the soldiers of the 1st Consolidated Battalion are good, capable people and they’re fighting heroically. They’re doing everything they can to carry out combat orders and inflict losses on the enemy. But the lack of adequate training prevents them from fully realizing their potential. And that leads to unnecessary losses — losses that could absolutely have been avoided. If the personnel who had served in the Air Force for an extended period had been sent to the training grounds of that same 225th Assault Regiment three months in advance — and undergone several months of solid combat training, unit-level coordination, and tactical drills — it would have been a completely different story. If they had fired all types of weapons, practiced maneuvers, worked out team interactions, the outcome would have been entirely different. Why isn’t that being done? Why such a formal, checkbox approach to human lives? This again falls squarely on the leadership of the Armed Forces, which continues to neglect proper combat training for infantry. The Office of the Commander-in-Chief pays no attention to these concerns, as if the only ones deserving answers are journalists. Where is the Commander-in-Chief with his evening videos? Where is Defense Minister Umerov — does he even exist? There are no answers.
How long will it take Europe to assume full responsibility for aid to Ukraine?
Europe will not be able to fully take over all support for Ukraine. To what extent Europe can actually assist us — we don’t know. In reality, it’s the actual decisions that matter, not promises. If Europe is to fund our army, then one of the core issues — for example, drone production — comes down to a lack of funding. As I’ve said repeatedly in interviews: if Europe allocates even 5 billion euros or dollars directly to our units involved in drone production and deployment, to our military formations, then Ukrainian UAV operators and combat units will be able to stop and destroy the Russian offensive without any involvement from the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff. By their own efforts — and no one would be able to stop them. Unfortunately, such funding is not reaching Ukrainian forces, and so far we haven’t seen any steps from Europe that could fully offset, for example, the pause in U.S. supplies. In reality, if Europe truly wanted peace, the only way to achieve it would be to stop the Russian army — and that requires funding. If the Russian army were stopped for six months, believe me, negotiations would become much more active. If Russian losses reached around 40,000 killed per month, confirmed on video, the Russian military in Ukraine would simply cease to exist. They would be unable to carry out any further attacks. This is all a matter of calculation.
For now, Europe is not able to provide us with the necessary resources. And unfortunately, Ukraine itself is still not in a position to plan the production of weapons and ammunition on the scale required.
Do you think Putin will go to extremes if the game isn’t being played by his rules?
Friends, Putin is already doing everything possible — throwing in every resource he can — just to try to seize Ukraine and destroy it.
How do you see the war ending?
The end of the war means halting the Russian offensive at the front. A stable frontline — where 40,000 Russian troops are eliminated every month — that is stability. Forty thousand Russian bodies on video. Forty thousand confirmed kills. And trust me, under those conditions, Russia will be incapable of making any advance. From what I’ve seen in combat footage, we’ve reached a maximum of about 20,000 eliminated in a month. If we push that number to 40, the Russian offensive will grind to a halt. Russia simply doesn’t have the capacity to mobilize more than 30,000–35,000 troops a month — that’s their current ceiling. And if we’re eliminating more than that, the Russian army will be depleted. At that point, they’ll go passive. They won’t be able to do anything. That way, the front will be stabilized, and effective negotiations will become possible.
The more we eliminate the enemy, the more the world sees that Putin is incapable of advancing even a single step — the better our position at the negotiating table. The key to negotiations is a stable frontline. Where that line will be — no one knows.
Do you think China will send its military to the war in Ukraine?
No, I don't think so.
Yurii, how would you assess the work of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs in this context?
We don’t really have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) — we have the President’s Office, and everything is run by Andriy Yermak. The MFA is just an administrative office under Yermak. It has no agency of its own, just like the Verkhovna Rada in this regard.
Will you raise the issue of the fighting in Belgorod, specifically the 225th Assault Regiment?
There is very heavy fighting taking place in the Belgorod region. Both the 225th Assault Regiment and the 1st Consolidated Air Force Battalion have suffered losses — as has the enemy, whose casualties are also significant. In my view, after the initial breakthrough and the achievement of tactical surprise, the enemy was dealt heavy losses in this direction. They’ve since brought in reinforcements and have now established a stable front line. They’re trying to use a large volume of ammunition to gain fire superiority and push us off the foothold we’ve established on the Belgorod side. I believe this operation — originally planned as a raid — has already fulfilled its objectives. And if a decision were made to withdraw now, I wouldn’t be surprised. I would consider it a reasonable and logical step. I just hope we don’t repeat the experience of Krynky 2.0 — where we stubbornly hold a small bridgehead with severely limited lines of communication.
Which branch of the military do you consider the most important after the infantry?
Well, in modern warfare, beyond infantry, the key element is unquestionably strike capability. And that comes down to a combined system — drones plus artillery. Neither works effectively on its own anymore: drones don’t operate effectively on their own, and artillery isn’t as effective without drone coordination. That’s why the combination of drones and artillery is now absolutely crucial.
Trump's peace plan
Bloomberg has reported on Donald Trump’s proposed peace plan. According to the agency, the U.S. has put forward a draft agreement to end Russia’s war against Ukraine. Trump’s advisor, Steve Witkoff, also outlined his vision for a peace deal. Unofficial information cited by Bloomberg mentions a ceasefire and the freezing of the front line at current positions. The core of Trump’s idea appears to be simple: a ceasefire order is issued, and from a certain date, everyone stops, no one shoots. However, Trump is clearly no longer as optimistic as before. Just yesterday, he said that he had done everything possible, and that there’s a limit to how long these proposals can keep being made — clearly, they can’t be offered indefinitely if the other side refuses to respond. While Trump continues to make public statements, from the very first day of his term, Putin has shown no interest in engaging in talks or a ceasefire. On the contrary, Russia continues its offensive and interprets Trump’s comments as a sign of weakness from NATO, as an opportunity to split the alliance, isolate the U.S. from Europe, and fracture Western support for Ukraine. That’s why Russia is using Trump’s words purely for realizing its own political strategy — nothing more. There are no negotiations, no signals from Putin indicating readiness for peace. So Trump’s unilateral statements — in which he praises Putin while criticizing Europe and Ukraine — do nothing to strengthen America’s position in the negotiation process. They simply don’t work.
This is realpolitik, I’ve said it many times on air — I don’t see any preconditions for a ceasefire, and I don’t see any pragmatism in the current U.S. position. What we’re seeing now is exactly what I was saying two months ago — an effort to justify the situation. Trump is no longer as optimistic about achieving a peace deal. He’s now saying, "Well, I made an offer." But what did he actually propose? It’s the obvious: "Let’s freeze the front line, let’s agree to a ceasefire." And then what? How exactly do we freeze the front? What peace deal are we talking about? Along which line does the ceasefire hold? Both sides have drawn their own versions of the front line — and they don’t match. For example, the Russians have already declared they’ve captured Toretsk. In reality, Ukrainian forces are still fighting there. The Russians claim to have seized numerous settlements but in fact, those places remain entirely under Ukrainian control.
How, in practice, do you establish and maintain a ceasefire? How is firing actually halted, and who oversees it? What mechanism is in place to monitor that no shots are fired? Who tracks drone flights and logs such violations? There isn’t a single word about any of that. And I’m not even talking about the empty talk of ‘security guarantees’ or ‘peacekeeping missions’ — that’s long‑term prospects that have nothing to do with the practical issues that must be resolved immediately when you’re talking about a truce or ceasefire. None of it exists.
That’s why Trump’s so-called peace plan is nothing more than a set of generic talking points — and none of it is backed by Putin. He hasn’t responded to it in any way, and clearly has no intention of doing so. Meanwhile, the war goes on. That is the only reality that exists right now. And at this point, it’s obvious: if we want this war to end — if we want to win — the Ukrainian leadership must first and foremost focus on strengthening the military, on stopping Russian assault groups, stabilizing the front, and eliminating as many Russian occupiers as possible. Is that happening? Unfortunately, no.
QUESTIONS FROM THE AUDIENCE
Some experts believe that Russia could collapse Ukraine’s defense industry by launching massive missile strikes on energy infrastructure powering our military-industrial complex. Is this a realistic scenario or just an information operation?
Absolutely, if the energy system is destroyed, everyone will be affected, including industry. But the ones who will suffer most from the destruction of the power sector are ordinary civilians, because without electricity, critical infrastructure — indeed, the very lifeline of cities, metropolitan areas, and towns — would collapse. That’s the real problem. Water supply, sewage systems, power grids, life-support systems — all of it would fail. The country would be forced into survival mode. Yes, it would have some impact on industry, but much of the defense sector is already equipped with autonomous power sources. By the fourth year of war, any industrial operation that has customers and revenue is already thinking about backup systems — about how to survive in blackout conditions. That’s why I’m confident the industry won’t disappear or grind to a halt. The impact on our defense capability would be limited. But this would amount to the continuation of genocide against the Ukrainian people. And the consequences for civilians — for all Ukrainians — would be devastating.
How do you see the future of regional signals intelligence (SIGINT) centers within the corps-level command structure?
I believe that each corps should have its own electronic signals intelligence units, given that our system is very hierarchical and status-driven, and considering the sheer number of SIGINT units we have — everyone will want to pull in their own direction. As a result, the issue will likely be handled on a case-by-case basis. Each corps is planning to create its own SIGINT command elements. As for the regional SIGINT structures, I think they’ll be preserved — they’re under central command, after all. However, coordination will increasingly flow through the corps structure, and I expect SIGINT elements at the corps level to be reinforced and expanded. Some personnel might transfer over, but the regional centers will remain in place. Structurally, no one’s planning any major changes or cutbacks — so that’s how things stand for now.
How can the ceasefire be enforced, and is it even possible in the current situation?
A ceasefire in the current situation could only come as a political decision. And when would such a decision be made by Russia’s leadership? Only when they no longer have the resources to continue the war. They still have the money — what they’re running short on is people. That’s why I’ve said — and not just recently, but for years now — that the only thing that could force a ceasefire is the confirmed elimination of 40,000 Russian troops per month, clearly documented on video. Real losses. Killed or wounded — visibly confirmed. That means the enemy would be suffering even greater losses, including a significant number who wouldn't appear on camera: those killed in shelters, forests, or out of sight. But if we could document at least 40,000 enemy combatants neutralized each month, that would break the momentum of Russia’s offensive and Putin would no longer be able to sustain the war. That’s the only way to compel Putin to negotiate and abide by a ceasefire — by depriving him of the means to keep attacking. This means destroying "biomass" that Putin keeps throwing into battle. When these meat grinder offensives end only in losses, without territorial gains, that’s when Putin will seek peace. That’s when he’ll say: "I can’t push forward anymore. I can’t take this. I’m ready to negotiate." And only then will an order be given — and followed — to halt the fighting. He might issue the order and it will be followed. But with the current state of the front and the use of precision weapons, this isn’t a ‘one-two-stop’ kind of situation. You can’t just bring it all to a halt instantly.
That’s why we need to be realistic. A ceasefire requires political will and right now, the Kremlin doesn’t have it, because Putin is listening to Trump, he sees that support for Ukraine is shaky, he sees that Ukraine’s leadership is uncertain and lacks a clear strategy. They’re struggling to gather the resources needed to stabilize the front and overhaul the command structure. So Putin thinks: "I’ll just keep going — they’ll collapse soon enough." That has to change. Trump needs to move beyond empty words and clearly define his position. Europe, if it truly supports Ukraine, needs to show its hand — present a defense budget and the weapons it’s ready to supply for the year ahead. And Ukraine’s leadership must stop the corruption, the chaos, the mismanagement of public funds — and redirect as many resources as possible toward key defense programs. Only then will things change. That’s the only way to convince Putin that a ceasefire is necessary, that peace is in his interest. There’s no other way.
War can only be won if it is made impossible not just for us, but for the enemy as well. When the cost of war becomes significantly higher for Russia than the cost of peace. They’ve got money, they’ve got oil, they’ve got gas. But the one thing they’re running out of — the one resource they use to break through the front — is cannon fodder that they keep throwing into assaults. If we stop their infantry from advancing — that’s it. That becomes the foundation for peace. It’s exactly what happened during the Korean War in 1953.
Procurement of ammunition and weapons
On April 18, First Deputy Defense Minister Ivan Havryliuk was dismissed from his post. Ivan Havryliuk is a well-known military officer — and quite possibly the only person who truly understood the needs of the Armed Forces. He wasn’t interested in just slicing up the budget; he actually tried to plan, to formulate concrete tasks for manufacturers so that the requirements of the General Staff could be aligned with the capabilities of Ukraine’s defense industry, procurement, and the financial resources of the Ministry of Defense. In other words, he worked on solving complex tasks. Unfortunately, he’s now been removed. In his place, they’ve appointed someone who previously handled international affairs — and that’s it. This person has no background in planning, organization, or ammunition supply. Just an outsider. What I’m trying to say is this: the core of our decision-making — the reason behind the constant personnel reshuffling, the chaos, and the ongoing shortage of ammunition and drones.
Let’s look at the root of the problem — money. Let’s talk numbers: what kind of funding are we dealing with in the Ministry of Defense budget? In 2025, defense spending is set to rise to 1.53 trillion hryvnias, an increase of 366 billion compared to the previous year. Of that, just over 1 trillion is earmarked for the Armed Forces directly. 455 billion UAH is allocated for procurement and modernization of weapons and equipment. 54.5 billion UAH is designated for the development of the defense industry. Additionally, the government will allocate 500 million UAH to support affordable credit programs for defense manufacturers. In total, around 1.2 trillion UAH from this budget will go directly to supporting the Defense Forces meaning funds that will be used to directly sustain and equip frontline troops.
Roughly 500 billion hryvnias — that’s the amount expected to go toward weapons and combat equipment. And this is exactly where the biggest disputes arise. What does our leadership see? They see tens and hundreds of billions. And around them are businesspeople, contractors, lobbyists — all with their own projects, ambitions, and promises: "Give us billions, and we’ll deliver everything you need." The problem is, there’s no real expertise, no structured planning, no proper procurement process. Planning means you actually have a plan — someone writes at the beginning of the year: "We need this, this, and this type of equipment." Why? Not just because the General Staff says so, but because that equipment has proven itself in combat. There’s evidence, videos, battlefield statistics, after-action reports from unit commanders — proof of combat effectiveness. There should be a clear list of prioritized weapons systems, each with its role in the overall defense system, and each with confirmed wartime effectiveness. That’s how real defense budgeting works. Then, based on that plan, we see what’s scheduled, how much money is available, how much can be paid upfront, what guarantees can be issued. We align our needs with our finances. At the same time, we assess our actual production capabilities. The Ministry of Defense must carry out verification: "What we want — and what we can afford — is it even feasible?" Can it be delivered this year? In the coming months? Or will it have to wait till next year? Is it technologically realistic? Are quality standards in place? All of this needs to be checked — and right now, it’s not.
Only when all the components are in place — when there’s a clearly defined plan outlining what’s needed, when procurement priorities are set, when sufficient funding is allocated to meet that plan, and when production capabilities are verified and confirmed — only then can we say we have real, effective planning. That’s when defense funding, though limited, actually translates into results and the core needs of the Armed Forces are met, at least to a significant degree.
If none of that is in place — if there’s just a line of manufacturers all saying, "Give us money," and there’s no structured planning based on proven effectiveness, no financial analysis to match needs with resources, no verification of production capabilities — then what we have is total chaos. And where there’s chaos, there’s always corruption. Because without a clear plan, who ends up getting the money? The one who runs into Zelenskyy’s office, or Yermak’s and sometimes Umerov’s. It’s the person who manages to get access to the top, saying, "Look, I’ve got the best weapon, just fund me." And because they have connections, they get the approval — they get the money. It doesn’t matter if the product works, if it's defective, if it meets requirements or not. None of that is checked. The money goes where the access is. And the army pays the price.
So how does this actually work? Let me give you an example — because this is exactly where the chaos comes from. The chaos is a result of a system with no logic behind it. What I want to highlight is that Ivan Havryliuk was the only person in the Ministry of Defense who consistently tried to build even a basic planning structure — procurement planning, analysis of real needs, and the use of proven battlefield effectiveness. He tried. I’m not saying it was perfect but he was the only one doing it. Under Reznikov, there was no such system in the ministry at all. Under Umerov, at first, Havryliuk continued his work — holding weekly coordination meetings, setting procurement plans, managing processes. There was a clear, logical structure to how things were being handled. Then Havryliuk was sidelined. And Umerov said, "We’ll create a Defense Procurement Agency." They appointed good people there — anti-corruption experts — but people who had no understanding of defense procurement. They started from scratch, learning what ammunition is, what weapon systems are, who the suppliers are, and how the supply chain works. As a result, we got an agency that was supposed to be independent — but in practice, how could it be? There’s the Minister of Defense, the President’s Office — and that’s where the real planning decisions are made.
Let’s take a look at a segment from the interview with Maryna Bezrukova, the recently dismissed head of the Defense Procurement Agency — a piece that clearly shows where the planning actually happened. The interview was published on Censor.NET. Journalist Tetiana Nikolaienko did an excellent job in highlighting what followed after Bezrukova’s dismissal.
- When was the last time you met with Umerov? Where was it?
- In the Office of the President.
- Was the conflict discussed in the Office?
- I don’t know. I’m not involved in politics, honestly — I don’t have time to chase rumors. It was a working meeting about contracting challenges and problems. It was a constructive meeting.
So what does this tell us? That we have a Ministry of Defense, but weapons and ammunition contracts are being handled in the President’s Office. That’s where the Minister goes. That’s where the head of the Defense Procurement Agency goes — regularly. Bezrukova was in that role for just a few months, and by the end of the year, when procurement planning was supposed to begin, she was removed.
Now, instead of Bezrukova, Arsen Zhumadilov has taken over as the new head of the agency.
Arsen Zhumadilov is now the new head of the Defense Procurement Agency. After Bezrukova was removed and Zhumadilov was appointed, Ivan Havryliuk once again stepped in for about two months, trying to restore a planning system. During that time, Havryliuk held meetings where they outlined which types of weapons and in what quantities needed to be purchased over the year. They discussed why, how, and in what amount. There were scandals at those meetings — military commanders were invited, including leaders of different service branches, as well as manufacturers. There were open discussions, disputes, and arguments. But it was the only place where any kind of real dialogue took place — where someone was actually trying to figure out how to plan weapons procurement and set priorities. And now, just like that — Havryliuk is removed again, and Zhumadilov takes over.
Who is Arsen Zhumadilov? He’s someone who, once again, has zero experience in weapons and ammunition procurement. Previously, he worked in procurement at the Ministry of Health. After that, he was brought into the Defense Ministry’s procurement department. But weapons and ammunition procurement is a field with its own specific demands. These aren’t regular market goods. This isn’t something you put on Prozorro or stock on a supermarket shelf. In wartime, this is a manufacturing process that requires constant adaptation and updates — changing contract terms, modifying technical specifications, adjusting quality, quantities, and funding. It’s continuous because the war evolves rapidly. Can someone who has never had any real connection to this kind of work possibly handle such a complex process?
There was one person actually doing the job — Havryliuk — and now he’s been completely pushed out. Why is he being removed? There is only one answer - money. Money, money, the desire to divide money instead of thinking. And what does this chaos and corruption lead to? Now there will be intermediaries circling around Bezrukova, Bezrukova— already forgotten, she was non-factor. She didn’t even have time to learn the basics. She wasn’t from the defense sector, had no plan, no structure. She needed time to learn. They took planning away from Havryliuk and handed it to her. Then they stripped her of funding, which was redirected to the State Border Guard Service. Then Havryliuk returned. And now he’s been completely dismissed again. Zhumadilov. Yet another person with no background, a newcomer from the street, who will now spend an entire financial year saying, "Sorry, I’m just learning." And what can you ask from him like that? He doesn’t know anything. He’s learning — and the government will once again tell us: "You see, we just don’t have the right people." Contract terms, procurement decisions, all of it — it’s handled there. Five or six managers sitting in the President’s Office think they’re experts in everything. They don’t see operational needs — they see where the money is. And they know how to "distribute" it to the right people and the right companies. That’s the core of the problem. At the start of every financial year, the priority is to assign contracts and funds to their own firms, their own people, and their own vision. And where does this kind of policy lead?
All of this, of course, is approved by decisions made at the highest level — by the Supreme Commander’s Staff. This is Zelenskyy and Yermak, who are in control of the entire process. Umerov is Yermak’s man — and everything flows from there. The disorder, the corruption, the preference for chaos over order — that’s where it originates. Anyone who tries to impose structure, like Havryliuk, gets removed. That’s the absurd reality — but it’s also our day-to-day practice. So what happens next? How does this actually function?
A clear example is the production of artillery shells and mortar rounds in Ukraine. Let’s start by looking at how the authorized agency — specifically, the Minister for Strategic Industries, Herman Smetanin — is planning ammunition manufacturing. In a recent interview, he spoke about it with striking honesty, almost like a Soviet-era Komsomol leader. Thus, Smetanin advocated for long-term contracting with Ukrainian manufacturers. "Do you realize that in 2024, the plant produced several times more than in 2023?" he said. "My logic is to issue a two-year contract — not abroad, but to keep it within Ukraine," the minister emphasized. "The plant says, ‘We can produce around 50,000 rounds next year.’ Then I ask, ‘What about 2026?’ And they say, ‘Well, maybe — if we work hard — 75,000 to 100,000.’ So I go to the Ministry of Defense and say, ‘Sign a contract for 150,000.’ That way, I’ll force the plant to make not 50,000, but 70,000. Force them. To produce more than they say they can," the minister stated.
The guy is 32 years old — can you believe it? He’s forcing factories, through sheer willpower, to produce more. Just like that — gave the order, and it happened. Well, you’re a real communist, like in that old joke. And then the machine gun started rattling. Let’s finish the quote. Smetanin stated that he forces factories to produce more than they want to. In November and December, media outlets and civil society representatives repeatedly reported problems faced by the military due to the use of 122mm mortar rounds. That particular quote — about forcing the factories — specifically referred to the production of those mortars.
Let’s take a look at how the chaos and disorder in defense procurement, created by the authorities, lead to losses and directly impact what’s happening on the front line. There’s no money. The United States isn’t providing it. Europe isn’t either. So what is the Ukrainian government doing with the money it squeezes out of domestic industries into the state budget? What’s going on there? Well, here’s what’s happening. I’ve already done several broadcasts on this issue — on the delivery of faulty mortars produced in Ukraine.
What happened? In 2024, the Ministry for Strategic Industries — namely Herman Smetanin and his predecessor Oleksandr Kamyshin, who is now an advisor to President Volodymyr Zelensky — made a top-down decision that one of the state-owned enterprises under the Ministry should begin producing 122mm artillery shells. They approached Maryna Bezrukova at the Defense Procurement Agency. However, the Agency — and Bezrukova personally — clearly lacked the necessary understanding of this process. She had no expertise and was unable to conduct an assessment of the plant’s production capacity. Still, they pushed through an informal verbal agreement with Bezrukova to allocate 10 billion UAH for the supply of 122mm shells. This is the same plant Smetanin referenced in his interview — the one that had produced nothing in 2023, and was suddenly told, "Start manufacturing." And, for some reason, the plant accepted this obligation. In reality, this isn’t something that can be done just like that. The plant was supposed to sign a capability statement — a verification document confirming whether it had the means to produce such munitions. That includes checking for components, technologies, specialists, and the actual production capacity. The plant initially refused to sign it. But after some behind-the-scenes talks, it signed a few weeks later. The Strategic Industries Minister then received 10 billion UAH from the Defense Procurement Agency, under Bezrukova’s leadership. The funds were transferred. The decision was formalized by top-level approval — the General Staff and the Office of the President were aware and gave the green light. They lobbied for it. But the only official signature on the document belonged to Bezrukova. The plant then ostensibly began production. But what happened next? In 2024, the plant, which had never manufactured such shells, failed to launch production. During testing, none of the shells functioned properly. As a result, the 10 billion UAH allocated for mass production was not utilized by the end of the year.
At that point, Maryna Bezrukova, realizing the extent of her responsibility, raised the issue that the funds had to be returned. And so, the plant which had spent an entire year holding and using the money earmarked for mass production that never materialized, simply returned the funds to the Defense Procurement Agency at the end of the year. So, what actually happened? A state-owned enterprise held nearly 10 billion UAH on its accounts for almost a year, funds intended for armaments for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Had this money been spent at the beginning of the year to procure ammunition from manufacturers that actually had production capacity, the situation would have been entirely different. The military would have received ammunition. But instead, it received nothing. And by year’s end, the funds were simply returned to the state budget. Instead of shells and mortar shells arriving to kill the enemy, all that came back was the money. Minister Smetanin, in his interview, claimed that this was a way to stimulate production. But in this case, that simply did not happen. Rather than allocating funds for research and development and then launching serial production of the shells, the money was immediately transferred to the enterprise’s account. The enterprise lacked production capabilities. These capabilities were falsified. In fact, in this very interview, Smetanin effectively testifies against himself. And after that, the entire program quietly failed.
So what does the Ministry for Strategic Industries do next, along with the same state-owned enterprise that took 10 billion UAH and failed to deliver any shells? You won’t believe it. They receive another state contract. This time, for the production of 120mm and 82mm mortar shells. And this same plant commits to producing 1.3 million mortar shells in a single year — including 500,000 rounds of 120mm mortar shells.
What happens with these mortar shells? I’ve shown videos many times, but the result of this scandal is Smetanin’s second interview, in which he admits that a large portion of these mortar shells are faulty. Minister Smetanin stated that around 10% of the faulty mortar shells delivered to the front line have already been replaced. A total of 15 batches, amounting to 54,000 rounds, were recalled and returned to the manufacturer for rework. At the same time, he said, another 32,000 mortars were delivered in accordance with the supply schedule. What does this tell us? Just imagine that.
So what was actually delivered? According to our data, this state-owned enterprise under the Ministry for Strategic Industries delivered 200,000 mortar rounds to the military. They failed to meet the production target set by Minister Smetanin. They received about 17 billion UAH for this production. In total, the enterprise received approximately 19 billion UAH for the manufacturing of all these mortar rounds. Instead of producing 500,000 120mm mortar rounds, they delivered only about 200,000. And of those 200,000, according to the minister himself, 57,000 were defective, meaning more than a quarter of the total batch.
These were defective rounds. And I want to emphasize — in reality, the majority of these mortar rounds were defective overall. Those 15 batches were simply the ones for which principled unit commanders officially filed complaints. Most of the mortar rounds were not subject to formal complaints because, on the front line, any type of ammunition gets used — even if not for its intended purpose. So these mortar rounds were disassembled, modified, and their fuzes were reinforced. In reality, nearly the entire batch was defective.
This is a criminal case. Of course, in our country, criminal proceedings are opened for everything. In 2024, 25 billion UAH were allocated to two state-owned enterprises under this mortar round program. Once again, capability statements were involved. And initially, the plant — the same one that failed the 122mm shell program — refused to sign the capability statement confirming its ability to produce this volume of mortar rounds. And then, two weeks later, it signed. Again. It’s absurd. Under pressure from the minister, they signed the document. The minister presented this decision at the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief meeting, and it was approved by the Commander-in-Chief, President Zelenskyy. The decision was formalized. This is how Kamyshin and Smetanin used Zelenskyy as cover.
So what actually happened? They funneled the money once again into the same plant — the one that had just misappropriated 10 billion UAH. They pushed funds into mortar production. And once again, the money wasn’t fully spent. It now needs to be returned — again. But the plant and the Ministry for Strategic Industries, in order to avoid having zero funds in their bank accounts and to offset the losses they themselves caused the state. Because if the state were to formally deduct those losses, the enterprise would be left with nothing. And then it would become clear that Smetanin’s grand "Pioneers and Komsomol" production plans were pure nonsense.
What Smetanin and Kamyshin did – a corrupt crime. A crime against the state. Instead of delivering ammunition, they delivered defective products. And only thanks to the support of Umerov and the Ministry of Defense were these mortar rounds not discarded and they themselves not imprisoned. The scandal was contained, and the authorities kept it hidden. Instead of spending this money on real, high-quality ammunition or on providing those plants with proper equipment and components, or allocating funds for R&D they pushed through mass production. Why not make quality ammunition first, and only then start large-scale manufacturing? First, give them the equipment, the components, the fuzes, the gunpowder. Then assign them a production plan. But no. The conversation was about something entirely different.
They want to funnel the money into the "right" enterprise first, run it through their cycle, and keep it in constant circulation — all without being held accountable. They don’t care about the results. Neither Smetanin nor Kamyshin has ever been to the front. This is not their concern. And Umerov hasn’t been there either. They simply do not care about what’s happening with the military’s ammunition supply. These are completely irresponsible individuals with a criminal attitude — for whom money and personal comfort in their official chairs matter far more than providing ammunition to the army. And this situation doesn’t interest the Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief either. That’s what really happened.
25 billion. Once again — who approved it? It was signed by Maryna Bezrukova. There is no signature from the Minister of Defense, no one else. No expert institution involved. No one took responsibility. They just found a woman and told her — sign it. And hers is the only signature under those 25 billion UAH allocated for faulty mortar rounds. Only after complaints started coming in about these mortars did Bezrukova respond — and to her credit, she wrote back honestly, saying: return the funds, replace the defective rounds, this is unacceptable, you must fix it. But by then it was too late — the money had already gone through. And what’s happening now? You wouldn’t believe it if I told you.
After all this — after the Ministry for Strategic Industries and these so-called "Komsomol" figures like Smetanin and Kamyshin, who are criminally mishandling state funds — they’re not in prison. They’re not under investigation. They’re not giving statements to law enforcement. They’re not in pre-trial detention for their criminal actions. No. They’re still planning weapons procurement — using the exact same corrupt scheme. And once again, the same enterprise that already failed to produce 122mm, 120mm, and 82mm munitions… has now received another 10 billion UAH for the production of 155mm shells. No one learns anything. No objections matter. They keep pouring money into a plant with no production capacity — where every contract has already failed. And yet again, the documents are signed. Bezrukova approved it, and now it’s being executed by Zhumadilov.
These people are simply insane. People with criminal tendencies. Because this can’t just be explained by saying that Zelenskyy — being an artist — doesn’t understand what’s going on. First of all, he’s been an "artist in power" for six years already. Second, everyone they appoint keeps making the same mistakes — with complete impunity. Tens of billions are being diverted — not to procure ammunition as the budget mandates — but to fund some absurd projects that Kamyshin and Smetanin later tell about in the media. They clearly have no understanding of what planning is. What manufacturing is. They clearly have no idea what planning or manufacturing actually means — and that you can’t just produce ammunition with a "stop–go" approach. It’s a technological process that depends on having the right explosives, the proper fuzes, the casting equipment, the filling compounds. These are basic things. The design of a mortar round hasn’t changed since 1917. It hasn’t evolved in a hundred years. It’s a simple process, it’s well known, the technology exists.
This isn’t happening because there's a desire to do stupid things: to appoint intellectually immature people to public office, to place absolute amateurs in key positions — people with no connection to the field, no sense of professional or moral responsibility, and who are willing to sign whatever they’re yelled at to approve.
Now they’ve put Zhumadilov in charge — and honestly, the man knows nothing about this field. What can you even expect from him? He’s a zero. He sits there reading up on the most basic things — the kind of knowledge he should already have just by holding this position. And yet, he doesn’t. And so the cycle continues.
Now, in the second year in a row, billions have once again been pumped into the same state enterprise. And you’ll see — I will be reporting on it — the result of this 155mm shell production will be another complete failure. Because where two contracts have already failed, the third one is guaranteed to fail too. And those people sitting in Kyiv — recording videos, giving interviews, making public appearances — they act with impunity. And why do they act with impunity? Because it’s a profit scheme. That’s all it is.
This is just a money-draining scheme. And that is exactly why we lack ammunition. Because instead of planning, accountability, and oversight — we have people sitting around pointing fingers, then going on interviews and making up total nonsense. There’s a war going on. We have private manufacturers in Ukraine — several enterprises producing high-quality mortar rounds. We also have foreign suppliers delivering high-quality mortar rounds that our troops actually need. But instead, these boys brag about pumping tens of billions of hryvnias into projects — just because they feel like it. They call it "expanding production capacity." But they have no understanding of what planning actually means. That’s the core of the problem. And that, my friends, is why we’re dealing with all of this.
Thank you for joining this broadcast. We’ll be covering these stories — and these issues — in much more detail in future segments. Thank you for being with us. Glory to Ukraine!
